randomizedcoder · Nov 8, 2026 · Nov 9, 2026 · Nov 9, 2026 · Nov 9, 2026 · Nov 9, 2026
diff --git a/docs/README.md b/docs/README.md
@@ -65,6 +65,10 @@ gRPC defaults to TCP port `8889`, with optional Unix sockets and bearer/HMAC aut
 
 Current TCP/UDS, TTL/hop-limit, bearer/HMAC, and read/admin protections, with defaults, tradeoffs, recommended deployment profiles, secret handling, and verification examples. Authentication is off by default; native TLS and the connection/accept-rate limits proposed in the earlier design are not implemented.
 
+### [Security advisory: `ConfigService.Set` filesystem writes](security-hardening/security-vulnerability-configservice-set-fs-write.md)
+
+`Set` re-executes the daemon with an attacker-chosen config and, absent path validation, becomes a root file-write primitive (`file:` destinations, `capture_path`, `baseline_file`, `ipmeta_cache_path`, unix listeners). The advisory maps every primitive, documents the container deployment and its permission model (runtime settings → Linux primitives, what `NET_ADMIN`+`SYS_ADMIN` really grant, what is restricted/filtered), checks the classic container-escape path idioms target-by-target, and lays out the layered fix: build-time elimination, protovalidate path rules, a runtime path policy with frozen fields, a universal validating interceptor, Landlock self-confinement, a chrooted state-writer process split, and privilege brokers that take the capabilities and `docker.sock` out of the collector. The [hardening plan](security-hardening/plan-configservice-set-hardening.md) tracks the workstreams; the [implementation plan](security-hardening/implementation-plan.md) sequences the phases and PRs; the phase drill-downs go deep: [phase 1](security-hardening/phase-1-code-hardening.md) (build tags, proto validators, path policy, interceptor, audit, CI gates, a startup confinement check), [phase 2](security-hardening/phase-2-kernel-confinement.md) (Landlock self-confinement, full test matrices), [phase 3](security-hardening/phase-3-writer-split.md) (the writer-process split with its path-free proto protocol and the complete write inventory), [phase 4](security-hardening/phase-4-egress-fleet-lockdown.md) (egress pinning, escape-hatch removal, v1.x retirement, standing CI gates), and [phase 5](security-hardening/phase-5-privilege-brokers.md) (netlink and Docker brokers with typed, validated APIs; per-process seccomp and AppArmor profiles).
+
 ### [Observability](observability.md)
 Prometheus metrics, Go `pprof` endpoints, optional Pyroscope continuous profiling, and the startup capability check that explains exactly which Linux capabilities are required.
 

diff --git a/docs/security-hardening/implementation-plan.md b/docs/security-hardening/implementation-plan.md
diff --git a/docs/security-hardening/phase-1-code-hardening.md b/docs/security-hardening/phase-1-code-hardening.md
diff --git a/docs/security-hardening/phase-2-kernel-confinement.md b/docs/security-hardening/phase-2-kernel-confinement.md
diff --git a/docs/security-hardening/phase-3-writer-split.md b/docs/security-hardening/phase-3-writer-split.md
diff --git a/docs/security-hardening/phase-4-egress-fleet-lockdown.md b/docs/security-hardening/phase-4-egress-fleet-lockdown.md
diff --git a/docs/security-hardening/phase-5-privilege-brokers.md b/docs/security-hardening/phase-5-privilege-brokers.md
diff --git a/docs/security-hardening/plan-configservice-set-hardening.md b/docs/security-hardening/plan-configservice-set-hardening.md
diff --git a/docs/security-hardening/security-vulnerability-configservice-set-fs-write.md b/docs/security-hardening/security-vulnerability-configservice-set-fs-write.md