refactor(plugin-security): remove the retired catalog objects' write gates and the walled data door; report positions naming an unresolved set (C3 stage 8-post)

.changeset/15204-8post-catalog-gates-retired.md

@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+---
+'@objectstack/plugin-security': patch
+'@objectstack/platform-objects': patch
+'@objectstack/spec': patch
+'@objectstack/core': patch
+'@objectstack/metadata-protocol': patch
+---
+
+fix(plugin-security): the data-door write gates of the retired catalog row objects are removed, the boot report names positions that bind a permission set nobody serves, and the texts that still named the retired objects and modules are corrected (ADR-0131 D3/D4, C3 stage 8-post)
+
+Clause-②: no
+
+Stage 8 retired the `sys_position`, `sys_permission_set`, `sys_position_permission_set` and `sys_capability` row objects, so no write to them reaches the engine. This change removes what only guarded those writes. No export of any package's entry changes, and no request that reaches the server is answered differently.
+
+- **`@objectstack/plugin-security`.**
+  - Three of the security middleware's gates on those objects are gone: the package-provenance gate on `sys_permission_set`, the platform/package row gate on `sys_position` and `sys_capability`, and the curated capability-name gate on `sys_capability`. The delegated-administration gate no longer judges `sys_position_permission_set` bindings or `sys_permission_set` authoring; it still governs `sys_user_position` assignments, `sys_user_permission_set` grants and `sys_member`. The rules those gates carried still hold where the catalog now lives: `everyone` and `guest` are code-declared positions an environment cannot overlay, and a capability cannot be created or overlaid through the metadata door at all.
+  - The walled data-door refusal for those objects is deleted. Stage 8 already left it unwired, and no composition registers the objects it judged; the metadata door's walled refusal is unchanged.
+  - The internal duplicate-name refusal class that only the retired permission-set data door raised is removed.
+  - The packaged-permission-set lock's refusal no longer has a "choose a different name" variant: only the retired data door's create raised it. The metadata door's refusal text is unchanged, and the published signatures keep their `operation` parameter.
+  - The boot's catalog reference report lists one more finding, per position: a position definition whose `permissionSets` names a set the security catalog does not resolve, usually because the package that declared the set is uninstalled or disabled. A holder of such a position is granted nothing through that name. The line clears by itself at the next boot after the package is installed again. It is logged at `error` once per boot, like the report's other lines.
+- **`@objectstack/platform-objects`** and **`@objectstack/plugin-security`** object metadata: the descriptions of `sys_invitation.positions`, `sys_user_position` (object and `position`), and `sys_audience_binding_suggestion`'s permission-set name no longer name the retired objects. The translated texts follow.
+- **`@objectstack/spec`**: the `projectionApplied` and `materializeApplied` descriptions on the metadata save, publish and batch-publish responses give a current example (`datasource`, `flow`) instead of `permission` → `sys_permission_set`. `EvalUser.positions` describes the positions assigned through `sys_user_position`. `PermissionSet.description`'s doc comment no longer names the deleted projection. The `name` describes of `PositionSchema` and `PermissionSetSchema` say a name is unique within the security catalog the environment serves (ADR-0131 D3: there is no organization-level catalog), replacing "unique per organization", which read the retired rows' index. The error-code ledger drops `@objectstack/plugin-security`'s `UNIQUE_VIOLATION` row, which named the removed refusal; `UNIQUE_VIOLATION` stays registered by its other emitters.
+- **`@objectstack/core`**: the doc comments of `positionDefinitionFromRow` and `permissionSetDefinitionFromRow` no longer describe the deleted boot backfills as current.
+- **`@objectstack/metadata-protocol`**: the doc comments of the publish materializer, mutation projector and uninstall cleanup registries give current examples (`flow`, `datasource`, the grant revocation) instead of `permission` → `sys_permission_set`.

content/docs/permissions/system-context.mdx

@@ -184,7 +184,7 @@ One of the largest consumers of the flag;
 | 54 | Package REST route capability gate bypassed | rest | Get: a marketplace publish over REST (`POST /packages/publish`, the one route the REST registrar mounts since #14503) without `manage_metadata`; the package read cohort (`studio.access` / `setup.access`) is enforced by the dispatcher `/packages` domain's own read gate, where the reads are served | `packages/rest/src/package-routes.ts#refusePackageRequest` |
 | 55 | Package domain capability gates bypassed | runtime | Get: package management and package-inventory reads without the capability | `packages/runtime/src/domains/packages.ts#requireManageMetadata`, `#requireReadCapability` |
 | 56 | Activation write / authoring refusals do not fire | runtime | Get: activation artifacts writable and authorable without the activation-authoring capability | `packages/runtime/src/domains/activation-gate.ts#refuseUngrantedActivationWrite`, `#refuseUngrantedActivationAuthoring` |
-| 55b | Walled environment-metadata refusal does not fire | metadata-core, rest, plugin-security, runtime | Get: under `isolated` / `group`, a write of the environment's metadata, of any type, at the `/meta` write doors (save, reset, publish, rollback) and `POST /meta/_migrate-stored` on both transports, at every `/packages` write door (create, the manifest `PATCH`, enable, disable, publish, `publish-drafts`, `discard-drafts`, `revert`, `rollback`, `commits/:commitId/revert`, `duplicate`, `adopt-orphans`, delete), at the `/automation` definition writes (create, update, delete, clone), at the permission-set clone door, and at the data door on `sys_position`, `sys_permission_set` and `sys_capability` while those objects are registered. Every other caller below the platform-operator rung is refused `403` there (ADR-0131 D3, D12 items 7–8, D11), because one organization's write would change what every organization resolves. The seeders, the package door and migrations write the environment's metadata this way. Under `single` the refusal is inert for every caller | `packages/metadata-core/src/meta-write-capability.ts#walledCatalogWriteVerdict`, `packages/rest/src/rest-server.ts#walledCatalogRefusal`, `packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/walled-catalog-data-door.ts#createWalledCatalogDataDoorRefusal`, `packages/runtime/src/domains/packages.ts#refuseWalledCatalogPackageWrite`, `packages/runtime/src/domains/automation.ts#refuseWalledFlowDefinitionWrite` |
+| 55b | Walled environment-metadata refusal does not fire | metadata-core, rest, runtime | Get: under `isolated` / `group`, a write of the environment's metadata, of any type, at the `/meta` write doors (save, reset, publish, rollback) and `POST /meta/_migrate-stored` on both transports, at every `/packages` write door (create, the manifest `PATCH`, enable, disable, publish, `publish-drafts`, `discard-drafts`, `revert`, `rollback`, `commits/:commitId/revert`, `duplicate`, `adopt-orphans`, delete), at the `/automation` definition writes (create, update, delete, clone), and at the permission-set clone door. Every other caller below the platform-operator rung is refused `403` there (ADR-0131 D3, D12 items 7–8, D11), because one organization's write would change what every organization resolves. The seeders, the package door and migrations write the environment's metadata this way. Under `single` the refusal is inert for every caller | `packages/metadata-core/src/meta-write-capability.ts#walledCatalogWriteVerdict`, `packages/rest/src/rest-server.ts#walledCatalogRefusal`, `packages/runtime/src/domains/packages.ts#refuseWalledCatalogPackageWrite`, `packages/runtime/src/domains/automation.ts#refuseWalledFlowDefinitionWrite` |
 | 57 | Automation run-state read, flow-authoring write, the paused-run caller gate (screen read and resume), the two operator run-lifecycle writes and the elevated self-triggered start at every door that starts a flow by name all pass | runtime | Get: run state, flow writes, a paused run's screen and its resume with no grant and without being the run's starter — and cancelling or restoring a suspension without the platform-operator rung. The screen read and the resume ask one predicate, so this is one bypass for both. The lifecycle bypass is the in-process owner's door: plugin-approvals' revise-window recall (ADR-0044) cancels on behalf of a decision it already authorized and recorded. And starting a flow declared `runAs: 'system'` whose type is self-triggered (`autolaunched`, `record_change`, `schedule`) through any door that starts a flow by name — the trigger route, an action of `type: 'flow'` (REST `/actions` and the MCP `run_action` bridge) and a declared endpoint of `type: 'flow'` — which every other caller, the guest principal included, is refused `403 PERMISSION_DENIED` (the maintainer's rulings, letters B and A). The three doors ask one predicate, so this is one bypass for all of them, and it is the in-process caller's, such as a job: inbound HTTP never carries the flag | `packages/runtime/src/domains/automation.ts#mayReadRunState`, `#refuseUngrantedFlowWrite`, `#isRunStarterOrRunStateReader`, `#refuseUngrantedRunLifecycleWrite`, `packages/runtime/src/flow-start-admission.ts#refusesElevatedSelfTriggeredStart` |
 | 58 | Audience-binding suggestion authority gate passes | plugin-security | Get: a system caller lists, accepts and dismisses suggestions without `manage_metadata` and, under a wall, without the platform-operator rung | `packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/suggested-audience-bindings.ts#assertDeploymentAuthority` |
 | 59 | Email-template organization door passes; webhook provenance stamp skipped | plugin-email, plugin-webhooks | Get (`sys_email_template`): a create or update of a template row. The door refuses every other write that names a caller, `403 PERMISSION_DENIED` (ADR-0131 D6); the plugin itself no longer writes the table (templates resolve from the registry), so the v18 migration ceremony's promotion is the one remaining writer. Lose (`sys_webhook`): the row is not marked as an admin customization | `packages/plugins/plugin-email/src/email-template-door.ts#isOrganizationWrite`, `packages/plugins/plugin-webhooks/src/webhook-provenance.ts#bindWebhookProvenanceStamp` |