fix(security): validate space name in chat +send#444
fix(security): validate space name in chat +send#444anshul-garg27 wants to merge 1 commit intogoogleworkspace:mainfrom
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Add validate_resource_name() to the --space argument in chat +send, consistent with the validation already applied in gmail +watch, events +subscribe, and modelarmor helpers. Prevents path traversal and query injection via the space parameter.
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Summary of ChangesHello, I'm Gemini Code Assist1! I'm currently reviewing this pull request and will post my feedback shortly. In the meantime, here's a summary to help you and other reviewers quickly get up to speed! This pull request significantly enhances the security of the Highlights
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Code Review
This pull request adds important security validation to the chat +send command by checking the --space argument for path traversal and query injection attempts. The change is consistent with other helpers in the codebase and includes new tests to cover these security cases. My review focuses on improving the robustness of the argument parsing logic. I've suggested a change to avoid using unwrap() which could lead to a panic, even if it's unlikely to be triggered in practice.
Summary
validate_resource_name()to the--spaceargument inchat +send../) and query injection (?,#) via the space parametergmail +watch,events +subscribe, andmodelarmorhelpersDetails
The
--spacevalue inchat +sendwas passed directly intoparams["parent"]without going throughvalidate_resource_name(). While the executor's URL encoding layer mitigates most attacks, this is inconsistent with other helpers that validate resource names before URL construction.Test plan
../path traversal is rejected?key=injectedquery injection is rejectedResultreturn type