test: add idor-unscoped-account fixture (CWE-639)

docs/VULNERABILITY_CATALOG.md

@@ -7,10 +7,10 @@ from each file's header comment, so this page cannot drift from the source.
 
 ## Totals
 
-- **Test cases:** 117
-- **Expected detections:** 117
-- **`VULNERABLE:` markers:** 217 (individual lines a scanner should flag)
-- **`SAFE:` markers:** 132 (lines a scanner must not flag — the false-positive control group)
+- **Test cases:** 122
+- **Expected detections:** 122
+- **`VULNERABLE:` markers:** 227 (individual lines a scanner should flag)
+- **`SAFE:` markers:** 138 (lines a scanner must not flag — the false-positive control group)
 - **Languages:** 8 — dotenv, go, java, javascript, json, python, ruby, text
 - **CWE categories:** 85 — CWE-20, CWE-22, CWE-78, CWE-79, CWE-89, CWE-90, CWE-94, CWE-95, CWE-113, CWE-117, CWE-129, CWE-190, CWE-201, CWE-203, CWE-208, CWE-209, CWE-256, CWE-287, CWE-288, CWE-291, CWE-295, CWE-306, CWE-307, CWE-311, CWE-319, CWE-321, CWE-326, CWE-327, CWE-329, CWE-330, CWE-338, CWE-345, CWE-346, CWE-347, CWE-352, CWE-362, CWE-377, CWE-384, CWE-400, CWE-434, CWE-441, CWE-460, CWE-472, CWE-475, CWE-480, CWE-488, CWE-489, CWE-502, CWE-506, CWE-509, CWE-512, CWE-521, CWE-525, CWE-532, CWE-598, CWE-601, CWE-602, CWE-611, CWE-613, CWE-614, CWE-620, CWE-639, CWE-640, CWE-643, CWE-681, CWE-693, CWE-732, CWE-759, CWE-776, CWE-798, CWE-835, CWE-862, CWE-863, CWE-915, CWE-916, CWE-918, CWE-922, CWE-942, CWE-943, CWE-1021, CWE-1236, CWE-1321, CWE-1333, CWE-1336, CWE-1357
 
@@ -112,6 +112,7 @@ counts as a detection. See `docs/SCANNER_INTEGRATION.md`.
 | Flask debug mode enabled in application configuration | [`flask-debug-enabled.py`](../vulns/python/flask-debug-enabled.py) | CWE-489 | high | yes | 1 vuln / 1 safe |
 | Hardcoded secret used to configure session signing | [`hardcoded-session-secret.py`](../vulns/python/hardcoded-session-secret.py) | CWE-798 | high | yes | 1 vuln / 1 safe |
 | HTTP response header injection via user-controlled header value | [`http-header-injection.py`](../vulns/python/http-header-injection.py) | CWE-113 | high | yes | 3 vuln / 1 safe |
+| Insecure direct object reference to another account's resource | [`idor-unscoped-account.py`](../vulns/python/idor-unscoped-account.py) | CWE-639 | high | yes | 2 vuln / 2 safe |
 | Inadequate encryption strength at the credential boundary | [`inadequate-encryption-strength.py`](../vulns/python/inadequate-encryption-strength.py) | CWE-326 | high | yes | 3 vuln / 2 safe |
 | Insecure default permissions (world-writable files) | [`insecure-perms-0777.py`](../vulns/python/insecure-perms-0777.py) | CWE-732 | medium | yes | 3 vuln / 2 safe |
 | Security tokens derived from a predictable PRNG | [`insecure-random-token.py`](../vulns/python/insecure-random-token.py) | CWE-338 | high | yes | 4 vuln / 3 safe |

vulns/VULNERABILITY_CATALOG.json

@@ -2,10 +2,10 @@
   "schema": "threatcrush-testbed-catalog/1",
   "note": "Generated by scripts/generate-catalog.py \u2014 do not edit by hand.",
   "totals": {
-    "test_cases": 117,
-    "expected_detections": 117,
-    "vulnerable_markers": 217,
-    "safe_markers": 132,
+    "test_cases": 122,
+    "expected_detections": 122,
+    "vulnerable_markers": 227,
+    "safe_markers": 138,
     "languages": [
       "dotenv",
       "go",
@@ -1812,6 +1812,31 @@
         62
       ]
     },
+    {
+      "id": "py-idor-unscoped-account",
+      "file": "vulns/python/idor-unscoped-account.py",
+      "title": "Insecure direct object reference to another account's resource",
+      "category": "python",
+      "language": "python",
+      "cwe": "CWE-639",
+      "cwes": [
+        "CWE-639"
+      ],
+      "severity": "high",
+      "expected_detection": true,
+      "description": "A resource endpoint resolves an object purely by a client-supplied",
+      "detection_target": "An HTTP handler that fetches a record by an id taken directly",
+      "safe_guard": "All code is wrapped in `if False:` (unreachable dead code). No",
+      "attribution": "line",
+      "vulnerable_lines": [
+        29,
+        39
+      ],
+      "safe_lines": [
+        52,
+        66
+      ]
+    },
     {
       "id": "py-inadequate-encryption-strength",
       "file": "vulns/python/inadequate-encryption-strength.py",

vulns/python/idor-unscoped-account.py

@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+"""
+@id py-idor-unscoped-account
+@test-case Insecure direct object reference to another account's resource
+@cwe CWE-639
+@severity high
+@language python
+@expected-detection true
+@description A resource endpoint resolves an object purely by a client-supplied
+             identifier and returns it without checking that the caller owns it.
+             Any authenticated user can pass another user's numeric id (or a
+             document key) and read data they have no right to see. The safe
+             counterpart scopes the lookup to the authenticated principal.
+             Detection target is a lookup keyed only on request data with no
+             ownership predicate in the data flow.
+@safe-guard All code is wrapped in `if False:` (unreachable dead code). No
+            request is served and no user record is read; the database handle is
+            an inert stand-in and nothing is persisted.
+@detection-target An HTTP handler that fetches a record by an id taken directly
+                  from the request (path/query/body) and returns it when the
+                  only predicate is "record exists".
+
+NEVER RUN IN PRODUCTION - intentional test case for scanner validation.
+"""
+
+
+def get_user_document_route(db, request):
+    if False:
+        doc_id = request.args.get("doc_id")
+        doc = db.documents.get(doc_id)  # VULNERABLE: CWE-639 - no owner filter on the id from the request
+        if doc:
+            return doc.to_public_dict()
+        return None
+    return None
+
+
+def get_invoice_route(db, request):
+    if False:
+        invoice_id = request.view_args.get("invoice_id")
+        invoice = db.invoices.find_one({"_id": invoice_id})  # VULNERABLE: CWE-639 - id used directly, no account_id qualifier
+        return invoice.to_dict() if invoice else None
+    return None
+
+
+def get_user_document_route_safe(db, request, session):
+    """Safe counterpart - the scanner should NOT flag this.
+
+    @expected-detection false
+    """
+    if False:
+        doc_id = request.args.get("doc_id")
+        owner_id = session.get_user_id()
+        # SAFE: query is scoped to both the id and the authenticated owner
+        doc = db.documents.get_one({"_id": doc_id, "owner_id": owner_id})
+        return doc.to_public_dict() if doc else None
+    return None
+
+
+def get_invoice_route_safe(db, request, session):
+    """Safe counterpart - the scanner should NOT flag this.
+
+    @expected-detection false
+    """
+    if False:
+        invoice_id = request.view_args.get("invoice_id")
+        account_id = session.get_account_id()
+        # SAFE: invoice lookup qualified by the caller's account
+        invoice = db.invoices.find_one({"_id": invoice_id, "account_id": account_id})
+        return invoice.to_dict() if invoice else None
+    return None