Give swarm external voices file-read + web research (0.6.0)#46
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Externals (codex, grok) were tool-less/inline-only — blind to out-of-diff bugs (callers, config, types, CVE/library knowledge). Grant file-read + web without re-opening the secret-exfil hole: - codex: `-s read-only -C <repo> -c tools.web_search=true` (web is model-native, works under read-only — no sandbox loosen). - grok: strict `--tools read_file,list_dir,grep,web_search,web_fetch` allowlist + `--cwd <repo>`; drop `--tools ""` / `--disable-web-search`. No write/shell tools for either voice. - Keep + extend the OS secret-jail: repo-root `.env*`/`data/`/key files join the HOME denylist (root-level only — nested via SWARM_DENY_PATHS). - Egress guard (prompt policy, outside the diff fence): web is for external general knowledge only, never put repo content into a query/URL. Model- cooperation-dependent, not transport-enforced — the jail is the hard boundary; scrub_secrets/output gate stay as output-only backstops. - Run-start notice once per review when external voices are live. - New test_sandbox_deny.py: denylist unit asserts + macOS e2e (sandboxed cat of a temp .env is blocked). Docs/knowledge rewritten off the old posture. Bumps swarm 0.5.1 → 0.6.0. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01B2y4GsnrE87L89uGHE5dGX
15 findings from a /swarm:review dogfooding run over the 0.6.0 diff (2 critical consensus among them), applied: - FAIL CLOSED without the OS jail (the critical): on hosts with neither sandbox-exec nor bwrap, run_codex/run_grok now degrade to the 0.5.x flags (grok tool-less/no-web, codex without web search) via the new _jail_available() gate, with an audible warning — read+web never runs without its hard boundary. 0.5.x was safe there by flags; 0.6.0 now is again. - E2E sandbox test gains a positive control (non-denied read must pass, rc asserted) so "jail never ran" can no longer pass as "jail denied". - Prompt hardening: all tool output declared untrusted DATA (file-read channel cannot be nonce-fenced — now a named residual); EPERM on secret paths flagged as expected; run-start notice names the root-only deny scope + SWARM_DENY_PATHS and no longer mis-renders as a bullet. - Named residuals documented: unfenced file-read channel, own-backend token readability; grok tool-id leniency (live-verified) replaces the stale degrade-promise in the adapter doc. - Cleanups: _repo_root() reused in _sandbox_deny_paths, redundant nullglob block dropped, honest test-runner comment, CLAUDE.md + root README posture sync, knowledge frontmatter per curate convention. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01B2y4GsnrE87L89uGHE5dGX
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Summary
.env*/data//key files join the HOME denylist; fail closed — without sandbox-exec/bwrap the externals degrade to the 0.5.x tool-less/no-web flags instead of running read+web bare./swarm:reviewdogfooding); 15 findings applied, incl. the fail-closed gap (cross-family consensus critical).Changes
agents.sh: grok--tools read_file,list_dir,grep,web_search,web_fetch --cwd <repo>(was--tools "" --disable-web-search); codex-C <repo> -c tools.web_search=trueunder unchanged-s read-only;_jail_available()fail-closed gate; repo-root secret globs in_sandbox_deny_paths; named residuals in comments.SKILL.md: exploration permission + HIGH-PRIORITY egress guard in the external prompt header (outside the diff fence); all tool output declared untrusted DATA; once-per-run notice (web + egress + jail +SWARM_DENY_PATHShint).test_sandbox_deny.py(new): denylist unit asserts + macOS e2e with positive control (non-denied read must pass — "jail never ran" can't masquerade as "jail denied").Readiness
origin/maincheck-structure.py: 0 errorsTest plan
python3 plugins/swarm/scripts/test_sandbox_deny.py— denylist + e2e green on macOSbash plugins/swarm/scripts/agents.sh list— codex + grok ready/swarm:reviewon any diff: run-start notice appears; externals return findings (file-read + web live)🤖 Generated with Claude Code
https://claude.ai/code/session_01B2y4GsnrE87L89uGHE5dGX