🛡️ Sentinel: Fix XSS vulnerability in invited room UI

[kevinaboos]

🛡️ Sentinel: [HIGH] Fix XSS vulnerability in invited room UI

🚨 Severity: HIGH
💡 Vulnerability: The user's display name and user ID were directly injected into an HTML string during the rendering of the RoomsListEntry when an invitation was received. This could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary HTML/scripts within the client's context by setting a malicious display name or sending an invite from a specially crafted user ID.
🎯 Impact: A malicious user could potentially break the UI rendering or execute unauthorized actions within the app's context by sending an invite with a crafted username.
🔧 Fix: Sanitized the display_name and user_id inputs using htmlize::escape_text before they are formatted and passed to show_html().
✅ Verification: Ran cargo check, cargo test, and cargo clippy which verified that the project compiles and passes all checks with the new sanitization in place.

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PR created automatically by Jules for task 8569256681624614964 started by @kevinaboos

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