diff --git a/tests/api/test_pkcs7.c b/tests/api/test_pkcs7.c
index 35661bb523..850da1930d 100644
--- a/tests/api/test_pkcs7.c
+++ b/tests/api/test_pkcs7.c
@@ -5320,3 +5320,111 @@ int test_wc_PKCS7_VerifySignedData_IndefLenOOB(void)
 #endif /* HAVE_PKCS7 && !NO_PKCS7_STREAM */
     return EXPECT_RESULT();
 }
+
+/*
+ * SignedData bundle truncated at the eContent [0] EXPLICIT tag in
+ * encapContentInfo. Verifies that the parser rejects the malformed
+ * input rather than dereferencing past the end of the buffer.
+ */
+int test_wc_PKCS7_VerifySignedData_TruncEContentTag(void)
+{
+    EXPECT_DECLS;
+#if defined(HAVE_PKCS7)
+    PKCS7* pkcs7 = NULL;
+
+    WOLFSSL_SMALL_STACK_STATIC byte der[] = {
+        /* outer ContentInfo SEQUENCE (75 bytes content) */
+        0x30, 0x4B,
+        /* contentType OID 1.2.840.113549.1.7.2 (signedData) */
+        0x06, 0x09, 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xF7, 0x0D, 0x01, 0x07, 0x02,
+        /* [0] EXPLICIT (62 bytes content) */
+        0xA0, 0x3E,
+        /* SignedData SEQUENCE (60 bytes content) */
+        0x30, 0x3C,
+        /* version INTEGER 1 */
+        0x02, 0x01, 0x01,
+        /* digestAlgorithms SET (empty - degenerate) */
+        0x31, 0x00,
+        /* encapContentInfo SEQUENCE (53 bytes content) */
+        0x30, 0x35,
+        /* eContentType OID with 50 bytes of arbitrary payload */
+        0x06, 0x32,
+        0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xF7, 0x0D, 0x01, 0x07, 0x01, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        /* eContent [0] EXPLICIT - buffer ends here, no length, no content */
+        0xA0
+    };
+    word32 derSz = (word32)sizeof(der);
+
+    ExpectNotNull(pkcs7 = wc_PKCS7_New(HEAP_HINT, testDevId));
+    ExpectIntEQ(wc_PKCS7_Init(pkcs7, HEAP_HINT, INVALID_DEVID), 0);
+    ExpectIntEQ(wc_PKCS7_InitWithCert(pkcs7, NULL, 0), 0);
+    ExpectIntNE(wc_PKCS7_VerifySignedData(pkcs7, der, derSz), 0);
+    wc_PKCS7_Free(pkcs7);
+
+#endif /* HAVE_PKCS7 */
+    return EXPECT_RESULT();
+}
+
+/*
+ * SignedData bundle truncated at the certificates [0] IMPLICIT tag.
+ * Verifies that the parser rejects the malformed input rather than
+ * dereferencing past the end of the buffer.
+ *
+ * TODO: limited to NO_PKCS7_STREAM because the streaming parser's stage 3
+ * early-exit check (pkcs7.c near line 6594) accepts any bundle
+ * whose remaining footer is < 6 bytes as a successful degenerate end,
+ * so the bounds check at line 6765 is unreachable in streaming mode.
+ * Drop the NO_PKCS7_STREAM gate if/when the early-exit check becomes
+ * more accurate.
+ */
+int test_wc_PKCS7_VerifySignedData_TruncCertSetTag(void)
+{
+    EXPECT_DECLS;
+#if defined(HAVE_PKCS7) && defined(NO_PKCS7_STREAM)
+    PKCS7* pkcs7 = NULL;
+
+    WOLFSSL_SMALL_STACK_STATIC byte der[] = {
+        /* outer ContentInfo SEQUENCE (78 bytes content) */
+        0x30, 0x4E,
+        /* contentType OID signedData */
+        0x06, 0x09, 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xF7, 0x0D, 0x01, 0x07, 0x02,
+        /* [0] EXPLICIT (65 bytes content) */
+        0xA0, 0x41,
+        /* SignedData SEQUENCE (63 bytes content) */
+        0x30, 0x3F,
+        /* version INTEGER 1 */
+        0x02, 0x01, 0x01,
+        /* digestAlgorithms SET (empty) */
+        0x31, 0x00,
+        /* encapContentInfo SEQUENCE (55 bytes content) */
+        0x30, 0x37,
+        /* eContentType OID 1.2.840.113549.1.7.1 (data) */
+        0x06, 0x09, 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xF7, 0x0D, 0x01, 0x07, 0x01,
+        /* eContent [0] EXPLICIT (42 bytes content) */
+        0xA0, 0x2A,
+        /* OCTET STRING (40 bytes content) */
+        0x04, 0x28,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        /* certificates [0] IMPLICIT - buffer ends here, no length */
+        0xA0
+    };
+    word32 derSz = (word32)sizeof(der);
+
+    ExpectNotNull(pkcs7 = wc_PKCS7_New(HEAP_HINT, testDevId));
+    ExpectIntEQ(wc_PKCS7_Init(pkcs7, HEAP_HINT, INVALID_DEVID), 0);
+    ExpectIntEQ(wc_PKCS7_InitWithCert(pkcs7, NULL, 0), 0);
+    ExpectIntNE(wc_PKCS7_VerifySignedData(pkcs7, der, derSz), 0);
+    wc_PKCS7_Free(pkcs7);
+
+#endif /* HAVE_PKCS7 && NO_PKCS7_STREAM */
+    return EXPECT_RESULT();
+}
+
diff --git a/tests/api/test_pkcs7.h b/tests/api/test_pkcs7.h
index f4aed161da..0f2866fc1c 100644
--- a/tests/api/test_pkcs7.h
+++ b/tests/api/test_pkcs7.h
@@ -68,6 +68,8 @@ int test_wc_PKCS7_DecodeEnvelopedData_multiple_recipients(void);
 int test_wc_PKCS7_DecodeEnvelopedData_forgedRecipientSetLen(void);
 int test_wc_PKCS7_VerifySignedData_PKCS7ContentSeq(void);
 int test_wc_PKCS7_VerifySignedData_IndefLenOOB(void);
+int test_wc_PKCS7_VerifySignedData_TruncEContentTag(void);
+int test_wc_PKCS7_VerifySignedData_TruncCertSetTag(void);
 
 
 #define TEST_PKCS7_DECLS                                        \
@@ -115,7 +117,9 @@ int test_wc_PKCS7_VerifySignedData_IndefLenOOB(void);
     TEST_DECL_GROUP("pkcs7_sd", test_wc_PKCS7_BER),                     \
     TEST_DECL_GROUP("pkcs7_sd", test_wc_PKCS7_NoDefaultSignedAttribs),  \
     TEST_DECL_GROUP("pkcs7_sd", test_wc_PKCS7_VerifySignedData_PKCS7ContentSeq), \
-    TEST_DECL_GROUP("pkcs7_sd", test_wc_PKCS7_VerifySignedData_IndefLenOOB)
+    TEST_DECL_GROUP("pkcs7_sd", test_wc_PKCS7_VerifySignedData_IndefLenOOB), \
+    TEST_DECL_GROUP("pkcs7_sd", test_wc_PKCS7_VerifySignedData_TruncEContentTag), \
+    TEST_DECL_GROUP("pkcs7_sd", test_wc_PKCS7_VerifySignedData_TruncCertSetTag)
 
 #define TEST_PKCS7_ENCRYPTED_DATA_DECLS                                     \
     TEST_DECL_GROUP("pkcs7_ed", test_wc_PKCS7_DecodeEnvelopedData_stream),  \
diff --git a/wolfcrypt/src/pkcs7.c b/wolfcrypt/src/pkcs7.c
index f85fd8b640..a4091890fd 100644
--- a/wolfcrypt/src/pkcs7.c
+++ b/wolfcrypt/src/pkcs7.c
@@ -6333,6 +6333,14 @@ static int PKCS7_VerifySignedData(wc_PKCS7* pkcs7, const byte* hashBuf,
              * OCTET_STRING will be next. If so, we use the length retrieved
              * there. PKCS#7 spec defines ANY as eContent type. In this case
              * we fall back and save this content length for use later */
+            if (ret == 0 && localIdx >= pkiMsgSz) {
+                /* Truncated input: don't dereference past the buffer.
+                 * Break out of the switch directly so the degenerate-
+                 * recovery path below cannot mask this error. */
+                ret = BUFFER_E;
+                break;
+            }
+
             if (ret == 0 && pkiMsg[localIdx] != ASN_INDEF_LENGTH) {
                 if (GetLength_ex(pkiMsg, &localIdx, &length, pkiMsgSz,
                         NO_USER_CHECK) <= 0) {
@@ -6590,6 +6598,14 @@ static int PKCS7_VerifySignedData(wc_PKCS7* pkcs7, const byte* hashBuf,
 
             /* check if bundle has more elements or footer, if not, set content
              * to pkcs7->content and hash to pkcs7->hash.
+             *
+             * NOTE: this check returns success whenever fewer than 6 bytes
+             * follow the content within the outer ContentInfo, which also
+             * accepts truncated bundles whose footer was cut short (e.g. a
+             * lone certificates [0] tag with no length). Distinguishing a
+             * legitimate degenerate end (such as an empty signerInfos SET
+             * "31 00") from truncated junk would require peeking at the
+             * remaining bytes or making stage 4's `expected` window smaller.
              */
             if (ret == 0 && pkcs7->stream->maxLen > 0 &&
                     (pkcs7->stream->maxLen - pkcs7->stream->totalRd)
@@ -6759,6 +6775,10 @@ static int PKCS7_VerifySignedData(wc_PKCS7* pkcs7, const byte* hashBuf,
                     && tag == (ASN_CONSTRUCTED | ASN_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 0)) {
                 idx++;
 
+                if (localIdx >= pkiMsg2Sz) {
+                    ret = BUFFER_E;
+                }
+
                 /* if certificates set has indefinite length, try to get
                  * the first certificate length of the set.
                  */
@@ -7269,11 +7289,16 @@ static int PKCS7_VerifySignedData(wc_PKCS7* pkcs7, const byte* hashBuf,
             /* make sure that terminating zero's follow */
             if ((ret == WC_NO_ERR_TRACE(PKCS7_SIGNEEDS_CHECK) || ret >= 0) &&
                     pkcs7->stream->indefLen == 1) {
-                word32 i;
-                for (i = 0; i < 3 * ASN_INDEF_END_SZ; i++) {
-                    if (pkiMsg2[idx + i] != 0) {
-                        ret = ASN_PARSE_E;
-                        break;
+                if (idx + (3 * ASN_INDEF_END_SZ) > pkiMsg2Sz) {
+                    ret = ASN_PARSE_E;
+                }
+                else {
+                    word32 i;
+                    for (i = 0; i < 3 * ASN_INDEF_END_SZ; i++) {
+                        if (pkiMsg2[idx + i] != 0) {
+                            ret = ASN_PARSE_E;
+                            break;
+                        }
                     }
                 }
             }