Repository navigation
docs(security): say that CA keys stay in the TPM and a network HSM is out of scope - #49
Merged
Merged
Conversation
… out of scope Closes #42 Signed-off-by: Bugs5382 <12115015+Bugs5382@users.noreply.github.com>
Contributor
Author
|
Merging on the owner's approval. CI is green and the branch is clean. |
This file contains hidden or bidirectional Unicode text that may be interpreted or compiled differently than what appears below. To review, open the file in an editor that reveals hidden Unicode characters.
Learn more about bidirectional Unicode characters
Sign up for free
to join this conversation on GitHub.
Already have an account?
Sign in to comment
Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.This suggestion is invalid because no changes were made to the code.Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is closed.Suggestions cannot be applied while viewing a subset of changes.Only one suggestion per line can be applied in a batch.Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.Applying suggestions on deleted lines is not supported.You must change the existing code in this line in order to create a valid suggestion.Outdated suggestions cannot be applied.This suggestion has been applied or marked resolved.Suggestions cannot be applied from pending reviews.Suggestions cannot be applied on multi-line comments.Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is queued to merge.Suggestion cannot be applied right now. Please check back later.
What and why
The docs implied but never said that CryptOS keeps CA keys in the node's TPM and has no network HSM or PKCS#11 support. This adds a section, "A network HSM is out of scope", to the TPM concept page: what is out of scope and why, what
kmsmode does (it wraps only the state key; the CA key stays in software and stays exportable), and a caution sokmsisn't read as HSM support. The Trust Center control KEY-6 moves from planned to not planned, with that section as its public source, and the register test counts and tracked-issue list are updated to match (10 planned, 5 not planned).Needs the owner's read on the reason wording: it states the design reason (the key is made and signs in the node's TPM; an HSM adds a second custodian and a third-party PKCS#11 module on the signing path).
Closes #42
Verification
How this was verified
npm ci,npx eslint apps/site/app/content/trust(exit 0),npm test -w @cryptos-pki/site(47 pass, 0 fail),npm run build -w @cryptos-pki/docs(exit 0). Thekmsand export behaviour is as the page already documents it; no new claim about code beyond that.Merge note: the two draft PRs #36 and #37 are still open and are blocked on a real Proxmox run, so this is a second open PR in this repo.