Please report vulnerabilities privately through GitHub's "Report a vulnerability" (private security advisory) feature on this repository instead of opening a public issue.
Known limitations of the current images (see the issue tracker for details):
- Each unit generates its own Wi-Fi PSK and
m5SSH password on first boot (credentials.txton the USB drive, #24). Anyone who can read that drive or the flash has them. - Secure Boot and flash encryption are disabled. Anyone with physical access can read the flash (including the boot FAT with Wi-Fi credentials) and write arbitrary firmware. docs/security-hardening.md lists what a product build would need; none of it is tested.
- The USB-C serial console (
ttyGS1) gives an unauthenticated root shell.
Every upstream source is pinned in versions.lock.json (commit, tag object
and, for Linux, the stable tag); python3 tools/verify-source-lock.py checks
the lock and the submodules. The network-facing components are:
| Component | Where it is pinned | Watch |
|---|---|---|
| Linux stable (6.18.y) | linux_base in versions.lock.json |
stable releases, linux-cve-announce |
| Dropbear, wpa_supplicant, BusyBox, uClibc-ng | the Buildroot commit in versions.lock.json |
Buildroot LTS point releases, upstream advisories |
| ESP-Hosted NG (P4 driver and C6 firmware) | esp_hosted_ng in versions.lock.json |
Espressif advisories |
| ESP-IDF (boot shim, C6 build) | esp_idf in versions.lock.json |
Espressif advisories |
To take an update:
- Move the submodule (or the external cache) to the new commit and update
the matching entry in
versions.lock.json. - Run
python3 tools/verify-source-lock.pyandbash tests/static-check.sh. - Rebuild (
linux/build-c68.sh --profile m3-lab); kernel and esp-hosted-ng patches must still apply cleanly. - Boot the image on hardware and add a
linux/tests/*hardware-validation-*.mdrecord before a release, because the release workflow checks the release hashes against those records.