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fix: pin 5 unpinned action(s)#7860

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dagecko wants to merge 1 commit intogoogleapis:mainfrom
dagecko:runner-guard/fix-ci-security
Open

fix: pin 5 unpinned action(s)#7860
dagecko wants to merge 1 commit intogoogleapis:mainfrom
dagecko:runner-guard/fix-ci-security

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@dagecko
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@dagecko dagecko commented Mar 26, 2026

Fix: CI/CD Security Vulnerabilities in GitHub Actions

Hi! Runner Guard, an open-source
CI/CD security scanner by Vigilant Cyber Security,
identified security vulnerabilities in this repository's GitHub Actions workflows.

This PR applies automated fixes where possible and reports additional findings
for your review.

Fixes applied (in this PR)

Rule Severity File Description
RGS-007 high .github/workflows/continuous.yaml Pinned 1 third-party action(s) to commit SHA
RGS-007 high .github/workflows/discovery.yaml Pinned 1 third-party action(s) to commit SHA
RGS-007 high .github/workflows/presubmit.yaml Pinned 1 third-party action(s) to commit SHA
RGS-007 high .github/workflows/update-api-list.yaml Pinned 1 third-party action(s) to commit SHA
RGS-007 high .github/workflows/windows-presubmit.yaml Pinned 1 third-party action(s) to commit SHA

Advisory: additional findings (manual review recommended)

| Rule | Severity | File | Description |
| RGS-005 | medium | .github/workflows/response.yml | Excessive Permissions on Untrusted Trigger |
| RGS-005 | medium | .github/workflows/response.yml | Excessive Permissions on Untrusted Trigger |

Why this matters

GitHub Actions workflows that use untrusted input in run: blocks, expose
secrets inline, or use unpinned third-party actions are vulnerable to
code injection, credential theft, and supply chain attacks. These are the same
vulnerability classes exploited in the tj-actions/changed-files and
LiteLLM supply chain attacks,
which compromised CI secrets across thousands of repositories.

How to verify

Review the diff — each change is mechanical and preserves workflow behavior:

  • Expression extraction (RGS-002/008/014): Moves ${{ }} expressions from
    run: blocks into env: mappings, preventing shell injection
  • SHA pinning (RGS-007): Pins third-party actions to immutable commit SHAs
    (original version tag preserved as comment)
  • Debug env removal (RGS-015): Removes ACTIONS_RUNNER_DEBUG/ACTIONS_STEP_DEBUG
    which leak secrets in workflow logs

Run brew install Vigilant-LLC/tap/runner-guard && runner-guard scan . or install from the
repo to verify.


Found by Runner Guard | Built by Vigilant Cyber Security | Learn more

If this PR is not welcome, just close it -- we won't send another.

Automated security fixes applied by Runner Guard (https://github.com/Vigilant-LLC/runner-guard).

Changes:
 .github/workflows/continuous.yaml        | 2 +-
 .github/workflows/discovery.yaml         | 2 +-
 .github/workflows/presubmit.yaml         | 2 +-
 .github/workflows/update-api-list.yaml   | 2 +-
 .github/workflows/windows-presubmit.yaml | 2 +-
 5 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
@dagecko dagecko requested a review from a team as a code owner March 26, 2026 03:42
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google-cla bot commented Mar 26, 2026

Thanks for your pull request! It looks like this may be your first contribution to a Google open source project. Before we can look at your pull request, you'll need to sign a Contributor License Agreement (CLA).

View this failed invocation of the CLA check for more information.

For the most up to date status, view the checks section at the bottom of the pull request.

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