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The #802 row said carabiner-dev's nested installers curl-and-chmod without verification, with the upstream issue open. That issue is closed and install/download-and-verify now defaults verify to true against SLSA provenance, so the row was steering reviewers to re-raise a settled finding. Adds rows for the five-PR carabiner sweep, the CRLF false positive behind #1283, and the cargo-rail-action hold. Each carries the check that decided it: compare blob SHAs rather than a compare's file list; diff with --strip-trailing-cr; and read the install script yourself, because verify reports "all verified" whenever checksum verification is present without reasoning about the checksum's trust root. Generated-by: Claude Opus 5
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The
#802row said carabiner-dev's nested installerscurl + chmodwithout verification, with upstream issuecarabiner-dev/actions#51open. That issue is closed, andinstall/download-and-verifynow defaultsverifyto true, checking SLSA provenance via a bootstrapped ampel trust anchor against a pinned policy revision with a sigstore signer spec. The row was steering reviewers to re-raise a settled finding against current versions, so it now says so and points at the new row.Three precedents added, each recording the check that actually decided it:
action.ymlat the old and new pin, which the compare's file list did not show; comparing blob SHAs is what settled it.whatwg-url@5.0.0publisheslib/url-state-machine.jswith CRLF, git normalises to LF on commit, so the committed blob can never byte-match the tarball.diff --strip-trailing-crsettles it in one command. Fix in verify-action-build: credit vendored files git normalised from CRLF #1297.cargo-rail-action, held for release-asset provenance. The reusable lesson:verifyreports "no downloads or all verified" whenever checksum verification is present, without reasoning about where the checksum came from - so the install script still has to be read. Same shape as the existing mise-action row (Add jdx/mise-action to the GitHub Actions allowlist #1013).Test plan: documentation only, no behaviour change.
prek run --files .claude/skills/analyze-action-pr/SKILL.mdpasses. Every claim is anchored to a merged PR, a closed upstream issue, or a byte count reproduced during the review that prompted it.🤖 Generated with Claude Code