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feat(cli): add --gateway-insecure flag to skip TLS certificate verification - #2

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feat(cli): add --gateway-insecure flag to skip TLS certificate verification#2
sjenning wants to merge 142 commits into
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feat/insecure-gateway

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@sjenning sjenning commented May 6, 2026

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Summary

Add --gateway-insecure flag and OPENSHELL_GATEWAY_INSECURE environment variable to skip TLS certificate verification when connecting to gateways. Useful for development environments with self-signed certificates.

Related Issue

N/A

Changes

  • Added --gateway-insecure global CLI flag with OPENSHELL_GATEWAY_INSECURE env var support
  • Added gateway_insecure field to TlsOptions struct
  • Implemented InsecureServerCertVerifier that bypasses TLS certificate validation
  • Implemented InsecureTlsConnector using tower::Service for custom TLS handling
  • Updated build_channel() and http_health_check() to use insecure TLS when flag is set
  • Added integration test cli_connects_with_gateway_insecure
  • Enabled http2 feature on hyper-rustls for HTTP/2 support
  • Added tower dependency

Testing

  • mise run pre-commit passes
  • Unit tests added/updated (integration test added)
  • E2E tests added/updated (if applicable)

Checklist

  • Follows Conventional Commits
  • Commits are signed off (DCO)
  • Architecture docs updated (if applicable)

mjamiv and others added 30 commits April 15, 2026 09:02
)

`git describe --tags --long --match "v*"` matches the `vm-dev` tag
alongside release tags. When `vm-dev` sits on or past the latest
release tag in the commit graph (currently the case on main), git
picks it, and the resulting `vm-dev-N-gSHA` string strips the leading
`v` down to `m-dev-N-gSHA`. With `commits == 0` that's returned
verbatim, producing a binary that reports itself as `m-dev`:

    $ openshell --version
    openshell m-dev

Confirmed on v0.0.28 (NVIDIA#832) and reproduced on v0.0.29 as well.

Restrict the glob to numeric release tags (`v[0-9]*`). All release
tags follow `v\d+\.\d+\.\d+`, so this loses no valid version — it
only filters out `vm-dev`, `vm-prod`, and any similar non-release
tags that share the `v` prefix.

Verified locally on this repo's current HEAD:

    # before
    $ git describe --tags --long --match 'v*'
    vm-dev-0-g355d845
    # after
    $ git describe --tags --long --match 'v[0-9]*'
    v0.0.29-2-g355d845

Closes NVIDIA#832

Signed-off-by: mjamiv <michael.commack@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com>
…ns (NVIDIA#862)

The proxy's upstream TLS client only trusted Mozilla root CAs
(webpki-roots), which prevented TLS termination from working with
internal/corporate hosts using private CA certificates.

Load system CA certificates from the container's trust store
(e.g. /etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt) in addition to
webpki-roots. This allows custom sandbox images to include
corporate CAs via update-ca-certificates.

Signed-off-by: Matthias Osswald <mat.osswald@sap.com>
Each RFC now lives in its own folder (rfc/NNNN-short-name/) with
README.md as the main proposal. This gives each RFC room for diagrams,
images, and other supporting files without cluttering the top level.

Move 0000-template into the new layout and update rfc/README.md to
describe the convention.
…VIDIA#869)

* fix(sandbox): block AF_NETLINK in seccomp unconditionally

Move AF_NETLINK to the unconditional socket-domain block list alongside
AF_PACKET, AF_BLUETOOTH, and AF_VSOCK. Previously it was only blocked in
NetworkMode::Block, leaving it accessible in Proxy mode where network
namespace isolation already scopes netlink to the sandbox's own veth —
making this a defense-in-depth hardening rather than a live exposure.

Closes OS-94

* fix(sandbox): scope inference.local interception to port 443

The pre-OPA interception for inference.local matched on hostname alone,
allowing any port to bypass OPA policy evaluation — including under
deny-all (network_policies: {}). Add a port check so only port 443
takes the interception path; all other ports on inference.local now
fall through to OPA and are subject to normal policy evaluation.

Closes OS-95

* fix(sandbox): enforce RLIMIT_NPROC to prevent fork bomb DoS

Set a hard limit of 512 processes per UID in harden_child_process(),
applied before privilege drop so the sandbox user cannot raise it.
Prevents unrestricted fork() from exhausting the process table — most
relevant for local dev mode where K8s pod cgroup pids.max is absent.

Closes OS-96

* chore(sandbox): fix rustfmt formatting for seccomp blocked_domains

---------

Co-authored-by: John Myers <johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com>
* docs: fix TOC structure

* docs: fix wrong section title

* remove Home

* fix(fern): properly add the landing page
…es (NVIDIA#868)

* docs: refresh user-facing docs for recent sandbox and inference changes

- architecture: document system CA loading for upstream TLS, `tls: skip`
  as the opt-out, gateway state persistence across restarts, and OCSF
  structured logging surface.
- inference: document per-provider header allowlist, Authorization
  stripping, 120s streaming idle tolerance, and extended-thinking
  timeout guidance.
- manage-sandboxes: add "Execute a Command in a Sandbox" section for
  `openshell sandbox exec` with flag reference.
- security best practices: expand seccomp denylist (unconditional and
  conditional blocks), document two-phase Landlock probe, High-severity
  `landlock-unavailable` finding, and inference keep-alive closure.
- observability logging: document port in HTTP log URLs, `[reason:...]`
  denial suffixes, proxy 403/502 JSON error bodies, and Landlock
  CONFIG:ENABLED/CONFIG:OTHER events.

Signed-off-by: Miyoung Choi <miyoungc@nvidia.com>

* docs(architecture): tighten high-level architecture page

Trim implementation detail (CA bundle paths, deprecated TLS keys, SSH
handshake secret) from the high-level architecture page, fix accuracy
issues surfaced during deep audit, and expand uncommon acronyms on first
mention.

- Drop unsupported "cost-based routing" claim from Privacy Router row.
- Replace "brokers requests across the platform" with auth-boundary
  description.
- Add "inference" to Policy Engine constraint list per AGENTS.md.
- Expand Deny rule to include SSRF, blocked control-plane port, and L7
  deny paths in addition to deny-by-default.
- Switch Allow/Deny labels from hyphen to colon; remove em dashes and a
  double space.
- Expand LLM, SSRF, L7, TLS, CA, PEM, SSH, OCSF, and JSONL on first use.

Signed-off-by: Miyoung Choi <miyoungc@nvidia.com>
Made-with: Cursor

* docs: address audit feedback on refresh PR

- observability/logging: rewrite the allowed_ips paragraph after the
  Denial Reasons table; the previous wording said authors "can use"
  invalid entries while also stating they were rejected, which was
  contradictory and conflated load-time validation with the runtime
  per-CONNECT denial phrases the section documents.
- about/architecture: split compound sentences in the new Gateway
  Lifecycle and Observability sections so each clause stands alone.
- inference/about: drop the streaming-tolerance sentence from the prose
  paragraph since the dedicated Streaming reliability table row already
  covers it.

Signed-off-by: Miyoung Choi <miyoungc@nvidia.com>
Made-with: Cursor

* docs(architecture): address review feedback on architecture page

- Drop the Privacy Router row from the Components table; it is not
  yet a separately exposed customer-facing component.
- Update the page description and intro count to match the remaining
  three components (gateway, sandbox, policy engine).
- Split the policy decision into the three modes that the engine
  actually implements: Explicit Deny (deny rules and hardening rules,
  takes precedence), Allow, and Implicit Deny (no rule matched).

Signed-off-by: Miyoung Choi <miyoungc@nvidia.com>
Made-with: Cursor

* docs(architecture): convert policy decisions to a table

Promote the three policy decisions (Explicit Deny, Allow, Implicit
Deny) to a top-level table with Decision, When it applies, and
Outcome columns instead of a nested bulleted list under list item 5.
Top-level tables render reliably across markdown renderers, where
nested-in-list tables do not.

Signed-off-by: Miyoung Choi <miyoungc@nvidia.com>
Made-with: Cursor

* docs: repharse a bit

---------

Signed-off-by: Miyoung Choi <miyoungc@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Mrunal Patel <mrunalp@gmail.com>
… paths (NVIDIA#844)

* fix(sandbox): strip " (deleted)" suffix from unlinked /proc/<pid>/exe paths

When a running binary is unlinked from its filesystem path — the common
case is a `docker cp` hot-swap of `/opt/openshell/bin/openshell-sandbox`
during the `cluster-deploy-fast` dev upgrade workflow — the Linux kernel
appends the literal string ` (deleted)` to the `/proc/<pid>/exe` readlink
target. The tainted `PathBuf` then flows into `collect_ancestor_binaries`
and on into `BinaryIdentityCache::verify_or_cache`, which tries to
`std::fs::metadata` the path. `stat()` fails with `ENOENT` because the
literal suffix isn't a real filesystem path, and the CONNECT proxy denies
every outbound request with:

    ancestor integrity check failed for \
      /opt/openshell/bin/openshell-sandbox (deleted): \
      Failed to stat ...: No such file or directory (os error 2)

Reproduced in production 2026-04-15: a cluster-deploy-fast-style hot-swap
of the supervisor binary caused every pod whose PID 1 held the now-deleted
inode to deny ALL outbound CONNECTs (slack.com, registry.npmjs.org,
169.254.169.254, etc.), breaking Slack REST delivery, npm installs, and
IMDS probes simultaneously. Existing pre-hot-swap TCP tunnels (e.g. Slack
Socket Mode WSS) kept working because they never re-evaluate the proxy.

Strip the suffix in `binary_path()` so downstream callers see the clean,
grep-friendly path. This aligns the cache key and log messages with the
original on-disk location.

Note: stripping the suffix does NOT by itself make the identity cache
tolerant of a legitimate binary replacement — `verify_or_cache` will now
`stat` and hash whatever currently lives at the stripped path, which is
the NEW binary, and surface a clearer `Binary integrity violation` error.
Fully unblocking the cluster-deploy-fast hot-swap workflow needs a
follow-up that either (a) reads running-binary content from
`/proc/<pid>/exe` directly via `File::open` (procfs resolves this to the
live in-memory executable even when the original inode has been unlinked),
or (b) keys the identity cache by exec dev+inode instead of path. Happy to
send that as a separate PR once the approach is decided — filing this
narrow fix first because it stands on its own: it fixes a concrete
misleading error and unblocks the obvious next step.

Added `binary_path_strips_deleted_suffix` test that copies `/bin/sleep`
to a temp path, spawns a child from it, unlinks the temp binary, verifies
the raw readlink contains the ` (deleted)` suffix, then asserts the public
API returns the stripped path.

Signed-off-by: mjamiv <michael.commack@gmail.com>

* fix(sandbox): narrow the " (deleted)" suffix strip and exercise it end-to-end

Address review feedback from @johntmyers on the initial version of this PR:

procfs::binary_path
- Only strip the kernel's " (deleted)" suffix when stat() on the raw
  readlink target reports NotFound. A live executable whose basename
  literally ends with " (deleted)" is now returned unchanged instead of
  being silently truncated, which matters because identity.rs hashes
  whatever this function returns as a trust anchor.
- Operate on raw bytes via OsStrExt, so filenames that are not valid
  UTF-8 still get exactly one suffix stripped. The previous
  strip_suffix-on-&str path skipped non-UTF-8 entirely and fell through
  to returning the tainted path.
- Expand the doc comment to describe both guardrails.

procfs tests
- binary_path_preserves_live_deleted_basename: copy /bin/sleep to a
  live file literally named "sleepy (deleted)", spawn it, and assert
  that the returned path still ends with " (deleted)".
- binary_path_strips_suffix_for_non_utf8_filename: exec a binary whose
  basename contains a 0xFF byte, unlink it, and assert that
  binary_path returns the stripped non-UTF-8 path. Writes the bytes
  with OpenOptions + sync_all + explicit drop so the write fd is fully
  released before exec() to avoid ETXTBSY under concurrent tests.

proxy: extract resolve_process_identity helper
- Pull the peer-resolution + TOFU verify + ancestor walk + cmdline
  collection block out of evaluate_opa_tcp into resolve_process_identity.
- Introduce IdentityError which carries the deny reason along with
  whatever partial identity data was resolved before the failure so
  evaluate_opa_tcp can thread that into ConnectDecision unchanged.
- evaluate_opa_tcp now calls the helper and proceeds straight to the
  OPA evaluate step; the surface visible to OPA and OCSF is unchanged.

proxy: end-to-end regression test for the hot-swap contract
- resolve_process_identity_surfaces_binary_integrity_violation_on_hot_swap
  stands up a real TcpListener, copies /bin/bash to a temp path,
  primes BinaryIdentityCache with that binary, spawns bash with a
  /dev/tcp one-liner that opens a real connection to the listener,
  and captures the peer's ephemeral port from accept().
- Simulates `docker cp` correctly: unlink the running binary (which
  persists via the child's exec mapping) and create a fresh file
  with different bytes at the same path. Writing in place is
  rejected by the kernel with ETXTBSY, so the old single-inode
  approach did not actually model the production failure mode.
- Asserts the error returned by resolve_process_identity contains
  "Binary integrity violation" (from BinaryIdentityCache) and does
  NOT contain "Failed to stat" or "(deleted)" — the pre-PR-NVIDIA#844
  failure mode. The binary field on the error is populated and is
  free of the tainted suffix.
- Skips cleanly if /bin/bash is not installed. Child process is
  always reaped before the assertion block so a failure does not
  leak a sleeping process.

---------

Signed-off-by: mjamiv <michael.commack@gmail.com>
* feat(policy): add incremental sandbox policy updates

Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com>

* docs(policies): expand incremental update guidance

Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(policy): audit incremental updates in gateway logs

* docs(policy): quote glob specs in shell examples

---------

Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com>
…#876)

The CLI and TUI build an SSH ProxyCommand string by interpolating fields
from CreateSshSessionResponse into a shell command. Three fields -
sandbox_id, token, and the assembled gateway_url (composed from
gateway_scheme, gateway_host, gateway_port, connect_path) - were not
passed through shell_escape, even though exe_command and gateway_name
were. The resulting string is handed to `ssh -o ProxyCommand=...` which
OpenSSH routes through `/bin/sh -c`, so a hostile or compromised gateway
could inject shell metacharacters and execute arbitrary commands under
the developer's workstation account.

- Add build_proxy_command in openshell-core::forward that wraps every
  interpolated value in shell_escape. Use it at all four ProxyCommand
  sites: openshell-cli/src/ssh.rs (ssh_session_config) and the three
  TUI sites in openshell-tui/src/lib.rs (shell connect, sandbox exec,
  port-forward reconciliation).
- Add validate_ssh_session_response in openshell-core::forward, called
  at each site immediately after response.into_inner(). Enforces a
  conservative charset per field (sandbox_id, token, gateway_host,
  gateway_scheme, gateway_port, connect_path, host_key_fingerprint) so
  malformed responses fail loudly at the gRPC trust boundary before
  shell escaping is attempted. Belt-and-suspenders with the escape.
- Harden render_ssh_config so `gateway` and `name` are shell-escaped
  even though validate_gateway_name currently gates `gateway`.
- Document the charset contract on CreateSshSessionResponse in
  proto/openshell.proto: servers must uphold these rules and clients
  reject responses that violate them.
- Add regression unit tests covering adversarial values in every field
  and a build_proxy_command test asserting no shell metacharacter
  remains outside single-quoted regions.

Tracks OS-100.
* fix(sandbox): apply supervisor seccomp prelude

Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(sandbox): delay supervisor prelude until bootstrap

---------

Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com>
…#880)

* feat(cli): Allow printing only the policy when retrieving sandbox info

* feat(cli): Indicate policy source and revision when retrieving sandboxes

* cargo fmt
…uation (NVIDIA#878)

* fix(sandbox): canonicalize HTTP request-targets before L7 policy evaluation

The L7 REST proxy evaluated OPA path rules against the raw request-target
and forwarded the raw header block byte-for-byte to the upstream. The
upstream normalized `..`, `%2e%2e`, and `//` before dispatching, so a
compromised agent inside the sandbox could bypass any path-based allow
rule by prefixing the blocked path with an allowed one (e.g.
`GET /public/../secret` matches `/public/**` at the proxy but the
upstream serves `/secret`). The inference-routing detection had the same
normalization gap via `normalize_inference_path`, which only stripped
scheme+authority and preserved dot-segments verbatim.

- Add `crates/openshell-sandbox/src/l7/path.rs` with
  `canonicalize_request_target`. Percent-decodes (with uppercase hex
  re-emission), resolves `.` / `..` segments per RFC 3986 5.2.4,
  collapses doubled slashes, strips trailing `;params`, rejects
  fragments / raw non-ASCII / control bytes / encoded slashes (unless
  explicitly enabled per-endpoint), and returns a `rewritten` flag so
  callers know when to rewrite the outbound request line.
- Wire the canonicalizer into `rest.rs::parse_http_request`. The
  canonical path is the `target` on `L7Request` that OPA sees, and
  when the canonical form differs from the raw input the request line
  is rebuilt in `raw_header` so the upstream dispatches on the exact
  bytes the policy evaluated.
- Canonicalize the forward (plain HTTP proxy) path at
  `proxy.rs`'s second L7 evaluation site. A non-canonical request-target
  is rejected with 400 Bad Request and an OCSF `NetworkActivity` Fail
  event rather than silently passed through.
- Replace the old `normalize_inference_path` body with a call to the
  canonicalizer. On canonicalization error the raw path is returned
  (so inference detection simply misses and the normal forward path
  handles and rejects).
- Document the invariant in `sandbox-policy.rego`: `input.request.path`
  is pre-canonicalized so rules must not attempt defensive matching
  against `..` or `%2e%2e`.
- Architecture doc (`architecture/sandbox.md`) lists the new module.
- 24 new unit tests cover dot segments, percent-encoded dot segments,
  double-slash collapse, encoded-slash reject/opt-in, null/control byte
  rejection, legitimate percent-encoded bytes round-tripping, mixed-case
  percent normalization, fragment rejection, absolute-form stripping,
  empty / length-bounded / non-ASCII handling, and regression payloads
  for the specific bypasses above.

Tracks OS-99.

* fix(sandbox): close forward-proxy parser-differential and wire allow_encoded_slash

Addresses two review findings on the L7 path canonicalization change.

1. `handle_forward_proxy` previously evaluated OPA on the canonical path
   but wrote the raw path to the upstream via `rewrite_forward_request`,
   leaving the parser-differential open for plain-HTTP forward-proxy
   traffic even though it was closed for the L7 tunnel path. `path` is
   now reassigned to the canonical form inside the L7 block before the
   outbound write, so the bytes dispatched to the upstream match what
   OPA evaluated. Covered by a new regression test against
   `rewrite_forward_request`.

2. `allow_encoded_slash` is now wired through the YAML policy schema,
   the proto `NetworkEndpoint` message, the Rego endpoint config, and
   the `L7EndpointConfig` → `RestProvider` canonicalization options.
   Operators can opt in per-endpoint for upstreams like GitLab that
   embed `%2F` in namespaced resource paths; the default remains
   strict. The `RestProvider` gains a constructor
   `RestProvider::with_options` so `relay_rest` constructs a provider
   with per-endpoint options while `relay_passthrough_with_credentials`
   retains strict defaults.

Integration tests:
- `parse_http_request_canonicalizes_target_and_rewrites_raw_header`
  drives a non-canonical request through the parser and asserts both
  `L7Request.target` (what OPA evaluates) and `raw_header` (what the
  upstream receives) are canonical.
- `parse_http_request_canonicalization_preserves_query_string`,
  `parse_http_request_leaves_canonical_input_byte_for_byte`,
  `parse_http_request_rejects_traversal_above_root`,
  `parse_http_request_preserves_http_10_version_on_rewrite`.
- `parse_http_request_accepts_encoded_slash_when_endpoint_opts_in` /
  `_rejects_encoded_slash_by_default` verify the
  `allow_encoded_slash` gate.
- `test_rewrite_forward_request_uses_canonical_path_on_the_wire`
  asserts the fix to the forward-proxy flow.
- `parse_l7_config_allow_encoded_slash_{defaults_false,opt_in}` verify
  the YAML/Rego wiring.
…IDIA#895)

Wrap gRPC and HTTP services with TraceLayer to log method, path,
status, and latency for every request. Health/readiness probe
endpoints are logged at debug level to reduce noise.
…NVIDIA#903)

Move /health, /healthz, and /readyz to a dedicated plaintext HTTP port
(default 8081) so Kubernetes probes work without mTLS client certificates.

- Add health_bind_address to Config with --health-port CLI arg
- Spawn standalone axum::serve for health_router on the health port
- Remove health routes from the main multiplexed HTTP router
- Update Helm statefulset probes from tcpSocket to httpGet on health port
- Fix cluster-healthcheck.sh to open/close TCP without sending data,
  avoiding InvalidContentType TLS errors in the gateway log
…atches (NVIDIA#907)

The 30s read_timeout on the shared kube client was killing the
long-lived watch streams during idle periods, causing a reconnect
cycle every 30 seconds. Use a separate client with no read_timeout
for watch_sandboxes so the streams stay open indefinitely.
…rd (NVIDIA#914)

the transfer of very large sandbox images to containerd can
timeout depending on the size of the image and the speed of
the local host.

Made-with: Cursor
Closes NVIDIA#905

Skip proxy baseline read-write enrichment when a path is already explicitly configured as read-only, add regression coverage for the proto and local policy code paths, and document the precedence rule in the sandbox architecture docs.

Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com>
Closes NVIDIA#879

Resolve policy hostnames against the sandbox's /etc/hosts before DNS so Kubernetes hostAliases are visible to the proxy while keeping the existing allowed_ips SSRF enforcement semantics intact.

Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com>
NVIDIA#918)

Ubuntu Noble's git links against libcurl-gnutls, which does not read
SSL_CERT_FILE. Without GIT_SSL_CAINFO, `git clone` over HTTPS fails
inside every community sandbox image with "server certificate
verification failed".

Add GIT_SSL_CAINFO to tls_env_vars pointing at the same combined CA
bundle already used by CURL_CA_BUNDLE / REQUESTS_CA_BUNDLE.

Fixes NVIDIA#790
Fixes NVIDIA/NemoClaw#2270
Fixes NVIDIA/NemoClaw#1828

Signed-off-by: Tinson Lai <tinsonl@nvidia.com>
zredlined and others added 27 commits May 4, 2026 13:31
…IA#1082)

Add a UUID-based request-ID middleware using tower-http's request-id
feature. Each inbound request receives a unique x-request-id header
(or preserves a client-supplied one), which is recorded in the tracing
span and propagated to the response.

This enables operators to correlate log lines across the middleware
stack for a single request under concurrent load, and lets clients
reference specific requests in bug reports.

Signed-off-by: sauagarwa <sauagarw@redhat.com>
Foundation for providers v2. Add provider profiles and provider profile composition with user policies.
…VIDIA#1166)

* fix(examples): harden multi-agent notepad 409 retry and improve docs

Add decorrelated jitter to the GitHub Contents API retry loop so racing
workers don't retry in lockstep, and widen the retry set to 5xx for
transient server errors. Without jitter, N concurrent workers trip the
same backoff schedule and re-collide on each beat.

Also:
- Extract the inline 220-line sandbox runner from demo.sh into a
  separate runner.sh. demo.sh stays as host orchestration; runner.sh
  is the per-sandbox program. demo.sh shrinks 460 to 240 lines.
- Rewrite README to lead with "Why GitHub as a shared notepad?" and
  add a "Memory architecture variants" section covering pile,
  append-journal, and indexed-memory patterns.
- Switch Quick Start to use \`gh auth token\` as the primary path.
- Pass the worker slice arg explicitly instead of reading \$9 from the
  outer dispatcher.
- Add .gitignore for personal run_demo.sh helpers.

* docs updates
* fix(driver-podman): use explicit cap_drop instead of cap_drop:ALL

cap_drop:ALL removes every capability in Podman's default set — including
CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE, CAP_CHOWN, CAP_FOWNER, CAP_SETUID, CAP_SETGID — and the
original cap_add list failed to re-add them which we need.

We also don't need to add CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID - those are defaults.

Signed-off-by: Colin Walters <walters@verbum.org>

* fix(e2e): fix gateway health check and SSH port in e2e-podman.sh

Two bugs in the Podman e2e gateway startup:

1. Health check: curl probed /healthz on the main gRPC port, which always
   returns 404 because the health router is only served on --health-port
   (a separate listener, disabled by default). Allocate a second free port
   and pass --health-port to the gateway; health check now probes that port.

2. SSH port: --ssh-gateway-port was not set, so the gateway always told
   clients to connect SSH to port 8080 regardless of the actual port.
   Explicitly pass --ssh-gateway-port ${PORT} to fix sandbox exec/SSH.

Signed-off-by: Colin Walters <walters@verbum.org>

---------

Signed-off-by: Colin Walters <walters@verbum.org>
Wires up a first-class `gateway list` command that calls the existing
`run::gateway_list()` helper. Resolves the dead reference in
`crates/openshell-bootstrap/src/errors.rs:248`, where the port-conflict
recovery hint already pointed users at this command.

Updates the manage-gateways doc to teach the new verb instead of the
`gateway select`-with-no-arg fallback.

Closes NVIDIA#1173

Signed-off-by: Max Dubrinsky <mdubrinsky@nvidia.com>
* fix(ci): harden packit rpm source prep

Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com>

* fix(ci): restrict packit version tag matching

Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com>

* fix(ci): collect local packit rpm artifacts

Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com>

---------

Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com>
…#1180)

* docs: add missing provider types to supported providers table
…IDIA#1188)

Signed-off-by: Florencio Cano Gabarda <fcanogab@redhat.com>
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Signed-off-by: Jonas Toelke <jtoelke@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com>
The openshell-providers crate uses `include_str!("../../../providers/*.yaml")`
to embed provider profile YAML at compile time. The rust-builder stage in
Dockerfile.images only copied `crates/` and `proto/`, so source builds
(BUILD_FROM_SOURCE=1, used by Skaffold dev) failed with:

  error: couldn't read `crates/openshell-providers/src/../../../providers/anthropic.yaml`

Copy `providers/` into the build context alongside the other source trees
so `include_str!` resolves.
…cation

Allow CLI to connect to gateways with self-signed or untrusted
certificates by skipping TLS verification when --gateway-insecure
is set via flag or OPENSHELL_GATEWAY_INSECURE env var.
@sjenning sjenning closed this May 6, 2026
@sjenning
sjenning deleted the feat/insecure-gateway branch May 6, 2026 19:24
@sjenning
sjenning restored the feat/insecure-gateway branch May 6, 2026 19:24
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