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Require human approval for Slack connector membership changes - #180
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Signed-off-by: Tiberiu Socaci <tsocaci@makeitfuture.com>
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A request to share a list or post in another Slack channel must not let an agent invite itself as an access workaround. Managed Composio Slack join, invite and channel-creation actions now require an exact, one-use human approval, including nested execution batches, both identities, Auto/Admin channels and host runtimes.
The daemon checks these calls before forwarding, snapshots their arguments, and rechecks authorization and cancellation after approval. Opaque workbench/bash/proxy/API executors are refused because persistent arbitrary code can hide a membership mutation; ordinary structured connector actions remain available. This enforcement covers managed Composio, with standing instructions also prohibiting bypass through independent credentials, browsers or custom MCPs.
Validation: full regression suite 3,791 passed, 32 optional tests skipped; static check, secret scan, security coverage and DCO passed. Real Unix-socket tests verify denied/approved forwarding and Auto/Admin agent-approval routing. Separate Claude/Codex live acceptance cases are documented and registered; live execution remains pending.