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Context — scoped inputs and an enforced egress boundary #25

Description

@zenithruneblade

Outcome

Only explicitly scoped inputs cross the selected execution/egress boundary.

Next planning checkpoint: Init. This is the earliest scope/review conversation, not an assignment or a promise to finish the whole outcome in that week. Selected work starts at #52.

Remaining acceptance

  • Carry ownership, source lineage and privacy classification through bounded Context contributions; retrieved or external text never becomes instruction authority.
  • Add a trusted egress port for one exact target and sealed payload; check policy, current authority and disclosure budget before transmission.
  • Verify allowed public fixtures pass, protected/unknown inputs refuse, and changed bytes, destination, expired decisions or direct-adapter bypass cannot send.
  • Keep decision records and secrets local; expose only redacted evidence.

Cross-task privacy route — 12 November

This is the enforcement/input owner, not the entire anonymization implementation. #62 — Anonymization / Privacy Cuts and remote model calls retains historical #38's transformation, sanitized branch and independent Privacy Cut verification, separately from #55's authorized Portal call. #28 owns delegated-runtime containment and Provider Gate.

In the selected foundation work, Anshuk coordinates backend privacy questions and Nav the Context/workflow passage; Kiran and Chirayu carry the same data/audience and refusal states into integrations and clients. This records stewardship without assigning or starting this whole outcome. Review what stays local, the exact candidate payload and destination, and changed-payload/destination, unknown-lineage and expired-authority refusals before any private offload. Current synthetic diagnostic/recording evidence does not establish a general anonymizer or private provider transmission.

Evidence and handoff

Start from current State of Work and its linked source/tests and owning ADRs. The linked original acceptance remains binding unless a named replacement outcome records its disposition. Detailed scope, negative cases and dated campaign evidence are preserved in preserved scope and evidence; historical evidence does not establish current qualification on its own. Any accepted requirement not selected for this profile needs an explicit route in #62 before this issue closes.

Choose one small implementation or verification slice when this outcome is admitted. Record the responsible contributor, exact profile/revision, observed result, failure/unknown boundary and next checkpoint. The founder reviews and approves all code for this campaign; merge and promotion follow CONTRIBUTING.

Activity

  1. added
    needs-designAn issue-specific implementation choice remains open; see Open decision.
    area:securityIdentity, authorization, containment, consent and disclosure boundaries.
    on Sep 18, 2026
  2. added
    help wantedActive contribution call for the named scope or host evidence; may require deep experience.
    on Sep 18, 2026
  3. removed
    help wantedActive contribution call for the named scope or host evidence; may require deep experience.
    on Sep 18, 2026
  4. zenithruneblade commented on Oct 11, 2026

    @zenithruneblade
    ContributorAuthor

    Bounded local Context progress is verified in local commit f05fe1c (not yet pushed): the opt-in public-note Bridge profile resolves an authorized PostgreSQL receipt into a separate attributed data message, reserves the complete serialized projection in Context, and keeps source bytes out of retained SDK history and Graph receipt state. Query/Run/receipt bindings, wrong namespace/subject, correction/revocation, count-to-request changes and stale settlement are covered. No tools or settled-history replay are exposed in this revision.

    This advances the scoped Archive-input part of the issue only. It does not implement the exact-payload remote egress gate, Privacy Cuts, Persona hydration, multi-principal IAM or permitted private disclosure. Existing Portal refusal remains in force. Shared validation: 3,707 Python + 165 PostgreSQL + 322 web tests passed, typing/lint and builds clean; the model in the PostgreSQL vertical receipt is controlled, not a live provider.

  5. zenithruneblade commented on Nov 6, 2026

    @zenithruneblade
    ContributorAuthor

    Planning reset — 6 November 2026. The original acceptance below remains binding unless a named replacement outcome records its disposition. This is a preserved historical body, not a fresh capability/qualification claim.

    Original issue scope and dated evidence before the planning reset

    Prepare typed memory/Persona inputs and prove one allow/deny route for remote disclosure.

    Starting point: Existing bounded Context assembly is separate from the partial privacy preparation and missing egress enforcement.

    First working slice

    • Carry ownership, source lineage and privacy classification through bounded Context contributions; retrieved or external text never becomes instruction authority.
    • Add a trusted egress port for one exact target and sealed payload; check policy, current authority and disclosure budget before transmission.
    • Verify allowed public fixtures pass, protected/unknown inputs refuse, and changed bytes, destination, expired decisions or direct-adapter bypass cannot send.
    • Keep decision records and secrets local; expose only redacted evidence.

    Connections: Extends #5/#7; integrates #24. Shared boundary for #19, delegated agents, memory and Persona hydration.

    Later: Verified Privacy Cuts, transformations and cumulative-disclosure controls. Private remote payloads remain blocked until those controls exist.

    References: ADR 21 · ADR 09.

    Privacy transformation: #38 owns Disclosure Plans, sanitized branches and independent Cut verification. This issue owns scoped inputs and enforcement at the transmission boundary.

    Consumer: #55 verifies one explicit remote model call through this gate.

    Contribution entry: Define exact-payload admission fixtures and prove one bypass is refused.
    Open decision: Choose the trusted transmission adapter and sealed-decision representation.
    Verification: Offline target/payload policy tests; controlled endpoint for egress proof. Shared contribution and touched-docs rules: #52.

    Delivery review — 12 October 2026

    Published source: a913bff.

    Archive-enabled bridge_chat@3 now injects bounded attributed public-note data and revalidates its source receipt before dispatch, model requests and settlement. This is a narrow local Context contribution, not general privacy-label/lineage implementation or an enforced transmission boundary. A trusted exact-target/payload Egress Gate, fresh authority/disclosure checks and controlled-endpoint bypass/refusal evidence remain required.

    Delivery evidence · Source/test 1 · Source/test 2

    Implemented privacy and runtime slice — 12 October 2026

    Published implementation: 1be94e9.

    Context Blocks now carry immutable influence labels. Aggregation preserves known ancestry and treats ungoverned query, history and continuation as restricted; mutation cannot leave a stale public aggregate. The bounded offline Privacy Cut work in #38 does not supply governed source adapters, a provider-specific wire branch, a trusted Egress Gate or transmission accounting. These transmission requirements remain open.

    Local integrated verification: 4,052 non-container Python tests passed, 11 existing optional-native-audio skips, 209 container tests deselected; 322 frontend tests passed, Svelte check reported no errors or warnings, and generated API files stayed unchanged. Repository lint, formatting, strict typing, architecture tests and a clean documentation build passed. Independent candidate reviews reproduced and repaired privacy-verification, protocol-identity and cancellation defects. The full-suite music cleanup failure was repaired with a bounded owned-process-group settlement check, including zombie leaders with live threads; its original immediate-state assertion is unchanged. No live foreign-runtime/provider/egress acceptance is claimed. Hosted Core Python CI passed on this exact main commit for Python 3.14.8 and 3.15.0; the matching dev run and documentation deployment also passed. This issue remains open.

  6. removed
    needs-designAn issue-specific implementation choice remains open; see Open decision.
    on Nov 6, 2026
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