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chore(deps): update dependency certifi to v2026.10.18 [security] - #65
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| [[package]] | ||
| name = "certifi" | ||
| version = "2026.4.22" | ||
| version = "2026.10.18" |
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Enforce the certifi floor in published metadata
For users installing this wrapper through pip, this lock-only change does not apply the security fix: pyproject.toml excludes uv.lock from the sdist and still publishes only posthog and pyyaml requirements, so an environment with certifi 2026.4.22 can retain it. This follows pip's documented install --help default, only-if-needed, which upgrades dependencies only when existing versions no longer satisfy requirements. Add the secure certifi lower bound to the published project dependency metadata, not only the development lockfile.
AGENTS.md reference: AGENTS.md:L7-L10
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| [[package]] | ||
| name = "certifi" | ||
| version = "2026.4.22" | ||
| version = "2026.10.18" |
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Use the restored CA bundle from 2026.10.19
When a locked environment connects to a legitimate service whose certificate chains to an unaffected emSign root, 2026.10.18 rejects that connection because it removed every emSign root. The advisory included with this commit states that 2026.10.19 restores the unaffected roots and explicitly recommends 2026.10.19 or later, so pinning the temporary 2026.10.18 bundle introduces avoidable TLS failures.
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This PR contains the following updates:
2026.4.22→2026.10.18certifi bundles emSign root CAs with compromised intermediate CA keys
GHSA-6q48-6c7w-9gw2
More information
Details
Certifi versions before 2026.10.18 include the
emSign ECC Root CA - G3root certificate in their bundled CA store. Eight eMudhra intermediate CA certificates that chain to this root have compromised private keys and the CA has revoked them.An attacker with one of the compromised keys can issue valid-looking certificates for any hostname. If the attacker is also on-path, they can intercept or modify TLS traffic from clients that trust the certifi bundle. Examples include
requests,urllib3andpip, and the Python.org macOS installer.Certifi 2026.10.18 removed all emSign roots from the bundle. Certifi 2026.10.19 restored the emSign roots that are not affected. Upgrade to 2026.10.19 or later, and rebuild container images that vendor certifi.
Severity
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:NReferences
This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).
Release Notes
certifi/python-certifi (certifi)
v2026.10.18Compare Source
v2026.7.22Compare Source
v2026.6.17Compare Source
v2026.5.20Compare Source
Configuration
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