GH-50077: [C++][IPC] Avoid int64 overflow in ReadSparseCSXIndex#50038
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GH-50077: [C++][IPC] Avoid int64 overflow in ReadSparseCSXIndex#50038jmestwa-coder wants to merge 1 commit into
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Done. Opened #50077 and retitled the PR to reference it, and restored the PR template in the description. |
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Pull request overview
This PR hardens the C++ IPC sparse tensor reader by preventing signed int64_t overflow when validating CSX (CSR/CSC) index buffer sizes in ReadSparseCSXIndex, closing an out-of-bounds read vector when parsing crafted IPC messages.
Changes:
- Use
internal::MultiplyWithOverflowto computeindices/indptrminimum byte sizes safely. - Use
internal::AddWithOverflowto compute(shape[axis] + 1)safely forindptrlength derivation. - Return
Status::Invalidwhen overflow is detected during size validation.
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| @@ -2336,26 +2337,40 @@ Result<std::shared_ptr<SparseIndex>> ReadSparseCSXIndex( | |||
| /*allow_short_read=*/false)); | |||
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| std::vector<int64_t> indices_shape({non_zero_length}); | |||
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Rationale for this change
ReadSparseCSXIndexvalidates the SparseTensorindices/indptrbuffer sizes against the claimed shape usingint64products (non_zero_length * byte_widthand(shape[axis] + 1) * byte_width). Both inputs come unchecked from the flatbuffer viaGetSparseTensorMetadata, so a value nearINT64_MAXoverflows the signed product (UBSan-confirmed), wraps to a small value, and the size guard passes. The indexTensoris then built over a buffer smaller than its shape, enabling an out-of-bounds read.What changes are included in this PR?
Compute the
indices/indptrbyte counts (and theshape[axis] + 1term) withMultiplyWithOverflow/AddWithOverflow, the same checked helpers already used for this size math intensor.cc, and returnStatus::Invalidwhen the computation overflows.Are these changes tested?
Covered by the existing sparse tensor IPC round-trip tests; the change only adds an overflow guard on the existing validation path.
Are there any user-facing changes?
No.