docs: launch-readiness checklist for team sign-off

docs/launch-readiness.md

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+# Launch Readiness Checklist
+
+**Status:** Draft for team sign-off
+**Scope:** Production launch (v1 / GA) of the ObjectStack framework monorepo
+**Last reviewed:** 2026-06-04 (`main` @ `9f311f8` — ADR-0030 P3b-2 digest)
+
+---
+
+## How to use this document
+
+Each item has an **owner**, a **verification box**, and a **sign-off box**. The
+two are deliberately separate:
+
+- ☐ **Verify** — a named engineer has confirmed the finding is real (or a false
+  positive) by reading the actual code / running a repro. Several items below
+  originate from an automated package-by-package sweep and are **not yet
+  hand-verified** — do not action them before verifying.
+- ☐ **Sign-off** — the fix is merged (or the risk is formally accepted and the
+  acceptance recorded in the "Notes" column).
+
+A "false positive" still gets ticked on Verify, with a one-line note explaining
+why no fix is needed. **Do not mark a P0 signed-off on the strength of the sweep
+alone.**
+
+Priority key: **P0** = blocks launch · **P1** = fix at/just-after launch ·
+**P2** = test-coverage / hardening gap · **Roadmap** = explicitly out of v1.
+
+---
+
+## Overall posture
+
+The codebase is mature and disciplined. A repo-wide scan found **zero**
+`TODO/FIXME/HACK` markers, `console.log` in source, empty `catch` blocks,
+`@ts-ignore`, or hard-coded secrets. `main` CI is green (Build/Test Core, Lint &
+Type Check, CodeQL). The core tier — `spec`, `objectql`, `plugin-security`,
+`runtime`, the SQL drivers, `service-ai` — is assessed production-ready.
+
+Launch risk is concentrated in a small number of themes below, not in code
+quality. **The single most important caveat: the security- and data-integrity
+findings (§P0) are from an automated sweep and MUST be hand-verified before any
+fix or acceptance.**
+
+---
+
+## P0 — Blockers (verify, then fix or formally accept)
+
+> Every P0 below must be **hand-verified** first — some may be false positives or
+> already-guarded. Do not ship without each row at Verify ✓ **and** Sign-off ✓.
+
+### P0-1 — Auth secret falls back to a weak dev secret
+- **Area:** `plugin-auth` — `src/auth-manager.ts` (~L1052–1071, `generateSecret()`)
+- **Risk:** If `OS_AUTH_SECRET` is unset in production, the manager logs a warning
+  and falls back to `dev-secret-<timestamp>`. Session tokens become predictable →
+  session forgery. (HIGH, security)
+- **Action:** Throw (fail boot) when no secret is configured and
+  `NODE_ENV === 'production'`; add a pre-boot config validation. Document
+  `OS_AUTH_SECRET` as a required go-live env var.
+- **Owner:** _______  ·  Verify ☐  ·  Sign-off ☐  ·  Notes: _______
+
+### P0-2 — Metadata-service failure bypasses all RBAC/RLS (fail-open)
+- **Area:** `plugin-security` — `src/security-plugin.ts:309–312`
+- **Risk:** A metadata-resolution error is swallowed and the request proceeds via
+  `next()` with **no permission checks**. If the metadata service degrades, every
+  user bypasses RBAC/RLS. (HIGH, security)
+- **Action:** Add a circuit-breaker + ERROR-level alerting; add an integration
+  test asserting "metadata service down ⇒ request denied", not allowed. Decide
+  fail-closed vs. fail-open explicitly and record the decision.
+- **Owner:** _______  ·  Verify ☐  ·  Sign-off ☐  ·  Notes: _______
+
+### P0-3 — Unescaped LIKE metacharacters in `contains`
+- **Area:** `driver-sql` — `src/sql-driver.ts:1565, 1656`
+- **Risk:** The `contains` / `$contains` operator embeds the user value into a
+  `%...%` LIKE pattern without escaping `%` / `_`. Parameterization prevents SQL
+  injection, but a `%` value matches everything → logic-level filter bypass.
+  (HIGH, data)
+- **Action:** Escape `%` and `_` (and the escape char) before building the LIKE
+  pattern; add a test with a `%`/`_` payload.
+- **Owner:** _______  ·  Verify ☐  ·  Sign-off ☐  ·  Notes: _______
+
+### P0-4 — MongoDB filter passes arbitrary `$` operators through
+- **Area:** `driver-mongodb` — `src/mongodb-filter.ts:82–84`
+- **Risk:** Operator keys are passed straight to MongoDB with no allowlist, so
+  `$where` / `$function` (server-side JS) reach the engine → query-intent bypass
+  and a potential JS-execution surface. (HIGH **if MongoDB is a launch driver**)
+- **Action:** Allowlist safe operators (`$eq/$ne/$gt/$gte/$lt/$lte/$in/$nin/$and/$or/...`);
+  reject unknown ones at filter-build time. If MongoDB is not a v1 driver, mark
+  Roadmap instead.
+- **Owner:** _______  ·  Verify ☐  ·  Sign-off ☐  ·  Notes: _______
+
+### P0-5 — Realtime & feed are in-memory only (no cluster coordination)
+- **Area:** `service-realtime` (`in-memory-realtime-adapter.ts`), `service-feed`
+  (`in-memory-feed-adapter.ts`)
+- **Risk:** Publish/subscribe and feed storage are process-local. In a multi-node
+  deployment, clients connected to node B never receive node A's events, and feed
+  data is lost on restart / unbounded in memory. (HIGH **for HA/cluster**;
+  N/A for single-instance)
+- **Action (cluster launch):** Provide a Redis-backed realtime adapter and a
+  DB-backed feed adapter, **or** formally restrict v1 to single-instance and
+  document it as non-HA. Enforce a `maxItems` cap if shipping in-memory feed.
+- **Owner:** _______  ·  Verify ☐  ·  Sign-off ☐  ·  Notes: _______
+
+---
+
+## P1 — Fix at launch or immediately after
+
+### P1-1 — External calls have no timeout / retry / backoff
+- **Area:** `embedder-openai` (`src/index.ts:~157`), `connector-rest` (~L157),
+  `connector-slack` (~L155), `connector-mcp`
+- **Risk:** Naked `fetch` with no timeout or 429/5xx backoff → a slow or
+  rate-limited external API hangs the entire agent turn with no recovery.
+- **Action:** Add a default request timeout (e.g. 30s, configurable) + exponential
+  backoff (3 tries) + a circuit breaker; tests for 429 / timeout paths.
+- **Owner:** _______  ·  Verify ☐  ·  Sign-off ☐  ·  Notes: _______
+
+### P1-2 — Unbounded growth: execution logs, job runs, event log
+- **Area:** `service-automation` (in-memory exec logs, hard 1000 cap),
+  `service-job` (`sys_job_run`, no retention), `service-messaging`
+  (event log retention is opt-in)
+- **Risk:** Long-running pods OOM; history tables grow without bound.
+- **Action:** Make retention **default-on** for all event/run tables; schedule
+  sweepers at startup; persist automation logs to a table rather than memory.
+- **Owner:** _______  ·  Verify ☐  ·  Sign-off ☐  ·  Notes: _______
+
+### P1-3 — No process-level graceful shutdown
+- **Area:** `runtime` (`http-server.ts`) + framework adapters
+- **Risk:** No SIGTERM/SIGINT handling → in-flight requests dropped on
+  rolling deploys (K8s SIGKILL after grace period); cluster (Redis) + kernel +
+  HTTP not drained in a coordinated order.
+- **Action:** Ship a graceful-shutdown utility (drain HTTP → stop kernel services
+  → close cluster) and wire it into app scaffolding; document a ≥60s grace floor.
+- **Owner:** _______  ·  Verify ☐  ·  Sign-off ☐  ·  Notes: _______
+
+### P1-4 — Per-request hostname → environment resolution (no cache)
+- **Area:** `rest` — `src/rest-server.ts:~504–530`
+- **Risk:** `resolveByHostname()` runs on every unscoped request → control-plane
+  latency spike under load; silent fallback to default project masks it.
+- **Action:** Add an in-memory TTL cache (~30s) for `hostname → environmentId`.
+- **Owner:** _______  ·  Verify ☐  ·  Sign-off ☐  ·  Notes: _______
+
+### P1-5 — Cluster pub/sub is fire-and-forget (metadata-changed)
+- **Area:** `service-cluster-redis` — `src/pubsub.ts:~75–90`
+- **Risk:** `publish()` doesn't wait for subscribers; a crash right after a schema
+  change leaves other nodes with a stale schema until the next full reload.
+- **Action:** Acceptable for non-critical events if documented; ensure schema
+  mutations re-sync on error boundaries (history exists in `sys_metadata_history`).
+  Record the durability contract.
+- **Owner:** _______  ·  Verify ☐  ·  Sign-off ☐  ·  Notes: _______
+
+---
+
+## P2 — Test-coverage & hardening gaps (ready, but shore up)
+
+| ID | Area | Gap | Action | Owner | Verify | Sign-off |
+|----|------|-----|--------|-------|:------:|:--------:|
+| P2-1 | `metadata-fs` | **NEEDS-WORK.** Atomicity / `watch` replay consistency under concurrent FS writes; 200ms chokidar self-write suppression is racy on slow/network FS | Add fault-injection tests (crash mid-write, concurrent put+delete, watch replay); validate `writeJsonAtomic` | ____ | ☐ | ☐ |
+| P2-2 | `cli` | Missing `serve` integration test (kernel init + HMR reload + SIGINT); possible missing `environments.ts` implementation (test exists) | Add serve/dev integration test; confirm `environments` command exists | ____ | ☐ | ☐ |
+| P2-3 | `plugin-webhooks` | Thin tests (1 test file); `eventId` dedup can collide on identical-ms timestamps | Add UUID suffix to `eventId`; expand auto-enqueuer tests | ____ | ☐ | ☐ |
+| P2-4 | `service-queue` | CAS claim (read-then-update) is not atomic → tolerated duplicate delivery; empty idempotency key bypasses dedup | Enforce non-empty idempotency key; add a lease safety margin; document at-least-once | ____ | ☐ | ☐ |
+| P2-5 | `plugin-audit` | `sys_session` mutations are not audited | Confirm login/logout are logged elsewhere (`sys_audit_log`); close the compliance gap if not | ____ | ☐ | ☐ |
+| P2-6 | `core` / `runtime` | `getService()` is sync but may return a Promise → unhandled-rejection footgun for plugin authors | Tighten the type / add a guard; document the sync-only contract | ____ | ☐ | ☐ |
+
+---
+
+## Roadmap — Explicitly out of scope for v1 (no action to launch)
+
+These are **designed but unbuilt** and should be named "not in v1" in the release
+notes, not treated as blockers.
+
+- ☐ **Unverified features — confirm stub vs. minimal, then include or exclude:**
+  `knowledge-ragflow`, `connector-openapi` (the sweep could not locate full
+  implementations; the packages exist — verify scope before GA).
+- ☐ **Proposed ADRs (roadmap):** ADR-0021 (analytics semantic layer),
+  ADR-0022/0023/0024 (connectors / OpenAPI→connector / MCP connectors),
+  ADR-0025/0026 (plugin & client-UI distribution), ADR-0027 (metadata authoring
+  lifecycle), ADR-0028 (naming/namespace isolation), ADR-0029 (kernel object
+  ownership — **partially landed**: K0 + D7 + several K2 domains), ADR-0033
+  Phase D (enterprise AI-authoring governance).
+
+---
+
+## Release mechanics
+
+- ☐ `main` CI green at the release commit (Build/Test Core, Lint & Type Check, CodeQL).
+- ☐ Pending changesets reviewed (4 at last check) and version bump intentional.
+- ☐ `pnpm run release` path verified (`build` → `build-console.sh` → `changeset publish`).
+- ☐ Required env vars documented for go-live (at minimum `OS_AUTH_SECRET`; see P0-1).
+- ☐ Deployment topology decided: **single-instance** vs. **HA/cluster** (drives P0-5).
+
+---
+
+## Provenance
+
+The per-package findings were produced by an automated, read-only package-by-package
+sweep on 2026-06-04 and synthesized here. They are a **starting point for review,
+not a verified defect list** — each item carries its own Verify box for exactly
+this reason. File:line references are approximate and must be confirmed against
+`main` before acting.