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Security: stackables/bridge

Security

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SECURITY.md

Security Policy

Security is a top priority for us, especially since The Bridge functions as an egress gateway handling sensitive context (like API keys) and routing HTTP traffic.

Supported Versions

Package Version Supported Notes
@stackables/bridge 2.x.x ✅ Umbrella package — recommended for most users
@stackables/bridge-core 1.x.x ✅ Execution engine
@stackables/bridge-parser 1.x.x ✅ Parser & language service
@stackables/bridge-compiler 2.x.x ⚠️ AOT compiler — pre-stable, API may change
@stackables/bridge-stdlib 1.x.x ✅ Standard library tools (httpCall, strings, arrays)
@stackables/bridge-graphql 1.x.x ✅ GraphQL schema adapter
@stackables/bridge-types 1.x.x ✅ Shared type definitions
bridge-syntax-highlight 1.x.x ✅ VS Code extension

Security patches are applied to the latest minor/patch of each supported major version.

Reporting a Vulnerability

Please do not report security vulnerabilities through public GitHub issues or discussions.

If you discover a security vulnerability within The Bridge, please report it at https://github.com/stackables/bridge/security

Please include the following in your report:

  • A description of the vulnerability and its impact.
  • Steps to reproduce the issue (a minimal .bridge file and GraphQL query is highly appreciated).
  • Any potential mitigation or fix you might suggest.

We will acknowledge receipt of your vulnerability report within 48 hours and strive to send you regular updates about our progress.

Scope & Threat Model

For a comprehensive analysis of trust boundaries, attack surfaces, and mitigations across all packages, see our full Security Threat Model.

Because The Bridge evaluates .bridge files and executes HTTP requests, we are particularly interested in reports concerning:

  • Credential Leakage: Bugs that could cause secrets injected via context to be exposed in unauthorized logs, traces, or unmapped GraphQL responses.
  • Engine Escapes / RCE: Vulnerabilities where a malicious .bridge file or dynamic input could break out of the engine sandbox and execute arbitrary code on the host. This includes the AOT compiler (bridge-compiler) which uses new AsyncFunction() for code generation.
  • SSRF (Server-Side Request Forgery): Unexpected ways dynamic input could manipulate the httpCall tool to query internal network addresses not explicitly defined in the .bridge topology.
  • Prototype Pollution: Bypasses of the UNSAFE_KEYS blocklist (__proto__, constructor, prototype) in setNested, applyPath, or lookupToolFn.
  • Cache Poisoning: Cross-tenant data leakage through the httpCall response cache.
  • Playground Abuse: Vulnerabilities in the browser-based playground or share API that could lead to data exfiltration or resource exhaustion.

Out of Scope:

  • Hardcoding API keys directly into .bridge files or GraphQL schemas and committing them to version control. (This is a user configuration error, not an engine vulnerability.)
  • Writing bridge files that send sensitive info from the context to a malicious server deliberately. (Writing insecure instructions is not a framework vulnerability.)
  • GraphQL query depth / complexity attacks — these must be mitigated at the GraphQL server layer (Yoga/Apollo), not within The Bridge engine.

There aren’t any published security advisories