Security: Build-time remote code download lacks integrity verification#2229
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The `url:` import mechanism downloads arbitrary remote JavaScript and bundles it into the extension build. This creates a supply-chain risk if the remote source is compromised or unexpectedly changed, since no checksum/signature verification is enforced before inclusion. Affected files: download.ts Signed-off-by: tuanaiseo <221258316+tuanaiseo@users.noreply.github.com>
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@tuanaiseo How it's possible to make supply-chain attack on this code, without sha? |
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Problem
The
url:import mechanism downloads arbitrary remote JavaScript and bundles it into the extension build. This creates a supply-chain risk if the remote source is compromised or unexpectedly changed, since no checksum/signature verification is enforced before inclusion.Severity:
mediumFile:
packages/wxt/src/core/builders/vite/plugins/download.tsSolution
Require integrity metadata (e.g., SHA-256) for
url:imports, verify content hash before caching/bundling, and optionally enforce an allowlist of approved domains.Changes
packages/wxt/src/core/builders/vite/plugins/download.ts(modified)Testing