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docs: add a security policy with the container's threat model - #12

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Aug 8, 2026
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docs: add a security policy with the container's threat model#12
TheHefty merged 1 commit into
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docs/security-policy

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@TheHefty TheHefty commented Aug 8, 2026

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Adds SECURITY.md. Private vulnerability reporting is now enabled on the repo, so the policy points at GitHub's advisory flow rather than an email address.

The substance is the scope section. It separates the host boundary — the one that is meant to hold, and where a finding is a real vulnerability — from the boundaries inside the container, which are weaker on purpose.

In scope: escaping to the host, the nested rootless daemon reaching the host's daemon, code-server's port escaping loopback, credentials baked into the image, and supply-chain problems in the stack fragments.

Out of scope, named explicitly so they are not rediscovered as surprises and reported as bugs:

  • ai-jail's restrictions are advisory within the container — a --rw-map /config/.docker grant reaches the whole container's filesystem through the nested daemon.
  • code-server runs with an empty PASSWORD=, so any local user reaching the published loopback port gets a shell.
  • --cap-add=SYS_ADMIN plus the unconfined seccomp/systempaths exist so bwrap can create user namespaces.
  • Nested containers get no cgroup limits of their own.

Each points back at docs/OVERVIEW.md, which stays the authoritative account — this file summarises its conclusions, it does not restate them.

Docs-only, so release-please will not propose a release from it.

🤖 Generated with Claude Code

Private vulnerability reporting is now enabled on the repo, so the policy
points at GitHub's advisory flow rather than an email address.

The substance is the scope section. It separates the host boundary — the
one that is meant to hold, and where a finding is a real vulnerability —
from the boundaries inside the container, which are weaker on purpose.
The four deliberate ones are named explicitly so they are not rediscovered
as surprises and reported as bugs: ai-jail's restrictions are advisory
within the container (a `--rw-map /config/.docker` grant reaches the whole
container's filesystem through the nested daemon), code-server runs with
an empty PASSWORD, SYS_ADMIN plus the unconfined seccomp/systempaths exist
so bwrap can create user namespaces, and nested containers get no cgroup
limits of their own. Each points back at docs/OVERVIEW.md, which stays the
authoritative account.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
@TheHefty
TheHefty merged commit 800da40 into main Aug 8, 2026
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TheHefty deleted the docs/security-policy branch August 8, 2026 16:37
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