A fourth seam, for the caller that spawns no process - #66
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The shim decides by argv[0], and that holds for exactly as long as publishing means running a command. An agent reaching a forge through an MCP server sends a pull-request body over HTTPS from inside its own process: no command, no argv[0], no link to install, and every rule that reads a published string sees nothing. Not because one was disabled, but because all of them are reached from a seam that needs a process to have been spawned first. `uphold hook <harness>` is that seam without the process. The harness hands over the pending call as JSON on stdin and reads a verdict back, and the rules consulted are the ones `scan --text` and `guard --text` consult, through the same functions rather than a second reading of them. Three decisions worth naming, because none was obvious: COULD-NOT-LOOK IS THE ORDINARY CASE HERE. Every other seam requires a policy and exits 2 without one, which is right when a git hook runs in the repository whose policy applies by construction. A tool call is made from wherever the session started, and that is frequently a superproject whose policy is not borrowed, a scratch directory, or a checkout with no policy at all. Refusing there would block routine work everywhere and get the matcher deleted within a day; passing silently would report an unknown as a pass. So the halves split by what each needs: the host-identity rules run anyway, carrying the fallback `scan --text` already documents for this case, and the guards do not run and say so on stderr. THE EXIT CODE IS NOT UPHOLD'S TO CHOOSE. Claude Code reads a refusal out of a JSON document on stdout and treats a non-zero status as a failure of the hook rather than a verdict on the call, so exiting 1 to mean refused would let the body through with a complaint attached. The refusal travels in the document and is printed to stderr as well. Exit 2 keeps its meaning for the two failures that are uphold's own: a harness this binary does not describe, and an event that is not JSON. THE FIELD NAMES ARE NOT A LIST. Every string under the input pointer is read, at any depth. A server decides what to call the field holding a body, and a table of those names is a table missing the one a new server just added, silently and in the green direction. Which calls arrive is the harness's own matcher. A second one here would be free to disagree with the first. Refs #63
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📝 WalkthroughWalkthroughThe change adds ChangesClaude Code hook enforcement
Estimated code review effort: 4 (Complex) | ~45 minutes Merge Risk: 🟡 Moderate · up to The new hook can treat missing or non-object tool_input as a clean call, allowing malformed requests to bypass policy checks instead of returning its documented failure. Merge should wait for field validation and corresponding exit-2 tests. Sequence Diagram(s)sequenceDiagram
participant ClaudeCode
participant UpholdCLI
participant HookRun
participant TextFailures
ClaudeCode->>UpholdCLI: Send JSON tool-call event
UpholdCLI->>HookRun: Run claude-code hook
HookRun->>TextFailures: Check extracted strings
TextFailures-->>HookRun: Return failures
HookRun-->>UpholdCLI: Return refusal JSON or clean result
UpholdCLI-->>ClaudeCode: Write stdout JSON and stderr report
🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 5✅ Passed checks (5 passed)
✨ Finishing Touches📝 Generate docstrings
🧪 Generate unit tests (beta)
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## main #66 +/- ##
==========================================
+ Coverage 89.81% 89.88% +0.07%
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Files 32 33 +1
Lines 10161 10305 +144
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Actionable comments posted: 1
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Inline comments:
In `@src/hook.rs`:
- Around line 194-200: Update the Claude Code event handling around
event.pointer and the collected.is_empty() check to validate that /tool_name is
a string and /tool_input is a present object before processing. Return
Exit::Fatal with field-specific evidence for missing or invalid fields, and
preserve Exit::Clean only for a valid object containing no strings. Add tests
covering missing and non-object tool_input, asserting both exit with status 2.
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Cargo.tomlREADME.mddocs/REFERENCE.mdsrc/hook.rssrc/main.rssrc/text.rstests/hook_cli.rs
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An event carrying nothing where the subject pointer says it should be exited 0 and said nothing. The JSON parses, the run ends, and what the call was about to send was never read -- which is what a harness renaming its field looks like from here, and it is the failure this module already refuses one level up, where an event that is not JSON exits 2 rather than passing. Reporting it as clean would leave the seam switched off at the version the harness changed, with nothing in any tree to show it. It exits 2 now, and the report names the pointer that found nothing. What is deliberately NOT part of this, because both would refuse calls this seam has no finding about: A subject that is present and holds no strings stays clean. A call carrying only numbers and flags publishes no text there is a rule about; it was read, and it passed. A subject that is a bare string rather than an object stays checked, because that is text and text is what every rule here judges. The question is whether the subject was FOUND, never what shape the harness chose for it. A missing label stays allowed. The label decides one word in the report and nothing else conditions on it, so an event without one is checked exactly as thoroughly with the harness name in its place. Refusing over a field that cannot change a verdict is a gate firing on work it had no finding about, and `psychological-acceptability` says what happens to a gate like that on a path traversed many times a day. Three tests, one per arm: the missing subject exits 2 and names the pointer, the bare-string subject is still refused on its content, and the unlabelled event is still refused on its content. Reported by CodeRabbit on #66, which also asked for the two arms above.
Closes #63.
The shim decides by
argv[0], and that holds for exactly as long as publishingmeans running a command. An agent reaching a forge through an MCP server sends a
pull-request body over HTTPS from inside its own process: no command, no
argv[0], no link to install, andprevent-ai-author, theprivate-namesguards and the
credentialsrules read nothing.uphold hook <harness>is that seam without the process. The harness hands overthe pending call as JSON on stdin and reads a verdict back, and the rules
consulted are the ones
scan --textandguard --textconsult -- through thesame functions, because a literal a commit message is refused for and a tool
call is allowed for would be two rules wearing one id.
The three decisions, none of them obvious
Could-not-look is the ordinary case at this seam. Every other seam requires
a policy and exits 2 without one, which is right when a git hook runs in the
repository whose policy applies by construction. A tool call is made from
wherever the session started: a superproject whose policy is deliberately not
borrowed, a scratch directory, a checkout with no
policy/at all. Refusingthere blocks routine work everywhere and gets the matcher deleted;
psychological-acceptabilitynames that decay. Passing silently reports anunknown as a pass, which
explicit-unknownrefuses. So the halves split by whateach needs -- the host-identity rules run anyway, carrying the fallback
scan --textalready documents for exactly this case, and the guards do not runand say so on stderr.
The exit code is not uphold's to choose. Claude Code reads a refusal out of a
JSON document on stdout and treats a non-zero status as a failure of the hook
rather than a verdict on the call, so exiting 1 to mean refused would let the
body through with a complaint attached. The refusal travels in the document and
is printed to stderr as well, so a person running this by hand reads the report.
Exit 2 keeps its meaning for the two failures that are uphold's own: a harness
this binary does not describe, and an event that is not JSON.
The field names are not a list. Every string under the input pointer is
read, at any depth. A server decides what to call the field holding a body, and
a table of those names is a table missing the one a new server just added --
silently, and in the green direction.
Scope kept
would be free to disagree with it.
document, where the report goes inside it, and the code that harness reads as
blocked. A name the table does not carry is refused and the known ones are
listed, because none of those five values is derivable from a name.
CI step and a script, whatever launched them; the hook reaches every transport
a harness can make and none of it when the harness is a different one. Neither
contains the other.
Tests
tests/hook_cli.rs, eight cases, all through the binary because the contract iswhat the harness sees: the refusal is a document on stdout at exit 0, a clean
call is silent, the identity rules still refuse without a policy and the reduced
coverage is stated, an unknown harness and a malformed event are both exit 2 and
neither is a pass, a string under a field name nothing has heard of is still
read, and a call carrying no text is allowed without looking further.
Three unit tests in
src/hook.rscover the one thing the refusal document mustsurvive: the text that caused it, quotes and newlines included.
Full suite green, clippy clean under the crate's lint profile,
prek run --all-filespasses including this repository's own content policy, guards andenforcement claims.
Summary by CodeRabbit
New Features
uphold hook claude-codecommand for evaluating pending tool calls from JSON input.Bug Fixes
Chores