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A confidential request can now set "require_attested_inference": true inside its encrypted envelope. The enclave then lets only attested code read the prompt: itself and a provider whose attestation it verifies before sending anything. It refuses routers, which send the prompt to the Router outside the enclave; skips PII masking, which sends it to the analyzer; checks every provider target, fallback included, for an attested transport before holding credit or sending; and discards an answer that arrives without a transport proof. A request it can't serve that way returns 422 attested_inference_unavailable. The field travels inside the EHBP-encrypted body, so nothing between the client and the enclave can add or remove it. Gateways that predate it reject the envelope as unknown, so asking for it fails closed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The client of an attested-inference request verifies the enclave itself and keeps its own proof, so a stored Tinfoil transport proof would only be a lasting record of which account used a private model, and when. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Web chat is going to claim, for private models: "Nobody can read your prompt — not Nexus, not the model provider." The browser can verify that its prompt reaches this enclave encrypted. It can't see what the enclave does next. Today the enclave may send the prompt to the Router (
nexus/auto), the PII analyzer, or a non-attested fallback provider, all outside attested code. This PR lets the client rule that out.Behavior
A confidential request may set
"require_attested_inference": truein its encrypted envelope. The enclave then lets only attested code read the prompt:AttestedTransport()(today Tinfoil, which verifies the provider enclave's attestation and encrypts to it over EHBP). The primary model and the fallback are each checked, both before the credit hold and again at send time.Anything it can't serve that way gets
422 attested_inference_unavailable, and nothing is sent upstream.The flag lives inside the encrypted body, so nothing between the client and the enclave can add or strip it. Every release with the confidential endpoint (v0.1.60–v0.1.72) decodes the envelope with
DisallowUnknownFields, so an older enclave rejects the flag rather than ignoring it. Rolling the enclave back fails closed.What leaves the enclave for these requests: Metering reservations and failures carry IDs, counts, error type and code, never message text.
Rollout
Nothing changes for requests without the flag. Web chat sends it only once
PRIVATE_CHAT_GATEWAY_URLis set on the control plane (dappnode-nexus, off by default), and that must happen after the enclave runs a release containing this PR.Validation
go test ./...🤖 Generated with Claude Code