Take rustls 0.23.45 for RUSTSEC-2026-0285 - #79
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The release for 0.5.1 went red on `cargo audit` and `cargo deny`, which is the weekly advisory scan doing the job it exists for. RUSTSEC-2026-0285: rustls accepted TLS 1.3 handshake messages sent at the wrong encryption level when they followed a key-changing message in the same record -- a plaintext `EncryptedExtensions` packed in with the `ServerHello` was taken. RFC 8446 section 5.1 requires terminating with `unexpected_message` instead. Not exploitable here in the way the headline suggests. The transcript is still authenticated, so nobody alters or completes a handshake with it; and this daemon's TLS is a server on loopback that a browser on the same machine dials. Fixing it anyway, because "our deployment happens not to reach it" is a reason to be unhurried, not a reason to ship a known-defective TLS stack in a mode whose entire purpose is being a real secure context. Verified past the lockfile: the https e2e completes a real handshake against a real host and reports `isSecureContext`, which is the thing that would break if the bump had. Signed-off-by: Souta <shimozono-sota631@g.ecc.u-tokyo.ac.jp>
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The 0.5.1 release PR went red on
cargo auditandcargo deny— the advisory scan doing the job it exists for.RUSTSEC-2026-0285. rustls accepted TLS 1.3 handshake messages sent at the wrong encryption level when they followed a key-changing message in the same record; a plaintext
EncryptedExtensionspacked in with theServerHellowas taken. RFC 8446 §5.1 requires terminating withunexpected_messageinstead.Not exploitable here in the way the headline suggests: the transcript is still authenticated, so nobody alters or completes a handshake with it, and this daemon's TLS is a server on loopback dialled by a browser on the same machine. Fixed anyway — "our deployment happens not to reach it" is a reason to be unhurried, not a reason to ship a known-defective TLS stack in a mode whose whole purpose is being a real secure context.
Verified past the lockfile: the https e2e completes a real handshake against a real SSH host and reports
isSecureContext, which is what would break if the bump had.230 tests, 65 e2e checks, clippy clean.