fix: extract 1 unsafe expression(s) to env vars#21556
fix: extract 1 unsafe expression(s) to env vars#21556plainheart merged 1 commit intoapache:releasefrom
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Thanks for your contribution! Please DO NOT commit the files in dist, i18n, and ssr/client/dist folders in a non-release pull request. These folders are for release use only. To reviewers: If this PR is going to be described in the changelog in the future release, please make sure this PR has one of the following labels: This message is shown because the PR description doesn't contain the document related template. |
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Let me know if you have any questions |
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Congratulations! Your PR has been merged. Thanks for your contribution! 👍 |
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Hey, thanks again for merging this. I was doing some additional validation against the CodeQL envvar-injection-critical guidance (https://codeql.github.com/codeql-query-help/actions/actions-envvar-injection-critical/) and noticed
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Security: Harden GitHub Actions workflows
Hey, I found some CI/CD security issues in this repo's GitHub Actions workflows. These are the same vulnerability classes that were exploited in the tj-actions/changed-files supply chain attack. I've been reviewing repos that are affected and submitting fixes where I can.
This PR applies mechanical fixes and flags anything else that needs a manual look. Happy to answer any questions.
Fixes applied
.github/workflows/teardown-pr-preview.ymlAdditional findings (manual review recommended)
| Rule | Severity | File | Description |
| RGS-004 | high |
.github/workflows/pr-preview.yml| Comment-Triggered Workflow Without Author Authorization Check || RGS-004 | high |
.github/workflows/pr-preview.yml| Comment-Triggered Workflow Without Author Authorization Check || RGS-004 | high |
.github/workflows/pr-preview.yml| Comment-Triggered Workflow Without Author Authorization Check || RGS-004 | high |
.github/workflows/pr-preview.yml| Comment-Triggered Workflow Without Author Authorization Check || RGS-004 | high |
.github/workflows/pr-preview.yml| Comment-Triggered Workflow Without Author Authorization Check |Why this matters
GitHub Actions workflows that use untrusted input in
run:blocks or reference unpinned third-party actions are vulnerable to code injection and supply chain attacks. These are the same vulnerability classes exploited in the tj-actions/changed-files incident which compromised CI secrets across thousands of repositories.How to verify
Review the diff, each change is mechanical and preserves workflow behavior:
${{ }}expressions fromrun:blocks intoenv:mappings, preventing shell injectionIf this PR is not welcome, just close it and I won't send another.