The Basalt shell lets AI agents ask for changes to a person's desktop, and its main promise is that nothing an agent asks for happens without the person's confirmation. A way around that confirmation, the SELinux boundary or the audit log is a security problem. Please report it privately and give us time to fix it before it is disclosed.
Use GitHub's private vulnerability reporting for this repository: https://github.com/basalt-os/basalt-shell/security/advisories/new (the "Report a vulnerability" button under the Security tab). If you cannot use GitHub, write to security@openbasalt.org.
Do not open a public issue, pull request or discussion for a security problem. If the problem is in another part of Basalt OS (the system assistant, basalt-agent, the installer), report it in basalt-os/basalt-os, or here if you are not sure: we move reports between repositories.
Please include what you can of:
- the version (
basalt-shell versionor the package version), the compositor (sway, niri, headless) and the distribution; - whether the
basalt_shellSELinux module was installed and enforcing; - steps to reproduce, and what an attacker gains (who the attacker is: an agent through MCP, another process of the same user, a remote party, a local user);
- whether you want to be credited, and how.
We aim to acknowledge a report within 7 days and to agree on a disclosure date with you, normally within 90 days of the report or when a fix is released, whichever comes first. Fixes are published as a new release with a GitHub security advisory (and a CVE when it applies).
The shell is a pre-release prototype. Until 1.0, only the latest release receives security fixes.
In scope: the daemon (basalt-shelld), the MCP server and command line
(basalt-shell), the shell UI launcher and QML, the session scripts, the
SELinux module in selinux/, the polkit policy and the packaging in this
repository.
Out of scope, report upstream: Quickshell, sway, niri, xdg-desktop-portal and the applications that run in the session. Known limits documented in docs/selinux.md (for example, code running unconfined as the same user without the policy) are not vulnerabilities by themselves, but a way to cross a boundary that document says holds is.
Packages in the Basalt OS repository (https://obpkg.org/basalt) are signed with the OpenBasalt release key, published at https://obpkg.org/keys/openbasalt-release-key.asc. Check its fingerprint before trusting it:
- primary key
3601 7348 42BD 4E48 2D19 DE4A E4EE D5EC A395 B302 - packages signing subkey
3024 61D2 6520 E077 D07F FCA9 AA27 C62C 36CC FC4B