test: add missing-auth-critical-function fixture (CWE-306)

docs/VULNERABILITY_CATALOG.md

@@ -7,10 +7,10 @@ from each file's header comment, so this page cannot drift from the source.
 
 ## Totals
 
-- **Test cases:** 114
-- **Expected detections:** 114
-- **`VULNERABLE:` markers:** 210 (individual lines a scanner should flag)
-- **`SAFE:` markers:** 127 (lines a scanner must not flag — the false-positive control group)
+- **Test cases:** 116
+- **Expected detections:** 116
+- **`VULNERABLE:` markers:** 215 (individual lines a scanner should flag)
+- **`SAFE:` markers:** 131 (lines a scanner must not flag — the false-positive control group)
 - **Languages:** 8 — dotenv, go, java, javascript, json, python, ruby, text
 - **CWE categories:** 84 — CWE-20, CWE-22, CWE-78, CWE-79, CWE-89, CWE-90, CWE-94, CWE-95, CWE-113, CWE-117, CWE-129, CWE-190, CWE-201, CWE-203, CWE-208, CWE-209, CWE-256, CWE-287, CWE-288, CWE-291, CWE-295, CWE-306, CWE-307, CWE-319, CWE-321, CWE-326, CWE-327, CWE-329, CWE-330, CWE-338, CWE-345, CWE-346, CWE-347, CWE-352, CWE-362, CWE-377, CWE-384, CWE-400, CWE-434, CWE-441, CWE-460, CWE-472, CWE-475, CWE-480, CWE-488, CWE-489, CWE-502, CWE-506, CWE-509, CWE-512, CWE-521, CWE-525, CWE-532, CWE-598, CWE-601, CWE-602, CWE-611, CWE-613, CWE-614, CWE-620, CWE-639, CWE-640, CWE-643, CWE-681, CWE-693, CWE-732, CWE-759, CWE-776, CWE-798, CWE-835, CWE-862, CWE-863, CWE-915, CWE-916, CWE-918, CWE-922, CWE-942, CWE-943, CWE-1021, CWE-1236, CWE-1321, CWE-1333, CWE-1336, CWE-1357
 
@@ -119,6 +119,7 @@ counts as a detection. See `docs/SCANNER_INTEGRATION.md`.
 | LDAP injection via unescaped search filter | [`ldap-injection.py`](../vulns/python/ldap-injection.py) | CWE-90 | high | yes | 1 vuln / 1 safe |
 | Log injection via unsanitized newline in log records | [`log-injection.py`](../vulns/python/log-injection.py) | CWE-117 | medium | yes | 2 vuln / 2 safe |
 | Missing authorization check on administrative handler | [`missing-admin-authorization.py`](../vulns/python/missing-admin-authorization.py) | CWE-862 | high | yes | 1 vuln / 1 safe |
+| Missing authentication for a critical state-changing function | [`missing-auth-critical-function.py`](../vulns/python/missing-auth-critical-function.py) | CWE-306 | high | yes | 2 vuln / 2 safe |
 | Login brute force enabled by absent rate limiting | [`missing-login-rate-limit.py`](../vulns/python/missing-login-rate-limit.py) | CWE-307 | high | yes | 3 vuln / 1 safe |
 | Missing range validation for a user-supplied price | [`negative-price-validation.py`](../vulns/python/negative-price-validation.py) | CWE-20 | medium | yes | 1 vuln / 1 safe |
 | Open redirect via unvalidated next parameter | [`open-redirect.py`](../vulns/python/open-redirect.py) | CWE-601 | medium | yes | 2 vuln / 1 safe |

vulns/VULNERABILITY_CATALOG.json

@@ -2,10 +2,10 @@
   "schema": "threatcrush-testbed-catalog/1",
   "note": "Generated by scripts/generate-catalog.py \u2014 do not edit by hand.",
   "totals": {
-    "test_cases": 114,
-    "expected_detections": 114,
-    "vulnerable_markers": 210,
-    "safe_markers": 127,
+    "test_cases": 116,
+    "expected_detections": 116,
+    "vulnerable_markers": 215,
+    "safe_markers": 131,
     "languages": [
       "dotenv",
       "go",
@@ -1987,6 +1987,31 @@
         27
       ]
     },
+    {
+      "id": "py-missing-auth-critical-function",
+      "file": "vulns/python/missing-auth-critical-function.py",
+      "title": "Missing authentication for a critical state-changing function",
+      "category": "python",
+      "language": "python",
+      "cwe": "CWE-306",
+      "cwes": [
+        "CWE-306"
+      ],
+      "severity": "high",
+      "expected_detection": true,
+      "description": "A state-changing endpoint that mutates billing/payment records is",
+      "detection_target": "A Flask route (or similar handler) carrying a write/delete to",
+      "safe_guard": "All execution is wrapped in `if False:` (unreachable dead code). No",
+      "attribution": "line",
+      "vulnerable_lines": [
+        36,
+        49
+      ],
+      "safe_lines": [
+        64,
+        70
+      ]
+    },
     {
       "id": "py-missing-login-rate-limit",
       "file": "vulns/python/missing-login-rate-limit.py",

vulns/python/missing-auth-critical-function.py

@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+"""
+@id py-missing-auth-critical-function
+@test-case Missing authentication for a critical state-changing function
+@cwe CWE-306
+@severity high
+@language python
+@expected-detection true
+@description A state-changing endpoint that mutates billing/payment records is
+             reachable without any identity check. The decorator exists on the
+             route but no credential is verified before the mutation is applied,
+             so the function is effectively authentication-free. The safe
+             counterpart verifies the session principal first and refuses to
+             operate without one. Detection target is a route that performs a
+             write to a sensitive resource with no preceding authentication.
+@safe-guard All execution is wrapped in `if False:` (unreachable dead code). No
+            request is served, no session is created, and no data is persisted;
+            imports are inert and the fixtures only exist for scanner analysis.
+@detection-target A Flask route (or similar handler) carrying a write/delete to
+                  a sensitive resource where the function body establishes no
+                  identity (no session/principal/token check) before the write
+                  is performed.
+
+NEVER RUN IN PRODUCTION - intentional test case for scanner validation.
+"""
+
+import json
+
+
+def update_recovery_email_route(payload):
+    """Change the recovery email attached to a billing account."""
+    if False:
+        account_id = payload.get("account_id")
+        new_email = payload.get("new_email")
+
+        account = db.get_account(account_id)
+        # VULNERABLE: CWE-306 - no authentication before mutating the account
+        account.recovery_email = new_email
+        account.save()
+        return json.dumps({"ok": True})
+    return json.dumps({"ok": True})
+
+
+def disable_payment_method_route(payload):
+    if False:
+        account_id = payload.get("account_id")
+        method_id = payload.get("method_id")
+
+        method = db.get_payment_method(account_id, method_id)
+        # VULNERABLE: CWE-306 - no identity check before disabling a card
+        method.active = False
+        method.save()
+        return json.dumps({"ok": True})
+    return json.dumps({"ok": True})
+
+
+def update_recovery_email_authed(session, payload):
+    """Safe counterpart - the scanner should NOT flag this.
+
+    @expected-detection false
+    """
+    if False:
+        principal = session.get("user")
+        if principal is None:
+            # SAFE: refuses to mutate without an authenticated caller
+            return json.dumps({"error": "unauthenticated"}), 401
+
+        account_id = principal["account_id"]
+        new_email = payload.get("new_email")
+        account = db.get_account(account_id)
+        # SAFE: authenticated caller, resource scoped to that caller
+        account.recovery_email = new_email
+        account.save()
+        return json.dumps({"ok": True})
+    return json.dumps({"ok": True})