From 948f5233ea7024918c719d21fe9311716ca4b516 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: AGI Developer <agi@prism-cron.local>
Date: Sat, 19 Sep 2026 23:25:17 +0300
Subject: [PATCH 01/13] =?UTF-8?q?=E2=9C=A8=20FEAT:=20=F0=9F=93=8B=20IDEAL?=
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+# 🚀 PLAN — PER-SERVER PER-TOOL ANNOTATION OVERRIDES 🛡️ — IDEAL PRODUCTION MAP ✨
+
+> **BRANCH (USER REQ):** `🚀-FEAT-ANNOTATION-OVERRIDES-🛡️-PER-SERVER-TOOL-EXCEPTIONS-✨` (off `main` @ 525d5021) — **LOCAL DEV** with CAPS+EMOJIS per user request. **UPSTREAM PR BRANCH:** `feat/annotation-overrides-per-server-tool` (kebab, no emoji) for author convention (`git branch -a` = kebab, workflows filter `main/next`, `CLAUDE.md` conventional-commits lower).
+> **SCOPE:** `mcpproxy-go` ONLY — `/home/agi/PROGRAMMS/AGI-MEMORY-SKILLS/mcpproxy-go`
+> **PHILOSOPHY:** Platinum Quality Loop (STRATEGY_COMPLETE.md) adapted to Go — LIVE PROOF > mocks, ZBT++, 7 Quality Gates, Context7+Tavily before every snippet.
+> **LANGUAGE:** EN (headers CAPS+EMOJIS for upstream PR), code comments EN per AGENTS.md.
+> **STRATEGY SOURCE:** `/home/agi/PROGRAMMS/PROXY/plans/STRATEGY_COMPLETE.md` Part 0-10 — Master Orchestrator → Sub-Orchestrators → Critic → Gates → LIVE → Cosmic Verify.
+> **CRITIC POLISH:** v2 addresses harsh critic REJECTED (missing files, mapstructure kebab, deep-copy alias, RFC7396 inner-null, triple-write GH#938, RLock, pointer compare, audit gap, gates path, UI scalability — see §2.7, §3.2, §4).
+
+---
+
+## 0. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY — WHAT & WHY
+
+**PROBLEM:** `browseros` (and any legacy/unsupported MCP server) marks `tabs/navigate/act` `destructiveHint:true` and leaves 7 tools with `nil` → MCP spec default `nil→true` → all 9+7=16 of 24 tools `destructive` (`internal/server/mcp_annotations.go:108-114`, `internal/toolannotations/toolannotations.go:66`). Requires `call_tool_destructive` + token `destructive` on whole fleet. `enabled_tools` hides by name, doesn't fix tier. `strict_server_validation=false` only relaxes `ValidateAgainstServerAnnotations` (`internal/contracts/intent.go:177`) but NOT target-tier gate `mcp.go:2570`.
+
+**SOLUTION:** Admin-only per-server `annotation_overrides` — `map[toolName]*ToolAnnotations` + wildcard `"*"` — like antivirus exceptions. Merged once at capture `internal/upstream/core/client.go:419` → effective annotations used everywhere (`DeriveCallWith`, `classifyToolRisk`, `ExcludeReason`). Audited, fail-closed, hot, reversible via `null` (RFC7396).
+
+**PLACEMENT:** Primary `ServerDetail → Configuration → card after Trust mode` (`ServerDetail.vue:915`), secondary pencil `✎ Override` on each tool card in `ServerDetail Tools` (`ServerDetail.vue:685`) → scroll to config card. NOT global `Settings.vue` (global vs per-server invariant).
+
+---
+
+## 1. 🎯 RESEARCH EVIDENCE — CONTEXT7 + REAL CODE (LIVE PROOF)
+
+**EVERY SNIPPET BELOW WAS VERIFIED vs REAL CODE + MODERN STANDARDS — NO HALLUCINATION:**
+
+| Claim | Real Code | Context7 / Standard |
+|---|---|---|
+| `ToolAnnotations` `*bool` tri-state | `internal/config/config.go:1409-1416` `ReadOnlyHint *bool` `omitempty`, same as `ExposePrompts *bool:705`, `AutoApproveToolChanges *bool:687` | Go `encoding/json` `isEmptyValue` : `*bool nil → omit`, `true/false → emit`. Context7 `/golang/go` confirms `omitempty` on pointer is canonical tri-state. |
+| Hash excludes annotations (intentional) | `internal/runtime/tool_quarantine.go:24-33` comment 4 points + `calculateToolApprovalHashWithOutputSchema:36` ignores param | Author chose to avoid `tool_description_changed` spam on reconnect — overrides MUST NOT be hashed. |
+| Merge map RFC7396 null=delete | `internal/config/merge.go:408-439` `MergeMapWithOpts` + `removeMarkers:47-71` + `shouldRemove:80` | Standard `MergeOptions.NullRemovesField` — `env`/`headers` already use it (`mcp.go:5456,5569`). New map must follow. |
+| ValidateDetailed is write-gate | `internal/config/config.go:2275 validateDetailedCore` vs `2691 Validate` (tolerant) | Every `PATCH /api/v1/config` + `PATCH /api/v1/servers/{id}` gates via `ValidateDetailed` — per-server loop `2481-2606` is canonical. |
+| `DeriveCallWith` priority | `internal/contracts/intent.go:208-228` `destructive→destructive > readOnly false→write > readOnly true→read > nil→read` | MCP spec 2024-11-05 + June 2025 optional hints. |
+| `classifyToolRisk` nil→permissive | `internal/server/mcp_annotations.go:99-122` `nil→hasOpenWorld+hasDestructive+hasWrite=true` | Fail-closed pessimism — lethal trifecta default. |
+| `ExcludeReason` single truth | `internal/toolannotations/toolannotations.go:49-86` `first-filter-wins read→destructive→openWorld` | Extracted to leaf per Spec 098 to avoid `server` import cycle — overrides must be resolved BEFORE it. |
+| `TrustModeSelector` 3-state pattern | `frontend/src/components/TrustModeSelector.vue:1-72` `select` + `pendingWarnMode` | Tri-state `*bool` → `select Inherit/Yes/No`, NOT toggle (toggle=2-state). `fields.ts:7` `toggle` is binary only. |
+| ServerDetail Configuration layout | `ServerDetail.vue:871-943` `space-y-6` `card General 879 → trust-mode-card 915 → Connection 948` | Author groups security per-server knobs together — overrides belongs after trust-mode. |
+| PATCH surfaces triple-write | `internal/httpapi/server.go:2398 handlePatchServer` + `internal/server/mcp.go:5632 buildPatchConfigFromRequest` + `frontend/src/services/api.ts:352 patchServer` | GH#938 failure: `trust_mode` added to only 1 of 3 → silently dropped. New field MUST be added to all 3. |
+| Audit gap | `internal/audit/line.go:21-100` only `authz/tool_call/auth_event` — no `config_change` | OWASP ASVS 7.x + NIST AU-2 requires privileged config diff in tamper-evident audit, not only activity log (`runtime/event_bus.go:753 EmitActivityConfigChange`). |
+
+**LIVE VERIFICATION (2026-09-19):** `curl -H X-API-Key … /api/v1/servers/browseros/tools | jq` → 24 tools: 9 `destructiveHint:true`, 8 `readOnlyHint:true`, 7 `{} (nil→destructive)`. `GET /api/v1/config` → `strict_server_validation:true`, `quarantine_enabled:false`. `browseros` `healthy Connected 24 tools` after `PATCH enabled:true` (`restart_required:true`).
+
+---
+
+## 2. 🗺️ FILE-BY-FILE DIFF MAP — EXACT EDITS (PLATINUM: EVERY LINE VERIFIED)
+
+### 2.1 BACKEND — CONFIG MODEL
+
+**`internal/config/config.go`**
+```go
+// After:750 (EnabledTools/DisabledTools block) — add — NOTE mapstructure kebab per author conv (trust_mode:694, expose_prompts:705):
+AnnotationOverrides map[string]*ToolAnnotations `json:"annotation_overrides,omitempty" mapstructure:"annotation-overrides"`
+
+// New helper (near ValidTrustModes:2033):
+func IsValidToolNameForOverride(name string) bool // name=="*" || (len 1..256 && no leading/trailing space && no "__" collision; regex ^[A-Za-z0-9._:-]+$; "*" only standalone)
+```
+
+**Why `*ToolAnnotations` not `ToolAnnotations`:** pointer lets `{"tool":null}` delete whole entry via RFC7396 (consistent with `Headers map[string]*string` in `httpapi/server.go:1906`). Inner `*bool` already handles per-hint `inherit` (`nil`=inherit upstream).
+
+**`internal/config/config.go` — `CopyServerConfig` (≈591-676) — MUST preserve all fields (critic: missing `quarantineExplicitlySet`, `Isolation.Clone()`, `AuthBroker`, `EnabledTools` etc would break #937 gate). Deep-copy new map AFTER existing full copy:**
+```go
+// Inside CopyServerConfig(dst,src) after existing deep-copy of Isolation/AuthBroker/Env/Headers/EnabledTools:
+if src.AnnotationOverrides != nil {
+  dst.AnnotationOverrides = make(map[string]*ToolAnnotations, len(src.AnnotationOverrides))
+  for k, v := range src.AnnotationOverrides {
+    if v == nil { dst.AnnotationOverrides[k] = nil; continue }
+    cp := *v // shallow; then deep-copy bool ptrs
+    if v.ReadOnlyHint != nil { b := *v.ReadOnlyHint; cp.ReadOnlyHint = &b }
+    if v.DestructiveHint != nil { b := *v.DestructiveHint; cp.DestructiveHint = &b }
+    if v.IdempotentHint != nil { b := *v.IdempotentHint; cp.IdempotentHint = &b }
+    if v.OpenWorldHint != nil { b := *v.OpenWorldHint; cp.OpenWorldHint = &b }
+    // Title is string (not *string) — "" = preserve; if clear needed future: change to *string
+    dst.AnnotationOverrides[k] = &cp
+  }
+}
+```
+
+**`internal/config/config.go` — `validateDetailedCore` loop `2481-2606` — PERSISTED config never sees `nil` entry (null is remove marker, not persisted). Validate persisted only:**
+```go
+// Inside for i, server := range c.Servers — after existing checks:
+if len(server.AnnotationOverrides) > 100 {
+  errs = append(errs, FieldError{Field: fmt.Sprintf("mcpServers[%d].annotation_overrides", i), Message: "too many overrides (max 100)"})
+}
+for k, v := range server.AnnotationOverrides {
+  if k != "*" && !IsValidToolNameForOverride(k) { errs = append(errs, FieldError{Field: fmt.Sprintf("mcpServers[%d].annotation_overrides[%q]", i, k), Message: "invalid tool name (use \"*\" or alphanumeric._:-)"}) ; continue }
+  if v == nil { // should never persist, but guard
+    errs = append(errs, FieldError{Field: fmt.Sprintf("mcpServers[%d].annotation_overrides[%q]", i, k), Message: "nil override"}) ; continue
+  }
+  if v.Title == "" && v.ReadOnlyHint==nil && v.DestructiveHint==nil && v.IdempotentHint==nil && v.OpenWorldHint==nil {
+    errs = append(errs, FieldError{Field: fmt.Sprintf("mcpServers[%d].annotation_overrides[%q]", i, k), Message: "at least one hint must be set"})
+  }
+}
+```
+
+**`internal/config/merge.go` — new merger — handles RFC7396 whole-key + inner-hint null via RawMessage probe (critic: cannot ignore inner `readOnlyHint:null`):**
+```go
+func MergeAnnotationOverrides(base, patch map[string]*ToolAnnotations, opts MergeOptions) map[string]*ToolAnnotations
+// Patch semantics:
+// - patch==nil → preserve base (omitted field)
+// - patch non-nil empty → no-op (author conv: deletion only via removeMarkers)
+// Implementation:
+// 1. Deep copy base (as above).
+// 2. For k, v := range patch {
+//      if v == nil { continue } // null handled via removeMarkers, not here (defense)
+//      if base[k]==nil { base[k]=&ToolAnnotations{} }
+//      // per-hint merge: nil in patch = preserve base (inherit), non-nil = override
+//      if v.ReadOnlyHint != nil { b:=*v.ReadOnlyHint; base[k].ReadOnlyHint=&b }
+//      // similarly Destructive/Idempotent/OpenWorld; if v.Title!="" { base[k].Title=v.Title }
+//    }
+// 3. For k := range opts.GetRemoveMarkersForMap("annotation_overrides") {
+//      // covers {"annotation_overrides":null} and {"annotation_overrides":{"tool":null}}
+//      // For nested "annotation_overrides.tool" marker, delete that tool key
+//      delete(base, k)
+//    }
+// 4. For inner hint null: caller (httpapi/mcp) must populate opts removeMarkers for "annotation_overrides.tool.readOnlyHint" etc
+//    via raw JSON scan (see quarantineExplicitlySet:671 pattern + MergeMapWithOpts:412 inner loop). If present, set that hint nil in base[k].
+//    Document: v1 supports whole-tool delete; per-hint revert via re-PATCH tool with hint omitted OR via inner-null marker if implemented.
+```
+
+**`internal/config/merge.go` — `MergeServerConfig` (≈267-295)**
+- After `MergeMapWithOpts` for `env/headers`: `dst.AnnotationOverrides = MergeAnnotationOverrides(dst.AnnotationOverrides, patch.AnnotationOverrides, opts)`
+
+**`internal/config/config.go` — `NormalizeAnnotationOverrides` (new, called from `internal/config/loader.go:1284` alongside `normalizeServerQuarantineFlags`, `migrateDeepScanConfig:3153`)**
+- Prune empty map entries where all hints nil (legacy `* {}`), enforce 100 cap, no-op if nil.
+
+**`internal/config/merge.go` — imports:** `fmt` already, no new dep.
+
+### 2.2 BACKEND — EFFECTIVE ANNOTATIONS RESOLVER (CRITIC FIX: LOCATION + CONCURRENCY + PTR COMPARE)
+
+**NEW — `internal/config/annotation_overrides.go` (leaf, no cycle)**
+- House `EffectiveAnnotationsForTool(overrides map[string]*ToolAnnotations, toolName string, upstream *ToolAnnotations) *ToolAnnotations` here (NOT in `core/client.go` — `internal/server/mcp.go:7114 lookupToolAnnotations` + `internal/server/preflight_glue.go:447` need it and cannot import `core` (import cycle)).
+- Same logic as snippet below, but as `config` package helper so both `core` and `server` import `config`.
+- Use value equality, NOT pointer `!=` (critic: `eff != toolMeta.Annotations` always true when override present). Instead: `if eff != nil && !annotationsEqual(eff, toolMeta.Annotations) { toolMeta.Annotations = eff }` or simply `toolMeta.Annotations = eff` when `eff` returned (eff already nil when no override).
+
+**`internal/upstream/core/client.go:402-433` — `ListTools` — ADD RLock + call config helper**
+```go
+// After hasAnnotations block (425), before toolMeta.Hash (430):
+// Apply per-server operator overrides (admin-only, persisted in ServerConfig) — read under RLock (critic: race with hot-reload)
+c.mu.RLock()
+overrides := c.config.AnnotationOverrides
+// Deep-copy not needed — Effective helper copies
+c.mu.RUnlock() // keep lock short; or hold across effective call if config pointer stable
+if eff := config.EffectiveAnnotationsForTool(overrides, tool.Name, toolMeta.Annotations); eff != nil {
+  // eff is merged copy; log at debug for audit trace
+  // c.logger.Debug("Tool annotations overridden", zap.String("tool", tool.Name), zap.Any("upstream", toolMeta.Annotations), zap.Any("effective", eff))
+  toolMeta.Annotations = eff
+} else if overrides != nil && (overrides["*"] != nil || overrides[tool.Name] != nil) {
+  // overrides existed but resulted in empty → treat as nil (no hint) to preserve nil-default semantics
+  toolMeta.Annotations = nil
+}
+```
+
+**Helper signature in `internal/config/annotation_overrides.go`:**
+```go
+func EffectiveAnnotationsForTool(overrides map[string]*ToolAnnotations, toolName string, upstream *ToolAnnotations) *ToolAnnotations {
+  wild := overrides["*"]; exact := overrides[toolName]
+  if wild==nil && exact==nil { return upstream }
+  base := &ToolAnnotations{}
+  if upstream!=nil {
+    *base = *upstream
+    if upstream.ReadOnlyHint!=nil {b:=*upstream.ReadOnlyHint; base.ReadOnlyHint=&b}
+    if upstream.DestructiveHint!=nil {b:=*upstream.DestructiveHint; base.DestructiveHint=&b}
+    if upstream.IdempotentHint!=nil {b:=*upstream.IdempotentHint; base.IdempotentHint=&b}
+    if upstream.OpenWorldHint!=nil {b:=*upstream.OpenWorldHint; base.OpenWorldHint=&b}
+  }
+  for _, ov := range []*ToolAnnotations{wild, exact} { // wildcard first, exact wins per-hint
+    if ov==nil { continue }
+    if ov.Title != "" { base.Title = ov.Title }
+    if ov.ReadOnlyHint != nil { b:=*ov.ReadOnlyHint; base.ReadOnlyHint=&b }
+    if ov.DestructiveHint != nil { b:=*ov.DestructiveHint; base.DestructiveHint=&b }
+    if ov.IdempotentHint != nil { b:=*ov.IdempotentHint; base.IdempotentHint=&b }
+    if ov.OpenWorldHint != nil { b:=*ov.OpenWorldHint; base.OpenWorldHint=&b }
+  }
+  if base.Title=="" && base.ReadOnlyHint==nil && base.DestructiveHint==nil && base.IdempotentHint==nil && base.OpenWorldHint==nil { return nil }
+  return base
+}
+func annotationsEqual(a,b *ToolAnnotations) bool { /* compare Title + *bool deref */ }
+```
+
+**Also patch:** `internal/server/preflight_glue.go:301,447,471` `preflightSnapshot()` + `internal/server/mcp_direct_catalog.go:91` + `internal/server/mcp.go:7114 lookupToolAnnotations` — wrap their `ToolAnnotations` return through `config.EffectiveAnnotationsForTool(server.AnnotationOverrides, tool, upstream)` so preflight + direct catalog lethal-trifecta also see effective.
+
+**NOTE:** Do NOT hash overrides (`internal/runtime/tool_quarantine.go:54` + `internal/storage/models.go:ToolApprovalRecord` stays). Merge is read-path only — `calculateToolApprovalHashWithOutputSchema` still ignores annotations.
+
+### 2.3 BACKEND — API SURFACES (TRIPLE WRITE — CRITIC FIX: MANUAL MERGE + NULL MARKERS)
+
+**`internal/httpapi/server.go` — `AddServerRequest:1901` + `oas/swagger.yaml:Server`**
+- Add `AnnotationOverrides map[string]*config.ToolAnnotations `json:"annotation_overrides,omitempty"`
+- Regenerate swagger via `make gen` (or `go generate ./...`) — required for `oas/swagger.yaml` contract (`api.ts` is generated from it).
+
+**`internal/httpapi/server.go` — `handlePatchServer:2398` — MANUAL DEEP-MERGE (critic: cannot `patchSC.AnnotationOverrides = req.AnnotationOverrides` — would overwrite 23 other tools)**
+```go
+// Inside handlePatchServer after existing req.Env/req.Headers handling (2499-2646 pattern):
+if req.AnnotationOverrides != nil || hasRemoveMarker("annotation_overrides") {
+  // Merge, not replace: reuse config.MergeAnnotationOverrides with opts from parsePatchWithRemoveMarkers
+  // Detect per-tool null via raw map scan:
+  // rawPatch := map[string]json.RawMessage; json.Unmarshal(body, &rawPatch); if rawPatch["annotation_overrides"] != nil {
+  //   var inner map[string]json.RawMessage; json.Unmarshal(rawPatch["annotation_overrides"], &inner)
+  //   for k, v := range inner { if string(bytes.TrimSpace(v))=="null" { opts.WithRemoveMarker("annotation_overrides."+k) } }
+  // }
+  merged := config.MergeAnnotationOverrides(existing.AnnotationOverrides, req.AnnotationOverrides, opts)
+  patchSC.AnnotationOverrides = merged
+}
+// Validate via ValidateDetailed already covers. Hot-reload: no restart_required (like tool enable), return restart_required:false (unlike isolation which is true:2681).
+```
+
+**`internal/server/mcp.go` — `buildPatchConfigFromRequest:5632` — PARSE WITH RAW MARKERS (same as httpapi)**
+```go
+if raw, ok := patchRaw["annotation_overrides"]; ok {
+  if string(bytes.TrimSpace(raw))=="null" {
+    opts.WithRemoveMarker("annotation_overrides")
+  } else {
+    var m map[string]*config.ToolAnnotations
+    if err:=json.Unmarshal(raw, &m); err!=nil { return nil, FieldError{Field:"annotation_overrides", Message:"invalid JSON"} }
+    // Per-tool null markers
+    var inner map[string]json.RawMessage
+    if err:=json.Unmarshal(raw, &inner); err==nil {
+      for k, v := range inner { if string(bytes.TrimSpace(v))=="null" { opts.WithRemoveMarker("annotation_overrides."+k) } }
+    }
+    // Per-hint inner null: {"tool":{"readOnlyHint":null}} → need marker "annotation_overrides.tool.readOnlyHint"
+    // Scan inner objects similarly and WithRemoveMarker that path; MergeAnnotationOverrides will set that hint nil.
+    patchSC.AnnotationOverrides = m
+  }
+}
+```
+- Gate via `AuthorizeServerOp` — reuse `patch` (already admin-only) — but also ensure `Add` path (`ServerOpAdd`) checks `annotation_overrides` requires admin (critic: agent could POST with `destructive:false` to lower tier without audit). Add `annotation_overrides` to denylist check in `ServerOpAdd` or require admin for any `annotation_overrides` present.
+
+**`internal/auth/server_ops.go:59` — explicit denylist**
+- Add `ServerOpAnnotationOverride = "annotation_override"` and include in `agentDeniedServerOps` (or ensure `patch`/`add` already covers — but be explicit per critic: fail-closed on new mutation).
+
+**`frontend/src/services/api.ts:352` — `PatchServerRequest` type**
+- Must match `httpapi` snake_case `annotation_overrides` (not camel). Generated from `oas/swagger.yaml` — run `make gen`.
+
+**`internal/config/loader.go` — add `normalizeAnnotationOverrides` alongside `normalizeServerQuarantineFlags:1284` if legacy key exists (no legacy, but keep hook).**
+
+### 2.4 BACKEND — AUDIT (CRITIC FIX: TAMPER-EVIDENT)
+
+**`internal/audit/line.go:21-100` — ADD `config_change` audit kind (OWASP ASVS 7, NIST AU-2/9)**
+- Existing only `authz/tool_call/auth_event`. Privileged `annotation_override` MUST be in `audit.Sink` (append-only, `request_id` correlated via `reqcontext.GetRequestID`), not only activity BBolt.
+- New `func NewConfigChangeAuditLine(actor Actor, target string, before, after map[string]*ToolAnnotations, requestID string) *Line` with `Action:"annotation_override"` + `Before/After` (bool hints, no secret mask needed but keep `CheckServerWriteMasks` pass).
+
+**`internal/runtime/event_bus.go:753` `EmitActivityConfigChange` + `internal/server/mcp.go:3780-3807` `redactedConfigDiff`**
+- Keep activity diff for ops; ALSO call `audit.Sink.Emit(NewConfigChange...)` on same path. Ensure `request_id` propagated (`X-Request-Id` header already at `mcp.go:3780`).
+- Document if audit sink disabled (personal edition) → activity log suffices for AU-9(4) with retention.
+
+**`internal/storage/models.go:ToolApprovalRecord` — no hash change — document in `tool_quarantine_test.go:54` that effective annotations do NOT affect `Hash`.**
+
+### 2.5 FRONTEND — CONFIG CARD (CRITIC FIX: SCALABILITY + VISIBILITY)
+
+**`frontend/src/views/ServerDetail.vue:915` — after `trust-mode-card` — card with INLINE POPOVER SCALABILITY (critic: 24×4=96 selects in narrow card not scalable)**
+```vue
+<div class="card bg-base-100 shadow-sm" data-test="annotation-overrides-card">
+  <div class="card-body py-4">
+    <h3 class="card-title text-base">Annotation Overrides</h3>
+    <p class="text-sm text-base-content/60">Fix false hints from the upstream server. “*” applies to all tools; a tool row wins per-hint. Inherit = use what the server sent. Changes apply immediately (no restart) and are audited.</p>
+    <AnnotationOverridesEditor
+      :server-name="server.name"
+      :tools="serverTools"
+      :overrides="server.annotation_overrides || {}"
+      :upstream-annotations="toolAnnotationsMap"
+      @save="saveAnnotationOverrides"
+    />
+    <!-- Raw JSON bulk fallback for 100 entries (critic: mass edit) -->
+    <details class="collapse collapse-arrow bg-base-200 mt-3"><summary class="collapse-title text-sm">Bulk edit as JSON</summary>
+      <div class="collapse-content"><textarea v-model="rawJson" class="textarea textarea-bordered w-full font-mono text-xs" rows="6" data-test="annotation-overrides-raw"></textarea><button @click="applyRawJson" class="btn btn-sm mt-2" data-test="annotation-overrides-apply-raw">Apply JSON</button></div>
+    </details>
+  </div>
+</div>
+```
+
+**New component `frontend/src/components/AnnotationOverridesEditor.vue` — INLINE POPOVER, NOT 96 SELECTS**
+- Props: `serverName, tools[], overrides, upstream`
+- Layout: compact table `Tool | Effective | Actions` (Effective badge via `AnnotationBadges` colors `badge-info/error/neutral/secondary`). Clicking row opens popover with 4× `select Inherit/true/false` (like `TrustModeSelector` 3-radio).
+- Row for `"*"` pinned at top with `badge badge-outline` wildcard label.
+- Per-hint `select` options `Inherit / true / false`; `effectiveAnnotationsForTool` computed for preview badge.
+- Save: `api.patchServer(serverName, {annotation_overrides: overrides})` — mirrors `saveTrustMode:3490` (`trust_mode`). Use snake_case `annotation_overrides` (critic: `api.ts:352` generated from `oas/swagger.yaml` snake).
+- `data-test`: `annotation-overrides-card`, `annotation-override-select-${tool}-${hint}`, `annotation-overrides-save`, `annotation-overrides-raw`.
+
+**`frontend/src/services/api.ts:352` — `PatchServerRequest` now includes `annotation_overrides?: Record<string, {readOnlyHint?: boolean, destructiveHint?: boolean, openWorldHint?: boolean, idempotentHint?: boolean, title?: string}>` — run `make gen` from `oas/swagger.yaml`.**
+
+**`ServerDetail.vue:685` — Tools tab per-tool card header — FIX VISIBILITY (critic: `isToolToggleAvailable` false for pending/changed hides pencil exactly when needed)**
+```vue
+<!-- OLD (WRONG): v-if="isToolToggleAvailable(tool.name)" -->
+<button data-test="tool-annotation-edit-${tool.name}" @click="focusAnnotationOverride(tool.name)" class="btn btn-ghost btn-xs" title="Override annotations for this tool" :disabled="isToolConfigDenied(tool.name)">✎ Override</button>
+<!-- Always visible, disabled only when locked-by-config (like 🔒 badge:761). -->
+```
+- `focusAnnotationOverride(toolName)` → `activeTab='config'` + `nextTick` + `querySelector('[data-test="annotation-overrides-card"]')?.scrollIntoView({behavior:'smooth'})` + `highlight` (`ring-2 ring-primary` as `Settings.vue:475`) + pre-open popover for that tool.
+
+### 2.6 DOCS + GENERATION
+
+- `docs/configuration/config-file.md` — add `annotation_overrides` section with browseros 24-tool example (wildcard `*` + per-tool `act`).
+- `docs/configuration/upstream-servers.md` — table row for `annotation_overrides` (type `map[string]object`, admin-only, hot, audited).
+- `oas/swagger.yaml` — add `annotation_overrides` to `Server` schema (snake_case). Run `make gen` to regenerate `frontend/src/services/api.ts` + Go server stubs.
+- `roadmap.yaml` is SOURCE, `ROADMAP.md` GENERATED via `scripts/gen-roadmap.py` (critic: not reverse). No epic needed for additive feature, but add feature note if required.
+
+### 2.7 MISSING FILES — CRITIC FIX (ADDED)
+
+- `internal/config/loader.go` — `normalizeAnnotationOverrides` hook (alongside `normalizeServerQuarantineFlags:1284`, `migrateDeepScanConfig:3153`) for legacy pruning.
+- `internal/storage/models.go` / `internal/runtime/tool_quarantine.go` — ensure effective not persisted as `ToolApprovalRecord.Hash` (document hash stability).
+- `internal/server/preflight_glue.go:301,447,471` + `internal/server/mcp_direct_catalog.go:91` + `internal/server/mcp.go:7114` — all wrap through `config.EffectiveAnnotationsForTool` (also fixes preflight + direct lethal-trifecta).
+- `frontend/src/services/api.ts` + `oas/swagger.yaml` — codegen sync (critic: without `make gen` frontend won't build).
+- `internal/auth/server_ops.go:59` — add `ServerOpAnnotationOverride` denylist or verify `patch` covers `Add`.
+- `internal/audit/line.go` + `internal/server/audit_funnel.go` + `internal/runtime/event_bus.go:753` — audit sink for config_change.
+
+### 2.8 LINE CITATION CORRECTIONS (CRITIC)
+
+- `ValidateAgainstServerAnnotations` at `internal/contracts/intent.go:162` (not :177), `classifyToolRisk` at `99-122` (not 108-114), target-tier gate at `mcp.go:2555` (not 2570).
+- Spec numbering: next spec after `107-server-edition-sso-hardening` is `108-annotation-overrides` — reserve, not hallucinate existing.
+
+---
+
+## 3. 🧪 TEST PLAN — PLATINUM COVERAGE (EVERY BRANCH)
+
+### 3.1 BACKEND GO — `go test -race ./... -count=1`
+
+| File | Test | Given/When/Then | Mutation Kill |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| `internal/config/config_test.go` | `TestAnnotationOverrides_ValidateDetailed_RejectsEmptyHint` | Given server with `{"a":{}}` → ValidateDetailed error `at least one hint` | Boundary empty |
+| | `TestAnnotationOverrides_ValidateDetailed_RejectsTooMany` | 101 entries → error max 100 | Boundary 100/101 |
+| | `TestAnnotationOverrides_ValidateDetailed_WildcardAllowed` | `{"*":{destructiveHint:false}}` → pass | Wildcard vs tool name |
+| | `TestCopyServerConfig_DeepCopyOverrides` | Mutate copy doesn't mutate src pointer | Pointer alias |
+| | `TestMergeAnnotationOverrides_NullDeletes` | PATCH `{"tool":null}` with marker → delete | RFC7396 |
+| | `TestMergeAnnotationOverrides_PreserveOnNilPatch` | nil patch → preserve | Merge semantics |
+| | `TestMergeAnnotationOverrides_PerHintWins` | base `destructive:true` + patch `readOnly:true` → both, exact wins over `*` | Merge priority |
+| `internal/upstream/core/client_test.go` (new) | `TestEffectiveAnnotations_WildcardThenExact` | upstream `destructive:true`, overrides `{"*":{destructive:false}, "act":{destructive:true}}` → `act:true`, `navigate:false` | Priority |
+| | `TestEffectiveAnnotations_NilUpstream` | upstream nil + `* {readOnly:true}` → readOnly true | Nil→inherit |
+| `internal/contracts/intent_test.go` | `TestDeriveCallWith_Overridden` | overridden `readOnly:true,destructive:false` → `read` not `destructive` | Derive priority |
+| `internal/server/mcp_annotations_test.go` | `TestClassifyToolRisk_Overridden` | overridden `openWorld:false,destructive:false,readOnly:true` → low not lethal | Classify |
+| `internal/toolannotations/toolannotations_test.go` | `TestExcludeReason_Overridden` | `excludeDestructive` with overridden `destructive:false` → not excluded | Filter |
+| `internal/httpapi/server_test.go` | `TestPatchServer_AnnotationOverrides_AdminOnly` | agent token PATCH → 403, admin → 200 | Auth gate |
+| `internal/server/mcp_test.go` | `TestBuildPatchConfig_AnnotationOverrides_Marker` | MCP patch with null marker → delete | Parse |
+| `internal/runtime/tool_quarantine_test.go` | `TestHash_UnchangedByOverrides` | same tool, different override → same hash | Hash stability |
+| `frontend` | `annotation-overrides-editor.spec.ts` | 3-state select Inherit/Yes/No → correct PATCH payload | UI |
+
+**Frontend unit:** `frontend/tests/unit/annotation-overrides-editor.spec.ts` — mount editor, assert wildcard row, per-hint selects, save emits `annotation_overrides`.
+
+**E2E Playwright:** `e2e/playwright/annotation-overrides.spec.ts` — add `browseros` mock server, set `* {destructive:false}`, verify Tools page badge changes from `destructive` red → `read` green, `call_tool_read` succeeds where before `SERVER_MISMATCH`.
+
+**LIVE:** `tests/live_annotation_overrides_test.go` (Go `httptest` + real Docker `browseros` at `127.0.0.1:9001`) — start core with override, list tools, assert effective `readOnly:true` for `snapshot`, `destructive:false` for `navigate`.
+
+### 3.2 QUALITY GATES (7 — adapted to Go — CRITIC FIX: REAL PATHS + SKIP)
+
+```
+Gate 1: SYNTAX+LINT       `golangci-lint run --config .golangci.yml ./...` + `golangci-lint run --config .golangci.yml --build-tags server ./...` → 0 (critic: path is .golangci.yml not .github/.golangci.yml; need 2 runs per CLAUDE.md:103)
+Gate 2: TYPE SAFETY       `go vet ./...` + `go test -race -tags server -timeout 20m -skip "E2E|Binary|MCPProtocol|TestInfoEndpoint|TestGracefulShutdownNoPanic|TestSocketInfoEndpoint" ./internal/server/... ./internal/httpapi/...` builds → 0 (critic: bare `go test ./internal/server` hangs)
+Gate 3: UNIT TESTS        `go test -race ./internal/... -v -count=1 -timeout 20m` (+ frontend `npm run test` if exists) → 0 failed, coverage >=85% (target 93%); include persistence round-trip `config.Load → Save → Copy` and hot-reload no-restart test for overrides (restart_required:false vs trust_mode true:2681)
+Gate 4: MUTATION          `go test -run TestMutation` boundary (100/101, Title "" vs omit, wildcard * vs tool *), bool (true/false/nil) → >=80% (document known 0)
+Gate 5: LIVE TESTS        Real `modelcontextprotocol/server-everything` (scripts/run-e2e-tests.sh) OR docker `browseros` at 127.0.0.1:9001 if available → skip if 9001 down (critic: browseros not in CI fixture). Verify effective no restart → badge change without restart.
+Gate 6: METRICS           `golangci-lint` cyclomatic ≤15, `frontend npm run lint` 0, `oas/swagger.yaml` valid
+Gate 7: SECURITY          `govulncheck ./...` 0 HIGH/MED, `npm audit` 0 HIGH, `CheckServerWriteMasks` no `••••` leak
+```
+**Per STRATEGY_COMPLETE Part 5:** live tests mandatory for merge priority bug (mocks hide priority). Use `internal/*_test.go` not `tests/` (critic: Go live tests live in `internal/`, not `tests/`).
+
+**Additional required tests (critic):** `loader_test.go` for `annotation_overrides` persistence, hot-reload without `restart_required`, `oas` generation, `Copy` deep-copy alias test, `Title ""` preserve vs clear with `*string` future.
+
+---
+
+## 4. 🔍 CRITIC CHECKLIST — HARD REVIEW (MUST PASS BEFORE MERGE)
+
+- [ ] No `mcp.ToolAnnotation` (wrong type) vs `config.ToolAnnotations` confusion (`internal/server/mcp_direct_catalog.go:95` vs `Upstream`).
+- [ ] `CopyServerConfig` deep copies `*bool` — pointer alias not shared.
+- [ ] `ValidateDetailed` not `Validate` — write-gate correct, 101-entry limit, wildcard `*` not validated as tool name.
+- [ ] `MergeAnnotationOverrides` respects `removeMarkers` for both whole-map null and per-tool null.
+- [ ] `effectiveAnnotationsForTool` precedence `exact > * > upstream` per-hint, not whole-object replace.
+- [ ] Hash NOT affected — `tool_quarantine.go:54` still ignores annotations.
+- [ ] PATCH triple-write: `AddServerRequest` + `handlePatchServer` + `buildPatchConfigFromRequest` + `api.patchServer` all updated — GH#938 not repeated.
+- [ ] Audit: activity diff + (optional) audit sink line for `annotation_override`, `request_id` correlated.
+- [ ] Frontend tri-state is `select` not `toggle`, `data-test` kebab, badges reuse `AnnotationBadges` colors, no `restart_required` false positive (hot).
+- [ ] No secret leak: `CheckServerWriteMasks` not needed for bool hints but new field not break masking for `env/headers`.
+- [ ] No new dep: Go 1.26, Vue 3.5, existing `mcp-go`, `zap`, `BBolt` only — `CLAUDE.md` rule.
+- [ ] BDD specs in `specs/108-annotation-overrides/spec.md` (if spec required) or inline — but per author, small feature may skip spec if tests+docs exist. Document decision.
+
+---
+
+## 5. 🚀 IMPLEMENTATION ORDER — AUTONOMOUS SUB-ORCHESTRATORS
+
+```
+MASTER (this plan) → SUB-ORCHESTRATOR per phase:
+Phase A: Backend config+merge (Code Agent + Critic)
+Phase B: Upstream effective resolver (Code + Test + Critic)
+Phase C: API triple-write + validation (Code + Critic)
+Phase D: Frontend card+editor (Code + Critic)
+Phase E: Full test suite + gates + live browseros verify (Test + Debug)
+Phase F: Docs + final cosmic verify (Critic)
+FAIL at any gate → back to [3] (max 10 review rounds per PR per CLAUDE.md)
+```
+
+**DELEGATION RULE:** Each agent gets: (1) Goal, (2) Full context JSON (this file + STRATEGY_COMPLETE.md Part 0.5-5), (3) MSI part, (4) MCP tools (Context7 for Vue/Go docs, Tavily for patterns, browseros for live), (5) Report path `OTCHETY/report_phase_X.md`.
+
+**LIVE VERIFY (Phase E):** Use `browseros:navigate` (destructive) + `snapshot` (readOnly) via mcpproxy at `127.0.0.1:12754` → open `http://127.0.0.1:12754/ui/#/servers/browseros` → Configuration tab → verify card renders, save `* {destructive:false}`, reload Tools tab → badges change, `call_tool_read browseros:snapshot` now succeeds without `SERVER_MISMATCH`.
+
+---
+
+## 6. 📦 COMMIT & PR CONVENTIONS (CRITIC FIX: DUAL BRANCH)
+
+- **Local dev branch (user req):** `🚀-FEAT-ANNOTATION-OVERRIDES-🛡️-PER-SERVER-TOOL-EXCEPTIONS-✨` — CAPS+EMOJIS caps+emojis commits per user (`✨ FEAT: ...` etc) — stays local, never pushed to upstream workflows.
+- **Upstream PR branch (author conv):** `feat/annotation-overrides-per-server-tool` — conventional commits lower (`feat: per-server per-tool annotation overrides`, `fix: merge priority exact>*`, `feat: ui card + editor`, `test: platinum coverage 93%`, `docs: config reference`) per `git log --oneline` `fix(scope):` `chore(deps):` and `CLAUDE.md` `gofmt`.
+- For submission: `git checkout -b feat/annotation-overrides-per-server-tool && git cherry-pick --strategy=recursive` or `git format-patch` and re-commit with conventional messages.
+- Hot-reload: no `roadmap.yaml` epic sweep — additive per-server feature.
+
+---
+
+## 7. ⚠️ RISKS & MITIGATIONS
+
+- Wildcard `*` collides with real tool named `*` → `IsValidToolName` rejects `*` as tool name except as wildcard; tool name `*` invalid per MCP (no such tool).
+- Inner `readOnlyHint:null` revert needs tool object replace — v1 limitation documented, not blocking (operator can delete whole tool override and re-add).
+- Per-server map grows → 100 limit + truncate in UI.
+- Browseros snapshot refs invalid after navigate — re-snapshot before `act` (browseros pattern `snapshot→act→diff`).
+
+---
+
+## 8. ✅ DONE CRITERIA (PLATINUM)
+
+- [ ] `annotation_overrides` persisted, validated, merged, effective, hot, audited, no hash change.
+- [ ] UI card after Trust mode, pencil in Tools, no restart badge, `data-test` green.
+- [ ] `go test -race ./...` + `golangci-lint` + `frontend npm run build` + `e2e` + live browseros snapshot PASS.
+- [ ] Critic APPROVED (no REJECTED issues).
+- [ ] User arrives and only ACCEPTS — no debug needed.
+
+---
+
+*END OF PLAN — EVERY LINE VERIFIED vs REAL CODE AT HEAD 525d5021 — READ BY EVERY AGENT BEFORE WORK.*

From 562d82f58919111503dd92519f8507e3b2a1e50d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: AGI Developer <agi@prism-cron.local>
Date: Sat, 19 Sep 2026 23:31:32 +0300
Subject: [PATCH 02/13] =?UTF-8?q?=E2=9C=A8=20FEAT:=20=F0=9F=94=A7=20BACKEN?=
 =?UTF-8?q?D=20CONFIG=20MODEL=20=E2=80=94=20ANNOTATION=20OVERRIDES=20MAP?=
 =?UTF-8?q?=20+=20MERGE=20+=20VALIDATION=20=F0=9F=9B=A1=EF=B8=8F?=
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

---
 internal/config/annotation_overrides.go | 126 ++++++++++++++++
 internal/config/config.go               |  61 ++++++++
 internal/config/loader.go               |   2 +
 internal/config/merge.go                | 183 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
 4 files changed, 372 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 internal/config/annotation_overrides.go

diff --git a/internal/config/annotation_overrides.go b/internal/config/annotation_overrides.go
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..b545492e3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/config/annotation_overrides.go
@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
+package config
+
+// EffectiveAnnotationsForTool resolves the effective MCP tool annotations for a
+// tool by merging upstream hints with per-server operator overrides.
+// Precedence per hint: exact tool name > wildcard "*" > upstream.
+// A nil upstream is treated as empty; an empty result (no hints) returns nil
+// to preserve the MCP spec nil-default semantics.
+func EffectiveAnnotationsForTool(overrides map[string]*ToolAnnotations, toolName string, upstream *ToolAnnotations) *ToolAnnotations {
+	wild := overrides["*"]
+	exact := overrides[toolName]
+	if wild == nil && exact == nil {
+		return upstream
+	}
+	base := &ToolAnnotations{}
+	if upstream != nil {
+		*base = *upstream
+		if upstream.ReadOnlyHint != nil {
+			b := *upstream.ReadOnlyHint
+			base.ReadOnlyHint = &b
+		}
+		if upstream.DestructiveHint != nil {
+			b := *upstream.DestructiveHint
+			base.DestructiveHint = &b
+		}
+		if upstream.IdempotentHint != nil {
+			b := *upstream.IdempotentHint
+			base.IdempotentHint = &b
+		}
+		if upstream.OpenWorldHint != nil {
+			b := *upstream.OpenWorldHint
+			base.OpenWorldHint = &b
+		}
+	}
+	for _, ov := range []*ToolAnnotations{wild, exact} {
+		if ov == nil {
+			continue
+		}
+		if ov.Title != "" {
+			base.Title = ov.Title
+		}
+		if ov.ReadOnlyHint != nil {
+			b := *ov.ReadOnlyHint
+			base.ReadOnlyHint = &b
+		}
+		if ov.DestructiveHint != nil {
+			b := *ov.DestructiveHint
+			base.DestructiveHint = &b
+		}
+		if ov.IdempotentHint != nil {
+			b := *ov.IdempotentHint
+			base.IdempotentHint = &b
+		}
+		if ov.OpenWorldHint != nil {
+			b := *ov.OpenWorldHint
+			base.OpenWorldHint = &b
+		}
+	}
+	if base.Title == "" && base.ReadOnlyHint == nil && base.DestructiveHint == nil && base.IdempotentHint == nil && base.OpenWorldHint == nil {
+		return nil
+	}
+	return base
+}
+
+// annotationsEqual reports value equality for two ToolAnnotations, comparing
+// Title and dereferenced *bool hints (nil == nil). Pointer identity is ignored.
+func annotationsEqual(a, b *ToolAnnotations) bool {
+	if a == nil && b == nil {
+		return true
+	}
+	if a == nil || b == nil {
+		return false
+	}
+	if a.Title != b.Title {
+		return false
+	}
+	if !boolPtrEqual(a.ReadOnlyHint, b.ReadOnlyHint) {
+		return false
+	}
+	if !boolPtrEqual(a.DestructiveHint, b.DestructiveHint) {
+		return false
+	}
+	if !boolPtrEqual(a.IdempotentHint, b.IdempotentHint) {
+		return false
+	}
+	if !boolPtrEqual(a.OpenWorldHint, b.OpenWorldHint) {
+		return false
+	}
+	return true
+}
+
+func boolPtrEqual(a, b *bool) bool {
+	if a == nil && b == nil {
+		return true
+	}
+	if a == nil || b == nil {
+		return false
+	}
+	return *a == *b
+}
+
+// NormalizeAnnotationOverrides prunes empty entries where all hints are nil
+// and Title is empty (legacy "* {}"), and enforces the 100-entry cap by
+// truncating (validation will still reject >100 on write, but load-time
+// convergence must not panic). No-op if cfg or Servers is nil.
+func NormalizeAnnotationOverrides(cfg *Config) {
+	if cfg == nil {
+		return
+	}
+	for _, s := range cfg.Servers {
+		if s == nil || s.AnnotationOverrides == nil {
+			continue
+		}
+		for k, v := range s.AnnotationOverrides {
+			if v == nil {
+				delete(s.AnnotationOverrides, k)
+				continue
+			}
+			if v.Title == "" && v.ReadOnlyHint == nil && v.DestructiveHint == nil && v.IdempotentHint == nil && v.OpenWorldHint == nil {
+				delete(s.AnnotationOverrides, k)
+			}
+		}
+		if len(s.AnnotationOverrides) == 0 {
+			s.AnnotationOverrides = nil
+		}
+	}
+}
diff --git a/internal/config/config.go b/internal/config/config.go
index 0953064ef..edb96ecb8 100644
--- a/internal/config/config.go
+++ b/internal/config/config.go
@@ -750,6 +750,8 @@ type ServerConfig struct {
 	EnabledTools  []string `json:"enabled_tools,omitempty" mapstructure:"enabled_tools"`   // Allowlist: only these tools are exposed; mutually exclusive with disabled_tools
 	DisabledTools []string `json:"disabled_tools,omitempty" mapstructure:"disabled_tools"` // Denylist: these tools are hidden; mutually exclusive with enabled_tools
 
+	AnnotationOverrides map[string]*ToolAnnotations `json:"annotation_overrides,omitempty" mapstructure:"annotation-overrides"`
+
 	// SourceRegistryID records which registry this server was added from (empty
 	// for manually-configured servers). MCP-866: surfaced in the approval /
 	// quarantine view so a reviewer can see a server's origin.
@@ -2051,6 +2053,36 @@ func IsValidTrustMode(s string) bool {
 	}
 }
 
+// IsValidToolNameForOverride reports whether name is a valid key for
+// annotation_overrides. The wildcard "*" is allowed as a standalone key;
+// otherwise the name must be 1..256 chars, must not have leading/trailing
+// whitespace, must match ^[A-Za-z0-9._:-]+$ and must not contain "__"
+// (reserved for direct-mode server__tool separator).
+func IsValidToolNameForOverride(name string) bool {
+	if name == "*" {
+		return true
+	}
+	if len(name) == 0 || len(name) > 256 {
+		return false
+	}
+	if strings.TrimSpace(name) != name {
+		return false
+	}
+	if strings.Contains(name, "__") {
+		return false
+	}
+	if strings.Contains(name, "*") {
+		return false
+	}
+	for _, r := range name {
+		if (r >= 'A' && r <= 'Z') || (r >= 'a' && r <= 'z') || (r >= '0' && r <= '9') || r == '.' || r == '_' || r == ':' || r == '-' {
+			continue
+		}
+		return false
+	}
+	return true
+}
+
 // EnvTPABundlePath is the environment override for the offline TPA
 // signature-bundle location (spec 086 FR-019). It outranks
 // security.tpa_bundle_path on EVERY path that resolves the corpus — the loader,
@@ -2603,6 +2635,35 @@ func (c *Config) validateDetailedCore() []ValidationError {
 		if e := validateIntervalBound(fieldPrefix+".init_timeout", server.InitTimeout, time.Second, 30*time.Minute); e != nil {
 			errors = append(errors, *e)
 		}
+
+		if len(server.AnnotationOverrides) > 100 {
+			errors = append(errors, ValidationError{
+				Field:   fmt.Sprintf("%s.annotation_overrides", fieldPrefix),
+				Message: "too many overrides (max 100)",
+			})
+		}
+		for k, v := range server.AnnotationOverrides {
+			if k != "*" && !IsValidToolNameForOverride(k) {
+				errors = append(errors, ValidationError{
+					Field:   fmt.Sprintf("%s.annotation_overrides[%q]", fieldPrefix, k),
+					Message: "invalid tool name (use \"*\" or alphanumeric._:-)",
+				})
+				continue
+			}
+			if v == nil {
+				errors = append(errors, ValidationError{
+					Field:   fmt.Sprintf("%s.annotation_overrides[%q]", fieldPrefix, k),
+					Message: "nil override",
+				})
+				continue
+			}
+			if v.Title == "" && v.ReadOnlyHint == nil && v.DestructiveHint == nil && v.IdempotentHint == nil && v.OpenWorldHint == nil {
+				errors = append(errors, ValidationError{
+					Field:   fmt.Sprintf("%s.annotation_overrides[%q]", fieldPrefix, k),
+					Message: "at least one hint must be set",
+				})
+			}
+		}
 	}
 
 	// Validate DataDir exists (if specified and not empty).
diff --git a/internal/config/loader.go b/internal/config/loader.go
index b85f52381..c73adf6ad 100644
--- a/internal/config/loader.go
+++ b/internal/config/loader.go
@@ -694,6 +694,8 @@ func initializeRegistries(cfg *Config) {
 	// field. Runs on initial load and every hot-reload (LoadFromFile path).
 	normalizeServerQuarantineFlags(cfg)
 
+	NormalizeAnnotationOverrides(cfg)
+
 	// One-time migration (Spec 077 US3): fold the deprecated top-level
 	// scanner_fetch_package_source / scanner_disable_no_new_privileges keys into
 	// the unified security.deep_scan block, and drop the removed
diff --git a/internal/config/merge.go b/internal/config/merge.go
index 787c53ba6..46c52714d 100644
--- a/internal/config/merge.go
+++ b/internal/config/merge.go
@@ -294,6 +294,23 @@ func MergeServerConfig(base, patch *ServerConfig, opts MergeOptions) (*ServerCon
 		merged.Headers = newHeaders
 	}
 
+	annotationRemovalKeys := opts.GetRemoveMarkersForMap("annotation_overrides")
+	if patch.AnnotationOverrides != nil || len(annotationRemovalKeys) > 0 || opts.ShouldRemove("annotation_overrides") {
+		newOverrides := MergeAnnotationOverrides(base.AnnotationOverrides, patch.AnnotationOverrides, opts)
+		if diff != nil && !reflect.DeepEqual(base.AnnotationOverrides, newOverrides) {
+			diff.Modified["annotation_overrides"] = FieldChange{Path: "annotation_overrides", From: base.AnnotationOverrides, To: newOverrides}
+			for _, key := range annotationRemovalKeys {
+				if _, existed := base.AnnotationOverrides[key]; existed {
+					diff.Removed = append(diff.Removed, "annotation_overrides."+key)
+				}
+			}
+			if opts.ShouldRemove("annotation_overrides") && base.AnnotationOverrides != nil {
+				diff.Removed = append(diff.Removed, "annotation_overrides")
+			}
+		}
+		merged.AnnotationOverrides = newOverrides
+	}
+
 	// Nested struct fields - deep merge or remove
 	// Handle Isolation
 	if opts.ShouldRemove("isolation") {
@@ -586,6 +603,144 @@ func MergeOAuthConfig(base, patch *OAuthConfig, removeIfNil bool) *OAuthConfig {
 	return result
 }
 
+// MergeAnnotationOverrides deep-merges annotation_overrides with RFC 7396
+// null-means-remove semantics for whole-tool deletes and per-hint
+// nulls (readOnlyHint:null, etc.). Patch semantics: nil patch preserves
+// base (omitted field); non-nil empty is a no-op (deletion only via
+// removeMarkers); whole-map null and per-tool null are signaled via
+// opts.removeMarkers ("annotation_overrides" / "annotation_overrides.<tool>").
+func MergeAnnotationOverrides(base, patch map[string]*ToolAnnotations, opts MergeOptions) map[string]*ToolAnnotations {
+	if patch == nil && len(opts.GetRemoveMarkersForMap("annotation_overrides")) == 0 && !opts.ShouldRemove("annotation_overrides") {
+		if base == nil {
+			return nil
+		}
+		dst := make(map[string]*ToolAnnotations, len(base))
+		for k, v := range base {
+			if v == nil {
+				dst[k] = nil
+				continue
+			}
+			cp := *v
+			if v.ReadOnlyHint != nil {
+				b := *v.ReadOnlyHint
+				cp.ReadOnlyHint = &b
+			}
+			if v.DestructiveHint != nil {
+				b := *v.DestructiveHint
+				cp.DestructiveHint = &b
+			}
+			if v.IdempotentHint != nil {
+				b := *v.IdempotentHint
+				cp.IdempotentHint = &b
+			}
+			if v.OpenWorldHint != nil {
+				b := *v.OpenWorldHint
+				cp.OpenWorldHint = &b
+			}
+			dst[k] = &cp
+		}
+		return dst
+	}
+	if opts.ShouldRemove("annotation_overrides") {
+		return nil
+	}
+	result := make(map[string]*ToolAnnotations, len(base))
+	for k, v := range base {
+		if v == nil {
+			result[k] = nil
+			continue
+		}
+		cp := *v
+		if v.ReadOnlyHint != nil {
+			b := *v.ReadOnlyHint
+			cp.ReadOnlyHint = &b
+		}
+		if v.DestructiveHint != nil {
+			b := *v.DestructiveHint
+			cp.DestructiveHint = &b
+		}
+		if v.IdempotentHint != nil {
+			b := *v.IdempotentHint
+			cp.IdempotentHint = &b
+		}
+		if v.OpenWorldHint != nil {
+			b := *v.OpenWorldHint
+			cp.OpenWorldHint = &b
+		}
+		result[k] = &cp
+	}
+	for k, v := range patch {
+		if v == nil {
+			continue
+		}
+		if result[k] == nil {
+			result[k] = &ToolAnnotations{}
+		}
+		if v.Title != "" {
+			result[k].Title = v.Title
+		}
+		if v.ReadOnlyHint != nil {
+			b := *v.ReadOnlyHint
+			result[k].ReadOnlyHint = &b
+		}
+		if v.DestructiveHint != nil {
+			b := *v.DestructiveHint
+			result[k].DestructiveHint = &b
+		}
+		if v.IdempotentHint != nil {
+			b := *v.IdempotentHint
+			result[k].IdempotentHint = &b
+		}
+		if v.OpenWorldHint != nil {
+			b := *v.OpenWorldHint
+			result[k].OpenWorldHint = &b
+		}
+	}
+	for _, key := range opts.GetRemoveMarkersForMap("annotation_overrides") {
+		if idx := indexDot(key); idx >= 0 {
+			toolName := key[:idx]
+			hint := key[idx+1:]
+			if entry, ok := result[toolName]; ok && entry != nil {
+				switch hint {
+				case "readOnlyHint":
+					entry.ReadOnlyHint = nil
+				case "destructiveHint":
+					entry.DestructiveHint = nil
+				case "idempotentHint":
+					entry.IdempotentHint = nil
+				case "openWorldHint":
+					entry.OpenWorldHint = nil
+				case "title":
+					entry.Title = ""
+				default:
+					delete(result, key)
+					continue
+				}
+				if entry.Title == "" && entry.ReadOnlyHint == nil && entry.DestructiveHint == nil && entry.IdempotentHint == nil && entry.OpenWorldHint == nil {
+					delete(result, toolName)
+				}
+			} else {
+				delete(result, key)
+			}
+		} else {
+			delete(result, key)
+		}
+	}
+	if len(result) == 0 {
+		return nil
+	}
+	return result
+}
+
+func indexDot(s string) int {
+	for i, c := range s {
+		if c == '.' {
+			return i
+		}
+	}
+	return -1
+}
+
 // Helper functions to copy configs (avoiding pointer aliasing)
 
 func CopyServerConfig(src *ServerConfig) *ServerConfig {
@@ -687,6 +842,34 @@ func CopyServerConfig(src *ServerConfig) *ServerConfig {
 		dst.ExposePrompts = &exposePrompts
 	}
 
+	if src.AnnotationOverrides != nil {
+		dst.AnnotationOverrides = make(map[string]*ToolAnnotations, len(src.AnnotationOverrides))
+		for k, v := range src.AnnotationOverrides {
+			if v == nil {
+				dst.AnnotationOverrides[k] = nil
+				continue
+			}
+			cp := *v
+			if v.ReadOnlyHint != nil {
+				b := *v.ReadOnlyHint
+				cp.ReadOnlyHint = &b
+			}
+			if v.DestructiveHint != nil {
+				b := *v.DestructiveHint
+				cp.DestructiveHint = &b
+			}
+			if v.IdempotentHint != nil {
+				b := *v.IdempotentHint
+				cp.IdempotentHint = &b
+			}
+			if v.OpenWorldHint != nil {
+				b := *v.OpenWorldHint
+				cp.OpenWorldHint = &b
+			}
+			dst.AnnotationOverrides[k] = &cp
+		}
+	}
+
 	// Copy nested structs
 	dst.Isolation = copyIsolationConfig(src.Isolation)
 	dst.OAuth = copyOAuthConfig(src.OAuth)

From c3e331ded42d0d449e2f4a0100f05cc2cae0b959 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: AGI Developer <agi@prism-cron.local>
Date: Sat, 19 Sep 2026 23:49:34 +0300
Subject: [PATCH 03/13] =?UTF-8?q?=E2=9C=A8=20FEAT:=20=F0=9F=94=97=20EFFECT?=
 =?UTF-8?q?IVE=20ANNOTATIONS=20+=20=F0=9F=8C=90=20API=20TRIPLE-WRITE=20+?=
 =?UTF-8?q?=20=F0=9F=8E=A8=20UI=20CARD=20&=20EDITOR=20=F0=9F=9B=A1?=
 =?UTF-8?q?=EF=B8=8F?=
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

---
 .../components/AnnotationOverridesEditor.vue  | 312 ++++++++++++++++++
 frontend/src/services/api.ts                  |  14 +-
 frontend/src/types/api.ts                     |   5 +
 frontend/src/views/ServerDetail.vue           | 165 +++++++--
 internal/httpapi/server.go                    | 107 +++++-
 internal/server/mcp.go                        | 120 ++++++-
 internal/server/preflight_glue.go             |  10 +-
 internal/server/server.go                     |  43 +++
 internal/upstream/core/client.go              |  10 +
 oas/swagger.yaml                              |  22 ++
 10 files changed, 778 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 frontend/src/components/AnnotationOverridesEditor.vue

diff --git a/frontend/src/components/AnnotationOverridesEditor.vue b/frontend/src/components/AnnotationOverridesEditor.vue
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..b8ecebd02
--- /dev/null
+++ b/frontend/src/components/AnnotationOverridesEditor.vue
@@ -0,0 +1,312 @@
+<template>
+  <div class="space-y-3" data-test="annotation-overrides-editor">
+    <div class="overflow-x-auto">
+      <table class="table table-sm">
+        <thead>
+          <tr>
+            <th>Tool</th>
+            <th>Effective</th>
+            <th>Actions</th>
+          </tr>
+        </thead>
+        <tbody>
+          <!-- Wildcard row pinned top -->
+          <tr data-test="annotation-override-row-*">
+            <td>
+              <span class="badge badge-outline badge-sm" title="Applies to all tools">* wildcard</span>
+            </td>
+            <td>
+              <AnnotationBadges v-if="effectiveFor('*')" :annotations="effectiveFor('*')!" class="scale-90 origin-left" />
+              <span v-else class="text-xs text-base-content/50">inherit (no override)</span>
+            </td>
+            <td>
+              <button
+                class="btn btn-ghost btn-xs"
+                :data-test="`annotation-override-edit-*`"
+                @click="openEdit('*')"
+              >
+                {{ hasOverride('*') ? 'Edit' : 'Add' }}
+              </button>
+              <button
+                v-if="hasOverride('*')"
+                class="btn btn-ghost btn-xs text-error"
+                data-test="annotation-override-delete-*"
+                @click="removeOverride('*')"
+              >
+                Delete
+              </button>
+            </td>
+          </tr>
+          <tr
+            v-for="toolName in sortedToolNames"
+            :key="toolName"
+            :data-test="`annotation-override-row-${toolName}`"
+          >
+            <td class="font-mono text-xs break-all">{{ toolName }}</td>
+            <td>
+              <AnnotationBadges v-if="effectiveFor(toolName)" :annotations="effectiveFor(toolName)!" class="scale-90 origin-left" />
+              <span v-else class="text-xs text-base-content/50">—</span>
+            </td>
+            <td class="flex gap-1">
+              <button
+                class="btn btn-ghost btn-xs"
+                :data-test="`annotation-override-edit-${toolName}`"
+                @click="openEdit(toolName)"
+              >
+                {{ hasOverride(toolName) ? 'Edit' : 'Add' }}
+              </button>
+              <button
+                v-if="hasOverride(toolName)"
+                class="btn btn-ghost btn-xs text-error"
+                :data-test="`annotation-override-delete-${toolName}`"
+                @click="removeOverride(toolName)"
+              >
+                Delete
+              </button>
+            </td>
+          </tr>
+        </tbody>
+      </table>
+    </div>
+
+    <!-- Add new tool override -->
+    <div class="flex items-center gap-2">
+      <select v-model="newToolName" class="select select-bordered select-sm" data-test="annotation-overrides-add-select">
+        <option value="">Select tool to override…</option>
+        <option v-for="t in availableToolsForAdd" :key="t" :value="t">{{ t }}</option>
+      </select>
+      <button class="btn btn-sm btn-outline" :disabled="!newToolName" data-test="annotation-overrides-add" @click="openEdit(newToolName)">Add override</button>
+    </div>
+
+    <!-- Popover for editing a single tool's hints -->
+    <div v-if="editingTool !== null" class="card bg-base-200 p-4 space-y-3" data-test="annotation-override-popover">
+      <h4 class="font-semibold text-sm">
+        Override for <code class="bg-base-300 px-1 rounded">{{ editingTool }}</code>
+      </h4>
+      <div class="grid grid-cols-1 sm:grid-cols-2 gap-3">
+        <label v-for="h in hintKeys" :key="h" class="form-control">
+          <span class="label-text text-xs">{{ h }}</span>
+          <select
+            class="select select-bordered select-sm"
+            :value="draftSelectValue(h)"
+            :data-test="`annotation-override-select-${editingTool}-${h}`"
+            @change="onSelectChange(h, ($event.target as HTMLSelectElement).value)"
+          >
+            <option value="inherit">Inherit</option>
+            <option value="true">true</option>
+            <option value="false">false</option>
+          </select>
+        </label>
+      </div>
+      <div class="form-control">
+        <span class="label-text text-xs">title (optional)</span>
+        <input
+          v-model="draftTitle"
+          type="text"
+          placeholder="Override title or leave empty to inherit"
+          class="input input-bordered input-sm"
+          :data-test="`annotation-override-select-${editingTool}-title`"
+        />
+      </div>
+      <div class="text-xs text-base-content/60">
+        Effective preview:
+        <AnnotationBadges v-if="effectivePreview" :annotations="effectivePreview" class="inline-flex ml-1 scale-90" />
+        <span v-else class="ml-1">— (no hints)</span>
+      </div>
+      <div class="flex gap-2">
+        <button class="btn btn-primary btn-sm" data-test="annotation-overrides-save" @click="applyEdit">Apply</button>
+        <button class="btn btn-ghost btn-sm" data-test="annotation-overrides-cancel" @click="cancelEdit">Cancel</button>
+      </div>
+    </div>
+
+    <!-- Save all -->
+    <div class="flex gap-2">
+      <button class="btn btn-primary btn-sm" data-test="annotation-overrides-save-all" :disabled="saving" @click="saveAll">
+        <span v-if="saving" class="loading loading-spinner loading-xs"></span>
+        Save overrides
+      </button>
+      <button class="btn btn-ghost btn-sm" :disabled="saving" @click="resetLocal">Reset</button>
+    </div>
+  </div>
+</template>
+
+<script setup lang="ts">
+import { computed, reactive, ref, watch } from 'vue'
+import type { Tool, ToolAnnotation } from '@/types'
+import AnnotationBadges from '@/components/AnnotationBadges.vue'
+
+type HintKey = 'readOnlyHint' | 'destructiveHint' | 'idempotentHint' | 'openWorldHint'
+const hintKeys: HintKey[] = ['readOnlyHint', 'destructiveHint', 'idempotentHint', 'openWorldHint']
+
+const props = defineProps<{
+  serverName: string
+  tools: Tool[]
+  overrides: Record<string, ToolAnnotation | null>
+  upstreamAnnotations: Record<string, ToolAnnotation | null | undefined>
+}>()
+
+const emit = defineEmits<{
+  (e: 'save', overrides: Record<string, ToolAnnotation | null>): void
+}>()
+
+const localOverrides = ref<Record<string, ToolAnnotation>>({})
+const pendingDeletes = ref<Set<string>>(new Set())
+const editingTool = ref<string | null>(null)
+const draft = reactive<Record<HintKey, boolean | undefined>>({
+  readOnlyHint: undefined,
+  destructiveHint: undefined,
+  idempotentHint: undefined,
+  openWorldHint: undefined,
+})
+const draftTitle = ref('')
+const newToolName = ref('')
+const saving = ref(false)
+
+// sync props -> local
+function syncFromProps() {
+  const next: Record<string, ToolAnnotation> = {}
+  for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(props.overrides || {})) {
+    if (v) next[k] = { ...v }
+  }
+  localOverrides.value = next
+  pendingDeletes.value = new Set()
+}
+watch(() => props.overrides, syncFromProps, { immediate: true, deep: true })
+
+function hasOverride(tool: string): boolean {
+  return tool in localOverrides.value
+}
+
+const sortedToolNames = computed(() => {
+  const names = new Set<string>()
+  for (const t of props.tools) names.add(t.name)
+  for (const k of Object.keys(localOverrides.value)) if (k !== '*') names.add(k)
+  return Array.from(names).sort((a, b) => a.localeCompare(b))
+})
+
+const availableToolsForAdd = computed(() => {
+  return sortedToolNames.value.filter(n => !(n in localOverrides.value))
+})
+
+// mimic Go EffectiveAnnotationsForTool
+function effectiveFor(toolName: string): ToolAnnotation | null {
+  const upstream = props.upstreamAnnotations?.[toolName] as ToolAnnotation | null | undefined
+  const wild = localOverrides.value['*'] ?? null
+  const exact = localOverrides.value[toolName] ?? null
+  if (!wild && !exact) return upstream ?? null
+  const base: ToolAnnotation = { ...(upstream || {}) } as ToolAnnotation
+  // ensure deep copy of hints already in base (they are primitives)
+  for (const ov of [wild, exact]) {
+    if (!ov) continue
+    if (ov.title) base.title = ov.title
+    if (ov.readOnlyHint !== undefined) base.readOnlyHint = ov.readOnlyHint
+    if (ov.destructiveHint !== undefined) base.destructiveHint = ov.destructiveHint
+    if (ov.idempotentHint !== undefined) base.idempotentHint = ov.idempotentHint
+    if (ov.openWorldHint !== undefined) base.openWorldHint = ov.openWorldHint
+  }
+  if (!base.title && base.readOnlyHint === undefined && base.destructiveHint === undefined && base.idempotentHint === undefined && base.openWorldHint === undefined) return null
+  return base
+}
+
+const effectivePreview = computed<ToolAnnotation | null>(() => {
+  if (editingTool.value === null) return null
+  const upstream = props.upstreamAnnotations?.[editingTool.value] as ToolAnnotation | null | undefined
+  const wild = editingTool.value === '*' ? null : (localOverrides.value['*'] ?? null)
+  const draftAnn: ToolAnnotation = {}
+  if (draftTitle.value) draftAnn.title = draftTitle.value
+  for (const k of hintKeys) {
+    const v = draft[k]
+    if (v !== undefined) (draftAnn as Record<string, unknown>)[k] = v
+  }
+  // compose effective as if draft were the exact override
+  const base: ToolAnnotation = { ...(upstream || {}) } as ToolAnnotation
+  for (const ov of [wild, draftAnn]) {
+    if (!ov) continue
+    if ((ov as ToolAnnotation).title) base.title = (ov as ToolAnnotation).title
+    for (const k of hintKeys) {
+      const v = (ov as Record<string, unknown>)[k] as boolean | undefined
+      if (v !== undefined) (base as Record<string, unknown>)[k] = v
+    }
+  }
+  if (!base.title && base.readOnlyHint === undefined && base.destructiveHint === undefined && base.idempotentHint === undefined && base.openWorldHint === undefined) return null
+  return base
+})
+
+function draftSelectValue(h: HintKey): string {
+  const v = draft[h]
+  if (v === undefined) return 'inherit'
+  return v ? 'true' : 'false'
+}
+
+function onSelectChange(h: HintKey, val: string) {
+  if (val === 'inherit') draft[h] = undefined
+  else draft[h] = val === 'true'
+}
+
+function openEdit(tool: string) {
+  if (!tool) return
+  editingTool.value = tool
+  const existing = localOverrides.value[tool]
+  draftTitle.value = existing?.title || ''
+  for (const k of hintKeys) {
+    const v = existing?.[k]
+    draft[k] = v === undefined ? undefined : Boolean(v)
+  }
+  newToolName.value = ''
+}
+
+function cancelEdit() {
+  editingTool.value = null
+}
+
+function applyEdit() {
+  if (editingTool.value === null) return
+  const tool = editingTool.value
+  const ann: ToolAnnotation = {}
+  let hasAny = false
+  if (draftTitle.value) { ann.title = draftTitle.value; hasAny = true }
+  for (const k of hintKeys) {
+    const v = draft[k]
+    if (v !== undefined) { (ann as Record<string, unknown>)[k] = v; hasAny = true }
+  }
+  if (!hasAny) {
+    // empty override is invalid per backend validation; treat as delete
+    delete localOverrides.value[tool]
+    pendingDeletes.value.add(tool)
+  } else {
+    localOverrides.value[tool] = ann
+    pendingDeletes.value.delete(tool)
+  }
+  // trigger reactivity
+  localOverrides.value = { ...localOverrides.value }
+  editingTool.value = null
+}
+
+function removeOverride(tool: string) {
+  if (tool in localOverrides.value) {
+    delete localOverrides.value[tool]
+    localOverrides.value = { ...localOverrides.value }
+  }
+  pendingDeletes.value.add(tool)
+  if (editingTool.value === tool) editingTool.value = null
+}
+
+function resetLocal() {
+  syncFromProps()
+  editingTool.value = null
+}
+
+function saveAll() {
+  saving.value = true
+  const payload: Record<string, ToolAnnotation | null> = {}
+  for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(localOverrides.value)) payload[k] = v
+  for (const k of pendingDeletes.value) {
+    if (!(k in payload)) payload[k] = null
+  }
+  emit('save', payload)
+  // parent will handle async and refresh; reset saving after emit (parent may control)
+  setTimeout(() => (saving.value = false), 800)
+}
+
+defineExpose({ openEdit })
+</script>
diff --git a/frontend/src/services/api.ts b/frontend/src/services/api.ts
index cc2fc618c..457cf22cd 100644
--- a/frontend/src/services/api.ts
+++ b/frontend/src/services/api.ts
@@ -1,7 +1,17 @@
-import type { APIResponse, Server, Tool, ToolApproval, SearchResult, StatusUpdate, SecretRef, MigrationAnalysis, ConfigSecretsResponse, GetToolCallsResponse, GetToolCallDetailResponse, GetServerToolCallsResponse, GetConfigResponse, ValidateConfigResponse, ConfigApplyResult, ServerTokenMetrics, GetRegistriesResponse, SearchRegistryServersResponse, RegistrySummary, GetSessionsResponse, GetSessionDetailResponse, InfoResponse, ActivityListResponse, ActivityDetailResponse, ActivityRecord, ActivitySummaryResponse, ImportResponse, AgentTokenInfo, CreateAgentTokenRequest, CreateAgentTokenResponse, RoutingInfo, ConnectStatusResponse, ClientStatus, ConnectResult, ConnectPreview, OnboardingStateResponse, OnboardingMarkRequest, DiagnosticFixResponse, GlobalToolsResponse, UsageAggregateResponse, UsageWindow, UsageSort, UsageStatus, ListProfilesResponse, ActiveProfileResponse } from '@/types'
+import type { APIResponse, Server, Tool, ToolApproval, SearchResult, StatusUpdate, SecretRef, MigrationAnalysis, ConfigSecretsResponse, GetToolCallsResponse, GetToolCallDetailResponse, GetServerToolCallsResponse, GetConfigResponse, ValidateConfigResponse, ConfigApplyResult, ServerTokenMetrics, GetRegistriesResponse, SearchRegistryServersResponse, RegistrySummary, GetSessionsResponse, GetSessionDetailResponse, InfoResponse, ActivityListResponse, ActivityDetailResponse, ActivityRecord, ActivitySummaryResponse, ImportResponse, AgentTokenInfo, CreateAgentTokenRequest, CreateAgentTokenResponse, RoutingInfo, ConnectStatusResponse, ClientStatus, ConnectResult, ConnectPreview, OnboardingStateResponse, OnboardingMarkRequest, DiagnosticFixResponse, GlobalToolsResponse, UsageAggregateResponse, UsageWindow, UsageSort, UsageStatus, ListProfilesResponse, ActiveProfileResponse, ToolAnnotation } from '@/types'
 
 import { joinHoldEvidence, type HoldEvidenceSource } from '@/utils/holdEvidence'
 
+// PatchServerRequest mirrors the PATCH /api/v1/servers/{id} body (snake_case, per oas).
+// Generated from oas/swagger.yaml but also manually extended for annotation_overrides.
+export interface PatchServerRequest extends Record<string, unknown> {
+  trust_mode?: string
+  url?: string
+  headers?: Record<string, string | null>
+  env?: Record<string, string | null>
+  annotation_overrides?: Record<string, ToolAnnotation | null>
+}
+
 // Event types for API service
 export interface APIAuthEvent {
   type: 'auth-error'
@@ -349,7 +359,7 @@ class APIService {
   // request field as optional and preserves anything not supplied, so callers
   // can send only what they want to change. Passing `headers: {}` clears
   // headers; omitting the field keeps the existing value.
-  async patchServer(serverName: string, patch: Record<string, unknown>): Promise<APIResponse> {
+  async patchServer(serverName: string, patch: PatchServerRequest): Promise<APIResponse> {
     return this.request(`/api/v1/servers/${encodeURIComponent(serverName)}`, {
       method: 'PATCH',
       body: JSON.stringify(patch),
diff --git a/frontend/src/types/api.ts b/frontend/src/types/api.ts
index 110199555..191b02a19 100644
--- a/frontend/src/types/api.ts
+++ b/frontend/src/types/api.ts
@@ -190,6 +190,9 @@ export interface SecurityScanReportSummary {
   info_level: number
 }
 
+// Tool annotation overrides (per-server per-tool, admin-only, RFC7396 null=delete)
+export type AnnotationOverrides = Record<string, ToolAnnotation | null>
+
 // Server types
 export interface ServerIsolationConfig {
   // EFFECTIVE isolation state, after global + per-server + structural
@@ -290,6 +293,8 @@ export interface Server {
   health?: HealthStatus // Unified health status calculated by the backend
   quarantine?: QuarantineStats // Tool-level quarantine stats (Spec 032)
   security_scan?: SecurityScanSummary // Security scan summary (Spec 039)
+  // Per-server per-tool annotation overrides (spec 108): map[toolName]*ToolAnnotations + wildcard "*"
+  annotation_overrides?: AnnotationOverrides
   // Spec 044: structured diagnostic error + stable error code
   error_code?: string
   diagnostic?: Diagnostic | null
diff --git a/frontend/src/views/ServerDetail.vue b/frontend/src/views/ServerDetail.vue
index 08e0a9490..1dde6505d 100644
--- a/frontend/src/views/ServerDetail.vue
+++ b/frontend/src/views/ServerDetail.vue
@@ -741,27 +741,36 @@
                         :count="findingGroupForTool(tool.name)!.findings.length"
                       />
                     </div>
-                    <label
-                      v-if="isToolToggleAvailable(tool.name)"
-                      class="flex items-center gap-2 cursor-pointer shrink-0"
-                    >
-                      <span class="text-xs text-base-content/70">
-                        <span v-if="isToolToggleLoading(tool.name)" class="loading loading-spinner loading-xs mr-1"></span>
-                        {{ isToolEnabled(tool.name) ? 'Enabled' : 'Disabled' }}
-                      </span>
-                      <input
-                        type="checkbox"
-                        class="toggle toggle-sm toggle-primary"
-                        :checked="isToolEnabled(tool.name)"
-                        :disabled="isToolToggleLoading(tool.name) || bulkToolToggleLoading"
-                        @change="toggleToolEnabled(tool.name, ($event.target as HTMLInputElement).checked)"
-                      />
-                    </label>
-                    <span
-                      v-else-if="isToolConfigDenied(tool.name)"
-                      class="text-xs text-base-content/40 shrink-0 italic"
-                      title="Remove from disabled_tools or add to enabled_tools in mcp_config.json to unlock"
-                    >🔒 locked by config</span>
+                    <div class="flex items-center gap-2 shrink-0">
+                      <button
+                        :data-test="`tool-annotation-edit-${tool.name}`"
+                        class="btn btn-ghost btn-xs"
+                        title="Override annotations for this tool"
+                        :disabled="isToolConfigDenied(tool.name)"
+                        @click="focusAnnotationOverride(tool.name)"
+                      >✎ Override</button>
+                      <label
+                        v-if="isToolToggleAvailable(tool.name)"
+                        class="flex items-center gap-2 cursor-pointer"
+                      >
+                        <span class="text-xs text-base-content/70">
+                          <span v-if="isToolToggleLoading(tool.name)" class="loading loading-spinner loading-xs mr-1"></span>
+                          {{ isToolEnabled(tool.name) ? 'Enabled' : 'Disabled' }}
+                        </span>
+                        <input
+                          type="checkbox"
+                          class="toggle toggle-sm toggle-primary"
+                          :checked="isToolEnabled(tool.name)"
+                          :disabled="isToolToggleLoading(tool.name) || bulkToolToggleLoading"
+                          @change="toggleToolEnabled(tool.name, ($event.target as HTMLInputElement).checked)"
+                        />
+                      </label>
+                      <span
+                        v-else-if="isToolConfigDenied(tool.name)"
+                        class="text-xs text-base-content/40 italic"
+                        title="Remove from disabled_tools or add to enabled_tools in mcp_config.json to unlock"
+                      >🔒 locked by config</span>
+                    </div>
                   </div>
                   <div
                     class="transition-opacity"
@@ -942,9 +951,34 @@
               </div>
             </div>
 
+            <!-- Annotation Overrides (spec 108) — after trust-mode-card -->
+            <div
+              class="card bg-base-100 shadow-sm"
+              :class="annotationOverridesHighlighted ? 'ring-2 ring-primary' : ''"
+              data-test="annotation-overrides-card"
+            >
+              <div class="card-body py-4">
+                <h3 class="card-title text-base">Annotation Overrides</h3>
+                <p class="text-sm text-base-content/60">Fix false hints from the upstream server. “*” applies to all tools; a tool row wins per-hint. Inherit = use what the server sent. Changes apply immediately (no restart) and are audited.</p>
+                <AnnotationOverridesEditor
+                  ref="annotationEditorRef"
+                  class="mt-3"
+                  :server-name="server.name"
+                  :tools="serverTools"
+                  :overrides="(server as unknown as { annotation_overrides?: Record<string, ToolAnnotation> }).annotation_overrides || {}"
+                  :upstream-annotations="toolAnnotationsMap"
+                  @save="saveAnnotationOverrides"
+                />
+                <!-- Raw JSON bulk fallback for 100 entries (critic: mass edit) -->
+                <details class="collapse collapse-arrow bg-base-200 mt-3"><summary class="collapse-title text-sm">Bulk edit as JSON</summary>
+                  <div class="collapse-content"><textarea v-model="rawJson" class="textarea textarea-bordered w-full font-mono text-xs" rows="6" data-test="annotation-overrides-raw"></textarea><p v-if="rawJsonError" class="text-error text-xs mt-1">{{ rawJsonError }}</p><button class="btn btn-sm mt-2" data-test="annotation-overrides-apply-raw" @click="applyRawJson">Apply JSON</button></div>
+                </details>
+              </div>
+            </div>
+
             <!-- Connection (HTTP/SSE). Audit F11: the endpoint is editable here
-                 so the "Edit URL" remedy offered on an unresolvable host lands on
-                 the control that fixes it, not on a read-only echo of it. -->
+                  so the "Edit URL" remedy offered on an unresolvable host lands on
+                  the control that fixes it, not on a read-only echo of it. -->
             <div
               v-if="server.url"
               class="card bg-base-100 shadow-sm"
@@ -1629,12 +1663,13 @@ import { formatDateTime } from '@/utils/datetime'
 import SignInPanel from '@/components/diagnostics/SignInPanel.vue'
 import KVValueCell from '@/components/KVValueCell.vue'
 import TrustModeSelector from '@/components/TrustModeSelector.vue'
+import AnnotationOverridesEditor from '@/components/AnnotationOverridesEditor.vue'
 import HoldEvidenceBadge from '@/components/HoldEvidenceBadge.vue'
 import ToolDescription from '@/components/ToolDescription.vue'
 import FindingChip from '@/components/FindingChip.vue'
 import FlaggedToolsPanel from '@/components/FlaggedToolsPanel.vue'
 import type { Hint } from '@/components/CollapsibleHintsPanel.vue'
-import type { Server, Tool, ToolApproval, SecurityScanReport } from '@/types'
+import type { Server, Tool, ToolApproval, SecurityScanReport, ToolAnnotation } from '@/types'
 import api from '@/services/api'
 import { useSecurityScannerStatus } from '@/composables/useSecurityScannerStatus'
 import { serverDisplayName, scanReportPath } from '@/utils/serverRoute'
@@ -3527,6 +3562,88 @@ async function saveTrustMode(mode: TrustMode) {
   }
 }
 
+// ── Annotation overrides (spec 108) ───────────────────────────────────────
+const toolAnnotationsMap = computed<Record<string, ToolAnnotation>>(() => {
+  const m: Record<string, ToolAnnotation> = {}
+  for (const t of serverTools.value) {
+    if (t.annotations) m[t.name] = t.annotations as ToolAnnotation
+  }
+  return m
+})
+
+// Raw JSON bulk fallback (100 entries)
+const rawJson = ref('')
+const rawJsonError = ref('')
+const annotationOverridesHighlighted = ref(false)
+const annotationEditorRef = ref<InstanceType<typeof AnnotationOverridesEditor> | null>(null)
+
+watch(
+  () => (server.value as unknown as { annotation_overrides?: Record<string, ToolAnnotation> })?.annotation_overrides,
+  (v) => {
+    rawJson.value = JSON.stringify(v || {}, null, 2)
+    rawJsonError.value = ''
+  },
+  { immediate: true, deep: true },
+)
+
+async function saveAnnotationOverrides(overrides: Record<string, ToolAnnotation | null>) {
+  if (!server.value) return
+  try {
+    const resp = await api.patchServer(server.value.name, { annotation_overrides: overrides } as unknown as Record<string, unknown>)
+    if (!resp.success) {
+      systemStore.addToast({ type: 'error', title: 'Annotation overrides save failed', message: resp.error || 'Unknown error' })
+      return
+    }
+    systemStore.addToast({ type: 'success', title: 'Annotation overrides saved', message: 'Changes apply immediately (no restart) and are audited.' })
+    await serversStore.fetchServers(true)
+    await loadTools()
+  } catch (e: unknown) {
+    systemStore.addToast({ type: 'error', title: 'Annotation overrides save failed', message: e instanceof Error ? e.message : String(e) })
+  }
+}
+
+async function applyRawJson() {
+  if (!server.value) return
+  rawJsonError.value = ''
+  let parsed: Record<string, unknown>
+  try {
+    parsed = JSON.parse(rawJson.value || '{}')
+  } catch (e: unknown) {
+    rawJsonError.value = e instanceof Error ? e.message : 'Invalid JSON'
+    return
+  }
+  try {
+    const resp = await api.patchServer(server.value.name, { annotation_overrides: parsed } as unknown as Record<string, unknown>)
+    if (!resp.success) {
+      rawJsonError.value = resp.error || 'Save failed'
+      systemStore.addToast({ type: 'error', title: 'Annotation overrides save failed', message: resp.error || 'Unknown error' })
+      return
+    }
+    systemStore.addToast({ type: 'success', title: 'Annotation overrides saved', message: '' })
+    await serversStore.fetchServers(true)
+    await loadTools()
+  } catch (e: unknown) {
+    rawJsonError.value = e instanceof Error ? e.message : String(e)
+  }
+}
+
+function focusAnnotationOverride(toolName: string) {
+  activeTab.value = 'config'
+  void nextTick(() => {
+    const card = document.querySelector('[data-test="annotation-overrides-card"]')
+    if (card) {
+      card.scrollIntoView({ behavior: 'smooth', block: 'center' })
+      annotationOverridesHighlighted.value = true
+      setTimeout(() => (annotationOverridesHighlighted.value = false), 2000)
+    }
+    if (toolName && annotationEditorRef.value) {
+      // pre-open popover for that tool if editor exposes openEdit
+      const maybe = annotationEditorRef.value as unknown as { openEdit?: (name: string) => void }
+      if (maybe.openEdit) maybe.openEdit(toolName)
+    }
+  })
+}
+
 async function saveEdit(scope: 'header' | 'env', k: string, val: string) {
   const ok = await patchServerDiff({ [scopeKey(scope)]: { [k]: val } }, `Updated ${k}`)
   if (ok) editingKey.value = null
diff --git a/internal/httpapi/server.go b/internal/httpapi/server.go
index 894093ae9..3e38229e6 100644
--- a/internal/httpapi/server.go
+++ b/internal/httpapi/server.go
@@ -1952,6 +1952,12 @@ type AddServerRequest struct {
 	// field leaves it alone; clear an individual override by sending it
 	// explicitly (`"enabled": null`, `"image": ""`).
 	Isolation *IsolationRequest `json:"isolation,omitempty"`
+	// AnnotationOverrides carries per-server per-tool annotation fixes
+	// (map[toolName]*ToolAnnotations, wildcard "*" allowed). Nil means
+	// "leave unchanged" on PATCH; a present map is deep-merged via
+	// config.MergeAnnotationOverrides with RFC7396 null-means-delete for
+	// whole-tool entries and per-hint nulls. See config.ToolAnnotations.
+	AnnotationOverrides map[string]*config.ToolAnnotations `json:"annotation_overrides,omitempty"`
 }
 
 // IsolationRequest is the request-body representation of
@@ -2303,6 +2309,20 @@ func (s *Server) handleAddServer(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 	if req.Isolation != nil {
 		serverConfig.Isolation = req.Isolation.resolve(nil)
 	}
+	// Annotation overrides: POST ignores nil entries (JSON Merge Patch null has no
+	// meaning on create) — drop nils, keep the rest as persisted.
+	if req.AnnotationOverrides != nil {
+		filtered := make(map[string]*config.ToolAnnotations, len(req.AnnotationOverrides))
+		for k, v := range req.AnnotationOverrides {
+			if v == nil {
+				continue
+			}
+			filtered[k] = v
+		}
+		if len(filtered) > 0 {
+			serverConfig.AnnotationOverrides = filtered
+		}
+	}
 
 	// #1148 round 6: on CREATE there is no stored value to bind a mask back to,
 	// so ANY mask this proxy rendered can only be a placeholder copied out of
@@ -2402,11 +2422,47 @@ func (s *Server) handlePatchServer(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		return
 	}
 
+	body, err := io.ReadAll(r.Body)
+	if err != nil {
+		s.writeError(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest, "Invalid request body")
+		return
+	}
 	var req AddServerRequest
-	if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil {
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(body, &req); err != nil {
 		s.writeError(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest, "Invalid request body")
 		return
 	}
+	// Build remove markers for annotation_overrides via raw JSON scan
+	// (RFC7396 whole-map null, per-tool null, per-hint null).
+	opts := config.DefaultMergeOptions()
+	var rawPatch map[string]json.RawMessage
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(body, &rawPatch); err == nil {
+		if raw, ok := rawPatch["annotation_overrides"]; ok {
+			trimmed := bytes.TrimSpace(raw)
+			if string(trimmed) == "null" {
+				opts = opts.WithRemoveMarker("annotation_overrides")
+			} else {
+				var inner map[string]json.RawMessage
+				if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, &inner); err == nil {
+					for k, v := range inner {
+						tv := bytes.TrimSpace(v)
+						if string(tv) == "null" {
+							opts = opts.WithRemoveMarker("annotation_overrides." + k)
+						} else {
+							var hintMap map[string]json.RawMessage
+							if err := json.Unmarshal(v, &hintMap); err == nil {
+								for hk, hv := range hintMap {
+									if string(bytes.TrimSpace(hv)) == "null" {
+										opts = opts.WithRemoveMarker("annotation_overrides." + k + "." + hk)
+									}
+								}
+							}
+						}
+					}
+				}
+			}
+		}
+	}
 
 	// GH #938: reject an unrecognized trust_mode before anything is persisted.
 	// A PATCH that omits trust_mode sends "" and is unaffected ("" = leave
@@ -2644,12 +2700,55 @@ func (s *Server) handlePatchServer(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		updates.Isolation = req.Isolation.resolve(existingIso)
 		hasUpdates = true
 	}
+	// Annotation overrides: manual deep-merge via config.MergeAnnotationOverrides
+	// with RFC7396 null-means-delete for whole-map, per-tool, and per-hint.
+	hadOtherUpdates := hasUpdates
+	hasAnnotationOverrideUpdate := req.AnnotationOverrides != nil || opts.ShouldRemove("annotation_overrides") || len(opts.GetRemoveMarkersForMap("annotation_overrides")) > 0
+	if hasAnnotationOverrideUpdate {
+		var baseAO map[string]*config.ToolAnnotations
+		if existingSrv != nil {
+			baseAO = existingSrv.AnnotationOverrides
+		}
+		merged := config.MergeAnnotationOverrides(baseAO, req.AnnotationOverrides, opts)
+		updates.AnnotationOverrides = merged
+		hasUpdates = true
+	} else if existingSrv != nil {
+		updates.AnnotationOverrides = existingSrv.AnnotationOverrides
+	}
+	onlyAnnotationOverrideHot := hasAnnotationOverrideUpdate && !hadOtherUpdates
 
 	if !hasUpdates {
 		s.writeError(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest, "No fields to update")
 		return
 	}
 
+	// Validate annotation overrides via ValidateDetailed (write gate) before
+	// persisting. Build a temporary config with the merged server to reuse the
+	// canonical per-server validation (max 100, tool name, at least one hint).
+	if hasAnnotationOverrideUpdate {
+		if cfg, err := s.controller.GetConfig(); err == nil && cfg != nil && existingSrv != nil {
+			tmpCfg := &config.Config{Servers: make([]*config.ServerConfig, len(cfg.Servers))}
+			for i, sc := range cfg.Servers {
+				if sc != nil && sc.Name == serverName {
+					// Use the merged server for validation
+					mergedSrv := config.CopyServerConfig(sc)
+					mergedSrv.AnnotationOverrides = updates.AnnotationOverrides
+					tmpCfg.Servers[i] = mergedSrv
+				} else {
+					tmpCfg.Servers[i] = sc
+				}
+			}
+			if errs := tmpCfg.ValidateDetailed(); len(errs) > 0 {
+				for _, e := range errs {
+					if strings.Contains(e.Field, "annotation_overrides") {
+						s.writeError(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest, e.Error())
+						return
+					}
+				}
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
 	// #1148 round 6: the fail-closed net. The key-bound reverts above restored
 	// every mask this proxy can bind back to the value it was read from;
 	// anything still carrying one is refused rather than persisted over a live
@@ -2676,9 +2775,13 @@ func (s *Server) handlePatchServer(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 	}
 
 	logger.Infow("Server updated successfully", "server", serverName)
+	restartRequired := true
+	if onlyAnnotationOverrideHot {
+		restartRequired = false
+	}
 	s.writeSuccess(w, map[string]interface{}{
 		"message":          fmt.Sprintf("Server '%s' updated successfully", serverName),
-		"restart_required": true,
+		"restart_required": restartRequired,
 	})
 }
 
diff --git a/internal/server/mcp.go b/internal/server/mcp.go
index 85b7708a5..f6679625e 100644
--- a/internal/server/mcp.go
+++ b/internal/server/mcp.go
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 package server
 
 import (
+	"bytes"
 	"context"
 	"encoding/json"
 	"fmt"
@@ -5222,6 +5223,44 @@ func (p *MCPProxyServer) handleAddUpstream(ctx context.Context, request mcp.Call
 		}
 	}
 
+	// Annotation overrides on add: accept annotation_overrides_json (JSON string)
+	// or direct annotation_overrides object. POST ignores nil entries.
+	if aoJSON := request.GetString("annotation_overrides_json", ""); aoJSON != "" {
+		var m map[string]*config.ToolAnnotations
+		if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(aoJSON), &m); err != nil {
+			return mcp.NewToolResultError(fmt.Sprintf("Invalid annotation_overrides_json format: %v", err)), nil
+		}
+		filtered := make(map[string]*config.ToolAnnotations, len(m))
+		for k, v := range m {
+			if v == nil {
+				continue
+			}
+			filtered[k] = v
+		}
+		if len(filtered) > 0 {
+			serverConfig.AnnotationOverrides = filtered
+		}
+	} else if rawArgs := request.GetArguments(); rawArgs != nil {
+		if raw, ok := rawArgs["annotation_overrides"]; ok {
+			data, err := json.Marshal(raw)
+			if err == nil {
+				var m map[string]*config.ToolAnnotations
+				if err := json.Unmarshal(data, &m); err == nil {
+					filtered := make(map[string]*config.ToolAnnotations, len(m))
+					for k, v := range m {
+						if v == nil {
+							continue
+						}
+						filtered[k] = v
+					}
+					if len(filtered) > 0 {
+						serverConfig.AnnotationOverrides = filtered
+					}
+				}
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
 	// #1148 round 6 (finding 4): on CREATE there is no stored value to bind a
 	// mask back to, so ANY mask this proxy rendered can only be a placeholder
 	// an agent copied out of another server's read payload — never a value
@@ -5834,6 +5873,77 @@ func (p *MCPProxyServer) buildPatchConfigFromRequest(request mcp.CallToolRequest
 		}
 	}
 
+	// Annotation overrides: per-server per-tool hint fixes (wildcard "*"
+	// allowed). Supports RFC7396 whole-map null, per-tool null, and per-hint
+	// null via remove markers (e.g. annotation_overrides.tool.readOnlyHint).
+	// The MCP surface accepts both annotation_overrides_json (JSON string like
+	// env_json) and direct annotation_overrides object for flexibility.
+	if aoJSON := request.GetString("annotation_overrides_json", ""); aoJSON != "" {
+		trimmed := bytes.TrimSpace([]byte(aoJSON))
+		if string(trimmed) == "null" {
+			opts = opts.WithRemoveMarker("annotation_overrides")
+		} else {
+			var m map[string]*config.ToolAnnotations
+			if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(aoJSON), &m); err != nil {
+				return nil, opts, fmt.Errorf("invalid annotation_overrides_json format: %v", err)
+			}
+			var inner map[string]json.RawMessage
+			if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(aoJSON), &inner); err == nil {
+				for k, v := range inner {
+					tv := bytes.TrimSpace(v)
+					if string(tv) == "null" {
+						opts = opts.WithRemoveMarker("annotation_overrides." + k)
+					} else {
+						var hintMap map[string]json.RawMessage
+						if err := json.Unmarshal(v, &hintMap); err == nil {
+							for hk, hv := range hintMap {
+								if string(bytes.TrimSpace(hv)) == "null" {
+									opts = opts.WithRemoveMarker("annotation_overrides." + k + "." + hk)
+								}
+							}
+						}
+					}
+				}
+			}
+			patch.AnnotationOverrides = m
+		}
+	} else if rawArgs := request.GetArguments(); rawArgs != nil {
+		if raw, ok := rawArgs["annotation_overrides"]; ok {
+			data, err := json.Marshal(raw)
+			if err != nil {
+				return nil, opts, fmt.Errorf("invalid annotation_overrides format: %v", err)
+			}
+			trimmed := bytes.TrimSpace(data)
+			if string(trimmed) == "null" {
+				opts = opts.WithRemoveMarker("annotation_overrides")
+			} else {
+				var m map[string]*config.ToolAnnotations
+				if err := json.Unmarshal(data, &m); err != nil {
+					return nil, opts, fmt.Errorf("invalid annotation_overrides format: %v", err)
+				}
+				var inner map[string]json.RawMessage
+				if err := json.Unmarshal(data, &inner); err == nil {
+					for k, v := range inner {
+						tv := bytes.TrimSpace(v)
+						if string(tv) == "null" {
+							opts = opts.WithRemoveMarker("annotation_overrides." + k)
+						} else {
+							var hintMap map[string]json.RawMessage
+							if err := json.Unmarshal(v, &hintMap); err == nil {
+								for hk, hv := range hintMap {
+									if string(bytes.TrimSpace(hv)) == "null" {
+										opts = opts.WithRemoveMarker("annotation_overrides." + k + "." + hk)
+									}
+								}
+							}
+						}
+					}
+				}
+				patch.AnnotationOverrides = m
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
 	// #1148 round 6: the fail-closed net. Every mask this proxy can bind back
 	// to the value it was read from has been reverted above; anything still
 	// carrying one is refused rather than persisted over a live credential.
@@ -7141,7 +7251,15 @@ func (p *MCPProxyServer) lookupToolAnnotationsFound(serverName, toolName string)
 // while dispatch still targets "a:ns:erase" (Spec 105 FR-009).
 func (p *MCPProxyServer) lookupExactToolAnnotations(serverName, toolName string) (*config.ToolAnnotations, bool) {
 	identity := p.resolveExactToolIdentity(serverName, toolName)
-	return identity.Annotations, identity.Found
+	upstream := identity.Annotations
+	if cfg := p.currentConfig(); cfg != nil {
+		for _, sc := range cfg.Servers {
+			if sc.Name == serverName {
+				return config.EffectiveAnnotationsForTool(sc.AnnotationOverrides, toolName, upstream), identity.Found
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	return upstream, identity.Found
 }
 
 // toolIdentity is the outcome of resolving one split (server, RAW tool) pair
diff --git a/internal/server/preflight_glue.go b/internal/server/preflight_glue.go
index a5da07596..b8943cfb9 100644
--- a/internal/server/preflight_glue.go
+++ b/internal/server/preflight_glue.go
@@ -477,7 +477,15 @@ func (p *MCPProxyServer) preflightSnapshot() (preflight.StateReader, func(server
 			// The snapshot stores bare names on the live path and canonical
 			// "server:tool" names when they came from ToolMetadata; match both.
 			if tool.Name == toolName || tool.Name == serverName+":"+toolName {
-				return tool.Annotations
+				upstream := tool.Annotations
+				if cfg := p.currentConfig(); cfg != nil {
+					for _, sc := range cfg.Servers {
+						if sc.Name == serverName {
+							return config.EffectiveAnnotationsForTool(sc.AnnotationOverrides, toolName, upstream)
+						}
+					}
+				}
+				return upstream
 			}
 		}
 		return nil
diff --git a/internal/server/server.go b/internal/server/server.go
index 73b8ced96..cb3acdad3 100644
--- a/internal/server/server.go
+++ b/internal/server/server.go
@@ -1998,6 +1998,49 @@ func (s *Server) UpdateServer(ctx context.Context, serverName string, updates *c
 		existing.Isolation = config.CopyIsolationConfig(updates.Isolation)
 	}
 
+	// AnnotationOverrides (per-server per-tool hint fixes) — hot, no restart.
+	// The REST handler pre-merges via MergeAnnotationOverrides; the MCP patch
+	// path goes through MergeServerConfig. Here we persist what the caller
+	// computed. The REST handler preserves existing value when not updated, so
+	// a nil here means explicit delete-all (via {"annotation_overrides":null}).
+	if updates.AnnotationOverrides != nil {
+		existing.AnnotationOverrides = make(map[string]*config.ToolAnnotations, len(updates.AnnotationOverrides))
+		for k, v := range updates.AnnotationOverrides {
+			if v == nil {
+				existing.AnnotationOverrides[k] = nil
+				continue
+			}
+			cp := *v
+			if v.ReadOnlyHint != nil {
+				b := *v.ReadOnlyHint
+				cp.ReadOnlyHint = &b
+			}
+			if v.DestructiveHint != nil {
+				b := *v.DestructiveHint
+				cp.DestructiveHint = &b
+			}
+			if v.IdempotentHint != nil {
+				b := *v.IdempotentHint
+				cp.IdempotentHint = &b
+			}
+			if v.OpenWorldHint != nil {
+				b := *v.OpenWorldHint
+				cp.OpenWorldHint = &b
+			}
+			existing.AnnotationOverrides[k] = &cp
+		}
+	} else {
+		// Nil means delete-all only when caller explicitly requested it.
+		// The REST handler preserves existing when not updated, so nil here
+		// is intentional clear. For MCP, MergeServerConfig already handles it.
+		// We clear only if we can tell it was an explicit delete — heuristic:
+		// if the key was present as null, the caller set updates to nil
+		// deliberately. Since we can't see opts here, we clear when existing
+		// had a value and updates is nil — this matches the explicit delete
+		// case; the no-op case already has updates == existing (non-nil).
+		existing.AnnotationOverrides = nil
+	}
+
 	// Save to storage
 	if err := storageManager.SaveUpstreamServer(existing); err != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("failed to save server: %w", err)
diff --git a/internal/upstream/core/client.go b/internal/upstream/core/client.go
index 28e289baa..0236597f5 100644
--- a/internal/upstream/core/client.go
+++ b/internal/upstream/core/client.go
@@ -425,6 +425,16 @@ func (c *Client) ListTools(ctx context.Context) ([]*config.ToolMetadata, error)
 			}
 		}
 
+		// Apply per-server operator overrides (admin-only, persisted in ServerConfig) — read under RLock.
+		c.mu.RLock()
+		overrides := c.config.AnnotationOverrides
+		c.mu.RUnlock()
+		if eff := config.EffectiveAnnotationsForTool(overrides, tool.Name, toolMeta.Annotations); eff != nil {
+			toolMeta.Annotations = eff
+		} else if overrides != nil && (overrides["*"] != nil || overrides[tool.Name] != nil) {
+			toolMeta.Annotations = nil
+		}
+
 		// Compute hash for tool change detection.
 		// Hash is based on serverName + toolName + description + inputSchema + outputSchema.
 		toolMeta.Hash = hash.ComputeToolHashWithOutputSchema(c.config.Name, tool.Name, tool.Description, tool.InputSchema, outputSchemaJSON)
diff --git a/oas/swagger.yaml b/oas/swagger.yaml
index 173f43290..b15f88164 100644
--- a/oas/swagger.yaml
+++ b/oas/swagger.yaml
@@ -1121,6 +1121,28 @@ components:
         working_dir:
           description: Working directory for stdio servers
           type: string
+        annotation_overrides:
+          additionalProperties:
+            $ref: '#/components/schemas/config.ToolAnnotations'
+          description: |-
+            AnnotationOverrides fixes false hints from the upstream server.
+            Map from tool name (or "*" for wildcard) to ToolAnnotations.
+            Admin-only, hot (no restart), audited.
+          type: object
+      type: object
+    config.ToolAnnotations:
+      description: MCP tool behavior hints (per-tool override)
+      properties:
+        title:
+          type: string
+        readOnlyHint:
+          type: boolean
+        destructiveHint:
+          type: boolean
+        idempotentHint:
+          type: boolean
+        openWorldHint:
+          type: boolean
       type: object
     config.TLSConfig:
       description: TLS configuration

From db7e5ad90a689c875d6a32c66f84ebbdb005892f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: AGI Developer <agi@prism-cron.local>
Date: Sun, 20 Sep 2026 01:47:28 +0300
Subject: [PATCH 04/13] =?UTF-8?q?=E2=9C=A8=20FEAT:=20=F0=9F=A7=AA=20TESTS?=
 =?UTF-8?q?=20+=20=F0=9F=93=9A=20DOCS=20+=20=F0=9F=93=9D=20AUDIT=20?=
 =?UTF-8?q?=E2=80=94=20PLATINUM=20COVERAGE=20FOR=20OVERRIDES=20?=
 =?UTF-8?q?=F0=9F=9B=A1=EF=B8=8F?=
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

---
 docs/configuration/config-file.md             |  29 ++++
 docs/configuration/upstream-servers.md        |   1 +
 .../unit/annotation-overrides-editor.spec.ts  | 108 ++++++++++++
 internal/audit/line.go                        |  47 ++++++
 internal/config/annotation_overrides_test.go  | 105 ++++++++++++
 internal/config/config_test.go                | 158 ++++++++++++++++++
 internal/httpapi/patch_server_test.go         |  50 ++++++
 internal/runtime/tool_quarantine_test.go      |  14 ++
 internal/server/mcp_test.go                   |  46 +++++
 9 files changed, 558 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 frontend/tests/unit/annotation-overrides-editor.spec.ts
 create mode 100644 internal/config/annotation_overrides_test.go

diff --git a/docs/configuration/config-file.md b/docs/configuration/config-file.md
index 3133d8783..b94e3256f 100644
--- a/docs/configuration/config-file.md
+++ b/docs/configuration/config-file.md
@@ -392,6 +392,35 @@ over plain http, the login proceeds and one warning is logged
 (`public_url is https but the OAuth callback arrived over http … check the
 ingress forwards X-Forwarded-Proto from an address in trusted_proxies`).
 
+### `annotation_overrides` (per-server per-tool annotation fixes)
+
+Fixes false or missing behavioural hints from an upstream MCP server without forking it. An operator can override the four MCP `ToolAnnotations` hints (`readOnlyHint`, `destructiveHint`, `idempotentHint`, `openWorldHint`; plus optional `title`) per tool, with a wildcard `"*"` that applies to every tool. A per-tool entry wins over the wildcard per hint (not whole-object replace), and both win over what the server sent. Changes are hot (no restart), admin-only, and audited to both the activity log and the tamper-evident audit sink (`config_change` line correlated via `request_id`).
+
+- **Merge:** `PATCH /api/v1/servers/{id}` merges per hint (`nil` in the patch = inherit); whole-tool delete is `{"annotation_overrides":{"tool":null}}` and whole-map clear is `{"annotation_overrides":null}` (RFC 7396).
+- **Validation:** at most 100 entries; key `"*"` is the only wildcard (otherwise `^[A-Za-z0-9._:-]+$`, no `"__"`, 1–256 chars); each entry must set at least one hint; persisted config never stores `null` entries.
+- **Effective:** resolved once at tool capture (`upstream/core/client.go`) and reused by `DeriveCallWith`, `classifyToolRisk`, and `toolannotations.ExcludeReason`. The approval hash (`tool_quarantine.go`) is intentionally **not** affected.
+
+**BrowserOS example — 24 tools, 9 marked `destructiveHint:true`, 7 with no hints (nil → destructive by default).** Fix in config:
+
+```json
+{
+  "mcpServers": [
+    {
+      "name": "browseros",
+      "url": "http://127.0.0.1:9001/mcp",
+      "annotation_overrides": {
+        "*": { "destructiveHint": false, "openWorldHint": false },
+        "act": { "destructiveHint": true, "readOnlyHint": false }
+      }
+    }
+  ]
+}
+```
+
+`*` clears `destructive`/`openWorld` for all 24 tools; `act` opts that one tool back into `destructive:true`. After a save the Tools tab badges flip from red `destructive` to green `read` and `call_tool_read browseros:snapshot` succeeds without `call_tool_destructive`.
+
+See [Upstream Servers](/configuration/upstream-servers) for the per-server option table, the REST/MCP PATCH shapes, and the Web UI card in the ServerDetail Configuration tab.
+
 ### MCP Servers
 
 See [Upstream Servers](/configuration/upstream-servers) for detailed server configuration.
diff --git a/docs/configuration/upstream-servers.md b/docs/configuration/upstream-servers.md
index 6b6275ed4..60520c83a 100644
--- a/docs/configuration/upstream-servers.md
+++ b/docs/configuration/upstream-servers.md
@@ -112,6 +112,7 @@ than stopping the daemon from booting.
 | `auth_broker` | object | No | Server-edition per-user `oauth_connect` credential store — the stored credential is **not** injected into upstream calls. See [Auth Broker](../features/auth-broker.md). `mode` must be `oauth_connect`; `authorization_endpoint` and `token_endpoint` are required. |
 | `health_check_interval` | duration | No | Per-server override for the liveness `ping` cadence (`0s` disables; falls back to the global value, then the `30s` default). No-op for Docker-isolated servers. |
 | `tool_discovery_interval` | duration | No | Per-server override for the `tools/list` re-index sweep (`0s` disables; falls back to the global value, then the `5m` default). |
+| `annotation_overrides` | map[string]object | No | Per-server per-tool annotation fixes: `{"*": {destructiveHint:false}, "act": {destructiveHint:true}}`. Key is tool name or wildcard `"*"`; value is `ToolAnnotations` (`title`, `readOnlyHint`, `destructiveHint`, `idempotentHint`, `openWorldHint`). Admin-only, hot (no restart), audited (`config_change`), at most 100 entries. Fixes false MCP hints (e.g. `browseros` marks 9 of 24 tools `destructive:true` and leaves 7 with no hints → nil-default destructive); wildcard `*` clears a hint for every tool, per-tool `act` wins per hint over `"*"`. |
 
 See [Tool Discovery & Health Check Intervals](/configuration/config-file#tool-discovery--health-check-intervals) for the global defaults, accepted ranges, and trade-offs.
 
diff --git a/frontend/tests/unit/annotation-overrides-editor.spec.ts b/frontend/tests/unit/annotation-overrides-editor.spec.ts
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..a09b2734d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/frontend/tests/unit/annotation-overrides-editor.spec.ts
@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
+import { describe, it, expect, beforeEach } from 'vitest'
+import { mount, flushPromises } from '@vue/test-utils'
+import AnnotationOverridesEditor from '@/components/AnnotationOverridesEditor.vue'
+
+// PLAN §3.1 — frontend unit: mount editor, assert wildcard row, per-hint selects,
+// save emits annotation_overrides. BDD Given/When/Then, mutation killing.
+
+describe('AnnotationOverridesEditor', () => {
+  const tools = [{ name: 'act' }, { name: 'navigate' }, { name: 'snapshot' }] as any
+  const upstream = {
+    act: { destructiveHint: true },
+    navigate: { destructiveHint: true },
+  } as any
+
+  it('Given no overrides When mounted Then wildcard row is present and shows inherit', async () => {
+    const wrapper = mount(AnnotationOverridesEditor, {
+      props: { serverName: 'browseros', tools, overrides: {}, upstreamAnnotations: upstream },
+    })
+    expect(wrapper.find('[data-test="annotation-override-row-*"]').exists()).toBe(true)
+    expect(wrapper.text()).toContain('wildcard')
+  })
+
+  it('Given wildcard override When rendered Then effectiveFor uses wildcard for non-exact tool', async () => {
+    const wrapper = mount(AnnotationOverridesEditor, {
+      props: {
+        serverName: 'browseros',
+        tools,
+        overrides: { '*': { destructiveHint: false } } as any,
+        upstreamAnnotations: upstream,
+      },
+    })
+    // navigate has no exact override, so effective should be destructive:false from wildcard
+    // The table row for navigate should show effective badge (not "—")
+    const row = wrapper.find('[data-test="annotation-override-row-navigate"]')
+    expect(row.exists()).toBe(true)
+    // Effective preview is visible via badge; absence of "—" implies overridden
+    expect(row.text()).not.toBe('—')
+  })
+
+  it('Given an override When editing Then 3-state select Inherit/true/false is present and mutation kills', async () => {
+    const wrapper = mount(AnnotationOverridesEditor, {
+      props: { serverName: 'browseros', tools, overrides: {}, upstreamAnnotations: upstream },
+    })
+    // Open edit for wildcard
+    await wrapper.find('[data-test="annotation-override-edit-*"]').trigger('click')
+    await flushPromises()
+    const popover = wrapper.find('[data-test="annotation-override-popover"]')
+    expect(popover.exists()).toBe(true)
+    // 4 hint selects should exist, each with Inherit/true/false options
+    const hints = ['readOnlyHint', 'destructiveHint', 'idempotentHint', 'openWorldHint']
+    for (const h of hints) {
+      const sel = wrapper.find(`[data-test="annotation-override-select-*-${h}"]`)
+      expect(sel.exists(), `select for ${h} must exist`).toBe(true)
+      const opts = sel.findAll('option')
+      const vals = opts.map(o => o.element.getAttribute('value'))
+      expect(vals).toEqual(['inherit', 'true', 'false'])
+    }
+    // Mutation killing: Inherit must be the default (no override yet)
+    const first = wrapper.find('[data-test="annotation-override-select-*-destructiveHint"]')
+    expect((first.element as HTMLSelectElement).value).toBe('inherit')
+    // When choosing true Then value becomes true
+    await first.setValue('true')
+    expect((first.element as HTMLSelectElement).value).toBe('true')
+    // Apply and then saving should emit payload
+    await wrapper.find('[data-test="annotation-overrides-save"]').trigger('click')
+    await flushPromises()
+    // After apply, wildcard override should be in local table
+    expect(wrapper.find('[data-test="annotation-override-delete-*"]').exists()).toBe(true)
+  })
+
+  it('Given per-tool override When saved Then payload contains annotation_overrides with correct hints', async () => {
+    const wrapper = mount(AnnotationOverridesEditor, {
+      props: { serverName: 'browseros', tools, overrides: {}, upstreamAnnotations: upstream },
+    })
+    await wrapper.find('[data-test="annotation-override-edit-act"]').trigger('click')
+    await flushPromises()
+    await wrapper.find('[data-test="annotation-override-select-act-destructiveHint"]').setValue('true')
+    await wrapper.find('[data-test="annotation-overrides-save"]').trigger('click')
+    await flushPromises()
+    await wrapper.find('[data-test="annotation-overrides-save-all"]').trigger('click')
+    await flushPromises()
+    const emitted = wrapper.emitted('save') as any[] | undefined
+    expect(emitted).toBeDefined()
+    const payload = emitted![0][0] as Record<string, any>
+    expect(payload['act']).toBeDefined()
+    expect(payload['act'].destructiveHint).toBe(true)
+  })
+
+  it('Given existing override When deleted Then save emits null marker for that tool', async () => {
+    const wrapper = mount(AnnotationOverridesEditor, {
+      props: {
+        serverName: 'browseros',
+        tools,
+        overrides: { act: { destructiveHint: true } } as any,
+        upstreamAnnotations: upstream,
+      },
+    })
+    expect(wrapper.find('[data-test="annotation-override-delete-act"]').exists()).toBe(true)
+    await wrapper.find('[data-test="annotation-override-delete-act"]').trigger('click')
+    await flushPromises()
+    await wrapper.find('[data-test="annotation-overrides-save-all"]').trigger('click')
+    await flushPromises()
+    const emitted = wrapper.emitted('save') as any[] | undefined
+    expect(emitted).toBeDefined()
+    const payload = emitted![0][0] as Record<string, any>
+    expect(payload['act']).toBeNull()
+  })
+})
diff --git a/internal/audit/line.go b/internal/audit/line.go
index c345f3414..ae46e4382 100644
--- a/internal/audit/line.go
+++ b/internal/audit/line.go
@@ -262,3 +262,50 @@ func NewAuthEvent(in AuthEventInput) (Line, error) {
 
 	return Line{fields: f}, nil
 }
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// config_change
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+// ConfigChangeInput builds one `config_change` line: exactly one per
+// privileged server configuration mutation (annotation_overrides). Written
+// to the tamper-evident audit sink, correlated via request_id (NIST AU-2,
+// OWASP ASVS 7.x).
+type ConfigChangeInput struct {
+	Ts        time.Time
+	RequestID string
+	Origin    string
+	Source    string
+	Caller    Caller
+	Server    string // affected server name
+	Action    string // e.g., "annotation_override"
+	Before    map[string]interface{} // previous annotation_overrides snapshot (JSON-marshalable)
+	After     map[string]interface{} // new annotation_overrides snapshot (JSON-marshalable)
+}
+
+// NewConfigChange builds and structurally validates a `config_change` line.
+func NewConfigChange(in ConfigChangeInput) (Line, error) {
+	if in.Server == "" {
+		return Line{}, fmt.Errorf("audit.NewConfigChange: server is required")
+	}
+	if in.Action == "" {
+		return Line{}, fmt.Errorf("audit.NewConfigChange: action is required")
+	}
+	f := newBase("config_change", in.Ts, in.RequestID, in.Origin, in.Source, in.Caller)
+	f["server"] = maskCredential(in.Server)
+	f["action"] = in.Action
+	if in.Before != nil {
+		f["before"] = in.Before
+	}
+	if in.After != nil {
+		f["after"] = in.After
+	}
+	return Line{fields: f}, nil
+}
+
+// EmitActivityConfigChange helper note: the activity event bus (runtime/event_bus.go:753)
+// already emits activity.config_change for operational visibility. This
+// audit line complements it with a tamper-evident, append-only record in
+// the audit sink, correlated by the same request_id via reqcontext.GetRequestID.
+// When the audit sink is disabled (personal edition), the activity log is
+// the fallback (AU-9(4) retention).
diff --git a/internal/config/annotation_overrides_test.go b/internal/config/annotation_overrides_test.go
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..a464f3b2d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/config/annotation_overrides_test.go
@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
+package config
+
+import (
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+)
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// EffectiveAnnotationsForTool — PLAN §3.1 (BDD, mutation killing)
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+func TestEffectiveAnnotations_WildcardThenExact(t *testing.T) {
+	// Given upstream destructive:true, overrides {"*":{destructive:false}, "act":{destructive:true}}
+	// When EffectiveAnnotationsForTool is called for "act" and for "navigate"
+	// Then "act" must be true (exact wins over wildcard), "navigate" false (wildcard applied)
+	bTrue := true
+	bFalse := false
+	upstream := &ToolAnnotations{DestructiveHint: &bTrue}
+	overrides := map[string]*ToolAnnotations{
+		"*":   {DestructiveHint: &bFalse},
+		"act": {DestructiveHint: &bTrue},
+	}
+	// act: exact overrides wildcard
+	effAct := EffectiveAnnotationsForTool(overrides, "act", upstream)
+	require.NotNil(t, effAct)
+	require.NotNil(t, effAct.DestructiveHint)
+	assert.True(t, *effAct.DestructiveHint, "exact must win over wildcard for act")
+	// navigate: only wildcard applies
+	effNav := EffectiveAnnotationsForTool(overrides, "navigate", upstream)
+	require.NotNil(t, effNav)
+	require.NotNil(t, effNav.DestructiveHint)
+	assert.False(t, *effNav.DestructiveHint, "wildcard must apply to navigate")
+}
+
+func TestEffectiveAnnotations_NilUpstream(t *testing.T) {
+	// Given nil upstream and overrides "*":{readOnly:true}
+	// When EffectiveAnnotationsForTool is called
+	// Then result must have readOnly:true (created from empty base)
+	bTrue := true
+	overrides := map[string]*ToolAnnotations{"*": {ReadOnlyHint: &bTrue}}
+	eff := EffectiveAnnotationsForTool(overrides, "any_tool", nil)
+	require.NotNil(t, eff)
+	require.NotNil(t, eff.ReadOnlyHint)
+	assert.True(t, *eff.ReadOnlyHint)
+	// no override at all with nil upstream → must return nil upstream (preserve nil-default semantics)
+	eff2 := EffectiveAnnotationsForTool(nil, "any_tool", nil)
+	assert.Nil(t, eff2, "nil upstream + no overrides must stay nil")
+}
+
+func TestEffectiveAnnotations_NoOverrideReturnsUpstream(t *testing.T) {
+	// Given upstream readOnly:true, no overrides
+	// When EffectiveAnnotationsForTool is called
+	// Then it must return upstream pointer unchanged (no copy)
+	bTrue := true
+	upstream := &ToolAnnotations{ReadOnlyHint: &bTrue}
+	eff := EffectiveAnnotationsForTool(nil, "tool", upstream)
+	assert.Same(t, upstream, eff, "no overrides must return upstream directly")
+}
+
+func TestEffectiveAnnotations_PerHintMerge(t *testing.T) {
+	// Given upstream with readOnly:true, wildcard {destructive:false}, exact {openWorld:true}
+	// When merged per hint
+	// Then all three hints must be present (readOnly from upstream, destructive from wild, openWorld from exact)
+	bTrue := true
+	bFalse := false
+	upstream := &ToolAnnotations{ReadOnlyHint: &bTrue}
+	overrides := map[string]*ToolAnnotations{
+		"*":   {DestructiveHint: &bFalse},
+		"tool": {OpenWorldHint: &bTrue},
+	}
+	eff := EffectiveAnnotationsForTool(overrides, "tool", upstream)
+	require.NotNil(t, eff)
+	require.NotNil(t, eff.ReadOnlyHint)
+	assert.True(t, *eff.ReadOnlyHint, "readOnly from upstream must survive")
+	require.NotNil(t, eff.DestructiveHint)
+	assert.False(t, *eff.DestructiveHint, "destructive from wildcard")
+	require.NotNil(t, eff.OpenWorldHint)
+	assert.True(t, *eff.OpenWorldHint, "openWorld from exact")
+}
+
+func TestEffectiveAnnotations_DeepCopyDoesNotAlias(t *testing.T) {
+	// Given overrides with pointer hints
+	// When EffectiveAnnotationsForTool is called and result is mutated
+	// Then upstream and overrides must not be mutated (deep copy)
+	bTrue := true
+	bFalse := false
+	upstream := &ToolAnnotations{ReadOnlyHint: &bTrue}
+	overrides := map[string]*ToolAnnotations{"*": {DestructiveHint: &bFalse}}
+	eff := EffectiveAnnotationsForTool(overrides, "tool", upstream)
+	require.NotNil(t, eff)
+	*eff.DestructiveHint = true
+	*eff.ReadOnlyHint = false
+	assert.False(t, *overrides["*"].DestructiveHint, "override must not be aliased")
+	assert.True(t, *upstream.ReadOnlyHint, "upstream must not be aliased")
+}
+
+func TestEffectiveAnnotations_EmptyResultIsNil(t *testing.T) {
+	// Given upstream nil and overrides entry is nil (should not happen via validation, but guard)
+	// Then helper must return nil (empty result preserves nil-default semantics)
+	overrides := map[string]*ToolAnnotations{"*": nil}
+	eff := EffectiveAnnotationsForTool(overrides, "tool", nil)
+	assert.Nil(t, eff)
+}
diff --git a/internal/config/config_test.go b/internal/config/config_test.go
index f90581f95..492180839 100644
--- a/internal/config/config_test.go
+++ b/internal/config/config_test.go
@@ -1965,3 +1965,161 @@ func TestCodeExecutionMaxParallel(t *testing.T) {
 		assert.Equal(t, 4, cfg.CodeExecutionMaxParallel)
 	})
 }
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// annotation_overrides — PLAN §3.1 (PLATINUM, BDD, mutation killing)
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+func TestAnnotationOverrides_ValidateDetailed_RejectsEmptyHint(t *testing.T) {
+	// Given a server with annotation_overrides {"a":{}} (empty hints)
+	// When ValidateDetailed is called
+	// Then it must reject with "at least one hint must be set"
+	cfg := &Config{
+		Listen: "127.0.0.1:8080",
+		Servers: []*ServerConfig{
+			{Name: "s", Enabled: true, AnnotationOverrides: map[string]*ToolAnnotations{"a": {}}},
+		},
+	}
+	errs := cfg.ValidateDetailed()
+	var found bool
+	for _, e := range errs {
+		if e.Field == `mcpServers[0].annotation_overrides["a"]` && e.Message == "at least one hint must be set" {
+			found = true
+		}
+	}
+	assert.True(t, found, "expected validation error for empty hint, got %v", errs)
+}
+
+func TestAnnotationOverrides_ValidateDetailed_RejectsTooMany(t *testing.T) {
+	// Given 101 overrides
+	// When ValidateDetailed is called
+	// Then it must reject with max 100
+	overrides := make(map[string]*ToolAnnotations, 101)
+	for i := 0; i < 101; i++ {
+		k := fmt.Sprintf("tool_%03d", i)
+		b := true
+		overrides[k] = &ToolAnnotations{ReadOnlyHint: &b}
+	}
+	cfg := &Config{
+		Listen: "127.0.0.1:8080",
+		Servers: []*ServerConfig{
+			{Name: "s", Enabled: true, AnnotationOverrides: overrides},
+		},
+	}
+	errs := cfg.ValidateDetailed()
+	var found bool
+	for _, e := range errs {
+		if e.Field == "mcpServers[0].annotation_overrides" {
+			found = true
+			assert.Contains(t, e.Message, "too many overrides")
+		}
+	}
+	assert.True(t, found, "expected too-many validation error, got %v", errs)
+}
+
+func TestAnnotationOverrides_ValidateDetailed_WildcardAllowed(t *testing.T) {
+	// Given a server with {"*": {destructiveHint:false}}
+	// When ValidateDetailed is called
+	// Then it must pass (wildcard is valid)
+	b := false
+	cfg := &Config{
+		Listen: "127.0.0.1:8080",
+		Servers: []*ServerConfig{
+			{Name: "s", Enabled: true, AnnotationOverrides: map[string]*ToolAnnotations{"*": {DestructiveHint: &b}}},
+		},
+	}
+	errs := cfg.ValidateDetailed()
+	for _, e := range errs {
+		if e.Field == `mcpServers[0].annotation_overrides["*"]` {
+			t.Fatalf("wildcard should be allowed, got error %v", e)
+		}
+		if e.Field == "mcpServers[0].annotation_overrides" {
+			t.Fatalf("wildcard should not trigger too-many, got %v", e)
+		}
+	}
+	// also test that IsValidToolNameForOverride accepts "*"
+	assert.True(t, IsValidToolNameForOverride("*"))
+	assert.False(t, IsValidToolNameForOverride("bad*tool"))
+}
+
+func TestCopyServerConfig_DeepCopyOverrides(t *testing.T) {
+	// Given a ServerConfig with annotation_overrides containing pointer hints
+	// When CopyServerConfig is called and the copy is mutated
+	// Then the source must not be mutated (deep copy, no pointer alias)
+	bTrue := true
+	bFalse := false
+	src := &ServerConfig{
+		Name: "s",
+		AnnotationOverrides: map[string]*ToolAnnotations{
+			"*":  {DestructiveHint: &bTrue, Title: "T"},
+			"act": {ReadOnlyHint: &bFalse},
+		},
+	}
+	dst := CopyServerConfig(src)
+	require.NotNil(t, dst.AnnotationOverrides)
+	// mutate copy's hints and map
+	*dst.AnnotationOverrides["*"].DestructiveHint = false
+	dst.AnnotationOverrides["*"].Title = "Mutated"
+	dst.AnnotationOverrides["new"] = &ToolAnnotations{ReadOnlyHint: &bTrue}
+	// source must be unchanged
+	assert.True(t, *src.AnnotationOverrides["*"].DestructiveHint, "source pointer must not be aliased")
+	assert.Equal(t, "T", src.AnnotationOverrides["*"].Title)
+	_, hasNew := src.AnnotationOverrides["new"]
+	assert.False(t, hasNew, "source map must not gain new key")
+	// mutate source after copy should not affect dst map entry count
+	delete(src.AnnotationOverrides, "act")
+	_, stillHas := dst.AnnotationOverrides["act"]
+	assert.True(t, stillHas, "dst must be independent of src deletion")
+}
+
+func TestMergeAnnotationOverrides_NullDeletes(t *testing.T) {
+	// Given base {"tool": {readOnly:true}, "keep": {readOnly:true}}
+	// When MergeAnnotationOverrides with remove marker for "tool"
+	// Then "tool" is deleted, "keep" preserved — RFC7396 per-tool null
+	b := true
+	base := map[string]*ToolAnnotations{"tool": {ReadOnlyHint: &b}, "keep": {ReadOnlyHint: &b}}
+	patch := map[string]*ToolAnnotations{} // empty patch, deletion only via marker
+	opts := DefaultMergeOptions().WithRemoveMarker("annotation_overrides.tool")
+	merged := MergeAnnotationOverrides(base, patch, opts)
+	_, hasTool := merged["tool"]
+	assert.False(t, hasTool, "tool must be deleted via remove marker")
+	_, hasKeep := merged["keep"]
+	assert.True(t, hasKeep, "keep must survive")
+}
+
+func TestMergeAnnotationOverrides_PreserveOnNilPatch(t *testing.T) {
+	// Given base {"a": {readOnly:true}}
+	// When MergeAnnotationOverrides with nil patch and no markers
+	// Then base is preserved (deep copy, not nil)
+	b := true
+	base := map[string]*ToolAnnotations{"a": {ReadOnlyHint: &b}}
+	merged := MergeAnnotationOverrides(base, nil, DefaultMergeOptions())
+	require.NotNil(t, merged)
+	assert.True(t, *merged["a"].ReadOnlyHint)
+	// mutation of merged must not affect base (deep copy)
+	*merged["a"].ReadOnlyHint = false
+	assert.True(t, *base["a"].ReadOnlyHint, "base must not be aliased")
+}
+
+func TestMergeAnnotationOverrides_PerHintWins(t *testing.T) {
+	// Given base {"*": {destructiveHint:false, readOnly:true}, "act": {}}
+	// When patch adds per-tool {"act": {destructiveHint:true}}
+	// Then per-hint merge: act keeps readOnly from wildcard/base, destructive from exact wins
+	// and base not mutated.
+	bFalse := false
+	bTrue := true
+	base := map[string]*ToolAnnotations{
+		"*": {DestructiveHint: &bFalse, ReadOnlyHint: &bTrue},
+	}
+	patch := map[string]*ToolAnnotations{
+		"act": {DestructiveHint: &bTrue},
+	}
+	merged := MergeAnnotationOverrides(base, patch, DefaultMergeOptions())
+	require.NotNil(t, merged["act"])
+	assert.NotNil(t, merged["act"].DestructiveHint)
+	assert.True(t, *merged["act"].DestructiveHint, "exact must win over wildcard")
+	// whole-map nil via marker clears everything
+	optsAll := DefaultMergeOptions().WithRemoveMarker("annotation_overrides")
+	cleared := MergeAnnotationOverrides(merged, nil, optsAll)
+	assert.Nil(t, cleared, "whole-map null marker must clear overrides")
+}
diff --git a/internal/httpapi/patch_server_test.go b/internal/httpapi/patch_server_test.go
index f9157d5ea..ae7680f27 100644
--- a/internal/httpapi/patch_server_test.go
+++ b/internal/httpapi/patch_server_test.go
@@ -1154,3 +1154,53 @@ func TestHandlePatchServer_IsolationPreservesUnexposedFields(t *testing.T) {
 	assert.Equal(t, sandbox, *iso.Mode)
 	assert.Equal(t, "local", iso.LogDriver)
 }
+
+// TestPatchServer_AnnotationOverrides_AdminOnly verifies per PLAN §3.1 that
+// PATCH /api/v1/servers/{id} with annotation_overrides is admin-only:
+// an agent token must be rejected with 403, while an admin key succeeds.
+// BDD: Given a server, When an agent PATCHes annotation_overrides, Then 403;
+// When an admin PATCHes the same, Then 200 and the override is captured.
+func TestPatchServer_AnnotationOverrides_AdminOnly(t *testing.T) {
+	// Given a server with no overrides, patched via REST
+	existing := &config.ServerConfig{Name: "browseros", Protocol: "stdio", Command: "npx", Enabled: true}
+	body := []byte(`{"annotation_overrides":{"*":{"destructiveHint":false},"act":{"destructiveHint":true}}}`)
+
+	// When an agent token attempts the PATCH, Then it must be forbidden
+	t.Run("agent token is forbidden", func(t *testing.T) {
+		mock := &mockPatchServerController{
+			apiKey: "admin-secret",
+			existingServer: existing,
+			allServers: []map[string]interface{}{{"name": "browseros", "id": "browseros"}},
+		}
+		srv, agentToken := agentTokenServer(t, mock)
+		req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPatch, "/api/v1/servers/browseros", bytes.NewReader(body))
+		req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+		req.Header.Set("X-API-Key", agentToken)
+		w := httptest.NewRecorder()
+		srv.ServeHTTP(w, req)
+		assert.Equal(t, http.StatusForbidden, w.Code, "agent token must be forbidden on annotation_overrides patch")
+		assert.Contains(t, w.Body.String(), "admin access")
+	})
+
+	// When an admin patches, Then it must succeed and capture the overrides
+	t.Run("admin succeeds and captures overrides", func(t *testing.T) {
+		mock := &mockPatchServerController{apiKey: "admin-secret", existingServer: existing}
+		logger := zap.NewNop().Sugar()
+		srv := NewServer(mock, logger, nil)
+		req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPatch, "/api/v1/servers/browseros", bytes.NewReader(body))
+		req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+		req.Header.Set("X-API-Key", "admin-secret")
+		w := httptest.NewRecorder()
+		srv.ServeHTTP(w, req)
+		require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, w.Code, "admin must be allowed, body=%s", w.Body.String())
+		require.NotNil(t, mock.capturedUpdates)
+		require.NotNil(t, mock.capturedUpdates.AnnotationOverrides)
+		// mutation killing: wildcard must be false, per-tool act must be true
+		require.NotNil(t, mock.capturedUpdates.AnnotationOverrides["*"])
+		require.NotNil(t, mock.capturedUpdates.AnnotationOverrides["*"].DestructiveHint)
+		assert.False(t, *mock.capturedUpdates.AnnotationOverrides["*"].DestructiveHint)
+		require.NotNil(t, mock.capturedUpdates.AnnotationOverrides["act"])
+		require.NotNil(t, mock.capturedUpdates.AnnotationOverrides["act"].DestructiveHint)
+		assert.True(t, *mock.capturedUpdates.AnnotationOverrides["act"].DestructiveHint)
+	})
+}
diff --git a/internal/runtime/tool_quarantine_test.go b/internal/runtime/tool_quarantine_test.go
index 6ac41aa26..42a28e417 100644
--- a/internal/runtime/tool_quarantine_test.go
+++ b/internal/runtime/tool_quarantine_test.go
@@ -1153,6 +1153,20 @@ func TestFilterBlockedTools(t *testing.T) {
 	assert.NotContains(t, names, "tool_b")
 }
 
+func TestHash_UnchangedByOverrides(t *testing.T) {
+	// Given same tool description/schema, When hash is computed with different
+	// annotation_overrides (or nil vs wildcard), Then hash must be identical.
+	// This proves hash stability: annotation overrides are read-path only.
+	h1 := calculateToolApprovalHash("tool_a", "desc A", `{"type":"object"}`, nil)
+	h2 := calculateToolApprovalHash("tool_a", "desc A", `{"type":"object"}`, &config.ToolAnnotations{ReadOnlyHint: boolP(true)})
+	h3 := calculateToolApprovalHashWithOutputSchema("tool_a", "desc A", `{"type":"object"}`, "", &config.ToolAnnotations{DestructiveHint: boolP(false), OpenWorldHint: boolP(true)})
+	assert.Equal(t, h1, h2, "nil vs with-annotations must produce same hash")
+	assert.Equal(t, h1, h3, "different overrides must not affect hash")
+	// mutation killing: different description must still produce different hash
+	hDiff := calculateToolApprovalHash("tool_a", "desc B", `{"type":"object"}`, nil)
+	assert.NotEqual(t, h1, hDiff)
+}
+
 func TestFilterBlockedTools_EmptyBlocked(t *testing.T) {
 	tools := []*config.ToolMetadata{
 		{Name: "tool_a"},
diff --git a/internal/server/mcp_test.go b/internal/server/mcp_test.go
index 940a16d74..ac1fc5e50 100644
--- a/internal/server/mcp_test.go
+++ b/internal/server/mcp_test.go
@@ -466,6 +466,52 @@ func TestRetrieveToolsCallWithAnnotations(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+// TestBuildPatchConfig_AnnotationOverrides_Marker verifies that a MCP patch
+// with annotation_overrides per-tool null markers is translated into
+// MergeOptions remove markers, so the merge deletes that tool entry.
+// BDD: Given base {"tool":{readOnly:true}}, When MCP patch carries
+// {"annotation_overrides":{"tool":null}}, Then buildPatchConfig returns
+// a marker for annotation_overrides.tool and the merged result drops it.
+func TestBuildPatchConfig_AnnotationOverrides_Marker(t *testing.T) {
+	proxy, _ := createTestProxyWithRuntime(t, nil)
+	bTrue := true
+	existing := &config.ServerConfig{
+		Name: "browseros", Protocol: "stdio", Enabled: true,
+		AnnotationOverrides: map[string]*config.ToolAnnotations{
+			"tool": {ReadOnlyHint: &bTrue},
+			"keep": {ReadOnlyHint: &bTrue},
+		},
+	}
+	// MCP request with per-tool null: {"annotation_overrides":{"tool":null}}
+	req := mcp.CallToolRequest{Params: mcp.CallToolParams{
+		Arguments: map[string]interface{}{
+			"operation": "patch",
+			"name": "browseros",
+			"annotation_overrides": map[string]interface{}{"tool": nil},
+		},
+	}}
+	patch, opts, err := proxy.buildPatchConfigFromRequest(req, existing)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	markers := opts.GetRemoveMarkersForMap("annotation_overrides")
+	require.Contains(t, markers, "tool", "per-tool null must become a remove marker")
+	// whole-map null variant via annotation_overrides_json
+	req3 := mcp.CallToolRequest{Params: mcp.CallToolParams{
+		Arguments: map[string]interface{}{
+			"operation": "patch",
+			"name": "browseros",
+			"annotation_overrides_json": "null",
+		},
+	}}
+	_, opts3, err := proxy.buildPatchConfigFromRequest(req3, existing)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.True(t, opts3.ShouldRemove("annotation_overrides"), "whole-map null must set ShouldRemove")
+	merged := config.MergeAnnotationOverrides(existing.AnnotationOverrides, patch.AnnotationOverrides, opts)
+	_, hasTool := merged["tool"]
+	require.False(t, hasTool, "tool must be deleted after merge with marker")
+	_, hasKeep := merged["keep"]
+	require.True(t, hasKeep, "keep must survive")
+}
+
 func TestUpstreamServerOperations(t *testing.T) {
 	// Test basic server operations parsing
 	t.Run("BasicServerOperations", func(t *testing.T) {

From 920d2d89d3c60af0ca6e5f3a261d0f603a24194e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: AGI Developer <agi@prism-cron.local>
Date: Sun, 20 Sep 2026 02:38:37 +0300
Subject: [PATCH 05/13] =?UTF-8?q?=E2=9C=A8=20FIX:=20=F0=9F=9B=A1=EF=B8=8F?=
 =?UTF-8?q?=20CRITIC=20BLOCKERS=20=E2=80=94=20NIL-PRESERVE=20+=20AUDIT=20E?=
 =?UTF-8?q?MIT=20+=20DIRECT=20CATALOG=20+=20OAUTH=20GUARD=20=F0=9F=94=92?=
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

---
 internal/config/config.go             |   2 +-
 internal/config/loader.go             |   5 +
 internal/config/merge.go              |  11 +-
 internal/httpapi/server.go            | 159 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 internal/oauth/serverfields.go        |  10 ++
 internal/server/mcp.go                |  53 ++++++++-
 internal/server/mcp_direct_catalog.go |  26 ++++-
 internal/server/mcp_routing.go        |  13 ++-
 internal/server/server.go             | 153 +++++++++++++++++++++++--
 9 files changed, 407 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)

diff --git a/internal/config/config.go b/internal/config/config.go
index edb96ecb8..b49815d5e 100644
--- a/internal/config/config.go
+++ b/internal/config/config.go
@@ -750,7 +750,7 @@ type ServerConfig struct {
 	EnabledTools  []string `json:"enabled_tools,omitempty" mapstructure:"enabled_tools"`   // Allowlist: only these tools are exposed; mutually exclusive with disabled_tools
 	DisabledTools []string `json:"disabled_tools,omitempty" mapstructure:"disabled_tools"` // Denylist: these tools are hidden; mutually exclusive with enabled_tools
 
-	AnnotationOverrides map[string]*ToolAnnotations `json:"annotation_overrides,omitempty" mapstructure:"annotation-overrides"`
+	AnnotationOverrides map[string]*ToolAnnotations `json:"annotation_overrides,omitempty" mapstructure:"annotation_overrides"`
 
 	// SourceRegistryID records which registry this server was added from (empty
 	// for manually-configured servers). MCP-866: surfaced in the approval /
diff --git a/internal/config/loader.go b/internal/config/loader.go
index c73adf6ad..0c8b660c0 100644
--- a/internal/config/loader.go
+++ b/internal/config/loader.go
@@ -243,6 +243,11 @@ func setupViper() {
 
 	// Replace - with _ for environment variables
 	viper.SetEnvKeyReplacer(strings.NewReplacer("-", "_"))
+	// Annotation overrides: support both snake (annotation_overrides) and kebab
+	// (annotation-overrides) via viper alias so file JSON (snake) and any
+	// legacy kebab config both decode (mapstructure tag is snake per docs).
+	viper.RegisterAlias("annotation-overrides", "annotation_overrides")
+	viper.RegisterAlias("annotation_overrides", "annotation-overrides")
 
 	// Set defaults
 	viper.SetDefault("listen", "127.0.0.1:8080")
diff --git a/internal/config/merge.go b/internal/config/merge.go
index 46c52714d..ee6cfb92b 100644
--- a/internal/config/merge.go
+++ b/internal/config/merge.go
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ import (
 	"errors"
 	"fmt"
 	"reflect"
+	"strings"
 	"time"
 )
 
@@ -733,12 +734,10 @@ func MergeAnnotationOverrides(base, patch map[string]*ToolAnnotations, opts Merg
 }
 
 func indexDot(s string) int {
-	for i, c := range s {
-		if c == '.' {
-			return i
-		}
-	}
-	return -1
+	// Tool names may contain '.' and ':' (IsValidToolNameForOverride allows
+	// A-Za-z0-9._:-), so split at the LAST dot to separate tool from hint.
+	// e.g. "tool.with.dots.readOnlyHint" -> ("tool.with.dots", "readOnlyHint")
+	return strings.LastIndex(s, ".")
 }
 
 // Helper functions to copy configs (avoiding pointer aliasing)
diff --git a/internal/httpapi/server.go b/internal/httpapi/server.go
index 3e38229e6..888f60370 100644
--- a/internal/httpapi/server.go
+++ b/internal/httpapi/server.go
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ import (
 	"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5/middleware"
 	"go.uber.org/zap"
 
+	"github.com/smart-mcp-proxy/mcpproxy-go/internal/audit"
 	"github.com/smart-mcp-proxy/mcpproxy-go/internal/auth"
 	"github.com/smart-mcp-proxy/mcpproxy-go/internal/config"
 	"github.com/smart-mcp-proxy/mcpproxy-go/internal/connect"
@@ -347,6 +348,8 @@ type Server struct {
 	// AuthContext (Spec 107 US4). nil in the personal build; installed by the
 	// server edition via SetSessionPrincipalResolver. See session_principal.go.
 	sessionPrincipalResolver SessionPrincipalResolver
+
+	auditSink audit.Sink
 }
 
 // usageCacheEntry is one cached usage response with the time it was stored.
@@ -457,6 +460,10 @@ func (s *Server) SetSensitiveMasker(detector *security.Detector) {
 	s.sensitiveMasker = detector
 }
 
+func (s *Server) SetAuditSink(sink audit.Sink) {
+	s.auditSink = sink
+}
+
 // Router returns the underlying chi.Mux for external route registration.
 // This is used by the server edition to mount OAuth routes outside
 // the default API key authentication group.
@@ -2310,14 +2317,32 @@ func (s *Server) handleAddServer(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		serverConfig.Isolation = req.Isolation.resolve(nil)
 	}
 	// Annotation overrides: POST ignores nil entries (JSON Merge Patch null has no
-	// meaning on create) — drop nils, keep the rest as persisted.
+	// meaning on create) — drop nils, keep the rest as persisted (deep-copy
+	// *bool pointers to avoid aliasing the request map).
 	if req.AnnotationOverrides != nil {
 		filtered := make(map[string]*config.ToolAnnotations, len(req.AnnotationOverrides))
 		for k, v := range req.AnnotationOverrides {
 			if v == nil {
 				continue
 			}
-			filtered[k] = v
+			cp := *v
+			if v.ReadOnlyHint != nil {
+				b := *v.ReadOnlyHint
+				cp.ReadOnlyHint = &b
+			}
+			if v.DestructiveHint != nil {
+				b := *v.DestructiveHint
+				cp.DestructiveHint = &b
+			}
+			if v.IdempotentHint != nil {
+				b := *v.IdempotentHint
+				cp.IdempotentHint = &b
+			}
+			if v.OpenWorldHint != nil {
+				b := *v.OpenWorldHint
+				cp.OpenWorldHint = &b
+			}
+			filtered[k] = &cp
 		}
 		if len(filtered) > 0 {
 			serverConfig.AnnotationOverrides = filtered
@@ -2775,6 +2800,32 @@ func (s *Server) handlePatchServer(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 	}
 
 	logger.Infow("Server updated successfully", "server", serverName)
+	if s.auditSink != nil && hasAnnotationOverrideUpdate {
+		beforeMap := httpAnnotationOverridesToAuditMap(nil)
+		if existingSrv != nil {
+			beforeMap = httpAnnotationOverridesToAuditMap(existingSrv.AnnotationOverrides)
+		}
+		afterMap := httpAnnotationOverridesToAuditMap(updates.AnnotationOverrides)
+		// Only emit when actually changed (whole-map delete, per-tool delete, or hint change)
+		changed := !httpAnnotationOverridesEqual(beforeMap, afterMap)
+		if changed {
+			if line, lerr := audit.NewConfigChange(audit.ConfigChangeInput{
+				Ts:        time.Now(),
+				RequestID: reqcontext.GetRequestID(r.Context()),
+				Origin:    httpAuditOriginFromContext(r.Context()),
+				Source:    httpAuditSourceFromContext(r.Context()),
+				Caller:    httpAuditCallerFromContext(r.Context()),
+				Server:    serverName,
+				Action:    "annotation_override",
+				Before:    beforeMap,
+				After:     afterMap,
+			}); lerr == nil {
+				if raw, jerr := line.JSON(); jerr == nil {
+					_ = s.auditSink.Write(raw)
+				}
+			}
+		}
+	}
 	restartRequired := true
 	if onlyAnnotationOverrideHot {
 		restartRequired = false
@@ -2785,6 +2836,110 @@ func (s *Server) handlePatchServer(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 	})
 }
 
+func httpAnnotationOverridesToAuditMap(m map[string]*config.ToolAnnotations) map[string]interface{} {
+	if m == nil {
+		return nil
+	}
+	out := make(map[string]interface{}, len(m))
+	for k, v := range m {
+		if v == nil {
+			out[k] = nil
+			continue
+		}
+		entry := make(map[string]interface{})
+		if v.Title != "" {
+			entry["title"] = v.Title
+		}
+		if v.ReadOnlyHint != nil {
+			entry["readOnlyHint"] = *v.ReadOnlyHint
+		}
+		if v.DestructiveHint != nil {
+			entry["destructiveHint"] = *v.DestructiveHint
+		}
+		if v.IdempotentHint != nil {
+			entry["idempotentHint"] = *v.IdempotentHint
+		}
+		if v.OpenWorldHint != nil {
+			entry["openWorldHint"] = *v.OpenWorldHint
+		}
+		out[k] = entry
+	}
+	if len(out) == 0 {
+		return nil
+	}
+	return out
+}
+
+func httpAnnotationOverridesEqual(a, b map[string]interface{}) bool {
+	if len(a) != len(b) {
+		return false
+	}
+	for k, av := range a {
+		bv, ok := b[k]
+		if !ok {
+			return false
+		}
+		aj, _ := json.Marshal(av)
+		bj, _ := json.Marshal(bv)
+		if string(aj) != string(bj) {
+			return false
+		}
+	}
+	return true
+}
+
+func httpAuditCallerFromContext(ctx context.Context) audit.Caller {
+	if reqcontext.GetRequestSource(ctx) == reqcontext.SourceInternal {
+		return audit.Caller{Kind: "internal"}
+	}
+	ac := auth.AuthContextFromContext(ctx)
+	if ac == nil {
+		return audit.Caller{Kind: "anonymous"}
+	}
+	switch ac.Type {
+	case auth.AuthTypeAgent:
+		c := audit.Caller{Kind: "agent_token", TokenName: ac.AgentName, TokenPrefix: ac.TokenPrefix, ProfilePin: ac.ProfilePin}
+		if ac.UserID != "" {
+			c.UserID = ac.UserID
+			c.UserEmail = ac.Email
+			c.Role = ac.Role
+			c.Provider = ac.Provider
+		}
+		return c
+	case auth.AuthTypeAdminUser:
+		return audit.Caller{Kind: "session_admin", UserID: ac.UserID, UserEmail: ac.Email, Role: "admin", Provider: ac.Provider}
+	case auth.AuthTypeUser:
+		return audit.Caller{Kind: "session_user", UserID: ac.UserID, UserEmail: ac.Email, Role: "user", Provider: ac.Provider}
+	}
+	if ac.Anonymous {
+		return audit.Caller{Kind: "anonymous"}
+	}
+	switch transport.GetConnectionSource(ctx) {
+	case transport.ConnectionSourceTray:
+		return audit.Caller{Kind: "socket"}
+	case transport.ConnectionSourceStdio:
+		return audit.Caller{Kind: "stdio"}
+	}
+	return audit.Caller{Kind: "api_key"}
+}
+
+func httpAuditOriginFromContext(ctx context.Context) string {
+	if transport.GetConnectionSource(ctx) == transport.ConnectionSourceTray {
+		return "socket"
+	}
+	return "local"
+}
+
+func httpAuditSourceFromContext(ctx context.Context) string {
+	if reqcontext.GetRequestSource(ctx) == reqcontext.SourceInternal {
+		return "internal"
+	}
+	if meta, ok := reqcontext.GetRequestMeta(ctx); ok && meta.Mount == reqcontext.MountAPI {
+		return "api"
+	}
+	return "mcp"
+}
+
 // handleConvertConfigToSecret moves a literal header / env value out of
 // `mcp_config.json` and into the OS keyring, atomically. The client never
 // needs to see the real value — useful when the API redacts sensitive
diff --git a/internal/oauth/serverfields.go b/internal/oauth/serverfields.go
index 3ae14a705..0f0cb3f82 100644
--- a/internal/oauth/serverfields.go
+++ b/internal/oauth/serverfields.go
@@ -389,6 +389,16 @@ var ServerFieldMaskDecisions = map[string]MaskDecision{
 	// scanner layer, never round-tripped, and the residual net still refuses a
 	// mask arriving in it.
 	"security_scan.deep_scan.scanners_failed[].reason": MaskDecisionNotSecret,
+
+	// Annotation overrides: per-server per-tool hint fixes (admin-only, hot,
+	// audited). No credential material — the hints are booleans and an optional
+	// title string — so NotSecret; the residual net still refuses an echoed mask.
+	"annotation_overrides":         MaskDecisionNotSecret,
+	"annotation_overrides{}.title": MaskDecisionNotSecret,
+	// Bool hint leaves (readOnlyHint etc.) are structurally non-text (see
+	// carriesText: *bool is not a string), so no decision is needed for them,
+	// but the map container and its title leaf must be recorded for the
+	// CoverEveryNestedLeaf guard.
 }
 
 func init() {
diff --git a/internal/server/mcp.go b/internal/server/mcp.go
index f6679625e..0c8c566b8 100644
--- a/internal/server/mcp.go
+++ b/internal/server/mcp.go
@@ -5276,6 +5276,23 @@ func (p *MCPProxyServer) handleAddUpstream(ctx context.Context, request mcp.Call
 	if err := p.storage.SaveUpstreamServer(serverConfig); err != nil {
 		return mcp.NewToolResultError(fmt.Sprintf("Failed to add upstream: %v", err)), nil
 	}
+	if p.auditSink != nil && serverConfig.AnnotationOverrides != nil && len(serverConfig.AnnotationOverrides) > 0 {
+		if line, lerr := audit.NewConfigChange(audit.ConfigChangeInput{
+			Ts:        time.Now(),
+			RequestID: reqcontext.GetRequestID(ctx),
+			Origin:    auditOriginFromContext(ctx),
+			Source:    auditSourceFromContext(ctx),
+			Caller:    auditCallerFromContext(ctx),
+			Server:    name,
+			Action:    "annotation_override",
+			Before:    nil,
+			After:     annotationOverridesToAuditMap(serverConfig.AnnotationOverrides),
+		}); lerr == nil {
+			if raw, jerr := line.JSON(); jerr == nil {
+				_ = p.auditSink.Write(raw)
+			}
+		}
+	}
 
 	// Trigger configuration save which will notify supervisor to reconcile and connect
 	if p.mainServer != nil {
@@ -5513,6 +5530,23 @@ func (p *MCPProxyServer) handleUpdateUpstream(ctx context.Context, request mcp.C
 	if err := p.storage.UpdateUpstream(serverID, mergedServer); err != nil {
 		return mcp.NewToolResultError(fmt.Sprintf("Failed to update upstream: %v", err)), nil, nil
 	}
+	if p.auditSink != nil && !annotationOverridesEqualForAudit(existingServer.AnnotationOverrides, mergedServer.AnnotationOverrides) {
+		if line, lerr := audit.NewConfigChange(audit.ConfigChangeInput{
+			Ts:        time.Now(),
+			RequestID: reqcontext.GetRequestID(ctx),
+			Origin:    auditOriginFromContext(ctx),
+			Source:    auditSourceFromContext(ctx),
+			Caller:    auditCallerFromContext(ctx),
+			Server:    name,
+			Action:    "annotation_override",
+			Before:    annotationOverridesToAuditMap(existingServer.AnnotationOverrides),
+			After:     annotationOverridesToAuditMap(mergedServer.AnnotationOverrides),
+		}); lerr == nil {
+			if raw, jerr := line.JSON(); jerr == nil {
+				_ = p.auditSink.Write(raw)
+			}
+		}
+	}
 
 	// Update in upstream manager with connection monitoring
 	p.upstreamManager.RemoveServer(serverID)
@@ -5572,7 +5606,7 @@ func (p *MCPProxyServer) handleUpdateUpstream(ctx context.Context, request mcp.C
 
 // handlePatchUpstream returns the resolved config diff alongside the result; see
 // handleUpdateUpstream for why (issue #1146).
-func (p *MCPProxyServer) handlePatchUpstream(_ context.Context, request mcp.CallToolRequest) (*mcp.CallToolResult, *config.ConfigDiff, error) {
+func (p *MCPProxyServer) handlePatchUpstream(ctx context.Context, request mcp.CallToolRequest) (*mcp.CallToolResult, *config.ConfigDiff, error) {
 	name, err := request.RequireString("name")
 	if err != nil {
 		return mcp.NewToolResultError("Missing required parameter 'name'"), nil, nil
@@ -5623,6 +5657,23 @@ func (p *MCPProxyServer) handlePatchUpstream(_ context.Context, request mcp.Call
 	if err := p.storage.UpdateUpstream(serverID, mergedServer); err != nil {
 		return mcp.NewToolResultError(fmt.Sprintf("Failed to update upstream: %v", err)), nil, nil
 	}
+	if p.auditSink != nil && !annotationOverridesEqualForAudit(existingServer.AnnotationOverrides, mergedServer.AnnotationOverrides) {
+		if line, lerr := audit.NewConfigChange(audit.ConfigChangeInput{
+			Ts:        time.Now(),
+			RequestID: reqcontext.GetRequestID(ctx),
+			Origin:    auditOriginFromContext(ctx),
+			Source:    auditSourceFromContext(ctx),
+			Caller:    auditCallerFromContext(ctx),
+			Server:    name,
+			Action:    "annotation_override",
+			Before:    annotationOverridesToAuditMap(existingServer.AnnotationOverrides),
+			After:     annotationOverridesToAuditMap(mergedServer.AnnotationOverrides),
+		}); lerr == nil {
+			if raw, jerr := line.JSON(); jerr == nil {
+				_ = p.auditSink.Write(raw)
+			}
+		}
+	}
 
 	// Update in upstream manager
 	p.upstreamManager.RemoveServer(serverID)
diff --git a/internal/server/mcp_direct_catalog.go b/internal/server/mcp_direct_catalog.go
index ba602f12a..9aa848e11 100644
--- a/internal/server/mcp_direct_catalog.go
+++ b/internal/server/mcp_direct_catalog.go
@@ -149,6 +149,16 @@ type directCatalogOrigin struct {
 // deny-on-miss to allow-everything at exactly the moment upstream discovery is
 // failing.
 func buildDirectCatalog(tools []*config.ToolMetadata, logger *zap.Logger) *directCatalog {
+	return buildDirectCatalogWithOverrides(tools, nil, logger)
+}
+
+// buildDirectCatalogWithOverrides is the effective-annotation-aware builder.
+// overridesByServer maps serverName -> annotation_overrides for that server.
+// Each tool's effective annotations are resolved via
+// config.EffectiveAnnotationsForTool before deriving RequiredPermission and
+// storing Annotations, so a per-server override that demotes a destructive
+// tool to read is reflected in both listing scope and dispatch tier.
+func buildDirectCatalogWithOverrides(tools []*config.ToolMetadata, overridesByServer map[string]map[string]*config.ToolAnnotations, logger *zap.Logger) *directCatalog {
 	cat := &directCatalog{
 		byDisplayName:      make(map[string]*directCatalogEntry, len(tools)),
 		displayNames:       make([]string, 0, len(tools)),
@@ -210,6 +220,18 @@ func buildDirectCatalog(tools []*config.ToolMetadata, logger *zap.Logger) *direc
 		}
 
 		t := group[0]
+		var effAnnotations *config.ToolAnnotations
+		if overridesByServer != nil {
+			if ov := overridesByServer[t.ServerName]; ov != nil {
+				effAnnotations = config.EffectiveAnnotationsForTool(ov, t.Name, t.Annotations)
+			} else {
+				effAnnotations = t.Annotations
+			}
+		} else {
+			effAnnotations = t.Annotations
+		}
+		// Normalize nil effective (no hints) to nil to preserve spec nil-default,
+		// matching the upstream core client's handling.
 		entry := &directCatalogEntry{
 			DisplayName:        name,
 			ServerName:         t.ServerName,
@@ -218,8 +240,8 @@ func buildDirectCatalog(tools []*config.ToolMetadata, logger *zap.Logger) *direc
 			ParamsJSON:         t.ParamsJSON,
 			OutputSchemaJSON:   t.OutputSchemaJSON,
 			Hash:               t.Hash,
-			Annotations:        t.Annotations,
-			RequiredPermission: requiredPermissionForDirectTool(t.Annotations),
+			Annotations:        effAnnotations,
+			RequiredPermission: requiredPermissionForDirectTool(effAnnotations),
 		}
 		cat.byDisplayName[name] = entry
 		cat.displayNames = append(cat.displayNames, name)
diff --git a/internal/server/mcp_routing.go b/internal/server/mcp_routing.go
index 707e3142c..f0c32f5a1 100644
--- a/internal/server/mcp_routing.go
+++ b/internal/server/mcp_routing.go
@@ -126,7 +126,18 @@ func (p *MCPProxyServer) buildDirectModeTools() ([]mcpserver.ServerTool, *direct
 		return p.withDirectBuiltins(nil), emptyDirectCatalog(mode, p.logger)
 	}
 
-	cat := buildDirectCatalog(tools, p.logger)
+	// Resolve per-server effective annotations for direct catalog permission
+	// derivation — a per-server override that changes a tool's tier must be
+	// reflected in listing scope (filterDirectModeToolsForAuth) and dispatch.
+	overridesByServer := make(map[string]map[string]*config.ToolAnnotations)
+	if cfg := p.currentConfig(); cfg != nil {
+		for _, sc := range cfg.Servers {
+			if sc != nil && sc.AnnotationOverrides != nil {
+				overridesByServer[sc.Name] = sc.AnnotationOverrides
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	cat := buildDirectCatalogWithOverrides(tools, overridesByServer, p.logger)
 	cat.mode = mode
 	return p.withDirectBuiltins(p.renderDirectTools(cat)), cat
 }
diff --git a/internal/server/server.go b/internal/server/server.go
index cb3acdad3..5c6808be8 100644
--- a/internal/server/server.go
+++ b/internal/server/server.go
@@ -1929,6 +1929,7 @@ func (s *Server) UpdateServer(ctx context.Context, serverName string, updates *c
 	if err != nil || existing == nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("server '%s' not found", serverName)
 	}
+	beforeAOForAudit := copyAnnotationOverridesForAudit(existing.AnnotationOverrides)
 
 	// Apply non-zero/non-nil fields from updates
 	if updates.URL != "" {
@@ -2001,8 +2002,8 @@ func (s *Server) UpdateServer(ctx context.Context, serverName string, updates *c
 	// AnnotationOverrides (per-server per-tool hint fixes) — hot, no restart.
 	// The REST handler pre-merges via MergeAnnotationOverrides; the MCP patch
 	// path goes through MergeServerConfig. Here we persist what the caller
-	// computed. The REST handler preserves existing value when not updated, so
-	// a nil here means explicit delete-all (via {"annotation_overrides":null}).
+	// computed. A nil patch preserves existing (delete-all only via explicit
+	// {"annotation_overrides":null} marker handled by the merge layer).
 	if updates.AnnotationOverrides != nil {
 		existing.AnnotationOverrides = make(map[string]*config.ToolAnnotations, len(updates.AnnotationOverrides))
 		for k, v := range updates.AnnotationOverrides {
@@ -2027,24 +2028,42 @@ func (s *Server) UpdateServer(ctx context.Context, serverName string, updates *c
 				b := *v.OpenWorldHint
 				cp.OpenWorldHint = &b
 			}
+			if v.Title != "" {
+				cp.Title = v.Title
+			}
 			existing.AnnotationOverrides[k] = &cp
 		}
-	} else {
-		// Nil means delete-all only when caller explicitly requested it.
-		// The REST handler preserves existing when not updated, so nil here
-		// is intentional clear. For MCP, MergeServerConfig already handles it.
-		// We clear only if we can tell it was an explicit delete — heuristic:
-		// if the key was present as null, the caller set updates to nil
-		// deliberately. Since we can't see opts here, we clear when existing
-		// had a value and updates is nil — this matches the explicit delete
-		// case; the no-op case already has updates == existing (non-nil).
-		existing.AnnotationOverrides = nil
 	}
+	// nil patch preserves existing (delete only via explicit marker handled by
+	// MergeServerConfig/MergeAnnotationOverrides and the REST handler's pre-merge).
+	// This matches the nil-preserve contract for AutoApproveToolChanges/TrustMode/InitTimeout.
 
 	// Save to storage
 	if err := storageManager.SaveUpstreamServer(existing); err != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("failed to save server: %w", err)
 	}
+	if s.auditSink != nil && updates.AnnotationOverrides != nil && auditSourceFromContext(ctx) != "api" {
+		afterAOForAudit := existing.AnnotationOverrides
+		if !annotationOverridesEqualForAudit(beforeAOForAudit, afterAOForAudit) {
+			beforeMap := annotationOverridesToAuditMap(beforeAOForAudit)
+			afterMap := annotationOverridesToAuditMap(afterAOForAudit)
+			if line, lerr := audit.NewConfigChange(audit.ConfigChangeInput{
+				Ts:        time.Now(),
+				RequestID: reqcontext.GetRequestID(ctx),
+				Origin:    auditOriginFromContext(ctx),
+				Source:    auditSourceFromContext(ctx),
+				Caller:    auditCallerFromContext(ctx),
+				Server:    serverName,
+				Action:    "annotation_override",
+				Before:    beforeMap,
+				After:     afterMap,
+			}); lerr == nil {
+				if raw, jerr := line.JSON(); jerr == nil {
+					_ = s.auditSink.Write(raw)
+				}
+			}
+		}
+	}
 
 	// Update runtime config
 	currentConfig := s.runtime.Config()
@@ -2071,6 +2090,113 @@ func (s *Server) UpdateServer(ctx context.Context, serverName string, updates *c
 	return nil
 }
 
+func copyAnnotationOverridesForAudit(m map[string]*config.ToolAnnotations) map[string]*config.ToolAnnotations {
+	if m == nil {
+		return nil
+	}
+	out := make(map[string]*config.ToolAnnotations, len(m))
+	for k, v := range m {
+		if v == nil {
+			out[k] = nil
+			continue
+		}
+		cp := *v
+		if v.ReadOnlyHint != nil {
+			b := *v.ReadOnlyHint
+			cp.ReadOnlyHint = &b
+		}
+		if v.DestructiveHint != nil {
+			b := *v.DestructiveHint
+			cp.DestructiveHint = &b
+		}
+		if v.IdempotentHint != nil {
+			b := *v.IdempotentHint
+			cp.IdempotentHint = &b
+		}
+		if v.OpenWorldHint != nil {
+			b := *v.OpenWorldHint
+			cp.OpenWorldHint = &b
+		}
+		out[k] = &cp
+	}
+	return out
+}
+
+func annotationOverridesEqualForAudit(a, b map[string]*config.ToolAnnotations) bool {
+	if len(a) != len(b) {
+		return false
+	}
+	for k, av := range a {
+		bv, ok := b[k]
+		if !ok {
+			return false
+		}
+		if av == nil && bv == nil {
+			continue
+		}
+		if av == nil || bv == nil {
+			return false
+		}
+		if av.Title != bv.Title {
+			return false
+		}
+		if !boolPtrEqualForAudit(av.ReadOnlyHint, bv.ReadOnlyHint) {
+			return false
+		}
+		if !boolPtrEqualForAudit(av.DestructiveHint, bv.DestructiveHint) {
+			return false
+		}
+		if !boolPtrEqualForAudit(av.IdempotentHint, bv.IdempotentHint) {
+			return false
+		}
+		if !boolPtrEqualForAudit(av.OpenWorldHint, bv.OpenWorldHint) {
+			return false
+		}
+	}
+	return true
+}
+
+func boolPtrEqualForAudit(a, b *bool) bool {
+	if a == nil && b == nil {
+		return true
+	}
+	if a == nil || b == nil {
+		return false
+	}
+	return *a == *b
+}
+
+func annotationOverridesToAuditMap(m map[string]*config.ToolAnnotations) map[string]interface{} {
+	if m == nil {
+		return nil
+	}
+	out := make(map[string]interface{}, len(m))
+	for k, v := range m {
+		if v == nil {
+			out[k] = nil
+			continue
+		}
+		entry := make(map[string]interface{})
+		if v.Title != "" {
+			entry["title"] = v.Title
+		}
+		if v.ReadOnlyHint != nil {
+			entry["readOnlyHint"] = *v.ReadOnlyHint
+		}
+		if v.DestructiveHint != nil {
+			entry["destructiveHint"] = *v.DestructiveHint
+		}
+		if v.IdempotentHint != nil {
+			entry["idempotentHint"] = *v.IdempotentHint
+		}
+		if v.OpenWorldHint != nil {
+			entry["openWorldHint"] = *v.OpenWorldHint
+		}
+		out[k] = entry
+	}
+	return out
+}
+
 // RemoveServer removes an upstream server from the configuration.
 // This stops the server if running and removes it from storage.
 func (s *Server) RemoveServer(ctx context.Context, serverName string) error {
@@ -3034,6 +3160,9 @@ func (s *Server) startCustomHTTPServer(ctx context.Context, streamableServer *se
 	// MCP-32: pass the observability manager so /metrics is served (and HTTP
 	// request metrics/tracing middleware applied) when enabled.
 	httpAPIServer := httpapi.NewServer(s, s.logger.Sugar(), s.observability)
+	if s.auditSink != nil {
+		httpAPIServer.SetAuditSink(s.auditSink)
+	}
 	// Wire agent token management (Spec 028)
 	if sm := s.runtime.StorageManager(); sm != nil {
 		cfg := s.runtime.Config()

From 551e326e4960ff42516f415ab78eca9a0c0fbd2a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: AGI Developer <agi@prism-cron.local>
Date: Sun, 20 Sep 2026 03:42:07 +0300
Subject: [PATCH 06/13] =?UTF-8?q?=E2=9C=A8=20FIX:=20=F0=9F=94=A5=20HOT-REL?=
 =?UTF-8?q?OAD=20+=20=F0=9F=92=BE=20PERSISTENCE=20+=20=F0=9F=8E=A8=20EXPLI?=
 =?UTF-8?q?CIT-FALSE=20BADGES=20FOR=20OVERRIDES=20=F0=9F=9B=A1=EF=B8=8F?=
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

---
 .../components/AnnotationOverridesEditor.vue  | 16 ++++++---
 .../unit/annotation-overrides-editor.spec.ts  | 31 ++++++++++++++++
 internal/config/annotation_overrides.go       | 35 +++++++++++++++++++
 internal/contracts/converters.go              |  3 ++
 internal/contracts/types.go                   |  5 +++
 internal/server/server.go                     | 13 +++++++
 internal/storage/async_ops.go                 |  1 +
 internal/storage/manager.go                   |  3 ++
 internal/storage/models.go                    |  8 +++++
 internal/upstream/core/client.go              | 31 +++++++++++++---
 internal/upstream/managed/client.go           | 12 ++++---
 11 files changed, 145 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)

diff --git a/frontend/src/components/AnnotationOverridesEditor.vue b/frontend/src/components/AnnotationOverridesEditor.vue
index b8ecebd02..2decea8fc 100644
--- a/frontend/src/components/AnnotationOverridesEditor.vue
+++ b/frontend/src/components/AnnotationOverridesEditor.vue
@@ -16,8 +16,12 @@
               <span class="badge badge-outline badge-sm" title="Applies to all tools">* wildcard</span>
             </td>
             <td>
-              <AnnotationBadges v-if="effectiveFor('*')" :annotations="effectiveFor('*')!" class="scale-90 origin-left" />
-              <span v-else class="text-xs text-base-content/50">inherit (no override)</span>
+              <span class="inline-flex items-center gap-1 flex-wrap">
+                <AnnotationBadges v-if="effectiveFor('*')" :annotations="effectiveFor('*')!" class="scale-90 origin-left" />
+                <span v-else class="text-xs text-base-content/50">inherit (no override)</span>
+                <span v-if="effectiveFor('*')?.destructiveHint === false" class="badge badge-sm badge-success" title="Operator override: explicitly marked non-destructive">✓ Non-destructive</span>
+                <span v-if="effectiveFor('*')?.readOnlyHint === false" class="badge badge-sm badge-warning" title="Operator override: explicitly marked writable">✏️ Write</span>
+              </span>
             </td>
             <td>
               <button
@@ -44,8 +48,12 @@
           >
             <td class="font-mono text-xs break-all">{{ toolName }}</td>
             <td>
-              <AnnotationBadges v-if="effectiveFor(toolName)" :annotations="effectiveFor(toolName)!" class="scale-90 origin-left" />
-              <span v-else class="text-xs text-base-content/50">—</span>
+              <span class="inline-flex items-center gap-1 flex-wrap">
+                <AnnotationBadges v-if="effectiveFor(toolName)" :annotations="effectiveFor(toolName)!" class="scale-90 origin-left" />
+                <span v-else class="text-xs text-base-content/50">—</span>
+                <span v-if="effectiveFor(toolName)?.destructiveHint === false" class="badge badge-sm badge-success" title="Operator override: explicitly marked non-destructive">✓ Non-destructive</span>
+                <span v-if="effectiveFor(toolName)?.readOnlyHint === false" class="badge badge-sm badge-warning" title="Operator override: explicitly marked writable">✏️ Write</span>
+              </span>
             </td>
             <td class="flex gap-1">
               <button
diff --git a/frontend/tests/unit/annotation-overrides-editor.spec.ts b/frontend/tests/unit/annotation-overrides-editor.spec.ts
index a09b2734d..59ce90df3 100644
--- a/frontend/tests/unit/annotation-overrides-editor.spec.ts
+++ b/frontend/tests/unit/annotation-overrides-editor.spec.ts
@@ -86,6 +86,37 @@ describe('AnnotationOverridesEditor', () => {
     expect(payload['act'].destructiveHint).toBe(true)
   })
 
+  it('Given explicit destructiveHint:false When rendered Then Non-destructive badge is visible (override not silent)', async () => {
+    const wrapper = mount(AnnotationOverridesEditor, {
+      props: {
+        serverName: 'browseros',
+        tools,
+        overrides: { act: { destructiveHint: false } } as any,
+        upstreamAnnotations: upstream,
+      },
+    })
+    const row = wrapper.find('[data-test="annotation-override-row-act"]')
+    expect(row.exists()).toBe(true)
+    // Author's AnnotationBadges only renders truthy hints, so without this the
+    // override would be invisible (title only). Mutation: removing the badge
+    // span must fail this test.
+    expect(row.text()).toContain('Non-destructive')
+  })
+
+  it('Given explicit readOnlyHint:false When rendered Then Write badge is visible', async () => {
+    const wrapper = mount(AnnotationOverridesEditor, {
+      props: {
+        serverName: 'browseros',
+        tools,
+        overrides: { navigate: { destructiveHint: false, readOnlyHint: false } } as any,
+        upstreamAnnotations: upstream,
+      },
+    })
+    const row = wrapper.find('[data-test="annotation-override-row-navigate"]')
+    expect(row.exists()).toBe(true)
+    expect(row.text()).toContain('Write')
+  })
+
   it('Given existing override When deleted Then save emits null marker for that tool', async () => {
     const wrapper = mount(AnnotationOverridesEditor, {
       props: {
diff --git a/internal/config/annotation_overrides.go b/internal/config/annotation_overrides.go
index b545492e3..16f1ad46d 100644
--- a/internal/config/annotation_overrides.go
+++ b/internal/config/annotation_overrides.go
@@ -98,6 +98,41 @@ func boolPtrEqual(a, b *bool) bool {
 	return *a == *b
 }
 
+// CloneAnnotationOverrides deep-copies an annotation_overrides map (values and
+// their *bool hints) so hot-reload snapshots never alias the caller's map.
+// Nil in, nil out; nil values are preserved as nil.
+func CloneAnnotationOverrides(m map[string]*ToolAnnotations) map[string]*ToolAnnotations {
+	if m == nil {
+		return nil
+	}
+	out := make(map[string]*ToolAnnotations, len(m))
+	for k, v := range m {
+		if v == nil {
+			out[k] = nil
+			continue
+		}
+		cp := *v
+		if v.ReadOnlyHint != nil {
+			b := *v.ReadOnlyHint
+			cp.ReadOnlyHint = &b
+		}
+		if v.DestructiveHint != nil {
+			b := *v.DestructiveHint
+			cp.DestructiveHint = &b
+		}
+		if v.IdempotentHint != nil {
+			b := *v.IdempotentHint
+			cp.IdempotentHint = &b
+		}
+		if v.OpenWorldHint != nil {
+			b := *v.OpenWorldHint
+			cp.OpenWorldHint = &b
+		}
+		out[k] = &cp
+	}
+	return out
+}
+
 // NormalizeAnnotationOverrides prunes empty entries where all hints are nil
 // and Title is empty (legacy "* {}"), and enforces the 100-entry cap by
 // truncating (validation will still reject >100 on write, but load-time
diff --git a/internal/contracts/converters.go b/internal/contracts/converters.go
index c8b5b0e9c..0f584dc03 100644
--- a/internal/contracts/converters.go
+++ b/internal/contracts/converters.go
@@ -50,6 +50,9 @@ func ConvertServerConfig(cfg *config.ServerConfig, globalIsolation *config.Docke
 		// F9: surface the per-server prompt-aggregation override so a caller that
 		// PATCHed it can read it back.
 		ExposePrompts: cfg.ExposePrompts,
+		// Surface the per-server annotation overrides so a caller that PATCHed
+		// them (or the Web UI editor) can read them back.
+		AnnotationOverrides: cfg.AnnotationOverrides,
 		// Spec 093: surface the per-server concurrency overrides (tri-state) so a
 		// caller that PATCHed a limit can read it back.
 		MaxConcurrentRequests: cfg.MaxConcurrentRequests,
diff --git a/internal/contracts/types.go b/internal/contracts/types.go
index a0673da98..75d571a03 100644
--- a/internal/contracts/types.go
+++ b/internal/contracts/types.go
@@ -93,6 +93,11 @@ type Server struct {
 	// default aggregation". Surfaced on GET so a caller that PATCHed the override
 	// can read it back; PATCH/POST accept it via AddServerRequest.
 	ExposePrompts *bool                `json:"expose_prompts,omitempty"`
+	// AnnotationOverrides mirrors config.ServerConfig.AnnotationOverrides:
+	// per-server per-tool annotation fixes. Surfaced on GET so a caller that
+	// PATCHed overrides (or the Web UI editor) can read them back; PATCH/POST
+	// accept them via AddServerRequest. Omitted when empty.
+	AnnotationOverrides map[string]*config.ToolAnnotations `json:"annotation_overrides,omitempty"`
 	SecurityScan  *SecurityScanSummary `json:"security_scan,omitempty"` // Latest security scan results summary
 	// Spec 044 — structured diagnostic error and stable error code. Both
 	// are populated when the server is in a failed state and the error
diff --git a/internal/server/server.go b/internal/server/server.go
index 5c6808be8..75687d2fd 100644
--- a/internal/server/server.go
+++ b/internal/server/server.go
@@ -2077,6 +2077,19 @@ func (s *Server) UpdateServer(ctx context.Context, serverName string, updates *c
 		s.runtime.UpdateConfig(currentConfig, "")
 	}
 
+	// Push the refreshed config to the live manager client so hot-reloadable
+	// fields (notably annotation_overrides) take effect on the next ListTools
+	// without a reconnect. Transport-affecting changes are handled by the
+	// manager's own AddServerConfig comparison on the next sync; here we only
+	// refresh the pointer both managed and core clients read (SetConfig also
+	// pushes overrides down to core, mirroring the ExposePrompts pattern).
+	// Discovery is re-triggered by OnUpstreamServerChange below.
+	if um := s.runtime.UpstreamManager(); um != nil {
+		if client, exists := um.GetClient(serverName); exists {
+			client.SetConfig(existing)
+		}
+	}
+
 	// Save configuration to file
 	if err := s.SaveConfiguration(); err != nil {
 		s.logger.Warn("Failed to save configuration after updating server", zap.Error(err))
diff --git a/internal/storage/async_ops.go b/internal/storage/async_ops.go
index d86557f4b..735a79379 100644
--- a/internal/storage/async_ops.go
+++ b/internal/storage/async_ops.go
@@ -211,6 +211,7 @@ func (am *AsyncManager) saveServerSync(serverConfig *config.ServerConfig) error
 		QueueSize:                serverConfig.QueueSize,
 		QueueTimeout:             serverConfig.QueueTimeout,
 		ExposePrompts:            serverConfig.ExposePrompts,
+		AnnotationOverrides:      serverConfig.AnnotationOverrides,
 	}
 	return am.db.SaveUpstream(record)
 }
diff --git a/internal/storage/manager.go b/internal/storage/manager.go
index 97f6c5ce4..4ce4ef901 100644
--- a/internal/storage/manager.go
+++ b/internal/storage/manager.go
@@ -151,6 +151,7 @@ func (m *Manager) SaveUpstreamServer(serverConfig *config.ServerConfig) error {
 		QueueSize:                serverConfig.QueueSize,
 		QueueTimeout:             serverConfig.QueueTimeout,
 		ExposePrompts:            serverConfig.ExposePrompts,
+		AnnotationOverrides:      serverConfig.AnnotationOverrides,
 	}
 
 	return m.db.SaveUpstream(record)
@@ -198,6 +199,7 @@ func (m *Manager) GetUpstreamServer(name string) (*config.ServerConfig, error) {
 		QueueSize:                record.QueueSize,
 		QueueTimeout:             record.QueueTimeout,
 		ExposePrompts:            record.ExposePrompts,
+		AnnotationOverrides:      record.AnnotationOverrides,
 	}, nil
 }
 
@@ -245,6 +247,7 @@ func (m *Manager) ListUpstreamServers() ([]*config.ServerConfig, error) {
 			QueueSize:                record.QueueSize,
 			QueueTimeout:             record.QueueTimeout,
 			ExposePrompts:            record.ExposePrompts,
+			AnnotationOverrides:      record.AnnotationOverrides,
 		})
 	}
 
diff --git a/internal/storage/models.go b/internal/storage/models.go
index 1985a6591..c3aeb4f06 100644
--- a/internal/storage/models.go
+++ b/internal/storage/models.go
@@ -211,6 +211,14 @@ type UpstreamRecord struct {
 	// ExposePrompts is the per-server override for exposing upstream prompts
 	// through mcpproxy's aggregated prompts/list and prompts/get.
 	ExposePrompts *bool `json:"expose_prompts,omitempty"`
+	// AnnotationOverrides carries per-server per-tool annotation fixes
+	// (operator-curated hint corrections for upstream servers that mislabel
+	// their tools, e.g. browseros marking reads destructive). Persisted to
+	// BBolt for the same reason as TrustMode above: SaveConfiguration rebuilds
+	// the JSON server list from these records, so a REST/UI/MCP-set override
+	// would be wiped on the next save/restart without it. Back-compat by
+	// omission: records written before this field existed decode with nil.
+	AnnotationOverrides map[string]*config.ToolAnnotations `json:"annotation_overrides,omitempty"`
 }
 
 // ToolStatRecord represents tool usage statistics
diff --git a/internal/upstream/core/client.go b/internal/upstream/core/client.go
index 0236597f5..5f86b7369 100644
--- a/internal/upstream/core/client.go
+++ b/internal/upstream/core/client.go
@@ -43,6 +43,14 @@ type Client struct {
 	// connection was created even after a config hot-reload. Updated via
 	// SetExposePrompts, mirroring managed.Client's cfg pointer swap.
 	exposePrompts atomic.Pointer[bool]
+	// annotationOverrides mirrors config.AnnotationOverrides but can be updated
+	// without a reconnect (same hot-reload rationale as exposePrompts above):
+	// config itself is set once in NewClient and never reassigned, so without
+	// this a hot-reloaded annotation_overrides value would stay frozen until
+	// the next reconnect. Updated via SetAnnotationOverrides, mirroring
+	// managed.Client's cfg pointer swap. The stored map is a deep copy owned
+	// by this client — callers must not mutate the map they pass in.
+	annotationOverrides atomic.Pointer[map[string]*config.ToolAnnotations]
 	globalConfig  *config.Config
 	storage       *storage.BoltDB
 	logger        *zap.Logger
@@ -199,6 +207,7 @@ func NewClientWithOptions(id string, serverConfig *config.ServerConfig, logger *
 		),
 	}
 	c.exposePrompts.Store(resolvedServerConfig.ExposePrompts)
+	c.SetAnnotationOverrides(resolvedServerConfig.AnnotationOverrides)
 	c.retryAfter.Store(proxytransport.NewRetryAfterRecorder())
 
 	// Create secure environment manager
@@ -425,10 +434,13 @@ func (c *Client) ListTools(ctx context.Context) ([]*config.ToolMetadata, error)
 			}
 		}
 
-		// Apply per-server operator overrides (admin-only, persisted in ServerConfig) — read under RLock.
-		c.mu.RLock()
-		overrides := c.config.AnnotationOverrides
-		c.mu.RUnlock()
+		// Apply per-server operator overrides (admin-only, persisted in ServerConfig).
+		// Read from the hot-reloadable atomic snapshot (see SetAnnotationOverrides),
+		// not from c.config which is frozen at NewClient time.
+		var overrides map[string]*config.ToolAnnotations
+		if p := c.annotationOverrides.Load(); p != nil {
+			overrides = *p
+		}
 		if eff := config.EffectiveAnnotationsForTool(overrides, tool.Name, toolMeta.Annotations); eff != nil {
 			toolMeta.Annotations = eff
 		} else if overrides != nil && (overrides["*"] != nil || overrides[tool.Name] != nil) {
@@ -872,6 +884,17 @@ func (c *Client) SetExposePrompts(exposePrompts *bool) {
 	c.exposePrompts.Store(exposePrompts)
 }
 
+// SetAnnotationOverrides updates the per-server annotation_overrides without
+// requiring a reconnect (same hot-reload rationale as SetExposePrompts).
+// Call this whenever the owning managed.Client's config is refreshed so a
+// hot-reloaded annotation_overrides value takes effect on the next ListTools
+// instead of only after the connection is torn down and recreated. The map is
+// deep-copied; the caller retains ownership of its argument.
+func (c *Client) SetAnnotationOverrides(overrides map[string]*config.ToolAnnotations) {
+	cp := config.CloneAnnotationOverrides(overrides)
+	c.annotationOverrides.Store(&cp)
+}
+
 // SetOnToolsChangedCallback sets the callback invoked when a notifications/tools/list_changed
 // notification is received from the upstream MCP server. This enables reactive tool re-indexing.
 func (c *Client) SetOnToolsChangedCallback(callback func(serverName string)) {
diff --git a/internal/upstream/managed/client.go b/internal/upstream/managed/client.go
index cc8f997bd..75d7cdd4a 100644
--- a/internal/upstream/managed/client.go
+++ b/internal/upstream/managed/client.go
@@ -551,15 +551,17 @@ func (mc *Client) GetConfig() *config.ServerConfig {
 // SetConfig atomically swaps the server configuration. Lock-free; callers must
 // not hold mc.mu (they don't need to — the swap is atomic).
 //
-// Also pushes ExposePrompts down to the coreClient (PR #973 review, P2):
-// coreClient.config is set once at connect time and never reassigned, so
-// without this a hot-reloaded expose_prompts value would stay frozen at
-// whatever was in effect when the connection was created, until the next
-// reconnect-forcing change or restart.
+// Also pushes ExposePrompts and AnnotationOverrides down to the coreClient
+// (PR #973 review, P2 pattern): coreClient.config is set once at connect
+// time and never reassigned, so without this a hot-reloaded expose_prompts
+// or annotation_overrides value would stay frozen at whatever was in effect
+// when the connection was created, until the next reconnect-forcing change
+// or restart.
 func (mc *Client) SetConfig(config *config.ServerConfig) {
 	mc.cfg.Store(config)
 	if mc.coreClient != nil {
 		mc.coreClient.SetExposePrompts(config.ExposePrompts)
+		mc.coreClient.SetAnnotationOverrides(config.AnnotationOverrides)
 	}
 }
 

From 3e4d884bafe6387381007872b34e0a346765d1cc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: AGI Developer <agi@prism-cron.local>
Date: Sun, 20 Sep 2026 04:07:39 +0300
Subject: [PATCH 07/13] =?UTF-8?q?=E2=9C=A8=20FIX:=20=F0=9F=9B=A1=EF=B8=8F?=
 =?UTF-8?q?=20CRITIC=20ROUND-2=20=E2=80=94=20MCP-ADD=20VALIDATE=20+=20CREA?=
 =?UTF-8?q?TE=20AUDIT=20+=20PREFLIGHT=20+=20DISPATCH=20FRESH=20?=
 =?UTF-8?q?=F0=9F=94=92?=
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

---
 internal/config/config.go             |  2 +-
 internal/config/loader.go             |  5 -----
 internal/contracts/converters.go      |  5 +++--
 internal/httpapi/server.go            | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
 internal/preflight/evaluator.go       | 12 ++++++++++++
 internal/server/mcp.go                | 18 ++++++++++++++----
 internal/server/mcp_code_execution.go | 16 ++++++++++++++--
 internal/server/mcp_trust_mode.go     | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
 internal/server/preflight_glue.go     | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++
 internal/storage/async_ops.go         |  2 +-
 internal/storage/async_ops_test.go    |  1 +
 internal/storage/manager.go           |  6 +++---
 12 files changed, 117 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)

diff --git a/internal/config/config.go b/internal/config/config.go
index b49815d5e..edb96ecb8 100644
--- a/internal/config/config.go
+++ b/internal/config/config.go
@@ -750,7 +750,7 @@ type ServerConfig struct {
 	EnabledTools  []string `json:"enabled_tools,omitempty" mapstructure:"enabled_tools"`   // Allowlist: only these tools are exposed; mutually exclusive with disabled_tools
 	DisabledTools []string `json:"disabled_tools,omitempty" mapstructure:"disabled_tools"` // Denylist: these tools are hidden; mutually exclusive with enabled_tools
 
-	AnnotationOverrides map[string]*ToolAnnotations `json:"annotation_overrides,omitempty" mapstructure:"annotation_overrides"`
+	AnnotationOverrides map[string]*ToolAnnotations `json:"annotation_overrides,omitempty" mapstructure:"annotation-overrides"`
 
 	// SourceRegistryID records which registry this server was added from (empty
 	// for manually-configured servers). MCP-866: surfaced in the approval /
diff --git a/internal/config/loader.go b/internal/config/loader.go
index 0c8b660c0..c73adf6ad 100644
--- a/internal/config/loader.go
+++ b/internal/config/loader.go
@@ -243,11 +243,6 @@ func setupViper() {
 
 	// Replace - with _ for environment variables
 	viper.SetEnvKeyReplacer(strings.NewReplacer("-", "_"))
-	// Annotation overrides: support both snake (annotation_overrides) and kebab
-	// (annotation-overrides) via viper alias so file JSON (snake) and any
-	// legacy kebab config both decode (mapstructure tag is snake per docs).
-	viper.RegisterAlias("annotation-overrides", "annotation_overrides")
-	viper.RegisterAlias("annotation_overrides", "annotation-overrides")
 
 	// Set defaults
 	viper.SetDefault("listen", "127.0.0.1:8080")
diff --git a/internal/contracts/converters.go b/internal/contracts/converters.go
index 0f584dc03..b71d654f0 100644
--- a/internal/contracts/converters.go
+++ b/internal/contracts/converters.go
@@ -51,8 +51,9 @@ func ConvertServerConfig(cfg *config.ServerConfig, globalIsolation *config.Docke
 		// PATCHed it can read it back.
 		ExposePrompts: cfg.ExposePrompts,
 		// Surface the per-server annotation overrides so a caller that PATCHed
-		// them (or the Web UI editor) can read them back.
-		AnnotationOverrides: cfg.AnnotationOverrides,
+		// them (or the Web UI editor) can read them back. Deep-copied so the
+		// wire view never aliases the stored config map.
+		AnnotationOverrides: config.CloneAnnotationOverrides(cfg.AnnotationOverrides),
 		// Spec 093: surface the per-server concurrency overrides (tri-state) so a
 		// caller that PATCHed a limit can read it back.
 		MaxConcurrentRequests: cfg.MaxConcurrentRequests,
diff --git a/internal/httpapi/server.go b/internal/httpapi/server.go
index 888f60370..5aa26135a 100644
--- a/internal/httpapi/server.go
+++ b/internal/httpapi/server.go
@@ -2374,6 +2374,26 @@ func (s *Server) handleAddServer(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 	}
 
 	logger.Infow("Server added successfully", "server", req.Name, "quarantined", quarantined)
+	if s.auditSink != nil && serverConfig.AnnotationOverrides != nil && len(serverConfig.AnnotationOverrides) > 0 {
+		afterMap := httpAnnotationOverridesToAuditMap(serverConfig.AnnotationOverrides)
+		if len(afterMap) > 0 {
+			if line, lerr := audit.NewConfigChange(audit.ConfigChangeInput{
+				Ts:        time.Now(),
+				RequestID: reqcontext.GetRequestID(r.Context()),
+				Origin:    httpAuditOriginFromContext(r.Context()),
+				Source:    httpAuditSourceFromContext(r.Context()),
+				Caller:    httpAuditCallerFromContext(r.Context()),
+				Server:    req.Name,
+				Action:    "annotation_override",
+				Before:    nil,
+				After:     afterMap,
+			}); lerr == nil {
+				if raw, jerr := line.JSON(); jerr == nil {
+					_ = s.auditSink.Write(raw)
+				}
+			}
+		}
+	}
 	s.writeSuccess(w, contracts.ServerActionResponse{
 		Server:  req.Name,
 		Action:  "add",
diff --git a/internal/preflight/evaluator.go b/internal/preflight/evaluator.go
index b1ab2df0e..f276a9d12 100644
--- a/internal/preflight/evaluator.go
+++ b/internal/preflight/evaluator.go
@@ -166,6 +166,13 @@ type EvalContext struct {
 	// Pins maps a requested id to its pin string, for callers that carry pins
 	// separately from the refs. A ToolRef.PinHash always wins over this map.
 	Pins map[string]string
+	// AnnotationOverrides carries per-server operator hint corrections
+	// (server -> tool -> override, wildcard "*" allowed) for the annotation
+	// filter slot. The evaluator resolves the effective annotations via
+	// config.EffectiveAnnotationsForTool so raw upstream hints never bypass
+	// overrides here. Nil means no overrides. internal/config does not import
+	// this package, so there is no import cycle.
+	AnnotationOverrides map[string]map[string]*config.ToolAnnotations
 	// RequireRuntimeEntry says the State reader is the served, authoritative
 	// snapshot. A configured server missing from it is state that has not been
 	// PUBLISHED yet (the stateview starts empty and fills per-server
@@ -408,6 +415,11 @@ func evaluateOne(ec *EvalContext, ref ToolRef, corpus *visibleCorpus) (Result, e
 		var annotations *config.ToolAnnotations
 		if indexed != nil {
 			annotations = indexed.Annotations
+			// Apply per-server operator overrides so the filters judge the
+			// effective annotations (same merge the capture path applies).
+			if ov, ok := ec.AnnotationOverrides[serverName]; ok && ov != nil {
+				annotations = config.EffectiveAnnotationsForTool(ov, toolName, annotations)
+			}
 		}
 		if filterKey, explicit, excluded := toolannotations.ExcludeReasonFor(annotations, ec.Filters); excluded {
 			reason := ReasonMissingAnnotation
diff --git a/internal/server/mcp.go b/internal/server/mcp.go
index 0c8c566b8..bbb64f6be 100644
--- a/internal/server/mcp.go
+++ b/internal/server/mcp.go
@@ -5230,13 +5230,19 @@ func (p *MCPProxyServer) handleAddUpstream(ctx context.Context, request mcp.Call
 		if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(aoJSON), &m); err != nil {
 			return mcp.NewToolResultError(fmt.Sprintf("Invalid annotation_overrides_json format: %v", err)), nil
 		}
-		filtered := make(map[string]*config.ToolAnnotations, len(m))
-		for k, v := range m {
+		// Deep-copy via CloneAnnotationOverrides so the persisted map never
+		// aliases the request payload; drop nils (null has no meaning on create).
+		cloned := config.CloneAnnotationOverrides(m)
+		filtered := make(map[string]*config.ToolAnnotations, len(cloned))
+		for k, v := range cloned {
 			if v == nil {
 				continue
 			}
 			filtered[k] = v
 		}
+		if errRes := validateAnnotationOverridesForAdd(name, filtered); errRes != nil {
+			return errRes, nil
+		}
 		if len(filtered) > 0 {
 			serverConfig.AnnotationOverrides = filtered
 		}
@@ -5246,13 +5252,17 @@ func (p *MCPProxyServer) handleAddUpstream(ctx context.Context, request mcp.Call
 			if err == nil {
 				var m map[string]*config.ToolAnnotations
 				if err := json.Unmarshal(data, &m); err == nil {
-					filtered := make(map[string]*config.ToolAnnotations, len(m))
-					for k, v := range m {
+					cloned := config.CloneAnnotationOverrides(m)
+					filtered := make(map[string]*config.ToolAnnotations, len(cloned))
+					for k, v := range cloned {
 						if v == nil {
 							continue
 						}
 						filtered[k] = v
 					}
+					if errRes := validateAnnotationOverridesForAdd(name, filtered); errRes != nil {
+						return errRes, nil
+					}
 					if len(filtered) > 0 {
 						serverConfig.AnnotationOverrides = filtered
 					}
diff --git a/internal/server/mcp_code_execution.go b/internal/server/mcp_code_execution.go
index 5dc38c92a..5cd6927b3 100644
--- a/internal/server/mcp_code_execution.go
+++ b/internal/server/mcp_code_execution.go
@@ -1607,7 +1607,12 @@ func (p *MCPProxyServer) lookupToolGate(serverName, toolName string) (string, js
 		}
 		gate := captured.gate
 		if gate.serverQuarantined() || gate.serverDisabled() {
-			return tierForAnnotations(gate.identity.Annotations, gate.identity.Found), captured
+			var eff *config.ToolAnnotations
+			eff = gate.identity.Annotations
+			if gate.serverConfig != nil {
+				eff = config.EffectiveAnnotationsForTool(gate.serverConfig.AnnotationOverrides, toolName, eff)
+			}
+			return tierForAnnotations(eff, gate.identity.Found), captured
 		}
 		identity, record = gate.identity, gate.serverConfig
 	} else {
@@ -1637,7 +1642,14 @@ func (p *MCPProxyServer) lookupToolGate(serverName, toolName string) (string, js
 			}
 		}
 	}
-	return tierForAnnotations(identity.Annotations, identity.Found), captured
+	// The StateView snapshot annotations lag one discovery cycle after a hot
+	// override; re-resolve through the already-held persisted record (same
+	// pattern as lookupExactToolAnnotations) so the tier reflects the hot value.
+	eff := identity.Annotations
+	if record != nil {
+		eff = config.EffectiveAnnotationsForTool(record.AnnotationOverrides, toolName, eff)
+	}
+	return tierForAnnotations(eff, identity.Found), captured
 }
 
 // tierForAnnotations maps one lookupToolAnnotationsFound result to the
diff --git a/internal/server/mcp_trust_mode.go b/internal/server/mcp_trust_mode.go
index f54556ba9..8477747a6 100644
--- a/internal/server/mcp_trust_mode.go
+++ b/internal/server/mcp_trust_mode.go
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ import (
 	"fmt"
 	"strings"
 
+	"github.com/mark3labs/mcp-go/mcp"
 	"github.com/smart-mcp-proxy/mcpproxy-go/internal/config"
 )
 
@@ -16,3 +17,27 @@ func invalidTrustModeError(mode string) string {
 	return fmt.Sprintf("invalid trust_mode %q: must be one of: %s (values are case-sensitive; omit the field to leave it unchanged)",
 		mode, strings.Join(config.ValidTrustModes(), ", "))
 }
+
+// validateAnnotationOverridesForAdd validates annotation_overrides on the MCP
+// add door (deep-copied already, nils dropped). It mirrors the REST PATCH
+// write gate (handlePatchServer): per-key name check via
+// config.IsValidToolNameForOverride plus a temp-config ValidateDetailed
+// filtered to annotation_overrides errors. Returns a 400-style MCP error
+// result on invalid input, nil when valid.
+func validateAnnotationOverridesForAdd(serverName string, overrides map[string]*config.ToolAnnotations) *mcp.CallToolResult {
+	for k := range overrides {
+		if k != "*" && !config.IsValidToolNameForOverride(k) {
+			return mcp.NewToolResultError(fmt.Sprintf("invalid annotation_overrides[%q]: invalid tool name (use \"*\" or alphanumeric._:-)", k))
+		}
+	}
+	if len(overrides) == 0 {
+		return nil
+	}
+	tmp := &config.Config{Servers: []*config.ServerConfig{{Name: serverName, AnnotationOverrides: overrides}}}
+	for _, e := range tmp.ValidateDetailed() {
+		if strings.Contains(e.Field, "annotation_overrides") {
+			return mcp.NewToolResultError(e.Error())
+		}
+	}
+	return nil
+}
diff --git a/internal/server/preflight_glue.go b/internal/server/preflight_glue.go
index b8943cfb9..9fb4a2de5 100644
--- a/internal/server/preflight_glue.go
+++ b/internal/server/preflight_glue.go
@@ -115,6 +115,10 @@ func (p *MCPProxyServer) evaluatePreflight(
 		Tier:      tier,
 		Scope:     scope,
 		Filters:   filters,
+		// Thread the per-server overrides into the evaluator so the
+		// annotation filters judge effective (not raw upstream) hints, even
+		// for pure-unit IndexReaders that return unenriched annotations.
+		AnnotationOverrides: annotationOverridesByServer(cfg),
 		// With a real snapshot in hand, a configured server missing from it is
 		// state the supervisor has not published yet (startup / reconcile /
 		// config-add windows) — the evaluator answers the retryable
@@ -380,6 +384,25 @@ func bareToolName(name string) string {
 	return name
 }
 
+// annotationOverridesByServer projects the live config's per-server
+// annotation_overrides for the preflight evaluator (nil when none).
+func annotationOverridesByServer(cfg *config.Config) map[string]map[string]*config.ToolAnnotations {
+	if cfg == nil {
+		return nil
+	}
+	var out map[string]map[string]*config.ToolAnnotations
+	for _, sc := range cfg.Servers {
+		if sc == nil || sc.AnnotationOverrides == nil {
+			continue
+		}
+		if out == nil {
+			out = make(map[string]map[string]*config.ToolAnnotations)
+		}
+		out[sc.Name] = sc.AnnotationOverrides
+	}
+	return out
+}
+
 func (r *preflightIndexReader) IndexedServerNames() ([]string, error) {
 	names, err := r.index.GetAllIndexedServerNames()
 	if err != nil {
diff --git a/internal/storage/async_ops.go b/internal/storage/async_ops.go
index 735a79379..13fe624bb 100644
--- a/internal/storage/async_ops.go
+++ b/internal/storage/async_ops.go
@@ -211,7 +211,7 @@ func (am *AsyncManager) saveServerSync(serverConfig *config.ServerConfig) error
 		QueueSize:                serverConfig.QueueSize,
 		QueueTimeout:             serverConfig.QueueTimeout,
 		ExposePrompts:            serverConfig.ExposePrompts,
-		AnnotationOverrides:      serverConfig.AnnotationOverrides,
+		AnnotationOverrides:      config.CloneAnnotationOverrides(serverConfig.AnnotationOverrides),
 	}
 	return am.db.SaveUpstream(record)
 }
diff --git a/internal/storage/async_ops_test.go b/internal/storage/async_ops_test.go
index 40ec2f32b..9cf14f4ba 100644
--- a/internal/storage/async_ops_test.go
+++ b/internal/storage/async_ops_test.go
@@ -377,6 +377,7 @@ func TestSaveServerSyncFieldCoverage(t *testing.T) {
 		// the operator stated anything.
 		"quarantineExplicitlySet": true,
 		"ExposePrompts":           true, // persisted to BBolt so the per-server override survives restarts
+		"AnnotationOverrides":     true, // per-server per-tool hint fixes; persisted to BBolt so REST/UI/MCP-set overrides survive save/restart
 	}
 
 	// Get all fields from ServerConfig
diff --git a/internal/storage/manager.go b/internal/storage/manager.go
index 4ce4ef901..aa56deb3a 100644
--- a/internal/storage/manager.go
+++ b/internal/storage/manager.go
@@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ func (m *Manager) SaveUpstreamServer(serverConfig *config.ServerConfig) error {
 		QueueSize:                serverConfig.QueueSize,
 		QueueTimeout:             serverConfig.QueueTimeout,
 		ExposePrompts:            serverConfig.ExposePrompts,
-		AnnotationOverrides:      serverConfig.AnnotationOverrides,
+		AnnotationOverrides:      config.CloneAnnotationOverrides(serverConfig.AnnotationOverrides),
 	}
 
 	return m.db.SaveUpstream(record)
@@ -199,7 +199,7 @@ func (m *Manager) GetUpstreamServer(name string) (*config.ServerConfig, error) {
 		QueueSize:                record.QueueSize,
 		QueueTimeout:             record.QueueTimeout,
 		ExposePrompts:            record.ExposePrompts,
-		AnnotationOverrides:      record.AnnotationOverrides,
+		AnnotationOverrides:      config.CloneAnnotationOverrides(record.AnnotationOverrides),
 	}, nil
 }
 
@@ -247,7 +247,7 @@ func (m *Manager) ListUpstreamServers() ([]*config.ServerConfig, error) {
 			QueueSize:                record.QueueSize,
 			QueueTimeout:             record.QueueTimeout,
 			ExposePrompts:            record.ExposePrompts,
-			AnnotationOverrides:      record.AnnotationOverrides,
+			AnnotationOverrides:      config.CloneAnnotationOverrides(record.AnnotationOverrides),
 		})
 	}
 

From dd1047e01095efca94dc759b861fc27504f636b1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: AGI Developer <agi@prism-cron.local>
Date: Sun, 20 Sep 2026 04:17:51 +0300
Subject: [PATCH 08/13] =?UTF-8?q?=E2=9C=A8=20FIX:=20=F0=9F=9B=A1=EF=B8=8F?=
 =?UTF-8?q?=20CRITIC=20ROUND-3=20=E2=80=94=20ADD-DOOR=20PARITY=20+=20NO=20?=
 =?UTF-8?q?SILENT=20DROP=20+=20TAG=20REVERT=20=F0=9F=9B=A1=EF=B8=8F?=
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

---
 internal/config/config.go         |  2 +-
 internal/httpapi/server.go        | 19 ++++++++++++++++
 internal/server/mcp.go            | 36 ++++++++++++++++---------------
 internal/server/preflight_glue.go |  2 +-
 4 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)

diff --git a/internal/config/config.go b/internal/config/config.go
index edb96ecb8..b49815d5e 100644
--- a/internal/config/config.go
+++ b/internal/config/config.go
@@ -750,7 +750,7 @@ type ServerConfig struct {
 	EnabledTools  []string `json:"enabled_tools,omitempty" mapstructure:"enabled_tools"`   // Allowlist: only these tools are exposed; mutually exclusive with disabled_tools
 	DisabledTools []string `json:"disabled_tools,omitempty" mapstructure:"disabled_tools"` // Denylist: these tools are hidden; mutually exclusive with enabled_tools
 
-	AnnotationOverrides map[string]*ToolAnnotations `json:"annotation_overrides,omitempty" mapstructure:"annotation-overrides"`
+	AnnotationOverrides map[string]*ToolAnnotations `json:"annotation_overrides,omitempty" mapstructure:"annotation_overrides"`
 
 	// SourceRegistryID records which registry this server was added from (empty
 	// for manually-configured servers). MCP-866: surfaced in the approval /
diff --git a/internal/httpapi/server.go b/internal/httpapi/server.go
index 5aa26135a..408718cc0 100644
--- a/internal/httpapi/server.go
+++ b/internal/httpapi/server.go
@@ -2349,6 +2349,25 @@ func (s *Server) handleAddServer(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		}
 	}
 
+	// Validate annotation overrides via ValidateDetailed (write gate) before
+	// persisting. Reuses the PATCH pattern: temporary config with the new
+	// server appended, filtered to annotation_overrides errors.
+	if serverConfig.AnnotationOverrides != nil && len(serverConfig.AnnotationOverrides) > 0 {
+		if cfg, err := s.controller.GetConfig(); err == nil && cfg != nil {
+			tmpCfg := &config.Config{Servers: make([]*config.ServerConfig, 0, len(cfg.Servers)+1)}
+			tmpCfg.Servers = append(tmpCfg.Servers, cfg.Servers...)
+			tmpCfg.Servers = append(tmpCfg.Servers, serverConfig)
+			if errs := tmpCfg.ValidateDetailed(); len(errs) > 0 {
+				for _, e := range errs {
+					if strings.Contains(e.Field, "annotation_overrides") {
+						s.writeError(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest, e.Error())
+						return
+					}
+				}
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
 	// #1148 round 6: on CREATE there is no stored value to bind a mask back to,
 	// so ANY mask this proxy rendered can only be a placeholder copied out of
 	// another server's read payload — never a value worth persisting. Refusing
diff --git a/internal/server/mcp.go b/internal/server/mcp.go
index bbb64f6be..5498051d1 100644
--- a/internal/server/mcp.go
+++ b/internal/server/mcp.go
@@ -5249,24 +5249,26 @@ func (p *MCPProxyServer) handleAddUpstream(ctx context.Context, request mcp.Call
 	} else if rawArgs := request.GetArguments(); rawArgs != nil {
 		if raw, ok := rawArgs["annotation_overrides"]; ok {
 			data, err := json.Marshal(raw)
-			if err == nil {
-				var m map[string]*config.ToolAnnotations
-				if err := json.Unmarshal(data, &m); err == nil {
-					cloned := config.CloneAnnotationOverrides(m)
-					filtered := make(map[string]*config.ToolAnnotations, len(cloned))
-					for k, v := range cloned {
-						if v == nil {
-							continue
-						}
-						filtered[k] = v
-					}
-					if errRes := validateAnnotationOverridesForAdd(name, filtered); errRes != nil {
-						return errRes, nil
-					}
-					if len(filtered) > 0 {
-						serverConfig.AnnotationOverrides = filtered
-					}
+			if err != nil {
+				return mcp.NewToolResultError(fmt.Sprintf("Invalid annotation_overrides format: %v", err)), nil
+			}
+			var m map[string]*config.ToolAnnotations
+			if err := json.Unmarshal(data, &m); err != nil {
+				return mcp.NewToolResultError(fmt.Sprintf("Invalid annotation_overrides format: %v", err)), nil
+			}
+			cloned := config.CloneAnnotationOverrides(m)
+			filtered := make(map[string]*config.ToolAnnotations, len(cloned))
+			for k, v := range cloned {
+				if v == nil {
+					continue
 				}
+				filtered[k] = v
+			}
+			if errRes := validateAnnotationOverridesForAdd(name, filtered); errRes != nil {
+				return errRes, nil
+			}
+			if len(filtered) > 0 {
+				serverConfig.AnnotationOverrides = filtered
 			}
 		}
 	}
diff --git a/internal/server/preflight_glue.go b/internal/server/preflight_glue.go
index 9fb4a2de5..d78fbecf8 100644
--- a/internal/server/preflight_glue.go
+++ b/internal/server/preflight_glue.go
@@ -398,7 +398,7 @@ func annotationOverridesByServer(cfg *config.Config) map[string]map[string]*conf
 		if out == nil {
 			out = make(map[string]map[string]*config.ToolAnnotations)
 		}
-		out[sc.Name] = sc.AnnotationOverrides
+		out[sc.Name] = config.CloneAnnotationOverrides(sc.AnnotationOverrides)
 	}
 	return out
 }

From 9cba5ebdf7047ba0167ce62a5b9880eb4c6c16e7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: AGI Developer <agi@prism-cron.local>
Date: Sun, 20 Sep 2026 04:54:11 +0300
Subject: [PATCH 09/13] =?UTF-8?q?=E2=9C=A8=20FIX:=20=F0=9F=9B=A1=EF=B8=8F?=
 =?UTF-8?q?=20CRITIC=20FINAL=20=E2=80=94=20FAIL-CLOSED=20GATES=20+=20TS=20?=
 =?UTF-8?q?SOURCE=20PIN=20=F0=9F=93=8C?=
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

---
 frontend/src/services/api.ts |  6 +++++-
 internal/httpapi/server.go   | 24 +++++++++++++++++++++---
 2 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/frontend/src/services/api.ts b/frontend/src/services/api.ts
index 457cf22cd..523c7a777 100644
--- a/frontend/src/services/api.ts
+++ b/frontend/src/services/api.ts
@@ -3,7 +3,11 @@ import type { APIResponse, Server, Tool, ToolApproval, SearchResult, StatusUpdat
 import { joinHoldEvidence, type HoldEvidenceSource } from '@/utils/holdEvidence'
 
 // PatchServerRequest mirrors the PATCH /api/v1/servers/{id} body (snake_case, per oas).
-// Generated from oas/swagger.yaml but also manually extended for annotation_overrides.
+// Hand-maintained: no `make gen` / swagger→TS codegen exists (`make swagger`
+// generates oas/swagger.yaml FROM Go via swag). annotation_overrides is pinned
+// to oas/swagger.yaml:1124 (config.ServerConfig) + config.ToolAnnotations;
+// the `| null` per-tool delete markers (RFC7396) are not expressible in the
+// swag-emitted schema, hence the manual extension.
 export interface PatchServerRequest extends Record<string, unknown> {
   trust_mode?: string
   url?: string
diff --git a/internal/httpapi/server.go b/internal/httpapi/server.go
index 408718cc0..2738b41fe 100644
--- a/internal/httpapi/server.go
+++ b/internal/httpapi/server.go
@@ -2353,7 +2353,16 @@ func (s *Server) handleAddServer(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 	// persisting. Reuses the PATCH pattern: temporary config with the new
 	// server appended, filtered to annotation_overrides errors.
 	if serverConfig.AnnotationOverrides != nil && len(serverConfig.AnnotationOverrides) > 0 {
-		if cfg, err := s.controller.GetConfig(); err == nil && cfg != nil {
+		cfg, err := s.controller.GetConfig()
+		if err != nil {
+			s.writeError(w, r, http.StatusInternalServerError, fmt.Sprintf("Failed to load current config for annotation validation: %v", err))
+			return
+		}
+		if cfg == nil {
+			s.writeError(w, r, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Failed to load current config for annotation validation: nil config")
+			return
+		}
+		{
 			tmpCfg := &config.Config{Servers: make([]*config.ServerConfig, 0, len(cfg.Servers)+1)}
 			tmpCfg.Servers = append(tmpCfg.Servers, cfg.Servers...)
 			tmpCfg.Servers = append(tmpCfg.Servers, serverConfig)
@@ -2789,8 +2798,17 @@ func (s *Server) handlePatchServer(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 	// Validate annotation overrides via ValidateDetailed (write gate) before
 	// persisting. Build a temporary config with the merged server to reuse the
 	// canonical per-server validation (max 100, tool name, at least one hint).
-	if hasAnnotationOverrideUpdate {
-		if cfg, err := s.controller.GetConfig(); err == nil && cfg != nil && existingSrv != nil {
+	if hasAnnotationOverrideUpdate && existingSrv != nil {
+		cfg, err := s.controller.GetConfig()
+		if err != nil {
+			s.writeError(w, r, http.StatusInternalServerError, fmt.Sprintf("Failed to load current config for annotation validation: %v", err))
+			return
+		}
+		if cfg == nil {
+			s.writeError(w, r, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Failed to load current config for annotation validation: nil config")
+			return
+		}
+		{
 			tmpCfg := &config.Config{Servers: make([]*config.ServerConfig, len(cfg.Servers))}
 			for i, sc := range cfg.Servers {
 				if sc != nil && sc.Name == serverName {

From 6312ee7df29efb6a81b1e5f848ad0e62f4b6b40f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: AGI Developer <agi@prism-cron.local>
Date: Sun, 20 Sep 2026 05:30:08 +0300
Subject: [PATCH 10/13] =?UTF-8?q?=E2=9C=A8=20FIX:=20=E2=9A=A1=20INSTANT=20?=
 =?UTF-8?q?DELETE=20CONVERGENCE=20+=20=F0=9F=93=9C=20SWAGGER=20REGEN=20?=
 =?UTF-8?q?=E2=80=94=20ZERO-LAG=20OVERRIDES=20=F0=9F=9B=A1=EF=B8=8F?=
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

---
 internal/config/config.go                     |   5 +-
 internal/httpapi/patch_server_test.go         |  34 ++++
 internal/httpapi/server.go                    |   9 +
 ...otation_override_immediate_refresh_test.go | 185 ++++++++++++++++++
 internal/server/server.go                     |  23 +++
 oas/docs.go                                   |   2 +-
 oas/swagger.yaml                              |  62 +++---
 7 files changed, 296 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 internal/server/annotation_override_immediate_refresh_test.go

diff --git a/internal/config/config.go b/internal/config/config.go
index b49815d5e..32ba0190b 100644
--- a/internal/config/config.go
+++ b/internal/config/config.go
@@ -750,6 +750,9 @@ type ServerConfig struct {
 	EnabledTools  []string `json:"enabled_tools,omitempty" mapstructure:"enabled_tools"`   // Allowlist: only these tools are exposed; mutually exclusive with disabled_tools
 	DisabledTools []string `json:"disabled_tools,omitempty" mapstructure:"disabled_tools"` // Denylist: these tools are hidden; mutually exclusive with enabled_tools
 
+	// AnnotationOverrides fixes false hints from the upstream server.
+	// Map from tool name (or "*" for wildcard) to ToolAnnotations.
+	// Admin-only, hot (no restart), audited.
 	AnnotationOverrides map[string]*ToolAnnotations `json:"annotation_overrides,omitempty" mapstructure:"annotation_overrides"`
 
 	// SourceRegistryID records which registry this server was added from (empty
@@ -1408,7 +1411,7 @@ type ToolMetadata struct {
 	Annotations      *ToolAnnotations `json:"annotations,omitempty"`
 }
 
-// ToolAnnotations represents MCP tool behavior hints
+// ToolAnnotations represents MCP tool behavior hints (per-tool override)
 type ToolAnnotations struct {
 	Title           string `json:"title,omitempty"`
 	ReadOnlyHint    *bool  `json:"readOnlyHint,omitempty"`
diff --git a/internal/httpapi/patch_server_test.go b/internal/httpapi/patch_server_test.go
index ae7680f27..eadf62481 100644
--- a/internal/httpapi/patch_server_test.go
+++ b/internal/httpapi/patch_server_test.go
@@ -1204,3 +1204,37 @@ func TestPatchServer_AnnotationOverrides_AdminOnly(t *testing.T) {
 		assert.True(t, *mock.capturedUpdates.AnnotationOverrides["act"].DestructiveHint)
 	})
 }
+
+// TestPatchServer_AnnotationOverrides_DeleteToEmptyPersistsClear verifies the
+// delete-to-empty edge: PATCH {"annotation_overrides":{"navigate":null}} when
+// "navigate" is the ONLY override merges to nil, which UpdateServer would
+// read as "preserve" and silently drop the delete. The handler must persist
+// the empty non-nil sentinel instead, so the clear survives and the
+// immediacy refresh fires. restart_required stays false (hot path).
+// BDD: Given one override, When the last tool entry is deleted via null,
+// Then UpdateServer receives an empty (not nil) map and no restart is needed.
+func TestPatchServer_AnnotationOverrides_DeleteToEmptyPersistsClear(t *testing.T) {
+	bFalse := false
+	existing := &config.ServerConfig{Name: "browseros", Protocol: "stdio", Command: "npx", Enabled: true,
+		AnnotationOverrides: map[string]*config.ToolAnnotations{
+			"navigate": {DestructiveHint: &bFalse},
+		},
+	}
+	mock := &mockPatchServerController{apiKey: "admin-secret", existingServer: existing}
+	logger := zap.NewNop().Sugar()
+	srv := NewServer(mock, logger, nil)
+
+	body := []byte(`{"annotation_overrides":{"navigate":null}}`)
+	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPatch, "/api/v1/servers/browseros", bytes.NewReader(body))
+	req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+	req.Header.Set("X-API-Key", "admin-secret")
+	w := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	srv.ServeHTTP(w, req)
+
+	require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, w.Code, "delete must succeed, body=%s", w.Body.String())
+	require.NotNil(t, mock.capturedUpdates, "UpdateServer should have been called")
+	require.NotNil(t, mock.capturedUpdates.AnnotationOverrides,
+		"delete-to-empty must persist an empty (non-nil) map, not nil-as-preserve")
+	assert.Empty(t, mock.capturedUpdates.AnnotationOverrides, "all overrides must be cleared")
+	assert.Contains(t, w.Body.String(), `"restart_required":false`, "override-only mutation stays hot")
+}
diff --git a/internal/httpapi/server.go b/internal/httpapi/server.go
index 2738b41fe..1c7386009 100644
--- a/internal/httpapi/server.go
+++ b/internal/httpapi/server.go
@@ -2783,6 +2783,15 @@ func (s *Server) handlePatchServer(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 			baseAO = existingSrv.AnnotationOverrides
 		}
 		merged := config.MergeAnnotationOverrides(baseAO, req.AnnotationOverrides, opts)
+		if merged == nil && len(baseAO) > 0 {
+			// Merge reports "empty" as nil, which UpdateServer reads as
+			// "preserve". An explicit mutation that empties the map (last
+			// override deleted) is a clear, not a no-op: persist the empty
+			// non-nil sentinel so the delete survives and the immediacy
+			// refresh fires. Semantically identical downstream (no override
+			// for any tool; loader normalizes empty back to nil).
+			merged = make(map[string]*config.ToolAnnotations)
+		}
 		updates.AnnotationOverrides = merged
 		hasUpdates = true
 	} else if existingSrv != nil {
diff --git a/internal/server/annotation_override_immediate_refresh_test.go b/internal/server/annotation_override_immediate_refresh_test.go
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..426e98d88
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/server/annotation_override_immediate_refresh_test.go
@@ -0,0 +1,185 @@
+package server
+
+// Regression guard: PATCH annotation_overrides must converge on the NEXT GET.
+//
+// Root cause: GET /api/v1/servers/{id}/tools is served from the StateView
+// snapshot (Runtime.GetServerTools, internal/runtime/runtime.go), which is
+// refreshed only by discovery. UpdateServer pushed the merged overrides to
+// the live client via SetConfig (hot for the NEXT ListTools) but returned
+// PATCH 200 before the background sweep (OnUpstreamServerChange → async
+// DiscoverAndIndexTools) re-listed, so the next GET raced one re-list (~10s
+// of stale hints). The fix re-lists THAT server synchronously inside
+// UpdateServer when the overrides actually changed, reusing the author's
+// existing authoritative hook (Runtime.RefreshServerTools) — no fleet sweep,
+// no reconnect, no restart.
+//
+// The test below fails before the fix (served annotations stay stale until
+// the background sweep lands) and passes after (synchronous convergence).
+// Every assertion after UpdateServer returns is IMMEDIATE — no sleep, no
+// Eventually, no clock advance. A secondary delete half proves the same for
+// RFC7396 whole-tool delete ({"navigate":null}).
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/mark3labs/mcp-go/mcp"
+	mcpserver "github.com/mark3labs/mcp-go/server"
+	"github.com/mark3labs/mcp-go/server/servertest"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+	"go.uber.org/zap"
+
+	"github.com/smart-mcp-proxy/mcpproxy-go/internal/config"
+	"github.com/smart-mcp-proxy/mcpproxy-go/internal/runtime"
+)
+
+// servedHints returns the (destructiveHint, readOnlyHint) the production GET
+// path would serve for the named tool (Runtime.GetServerTools → StateView
+// snapshot). The snapshot carries *config.ToolAnnotations, not JSON maps.
+func servedHints(t *testing.T, rt *runtime.Runtime, server, tool string) (destructive, readOnly *bool) {
+	t.Helper()
+	tools, err := rt.GetServerTools(server)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	for _, tm := range tools {
+		if tm["name"] == tool {
+			ann, ok := tm["annotations"].(*config.ToolAnnotations)
+			require.True(t, ok, "served annotations must be *config.ToolAnnotations, got %T", tm["annotations"])
+			if ann == nil {
+				return nil, nil
+			}
+			return ann.DestructiveHint, ann.ReadOnlyHint
+		}
+	}
+	t.Fatalf("tool %q not served for server %q", tool, server)
+	return nil, nil
+}
+
+func boolVal(b *bool) interface{} {
+	if b == nil {
+		return nil
+	}
+	return *b
+}
+
+// servedAnnotations is the map form the existing test body expects (keys
+// "destructiveHint"/"readOnlyHint" etc). Kept for the test assertions that
+// compare via map lookup; built from the same StateView snapshot as servedHints.
+func servedAnnotations(t *testing.T, rt *runtime.Runtime, server, tool string) map[string]interface{} {
+	t.Helper()
+	tools, err := rt.GetServerTools(server)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	for _, tm := range tools {
+		if tm["name"] == tool {
+			out := map[string]interface{}{}
+			if ann, ok := tm["annotations"].(*config.ToolAnnotations); ok && ann != nil {
+				if ann.DestructiveHint != nil {
+					out["destructiveHint"] = *ann.DestructiveHint
+				}
+				if ann.ReadOnlyHint != nil {
+					out["readOnlyHint"] = *ann.ReadOnlyHint
+				}
+				if ann.IdempotentHint != nil {
+					out["idempotentHint"] = *ann.IdempotentHint
+				}
+				if ann.OpenWorldHint != nil {
+					out["openWorldHint"] = *ann.OpenWorldHint
+				}
+				if ann.Title != "" {
+					out["title"] = ann.Title
+				}
+			}
+			return out
+		}
+	}
+	t.Fatalf("tool %q not served for server %q", tool, server)
+	return nil
+}
+
+func TestUpdateServer_AnnotationOverrides_RefreshStateViewImmediately(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Setenv("MCPPROXY_DISABLE_OAUTH", "true")
+	logger := zap.NewNop()
+	ctx := context.Background()
+
+	// Stub upstream: "navigate" carries destructive upstream truth (the
+	// browseros shape), "snapshot" is a read-only control with no override.
+	stub := mcpserver.NewMCPServer("ao-srv", "0.0.1-test", mcpserver.WithToolCapabilities(true))
+	okHandler := func(_ context.Context, _ mcp.CallToolRequest) (*mcp.CallToolResult, error) {
+		return mcp.NewToolResultText("ok"), nil
+	}
+	stub.AddTool(mcp.Tool{
+		Name: "navigate", Description: "Navigate somewhere",
+		InputSchema: mcp.ToolInputSchema{Type: "object"},
+		Annotations: mcp.ToolAnnotation{DestructiveHint: boolPtr(true)},
+	}, okHandler)
+	stub.AddTool(mcp.Tool{
+		Name: "snapshot", Description: "Take a snapshot",
+		InputSchema: mcp.ToolInputSchema{Type: "object"},
+		Annotations: mcp.ToolAnnotation{ReadOnlyHint: boolPtr(true)},
+	}, okHandler)
+	httpSrv := servertest.NewTestStreamableHTTPServer(stub)
+	t.Cleanup(httpSrv.Close)
+
+	serverCfg := &config.ServerConfig{Name: "ao-srv", URL: httpSrv.URL, Protocol: "streamable-http", Enabled: true}
+	rt, err := runtime.New(&config.Config{
+		DataDir: t.TempDir(), Listen: "127.0.0.1:0",
+		Servers: []*config.ServerConfig{serverCfg},
+	}, "", logger)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	t.Cleanup(func() { _ = rt.Close() })
+
+	// UpdateServer resolves the existing record from storage.
+	require.NoError(t, rt.StorageManager().SaveUpstreamServer(serverCfg))
+	require.NoError(t, rt.UpstreamManager().AddServerConfig("ao-srv", serverCfg))
+	require.NoError(t, rt.UpstreamManager().ConnectAll(ctx))
+	require.Eventually(t, func() bool {
+		client, ok := rt.UpstreamManager().GetClient("ao-srv")
+		return ok && client.IsConnected()
+	}, 10*time.Second, 50*time.Millisecond, "stub upstream must connect")
+
+	// Seed the served snapshot with upstream truth.
+	require.NoError(t, rt.RefreshServerTools(ctx, "ao-srv"))
+	require.Equal(t, true, servedAnnotations(t, rt, "ao-srv", "navigate")["destructiveHint"],
+		"precondition: upstream truth is destructive")
+
+	mainSrv := &Server{runtime: rt, logger: logger}
+
+	// SET: operator overrides navigate to non-destructive, read-only.
+	setUpdates := &config.ServerConfig{Name: "ao-srv", Enabled: true,
+		AnnotationOverrides: map[string]*config.ToolAnnotations{
+			"navigate": {DestructiveHint: boolPtr(false), ReadOnlyHint: boolPtr(true)},
+		},
+	}
+	require.NoError(t, mainSrv.UpdateServer(ctx, "ao-srv", setUpdates))
+
+	// IMMEDIATE: no sleep, no tick — the next GET must already be effective.
+	// Before the fix this still shows upstream destructive:true until the
+	// background sweep lands (~one re-list later).
+	got := servedAnnotations(t, rt, "ao-srv", "navigate")
+	require.Equal(t, false, got["destructiveHint"], "override must be effective on the next GET")
+	require.Equal(t, true, got["readOnlyHint"], "override must be effective on the next GET")
+	// The un-overridden control tool still serves upstream truth.
+	require.Equal(t, true, servedAnnotations(t, rt, "ao-srv", "snapshot")["readOnlyHint"])
+
+	// DELETE: PATCH {"annotation_overrides":{"navigate":null}} with the
+	// per-tool remove marker merges to nil; the REST handler persists the
+	// empty non-nil sentinel (see handlePatchServer) so the clear survives.
+	// Replicate that exact merge here.
+	delOpts := config.DefaultMergeOptions().WithRemoveMarker("annotation_overrides.navigate")
+	merged := config.MergeAnnotationOverrides(
+		setUpdates.AnnotationOverrides,
+		map[string]*config.ToolAnnotations{"navigate": nil},
+		delOpts,
+	)
+	require.Nil(t, merged, "merge reports delete-to-empty as nil")
+	if merged == nil {
+		merged = make(map[string]*config.ToolAnnotations)
+	}
+	require.NoError(t, mainSrv.UpdateServer(ctx, "ao-srv",
+		&config.ServerConfig{Name: "ao-srv", Enabled: true, AnnotationOverrides: merged}))
+
+	// IMMEDIATE: upstream truth is back on the next GET.
+	back := servedAnnotations(t, rt, "ao-srv", "navigate")
+	require.Equal(t, true, back["destructiveHint"], "deleted override must revert to upstream truth immediately")
+	require.Nil(t, back["readOnlyHint"], "deleted override hint must be gone")
+}
diff --git a/internal/server/server.go b/internal/server/server.go
index 75687d2fd..baf7c8aa1 100644
--- a/internal/server/server.go
+++ b/internal/server/server.go
@@ -2090,6 +2090,29 @@ func (s *Server) UpdateServer(ctx context.Context, serverName string, updates *c
 		}
 	}
 
+	// Annotation-override immediacy: the served tools list (GET
+	// /api/v1/servers/{id}/tools) is the StateView snapshot, refreshed only by
+	// discovery. SetConfig above makes the NEXT ListTools return effective
+	// annotations, but without this the PATCH 200 races the background sweep
+	// (OnUpstreamServerChange → async DiscoverAndIndexTools) and serves stale
+	// hints for ~one re-list. Re-list THIS server synchronously via the
+	// author's existing authoritative single-server hook, so the next GET
+	// after PATCH converges with no fleet sweep, reconnect, or restart.
+	// Best-effort: on failure only log; the background sweep below still
+	// converges eventually.
+	if !annotationOverridesEqualForAudit(beforeAOForAudit, existing.AnnotationOverrides) {
+		rctx := ctx
+		if rctx == nil {
+			rctx = context.Background()
+		}
+		rctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(rctx, 30*time.Second)
+		if rerr := s.runtime.RefreshServerTools(rctx, serverName); rerr != nil {
+			s.logger.Warn("Annotation-override refresh failed; background sweep will converge",
+				zap.String("server", serverName), zap.Error(rerr))
+		}
+		cancel()
+	}
+
 	// Save configuration to file
 	if err := s.SaveConfiguration(); err != nil {
 		s.logger.Warn("Failed to save configuration after updating server", zap.Error(err))
diff --git a/oas/docs.go b/oas/docs.go
index 2d6d3e876..46b297bda 100644
--- a/oas/docs.go
+++ b/oas/docs.go
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ import "github.com/swaggo/swag/v2"
 
 const docTemplate = `{
     "schemes": {{ marshal .Schemes }},
-    "components": {"schemas":{"config.AuditLogConfig":{"description":"AuditLog configures the Spec 107 edition-neutral audit sink\n(internal/audit). nil means \"use the per-edition/per-transport\ndefault\" (EffectiveAuditLog); restart-pinned (bound at sink\nconstruction). See audit_log.go.","properties":{"compress":{"type":"boolean"},"enabled":{"type":"boolean"},"max_age_days":{"type":"integer"},"max_backups":{"type":"integer"},"max_size_mb":{"type":"integer"},"path":{"type":"string"},"stdout":{"type":"boolean"}},"type":"object"},"config.ConcurrencyDefaults":{"description":"ServerConcurrencyDefaults is scope (b) of FR-020: the blanket per-server\ndefault set inherited by every server that does not override a setting.\nAbsent (the default) = no per-server limiting unless a server configures\nit explicitly. File/API-configured only — no env scheme (FR-022).","properties":{"max_concurrent_requests":{"type":"integer"},"queue_size":{"type":"integer"},"queue_timeout":{"type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"config.Config":{"properties":{"activity_cleanup_interval_min":{"description":"Background cleanup interval in minutes (default: 60)","type":"integer"},"activity_max_records":{"description":"Max records before pruning (default: 100000)","type":"integer"},"activity_max_response_size":{"description":"Response truncation limit in bytes (default: 65536)","type":"integer"},"activity_max_size_mb":{"description":"ActivityMaxSizeMB caps the total activity-log size in MB before the\noldest records are pruned. Omit the key for the 256MB default; set it to\n0 to disable the size cap.","type":"integer"},"activity_retention_days":{"description":"Activity logging settings (RFC-003)","type":"integer"},"aggregate_upstream_prompts":{"description":"AggregateUpstreamPrompts, when true, aggregates every connected upstream\nserver's advertised MCP prompts into mcpproxy's own prompts/list\n(exposed as \"\u003cserver\u003e__\u003cprompt\u003e\"). OFF by default: users are safe by\ndefault and opt in deliberately. EnablePrompts still governs the built-in\nprompts + the prompts capability; this flag gates ONLY the upstream\naggregation performed by RefreshPrompts. Hot-reloadable.","type":"boolean"},"allow_private_registry_fetch":{"description":"AllowPrivateRegistryFetch opts out of the registry SSRF guard (MCP-1076,\nCWE-918). By default (false) registry fetches refuse any host that is — or\nresolves to — a non-routable address (loopback, RFC1918/CGNAT private,\nlink-local incl. the 169.254.169.254 cloud-metadata endpoint), so a\nmalicious or typo'd registry source cannot turn the daemon into a\nrequest-forgery vector against internal services.\n\nThis opt-out is BLANKET (all-or-nothing): setting it true disables the\nguard for EVERY non-routable range at once — loopback, RFC1918/CGNAT\nprivate, link-local AND the 169.254.169.254 cloud-metadata endpoint. There\nis no way to allow only loopback; enabling it for a localhost dev registry\nalso re-opens the cloud-metadata SSRF vector. Set true ONLY when you\nintentionally run a trusted registry mirror on an internal/private address,\nideally on a host with no cloud-metadata exposure. The change takes effect\nonly on daemon (re)start or config reload.","type":"boolean"},"allow_server_add":{"type":"boolean"},"allow_server_remove":{"type":"boolean"},"api_key":{"description":"Security settings","type":"string"},"audit_log":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/config.AuditLogConfig"},"call_tool_timeout":{"type":"string"},"check_server_repo":{"description":"Repository detection settings","type":"boolean"},"code_execution_max_parallel":{"description":"Default concurrency for call_tools() batches (1-32, default: 8)","type":"integer"},"code_execution_max_tool_calls":{"description":"Max tool calls per execution (0 = unlimited, default: 0)","type":"integer"},"code_execution_pool_size":{"description":"JavaScript runtime pool size (default: 10)","type":"integer"},"code_execution_timeout_ms":{"description":"Timeout in milliseconds (default: 120000, max: 600000)","type":"integer"},"data_dir":{"type":"string"},"debug_search":{"type":"boolean"},"direct_tool_response_mode":{"description":"DirectToolResponseMode selects the serialization of the DIRECT\nenumeration surface (Spec 102). Valid values: \"\" (= full), \"full\"\n(default: today's schema-bearing entries), \"deferred\" (description +\ncompact signature, with a minimal permissive input schema; upstream\ninputSchema and outputSchema are stripped and recovered on demand via\ndescribe_tool).\n\nDeliberately NOT an extension of tool_response_mode: reusing that axis\nwould silently change /mcp/all output for every deployment already\nrunning compact, which FR-015 forbids. Serialization-only — it never\nchanges WHICH tools are listed, only how (FR-008). Hot-reloadable.","type":"string"},"disable_management":{"type":"boolean"},"docker_isolation":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/config.DockerIsolationConfig"},"docker_recovery":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/config.DockerRecoveryConfig"},"enable_code_execution":{"description":"Code execution settings","type":"boolean"},"enable_prompts":{"description":"Prompts settings","type":"boolean"},"enable_socket":{"description":"Enable Unix socket/named pipe for local IPC (default: true)","type":"boolean"},"enable_tray":{"description":"Deprecated: EnableTray is unused and has no runtime effect. Kept for backward compatibility.","type":"boolean"},"environment":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/secureenv.EnvConfig"},"features":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/config.FeatureFlags"},"forward_proxy_env":{"description":"ForwardProxyEnv opts in to forwarding the ambient HTTP(S)/ALL/NO/FTP proxy\nenvironment variables to spawned stdio upstream servers (MCP-2769). OFF by\ndefault: proxy URLs commonly embed credentials (http://user:pass@proxy), so\nforwarding them to every upstream is a credential-leak risk. When enabled,\nvalues are forwarded with their userinfo (credentials) redacted.","type":"boolean"},"health_check_interval":{"description":"Discovery \u0026 health-check cadence (spec 074, #608). Both are *Duration\ntri-state pointers: nil = inherit the built-in default; a pointer to 0s =\nthe loop is disabled; a positive value = that interval. Defaults live only\nin the resolvers (ResolveHealthCheckInterval / ResolveToolDiscoveryInterval)\nso an unset key behaves exactly as before this feature (SC-005). Validated\nin Validate(): health-check ∈ {0} ∪ [5s,1h]; tool-discovery ∈ {0} ∪ [30s,24h].","type":"string"},"http_idle_timeout":{"description":"HTTPIdleTimeout caps how long an idle keep-alive connection is kept open.\nUnset = 180s. \"0s\" removes the dedicated idle deadline, but net/http then\nfalls back to ReadTimeout — idle is fully unbounded only when\nhttp_read_timeout is also \"0s\". Requires a restart.","type":"string"},"http_read_timeout":{"description":"HTTPReadTimeout caps how long reading a whole request (headers + body)\nmay take. Unset = 120s; \"0s\" disables it. Requires a restart.","type":"string"},"http_write_timeout":{"description":"HTTPWriteTimeout caps how long producing a whole response may take on\nnon-streaming endpoints (REST, Web UI, health). Unset = 120s; \"0s\"\ndisables it globally. MCP and SSE /events routes are exempt by design.","type":"string"},"init_timeout":{"description":"InitTimeout is the global default deadline for an upstream's MCP\n` + "`" + `initialize` + "`" + ` handshake (MCP-3322 / GH #760). *Duration tri-state: nil =\ninherit the built-in 30s default; a positive value = that deadline. A\nper-server InitTimeout overrides this. Resolved by ResolveInitTimeout;\nvalidated to {0} ∪ [1s, 30m] in Validate(). Servers doing legitimate\nfirst-run warmup (cache/index build) before answering ` + "`" + `initialize` + "`" + ` can\nraise this so they are not killed mid-startup.","type":"string"},"instructions":{"description":"Instructions text returned in the MCP initialize response to guide AI agents.\nWhen empty, a built-in default is used that explains retrieve_tools workflow.","type":"string"},"intent_declaration":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/config.IntentDeclarationConfig"},"listen":{"type":"string"},"logging":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/config.LogConfig"},"max_concurrent_requests":{"description":"Concurrency limits (spec 093, GH #955). Scope (a) of FR-020: the GLOBAL\nAGGREGATE limiter — one proxy-wide cap on concurrently running upstream\ntool calls, with its own bounded wait queue. Tri-state pointers: absent =\nthe limiter does not exist (default, zero behavior change); an explicit 0\nmax also disables it; positive = that cap. This scope is NEVER a\nper-server inheritance source — per-server values come from\nServerConcurrencyDefaults / the per-server overrides — but a server's\neffective concurrency is bounded by BOTH its own limiter and this one.\nResolved by ResolveGlobalConcurrency; hot-reloadable; overridable via\nMCPPROXY_MAX_CONCURRENT_REQUESTS / _QUEUE_SIZE / _QUEUE_TIMEOUT (FR-022).","type":"integer"},"max_result_size_chars":{"description":"MaxResultSizeChars is advertised on every tool as\n` + "`" + `_meta.anthropic/maxResultSizeChars` + "`" + `; it raises Claude Code's\ninline-response ceiling from 50k to up to 500k chars. Omit the key for\nthe 500000 default; set it to 0 to disable the annotation.","type":"integer"},"mcpServers":{"items":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/config.ServerConfig"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"oauth_expiry_warning_hours":{"description":"Health status settings","type":"number"},"observability":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/config.ObservabilityConfig"},"output_sanitisation":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/config.OutputSanitisationConfig"},"output_validation":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/config.OutputValidationConfig"},"profiles":{"description":"Profiles are optional named, server-scoped views exposed at /mcp/p/\u003cname\u003e\n(Spec 057). Absent/empty is fully supported — /mcp is unchanged and configs\nwithout this key serialize byte-identically (SC-004).","items":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/config.ProfileConfig"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"quarantine_enabled":{"description":"QuarantineEnabled controls whether quarantine is active. It gates two\nthings together:\n  1. Server-level auto-quarantine for newly added servers (issue #370).\n     When true, servers added via the upstream_servers MCP tool or the\n     REST API default to quarantined=true; when false, they default to\n     quarantined=false. Explicit per-request values always win.\n  2. Tool-level quarantine (Spec 032): per-tool SHA-256 approval of\n     tool descriptions/schemas.\nWhen nil (default), quarantine is enabled (secure by default). Set to\nexplicit false to opt out of both. Per-server SkipQuarantine still\napplies for the tool-level check on individual servers.","type":"boolean"},"queue_size":{"type":"integer"},"queue_timeout":{"type":"string"},"read_only_mode":{"type":"boolean"},"registries":{"description":"Registries configuration for MCP server discovery","items":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/config.RegistryEntry"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"registries_locked":{"description":"RegistriesLocked is an enterprise stub knob (MCP-866): when true, runtime\nadditions of custom registries (e.g. ` + "`" + `registry add-source` + "`" + `, the REST/MCP\nadd-source surface) are rejected so an administrator can pin the discovery\nsources. Built-in defaults are unaffected. Documented but otherwise inert\nbeyond the add-source rejection.","type":"boolean"},"require_mcp_auth":{"description":"Require authentication on /mcp endpoint (default: false)","type":"boolean"},"reveal_secret_headers":{"description":"RevealSecretHeaders, when true, disables the redaction of the\nsecret-bearing server fields — sensitive header values (Authorization,\nX-API-Key, Cookie, …), env-var secrets, and URL query credentials — in\nresponses from the ` + "`" + `upstream_servers` + "`" + ` MCP tool, the ` + "`" + `/api/v1/servers` + "`" + `\nREST API, and the SSE event stream. It also lets URL secrets echoed\ninto last_error / health.detail through unscrubbed.\n\nDefault false — sensitive values are surfaced masked as\n` + "`" + `••••\u003clast2\u003e (\u003cN\u003e chars)` + "`" + ` (error strings use ` + "`" + `***REDACTED***` + "`" + `) so an\nMCP agent cannot read Bearer tokens / API keys / URL secrets out of\nanother upstream's config (PR #425, issue #872). ${env:…}/${keyring:…}\nreferences are labels, not secrets, and pass through unchanged.\n\nThe Web UI / macOS tray edit forms work without seeing the real\nvalues: PATCH /api/v1/servers/{id} deep-merges (omitted keys are\npreserved, see ` + "`" + `headers_remove` + "`" + ` / ` + "`" + `env_remove` + "`" + ` for explicit\ndeletes), so clients compute a diff and only send the keys that\nactually changed. Redacted-but-unchanged values never round-trip\n— the backend keeps the real string. Set this to true if a\ndownstream tool genuinely needs raw values in the response.","type":"boolean"},"routing_mode":{"description":"Routing mode (Spec 031): how MCP tools are exposed to clients\nValid values: \"retrieve_tools\" (default), \"direct\", \"code_execution\"","type":"string"},"security":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/config.SecurityConfig"},"sensitive_data_detection":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/config.SensitiveDataDetectionConfig"},"server_concurrency_defaults":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/config.ConcurrencyDefaults"},"telemetry":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/config.TelemetryConfig"},"tls":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/config.TLSConfig"},"tokenizer":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/config.TokenizerConfig"},"tool_call_max_records_per_server":{"description":"Calls retained per server (default: 1000)","type":"integer"},"tool_call_max_response_size":{"description":"Bounds for the per-server tool-call history behind GET /api/v1/tool-calls\n(#1176). It is a recent-debugging window, not an audit log — the activity\nlog is the durable record — and it kept every upstream response whole,\nper server, forever. A non-positive value means \"use the default\", not\n\"disable\": this store must never be unbounded again, so there is\ndeliberately no off switch.","type":"integer"},"tool_discovery_interval":{"type":"string"},"tool_response_limit":{"type":"integer"},"tool_response_mode":{"description":"Tool response mode (Spec 085): how retrieve_tools serializes results.\nValid values: \"\" (= full), \"full\" (default: today's schema-bearing\nentries), \"compact\" (signature + first-sentence entries). Orthogonal to\nrouting_mode — routing_mode selects the tool SURFACE, this selects the\nSERIALIZATION within the retrieve_tools surface. Serialization-only: it\nnever affects the query, ranking, or result set. Hot-reloadable.","type":"string"},"tool_response_session_risk_warning":{"description":"ToolResponseSessionRiskWarning controls whether the prose ` + "`" + `warning` + "`" + ` field\nis included in the ` + "`" + `session_risk` + "`" + ` object returned by ` + "`" + `retrieve_tools` + "`" + `.\nThe structured fields (level, lethal_trifecta, has_open_world_tools, etc.)\nare always included. Default: false (quiet for LLM clients) — see issue #406.\nMost tools lack annotations, so the MCP-spec defaults treat them as fully\npermissive across all three risk axes, which makes the prose warning fire\non almost every call and wastes tokens.","type":"boolean"},"tools_limit":{"type":"integer"},"toon_min_savings_pct":{"description":"ToonMinSavingsPct is the minimum byte-savings percentage (validated\n1-90; 0/unset → 15) the complete TOON emission (marker + hint + body)\nmust achieve over the exact passthrough emission for adaptive mode to\nencode a block. Byte savings approximate token savings for the tabular\npayload class; the spec-083 profiler reports true token deltas.\nGlobal-only (no per-server override, FR-001).","type":"integer"},"toon_output":{"description":"ToonOutput selects the TOON encoding mode for call_tool_* result text\nblocks (spec 084): \"off\" (default — responses byte-identical to\npre-feature behavior), \"adaptive\" (encode only tabular-uniform payloads\nthat beat compact JSON by ToonMinSavingsPct), or \"always\"\n(benchmark/debug only — encodes every JSON-parseable block and can\nINCREASE token cost). Per-server override: ServerConfig.ToonOutput.\nResolved by ResolveToonOutput; hot-reloadable.","type":"string"},"top_k":{"description":"Deprecated: TopK is superseded by ToolsLimit and has no runtime effect. Kept for backward compatibility.","type":"integer"},"tray_endpoint":{"description":"Tray endpoint override (unix:// or npipe://)","type":"string"},"trusted_hosts":{"description":"TrustedHosts lists non-loopback Host header values accepted on loopback\nlisteners (GH #898). DNS-rebinding protection rejects requests whose Host\nheader is not a loopback address when mcpproxy listens on loopback; a\nreverse proxy (nginx → 127.0.0.1) forwarding the public domain in Host\ntrips it. Entries are hostnames, case-insensitive; an entry without a\nport matches any port, with a port it must match exactly; a leading dot\n(\".example.com\") is a subdomain wildcard. The single entry \"*\" disables\nHost and Origin validation entirely. The same list also validates the\nOrigin header when present (MCP spec DNS-rebinding defense). Empty\n(default) keeps full protection. Env override: MCPPROXY_TRUSTED_HOSTS\n(comma-separated).","items":{"type":"string"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"trusted_proxies":{"description":"TrustedProxies lists the CIDRs or IP addresses whose X-Forwarded-For /\nX-Real-IP / X-Forwarded-Proto / X-Forwarded-Host headers are believed\n(Spec 107 FR-027). Empty (default) trusts nobody. Edition-neutral, live\n(hot-reloadable). Env override: MCPPROXY_TRUSTED_PROXIES (comma-separated).\nThe one reader is ForwardedHeaders; validation is validateTrustedProxies.","items":{"type":"string"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"update_check":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/config.UpdateCheckConfig"}},"type":"object"},"config.CustomPattern":{"properties":{"category":{"description":"Category (defaults to \"custom\")","type":"string"},"keywords":{"description":"Keywords to match (mutually exclusive with Regex)","items":{"type":"string"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"name":{"description":"Unique identifier for this pattern","type":"string"},"regex":{"description":"Regex pattern (mutually exclusive with Keywords)","type":"string"},"severity":{"description":"Risk level: critical, high, medium, low","type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"config.DeepScanConfig":{"description":"DeepScan is the opt-in \"deep scan\" layer (Spec 077 US3). It subsumes the\ndeprecated top-level scanner_fetch_package_source / scanner_disable_no_new_privileges\nkeys (migrated on load) and gates the heavy Docker-based scanners + source\nextraction. Disabled by default (FR-006): only the deterministic in-process\nbaseline scanner runs. A deep-scan failure NEVER changes the baseline verdict\n(FR-007/FR-008).","properties":{"disable_no_new_privileges":{"description":"DisableNoNewPrivileges, when true, omits the ` + "`" + `--security-opt\nno-new-privileges` + "`" + ` flag from scanner container runs (snap-docker/AppArmor\nescape hatch). Absorbs the deprecated top-level\nscanner_disable_no_new_privileges. Default false.","type":"boolean"},"enabled":{"description":"Enabled is the master opt-in for the heavy layer (FR-006). Default false.","type":"boolean"},"fetch_package_source":{"description":"FetchPackageSource controls whether the scanner fetches the PUBLISHED\nsource of package-runner servers (npx/uvx) — without executing it — when\nno local source is available. Absorbs the deprecated top-level\nscanner_fetch_package_source. Default (nil) is ENABLED within deep scan.","type":"boolean"},"scanners":{"description":"Scanners optionally restricts which deep scanners may run under the\numbrella (by scanner id). Empty ⇒ all enabled deep scanners are eligible.","items":{"type":"string"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false}},"type":"object"},"config.DockerIsolationConfig":{"description":"Docker isolation settings","properties":{"cpu_limit":{"description":"CPU limit for containers","type":"string"},"default_images":{"additionalProperties":{"type":"string"},"description":"Map of runtime type to Docker image","type":"object"},"enable_cache_volume":{"description":"Mount shared cache volumes for faster restarts (default: true)","type":"boolean"},"enabled":{"description":"Global enable/disable for Docker isolation (legacy; superseded by Mode)","type":"boolean"},"extra_args":{"description":"Additional docker run arguments","items":{"type":"string"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"log_driver":{"description":"Docker log driver (default: json-file)","type":"string"},"log_max_files":{"description":"Maximum number of log files (default: 3)","type":"string"},"log_max_size":{"description":"Maximum size of log files (default: 100m)","type":"string"},"memory_limit":{"description":"Memory limit for containers","type":"string"},"mode":{"description":"Isolation mode: \"docker\" | \"sandbox\" | \"none\" (MCP-34.2). Unset per-server inherits the global mode; unset globally falls back to the legacy \"enabled\" flag (true ⇒ docker, false ⇒ none)","type":"string","x-enum-varnames":["IsolationModeDocker","IsolationModeSandbox","IsolationModeNone"]},"network_mode":{"description":"Docker network mode (default: bridge)","type":"string"},"registry":{"description":"Custom registry (defaults to docker.io)","type":"string"},"timeout":{"description":"Container startup timeout","type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"config.DockerRecoveryConfig":{"description":"Docker recovery settings","properties":{"enabled":{"description":"Enable Docker recovery monitoring (default: true)","type":"boolean"},"max_retries":{"description":"Maximum retry attempts (0 = unlimited)","type":"integer"},"notify_on_failure":{"description":"Show notification on recovery failure (default: true)","type":"boolean"},"notify_on_retry":{"description":"Show notification on each retry (default: false)","type":"boolean"},"notify_on_start":{"description":"Show notification when recovery starts (default: true)","type":"boolean"},"notify_on_success":{"description":"Show notification on successful recovery (default: true)","type":"boolean"},"persistent_state":{"description":"Save recovery state across restarts (default: true)","type":"boolean"}},"type":"object"},"config.FeatureFlags":{"description":"Deprecated: Features flags are unused and have no runtime effect. Kept for backward compatibility.","properties":{"enable_async_storage":{"type":"boolean"},"enable_caching":{"type":"boolean"},"enable_contract_tests":{"type":"boolean"},"enable_debug_logging":{"description":"Development features","type":"boolean"},"enable_docker_isolation":{"type":"boolean"},"enable_event_bus":{"type":"boolean"},"enable_health_checks":{"type":"boolean"},"enable_metrics":{"type":"boolean"},"enable_oauth":{"description":"Security features","type":"boolean"},"enable_observability":{"description":"Observability features","type":"boolean"},"enable_quarantine":{"type":"boolean"},"enable_runtime":{"description":"Runtime features","type":"boolean"},"enable_search":{"description":"Storage features","type":"boolean"},"enable_sse":{"type":"boolean"},"enable_tracing":{"type":"boolean"},"enable_tray":{"type":"boolean"},"enable_web_ui":{"description":"UI features","type":"boolean"}},"type":"object"},"config.IntentDeclarationConfig":{"description":"Intent declaration settings (Spec 018)","properties":{"strict_server_validation":{"description":"StrictServerValidation controls whether server annotation mismatches\ncause rejection (true) or just warnings (false).\nDefault: true (reject mismatches)","type":"boolean"}},"type":"object"},"config.IsolationConfig":{"description":"Per-server isolation settings","properties":{"enabled":{"description":"Enable Docker isolation for this server (nil = inherit global; legacy, superseded by Mode)","type":"boolean"},"extra_args":{"description":"Additional docker run arguments for this server","items":{"type":"string"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"image":{"description":"Custom Docker image (overrides default)","type":"string"},"log_driver":{"description":"Docker log driver override for this server","type":"string"},"log_max_files":{"description":"Maximum number of log files override","type":"string"},"log_max_size":{"description":"Maximum size of log files override","type":"string"},"mode":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/config.IsolationMode"},"network_mode":{"description":"Custom network mode for this server","type":"string"},"working_dir":{"description":"Custom working directory in container","type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"config.IsolationMode":{"description":"Isolation mode: \"docker\" | \"sandbox\" | \"none\" (MCP-34.2). Unset per-server inherits the global mode; unset globally falls back to the legacy \"enabled\" flag (true ⇒ docker, false ⇒ none)","type":"string","x-enum-varnames":["IsolationModeDocker","IsolationModeSandbox","IsolationModeNone"]},"config.LogConfig":{"description":"Logging configuration","properties":{"compress":{"type":"boolean"},"enable_console":{"type":"boolean"},"enable_file":{"type":"boolean"},"filename":{"type":"string"},"json_format":{"type":"boolean"},"level":{"type":"string"},"log_dir":{"description":"Custom log directory","type":"string"},"max_age":{"description":"days","type":"integer"},"max_backups":{"description":"number of backup files","type":"integer"},"max_size":{"description":"MB","type":"integer"}},"type":"object"},"config.MetricsExporterConfig":{"description":"Metrics gates the Prometheus /metrics scrape endpoint (MCP-32). Disabled\nby default — operators opt in for k8s/enterprise deployments.","properties":{"enabled":{"description":"Enabled exposes /metrics on the existing HTTP listener when true.","type":"boolean"}},"type":"object"},"config.OAuthConfig":{"description":"OAuth configuration (keep even when empty to signal OAuth requirement)","properties":{"client_id":{"type":"string"},"client_secret":{"type":"string"},"extra_params":{"additionalProperties":{"type":"string"},"description":"Additional OAuth parameters (e.g., RFC 8707 resource)","type":"object"},"pkce_enabled":{"type":"boolean"},"redirect_uri":{"type":"string"},"scopes":{"items":{"type":"string"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false}},"type":"object"},"config.ObservabilityConfig":{"description":"Observability settings (Spec 069): usage aggregate cache/persistence cadence.","properties":{"metrics":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/config.MetricsExporterConfig"},"tracing":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/config.TracingExporterConfig"},"usage_cache_ttl":{"description":"UsageCacheTTL bounds the freshness of the usage endpoint's read cache for\nwide windows (FR-005). Default 5s.","type":"string"},"usage_persist_interval":{"description":"UsagePersistInterval is how often the actor-owned usage aggregate snapshot\nis flushed to storage. Default 30s.","type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"config.OutputSanitisationConfig":{"description":"Output sanitisation settings (Spec 054 Track B)","properties":{"max_redactions":{"description":"cap on redactions per response; default 100","type":"integer"},"response_action":{"description":"\"spotlight\" | \"redact\" | \"block\"; default \"spotlight\"","type":"string"},"spotlight_untrusted":{"description":"wrap untrusted output in spotlight markers; default true","type":"boolean"},"strip_classes":{"description":"classes to strip: ansi/c0c1/bidi/zero_width","items":{"type":"string"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"strip_control_chars":{"description":"strip control-character classes; default false","type":"boolean"}},"type":"object"},"config.OutputValidationConfig":{"description":"Output-schema validation settings (Spec 056)","properties":{"max_bytes":{"description":"structured payload byte cap; default 5\u003c\u003c20","type":"integer"},"max_depth":{"description":"nesting depth cap; default 64","type":"integer"},"missing_structured_content":{"description":"\"allow\" | \"block\"; default \"allow\"","type":"string"},"mode":{"description":"\"off\" | \"warn\" | \"strict\"; default \"warn\"","type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"config.ProfileConfig":{"properties":{"name":{"description":"URL slug, validated","type":"string"},"servers":{"description":"references to mcpServers[].name","items":{"type":"string"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false}},"type":"object"},"config.RegistryEntry":{"properties":{"count":{"description":"number or string","type":"string"},"description":{"type":"string"},"id":{"type":"string"},"name":{"type":"string"},"protocol":{"type":"string"},"provenance":{"description":"Provenance is the trust tag for this registry (MCP-866):\nRegistryProvenanceOfficial for built-in defaults, RegistryProvenanceCustom\nfor user-added registries. It is authoritatively (re)computed by the\nregistries merge from whether the ID is a shipped default — a user cannot\nclaim \"official\" by writing it into their config.","type":"string"},"requires_key":{"description":"RequiresKey marks a registry that needs an API key to be queried. When\ntrue and no key is configured, the registry is skipped/marked unavailable\nrather than failing the whole search (FR-008).","type":"boolean"},"servers_url":{"type":"string"},"tags":{"items":{"type":"string"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"url":{"type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"config.SecurityConfig":{"description":"Security scanner settings (Spec 039)","properties":{"auto_baseline_scan":{"description":"AutoBaselineScan is the kill-switch for the AUTOMATIC, informational\nPass-1 baseline scan: the free in-process TPA scan mcpproxy runs for every\nnewly admitted server (any trust mode) and, once per installation, over\npre-existing servers that have never been scanned.\n\nInformational ONLY: the resulting verdict populates the security badge and\nthe scan summary, and NEVER gates quarantine or approval. The\ntrust_mode:\"scan\" admission gate is a separate path and is unaffected by\nthis flag.\n\nDefault (nil) is ENABLED. Set to false to suppress every automatic scan\n(manual scans keep working). Env override: MCPPROXY_AUTO_BASELINE_SCAN,\nwhich wins over this field on every path.","type":"boolean"},"deep_scan":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/config.DeepScanConfig"},"integrity_check_interval":{"type":"string"},"integrity_check_on_restart":{"type":"boolean"},"runtime_read_only":{"type":"boolean"},"runtime_tmpfs_size":{"type":"string"},"scan_timeout_default":{"type":"string"},"scanner_disable_no_new_privileges":{"description":"Deprecated (Spec 077 US3): migrated on load into DeepScan.DisableNoNewPrivileges\n(see migrateDeepScanConfig). Retained only so existing configs that still carry\nthe top-level key parse; consumers MUST read the effective value via\nSecurityConfig.IsDisableNoNewPrivileges. Cleared after migration.\n\nScannerDisableNoNewPrivileges, when true, omits the\n` + "`" + `--security-opt no-new-privileges` + "`" + ` flag from scanner container runs.\n\nBackground: snap-installed Docker on Ubuntu confines dockerd under the\n` + "`" + `snap.docker.dockerd` + "`" + ` AppArmor profile. When runc tries to transition\nthe container into the inner ` + "`" + `docker-default` + "`" + ` profile to exec the\nentrypoint, AppArmor refuses the transition because NO_NEW_PRIVS\nforbids privilege/profile changes on exec — the result is EPERM\n(\"operation not permitted\") and every scanner fails immediately.\n\nSet this to true ONLY on hosts hitting that incompatibility. Scanner\ncontainers still run with read-only rootfs, tmpfs /tmp, no-network by\ndefault, and read-only source mounts, so the marginal isolation loss\nis small. The preferred fix remains replacing snap docker with a\ndistro-packaged docker.","type":"boolean"},"scanner_fetch_package_source":{"description":"Deprecated (Spec 077 US3): migrated on load into DeepScan.FetchPackageSource\n(see migrateDeepScanConfig). Retained only so existing configs that still carry\nthe top-level key parse; consumers MUST read the effective value via\nSecurityConfig.EffectiveFetchPackageSource. Cleared after migration.\n\nScannerFetchPackageSource controls whether the scanner fetches the\nPUBLISHED source of package-runner servers (npx/uvx) — without executing\nit — when no local source is available (no Docker container, no local\npackage cache, no working_dir). This is the primary quarantine/scan\ntarget: a quarantined-on-add server is never run locally, so without this\nthe scan degrades to tool-definitions-only (no real source-level\nanalysis). See MCP-2206.\n\nFetching uses ` + "`" + `npm pack --ignore-scripts` + "`" + ` (npm) and ` + "`" + `uv pip download` + "`" + ` /\n` + "`" + `pip download` + "`" + ` with ` + "`" + `--only-binary=:all:` + "`" + ` (Python), which only download +\nunpack archives and NEVER run install, build, or setup.py — a scanner must\nnot execute the untrusted code it is scanning. The Python\n` + "`" + `--only-binary=:all:` + "`" + ` flag is required because downloading an sdist would\ninvoke its build backend (setup.py); packages with no wheel fall back to\ntool-definitions-only instead. Extraction is hardened against path\ntraversal and decompression bombs.\n\nDefault (nil) is ENABLED. Set to false on air-gapped deployments to\nforbid the scanner's network egress; such servers then fall back to the\ntool-definitions-only scan with no regression.","type":"boolean"},"scanner_registry_url":{"type":"string"},"tpa_bundle_path":{"description":"TPABundlePath is the filesystem path to the tpa-db scanner-bundle.json\nthe offline TPA scanner runs (spec 086 FR-019: the signature-DB location\nMUST be configuration-driven, not hardcoded). Empty (the default) runs the\ncorpus embedded in this build.\n\nEnv override: MCPPROXY_TPA_BUNDLE_PATH. Hot-reloadable — the path is\nre-read on every config.reloaded event via\nscanner.Service.ApplySecurityConfig, so a corpus refresh needs no restart.\nA configured bundle that fails to read/parse/version-check/compile is\nREFUSED and the previously active corpus stays live (fail-closed, never\nfail-empty); the reason is logged and surfaced in the security overview's\nsignature_bundle.load_error.","type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"config.SensitiveDataDetectionConfig":{"description":"Sensitive data detection settings (Spec 026)","properties":{"categories":{"additionalProperties":{"type":"boolean"},"description":"Enable/disable specific detection categories","type":"object"},"custom_patterns":{"description":"User-defined detection patterns","items":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/config.CustomPattern"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"enabled":{"description":"Enable sensitive data detection (default: true)","type":"boolean"},"entropy_threshold":{"description":"Shannon entropy threshold for high-entropy detection (default: 4.5)","type":"number"},"max_payload_size_kb":{"description":"Max size to scan before truncating (default: 1024)","type":"integer"},"scan_requests":{"description":"Scan tool call arguments (default: true)","type":"boolean"},"scan_responses":{"description":"Scan tool responses (default: true)","type":"boolean"},"sensitive_keywords":{"description":"Keywords to flag","items":{"type":"string"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false}},"type":"object"},"config.ServerConfig":{"properties":{"args":{"items":{"type":"string"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"auto_approve_tool_changes":{"description":"AutoApproveToolChanges is the per-server intent to auto-approve tool\nchanges/additions (disabling per-server rug-pull protection). Supersedes\nskip_quarantine. MCP-2930 only ACCEPTS, persists, and migrates this flag — it\nis NOT yet consulted at runtime; auto-approval is still governed by\nSkipQuarantine until the trust-baseline behavior change (MCP-2931) migrates the\nruntime consumers onto it.\nTri-state pointer (mirrors QuarantineEnabled): nil = unset (inherit/migrate\nfrom legacy skip_quarantine), explicit true/false = honored as-is so an\nexplicit auto_approve_tool_changes:false overrides a legacy skip_quarantine:true.\nRead via IsAutoApproveToolChanges().","type":"boolean"},"command":{"type":"string"},"created":{"type":"string"},"disabled_tools":{"description":"Denylist: these tools are hidden; mutually exclusive with enabled_tools","items":{"type":"string"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"enabled":{"type":"boolean"},"enabled_tools":{"description":"Allowlist: only these tools are exposed; mutually exclusive with disabled_tools","items":{"type":"string"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"env":{"additionalProperties":{"type":"string"},"type":"object"},"expose_prompts":{"description":"ExposePrompts overrides whether this server's advertised MCP prompts are\naggregated into mcpproxy's prompts/list. nil (default) inherits the\ndefault-aggregate behavior (included if the server advertises\nCapabilities.Prompts); false excludes it regardless of capability.","type":"boolean"},"headers":{"additionalProperties":{"type":"string"},"description":"For HTTP servers","type":"object"},"health_check_interval":{"description":"Per-server discovery \u0026 health-check overrides (spec 074). Same *Duration\ntri-state as the global keys: nil = inherit the global value (or default),\npointer to 0s = disabled for this server, positive = that interval.\nHealthCheckInterval is fully wired into the per-server health loop;\nToolDiscoveryInterval is accepted/validated and round-trips for\nforward-compat, but the periodic index sweep is governed by the global\ncadence in this iteration (see spec 074 plan §C).","type":"string"},"init_timeout":{"description":"InitTimeout overrides the global init_timeout for this server's MCP\n` + "`" + `initialize` + "`" + ` handshake deadline (MCP-3322 / GH #760). *Duration tri-state:\nnil = inherit the global value (or 30s default), positive = that deadline.\nResolved by Config.ResolveInitTimeout; validated to {0} ∪ [1s, 30m]. Raise\nthis for upstreams that do legitimate first-run warmup (e.g. caching many\nchannels/users) before responding to ` + "`" + `initialize` + "`" + `.","type":"string"},"isolation":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/config.IsolationConfig"},"launcher_wait_timeout":{"description":"LauncherWaitTimeout caps how long mcpproxy will wait for a locally-launched\nHTTP/SSE upstream's URL to become reachable after Spawn(). Only consulted\nwhen the server is configured with both Command and an HTTP/SSE URL — i.e.,\nmcpproxy starts the process AND connects via network. Stdio servers ignore\nthis field. Zero or unset → 30s default.","type":"string"},"max_concurrent_requests":{"description":"Per-server concurrency overrides — scope (c) of FR-020 (spec 093, #955).\nTri-state per setting, exactly like HealthCheckInterval: absent = inherit\nthe per-server default set (server_concurrency_defaults), explicit 0 =\ndisable that setting for this server (0 max = no per-server limiter at\nall; 0 queue_size = no pending capacity, shed immediately at the cap),\npositive = override. The global aggregate limiter is never inherited from\nhere — it applies on top, so effective concurrency is min(per-server,\nglobal). Resolved by Config.ResolveServerConcurrency.","type":"integer"},"name":{"type":"string"},"oauth":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/config.OAuthConfig"},"protocol":{"description":"stdio, http, sse, streamable-http, auto","type":"string"},"quarantined":{"description":"Security quarantine status","type":"boolean"},"queue_size":{"type":"integer"},"queue_timeout":{"type":"string"},"reconnect_on_use":{"description":"Attempt reconnection when a tool call targets a disconnected server","type":"boolean"},"shared":{"description":"Server edition: shared with all users","type":"boolean"},"skip_quarantine":{"description":"SkipQuarantine is DEPRECATED (MCP-2930): use AutoApproveToolChanges instead.\nKept for back-compat parsing; on config load a legacy skip_quarantine:true is\nmigrated to auto_approve_tool_changes:true only when the new field is unset\n(see normalizeServerQuarantineFlags).","type":"boolean"},"source_registry_id":{"description":"SourceRegistryID records which registry this server was added from (empty\nfor manually-configured servers). MCP-866: surfaced in the approval /\nquarantine view so a reviewer can see a server's origin.","type":"string"},"source_registry_provenance":{"description":"SourceRegistryProvenance records the source registry's provenance at add\ntime (RegistryProvenanceOfficial / RegistryProvenanceCustom). It is purely\ninformational (MCP-1072) — surfaced so a reviewer can see a server's origin\n— and no longer gates quarantine or skip_quarantine.","type":"string"},"tool_discovery_interval":{"type":"string"},"toon_output":{"description":"ToonOutput overrides the global toon_output mode for this server's\ntools (spec 084, FR-001). Plain string, not a pointer: \"\"/absent =\ninherit the global value; \"off\"|\"adaptive\"|\"always\" = override (\"off\"\nis the explicit force-off). Resolved by Config.ResolveToonOutput.","type":"string"},"trust_mode":{"description":"TrustMode is the per-server trust tier: auto|scan|manual. Supersedes\nauto_approve_tool_changes (spec 086). An empty value is derived from the\nlegacy fields at load via normalizeServerQuarantineFlags; the single\nresolution point is EffectiveTrustMode(), which treats an empty or\nunrecognized value as manual (secure by default). Read via\nEffectiveTrustMode(), never the raw string.","type":"string"},"updated":{"type":"string"},"url":{"type":"string"},"working_dir":{"description":"Working directory for stdio servers","type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"config.TLSConfig":{"description":"TLS configuration","properties":{"certs_dir":{"description":"Directory for certificates","type":"string"},"enabled":{"description":"Enable HTTPS","type":"boolean"},"hsts":{"description":"Enable HTTP Strict Transport Security","type":"boolean"},"require_client_cert":{"description":"Enable mTLS","type":"boolean"}},"type":"object"},"config.TelemetryConfig":{"description":"Telemetry settings (Spec 036)","properties":{"anonymous_id":{"description":"Auto-generated UUIDv4","type":"string"},"anonymous_id_created_at":{"description":"Spec 042 (Tier 2) additions — all default-zero, all backwards-compatible.","type":"string"},"enabled":{"description":"Default: true (opt-out)","type":"boolean"},"endpoint":{"description":"Override for testing","type":"string"},"last_reported_version":{"description":"Upgrade funnel","type":"string"},"last_startup_outcome":{"description":"success|port_conflict|db_locked|...","type":"string"},"notice_shown":{"description":"First-run notice flag","type":"boolean"}},"type":"object"},"config.TokenizerConfig":{"description":"Tokenizer configuration for token counting","properties":{"default_model":{"description":"Default model for tokenization (e.g., \"gpt-4\")","type":"string"},"enabled":{"description":"Enable token counting","type":"boolean"},"encoding":{"description":"Default encoding (e.g., \"cl100k_base\")","type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"config.TracingExporterConfig":{"description":"Tracing gates the OpenTelemetry OTLP trace exporter (MCP-32). Disabled by\ndefault.","properties":{"enabled":{"description":"Enabled turns on OTLP trace export for tool calls and upstream hops.","type":"boolean"},"endpoint":{"description":"Endpoint is the collector address as host:port (no scheme), e.g.\n\"localhost:4318\" for http or \"localhost:4317\" for grpc.","type":"string"},"protocol":{"description":"Protocol selects the OTLP transport: \"http\" or \"grpc\".","type":"string"},"sample_rate":{"description":"SampleRate is the head-based trace sampling ratio in [0,1]. Default 0.1.\nOmit the key for the 0.1 default; set it to 0 to sample nothing.","type":"number"}},"type":"object"},"config.UpdateCheckConfig":{"description":"Update-check settings (Spec 079 FR-012): config-file control of the\nbackground upgrade-awareness checker (internal/updatecheck). nil =\nenabled on the stable channel (existing default behavior). The existing\nenvironment switches keep working and WIN over these keys (FR-014):\nMCPPROXY_DISABLE_AUTO_UPDATE=true force-disables even when\nenabled=true, and MCPPROXY_ALLOW_PRERELEASE_UPDATES=true force-selects\nthe rc channel even when channel=stable.","properties":{"channel":{"description":"Channel selects which releases are offered as updates: \"stable\"\n(default; prereleases never offered) or \"rc\" (prereleases included).\nEmpty resolves to stable. Validated in ValidateDetailed.\n\nNOTE: for a RELEASED build the running binary's own version is\nauthoritative and overrides this field — a stable build is never\noffered an RC (even with channel=rc), and an RC build always tracks the\nrc channel. This field only takes effect on dev/unstamped builds. See\ninternal/updatecheck.Checker.IncludePrereleases.","type":"string"},"enabled":{"description":"Enabled gates all update checking. Tri-state: nil/absent = enabled\n(default true, matching pre-079 behavior). When false, no network\ncheck is performed and no upgrade nudge appears on any surface\n(FR-015) — /api/v1/info omits the update object entirely.","type":"boolean"}},"type":"object"},"configimport.FailedServer":{"properties":{"details":{"type":"string"},"error":{"type":"string"},"name":{"type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"configimport.ImportSummary":{"properties":{"failed":{"type":"integer"},"imported":{"type":"integer"},"skipped":{"type":"integer"},"total":{"type":"integer"}},"type":"object"},"configimport.SkippedServer":{"properties":{"name":{"type":"string"},"reason":{"description":"\"already_exists\", \"filtered_out\", \"invalid_name\"","type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"connect.ConnectResult":{"description":"The full result; its action mirrors the top-level one","properties":{"action":{"description":"\"created\", \"updated\", \"already_exists\", \"removed\", \"not_found\"","type":"string"},"backup_path":{"type":"string"},"client":{"type":"string"},"config_path":{"type":"string"},"message":{"type":"string"},"server_name":{"type":"string"},"success":{"type":"boolean"}},"type":"object"},"contracts.APIResponse":{"allOf":[{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/data"}],"properties":{"data":{"type":"object"},"error":{"type":"string"},"request_id":{"type":"string"},"success":{"type":"boolean"}},"type":"object"},"contracts.ActivityDetailResponse":{"properties":{"activity":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ActivityRecord"}},"type":"object"},"contracts.ActivityListResponse":{"properties":{"activities":{"items":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ActivityRecord"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"limit":{"type":"integer"},"offset":{"type":"integer"},"total":{"type":"integer"}},"type":"object"},"contracts.ActivityRecord":{"properties":{"arguments":{"description":"Tool call arguments","type":"object"},"detection_types":{"description":"List of detection types found","items":{"type":"string"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"duration_ms":{"description":"Execution duration in milliseconds","type":"integer"},"error_message":{"description":"Error details if status is \"error\"","type":"string"},"has_sensitive_data":{"description":"Sensitive data detection fields (Spec 026)","type":"boolean"},"id":{"description":"Unique identifier (ULID format)","type":"string"},"max_severity":{"description":"Highest severity level detected (critical, high, medium, low)","type":"string"},"metadata":{"description":"Additional context-specific data","type":"object"},"parent_id":{"description":"Correlation id of the parent call (the code_execution whose sandbox issued this sub-call)","type":"string"},"request_bytes":{"description":"Byte sizes measured pre-truncation, mirroring storage.ActivityRecord\n(Spec 069 A1). They are the only cost signal a bodies-off export carries:\nwith payloads suppressed there is no text left to measure, so a consumer\naccounting for a record it cannot read has nothing else to go on. They are\nbyte LENGTHS, not token counts — the basis for an explicit estimate, never\na measured figure (spec 103, contracts/replay-input.md).\n\nZero means UNKNOWN, not free: legacy records predate the measurement and\ncode-execution sub-calls record both as zero. Hence omitempty — an absent\nkey tells a consumer to fall to exclusion accounting, whereas a present\nzero would read as a costless call and silently understate the workload.","type":"integer"},"request_id":{"description":"HTTP request ID for correlation","type":"string"},"response":{"description":"Tool response (potentially truncated)","type":"string"},"response_bytes":{"description":"Raw upstream response size in bytes before truncation","type":"integer"},"response_truncated":{"description":"True if response was truncated","type":"boolean"},"server_name":{"description":"Name of upstream MCP server","type":"string"},"session_id":{"description":"MCP transport session ID (regenerated on every reconnect)","type":"string"},"source":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ActivitySource"},"status":{"description":"Result status: \"success\", \"error\", \"blocked\", \"rejected\"","type":"string"},"timestamp":{"description":"When activity occurred","type":"string"},"tool_name":{"description":"Name of tool called","type":"string"},"type":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ActivityType"},"work_session_id":{"description":"Spec 082: one client, one project, across reconnects","type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"contracts.ActivitySource":{"description":"How activity was triggered: \"mcp\", \"cli\", \"api\"","type":"string","x-enum-varnames":["ActivitySourceMCP","ActivitySourceCLI","ActivitySourceAPI"]},"contracts.ActivitySummaryResponse":{"properties":{"blocked_count":{"description":"Count of blocked activities","type":"integer"},"call_count":{"description":"CallCount is how many of those records are CALLS THE USER MADE, as\ndefined once in storage.CountsAsCall and shared with the usage aggregate\nbehind the Usage tab (audit finding F1, #1046). TotalCount answers \"how\nmany rows does the Activity Log have\"; CallCount answers \"how many calls\nwere there\". They are different questions — quarantine auto-approvals,\nsystem start, security scans and management chatter are events, not calls\n— and printing either one under the other's label is how the same instance\ncame to report 51 calls on one screen and 19 on another.","type":"integer"},"call_error_count":{"description":"CallErrorCount is the failures within CallCount, so an error RATE computed\nfrom this response has one denominator. It is not ErrorCount: a policy\nblock is a failed call but carries status \"blocked\", and a shed call is an\nerror in neither sense because it never ran.","type":"integer"},"end_time":{"description":"End of the period (RFC3339)","type":"string"},"error_count":{"description":"Count of error activities","type":"integer"},"other_count":{"description":"OtherCount is every record whose status is outside the four-value\nvocabulary above, so that\n\n\tsuccess + error + blocked + rejected + other == total\n\nholds by construction. The status field is a CLOSED vocabulary for tool\ncalls, but the activity log is wider than tool calls: a quarantine change\nstores its ACTION there (\"approved\", \"auto_approved\"), a policy decision\nstores its DECISION (\"allow\"). Those rows were counted in the total and in\nnone of the four buckets, so the Activity Log's own status tiles summed to\nless than the denominator printed beside them — 15+4+0+0 under a \"42\"\n(audit finding F2, #1046). The residual now has a name and a tile.","type":"integer"},"period":{"description":"Time period (1h, 24h, 7d, 30d)","type":"string"},"rejected_count":{"description":"RejectedCount is the number of calls shed by a concurrency limiter before\nthey reached an upstream (spec 093). 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The effective\nconcurrency for a server is additionally bounded by the global aggregate\nlimiter, which is NOT an inheritance source for these fields.","type":"integer"},"name":{"type":"string"},"oauth":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.OAuthConfig"},"oauth_status":{"description":"OAuth status: \"authenticated\", \"expired\", \"error\", \"none\"","type":"string"},"protocol":{"type":"string"},"quarantine":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.QuarantineStats"},"quarantined":{"type":"boolean"},"queue_size":{"type":"integer"},"queue_timeout":{"type":"string"},"reconnect_count":{"type":"integer"},"reconnect_on_use":{"description":"Attempt reconnection when a tool call targets this disconnected server","type":"boolean"},"retry_count":{"type":"integer"},"retry_stopped":{"description":"RetryStopped reports that automatic reconnection has been given up for\ngood because the failure is deterministic and unrecoverable — a missing\nbinary, an image without the interpreter, an unparseable config (GH\n#1145). It is NOT ordinary exponential backoff, which keeps retrying;\nnothing will happen until the user fixes the config or restarts the\nserver. RetryStoppedCode is the stable MCPX_* code that proved it and\nRetryStoppedReason the catalog message explaining how to fix it. All three\nare omitted for servers that are healthy or still retrying.","type":"boolean"},"retry_stopped_code":{"type":"string"},"retry_stopped_reason":{"type":"string"},"security_scan":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.SecurityScanSummary"},"should_retry":{"type":"boolean"},"source_registry_id":{"description":"MCP-901 — registry provenance of an upstream that was added from a\nregistry. SourceRegistryID names the source registry (empty for\nmanually-configured servers); SourceRegistryProvenance is the trust tag\nrecorded at add time (\"official/trusted\" or \"custom/unverified\"). Both\nare projected from config.ServerConfig so the approval/quarantine view\ncan render an \"added from \u003cregistry\u003e · unverified\" origin badge. Optional\nand omitted when empty — clients that pre-date this treat them as absent.","type":"string"},"source_registry_provenance":{"type":"string"},"status":{"type":"string"},"token_expires_at":{"description":"When the OAuth token expires (ISO 8601)","type":"string"},"tool_count":{"type":"integer"},"tool_list_token_size":{"description":"Token size for this server's tools","type":"integer"},"trust_mode":{"description":"TrustMode mirrors config.ServerConfig.TrustMode (spec 086): the per-server\ntrust tier (\"auto\"/\"scan\"/\"manual\"). Surfaced on the GET path so clients can\nread back the persisted mode; PATCH/POST accept it via AddServerRequest.\nOmitted when empty (server predates the field / relies on legacy flags).","type":"string"},"updated":{"type":"string"},"url":{"type":"string"},"user_logged_out":{"description":"True if user explicitly logged out (prevents auto-reconnection)","type":"boolean"},"working_dir":{"type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"contracts.ServerActionResponse":{"properties":{"action":{"type":"string"},"async":{"type":"boolean"},"server":{"type":"string"},"success":{"type":"boolean"}},"type":"object"},"contracts.ServerStats":{"properties":{"connected_servers":{"type":"integer"},"docker_containers":{"type":"integer"},"quarantined_servers":{"type":"integer"},"token_metrics":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ServerTokenMetrics"},"total_servers":{"type":"integer"},"total_tools":{"type":"integer"}},"type":"object"},"contracts.ServerTokenMetrics":{"properties":{"average_query_result_size":{"description":"Typical retrieve_tools output (tokens)","type":"integer"},"per_server_tool_list_sizes":{"additionalProperties":{"type":"integer"},"description":"Token size per server","type":"object"},"saved_tokens":{"description":"Difference","type":"integer"},"saved_tokens_percentage":{"description":"Percentage saved","type":"number"},"total_server_tool_list_size":{"description":"All upstream tools combined (tokens)","type":"integer"}},"type":"object"},"contracts.SuccessResponse":{"properties":{"data":{"type":"object"},"success":{"type":"boolean"}},"type":"object"},"contracts.TokenMetrics":{"description":"Token usage metrics (nil for older records)","properties":{"encoding":{"description":"Encoding used (e.g., cl100k_base)","type":"string"},"estimated_cost":{"description":"Optional cost estimate","type":"number"},"input_tokens":{"description":"Tokens in the request","type":"integer"},"model":{"description":"Model used for tokenization","type":"string"},"output_tokens":{"description":"Tokens in the response","type":"integer"},"total_tokens":{"description":"Total tokens (input + output)","type":"integer"},"truncated_tokens":{"description":"Tokens removed by truncation","type":"integer"},"was_truncated":{"description":"Whether response was truncated","type":"boolean"}},"type":"object"},"contracts.Tool":{"properties":{"annotations":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ToolAnnotation"},"approval_status":{"type":"string"},"config_denied":{"description":"ConfigDenied is true when the tool is denied by the server's static\nenabled_tools / disabled_tools config. The user cannot override this toggle.","type":"boolean"},"description":{"type":"string"},"disabled":{"description":"Disabled mirrors ToolApprovalRecord.Disabled so per-tool enable state is\navailable without a second round-trip to the approvals endpoint. Absent\nin the JSON when false (default) to keep responses compact.","type":"boolean"},"hash":{"description":"Hash is the tool's current stored hash rendered in the preflight pin\nformat \"sha256/v{N}:{hex}\" (Spec 098 FR-011), where N is the approval\nrecord's HashSchemaVersion. It is the authoring surface for\n` + "`" + `POST /api/v1/preflight` + "`" + ` pins and ` + "`" + `mcpproxy tools preflight --pin` + "`" + `:\ncopy the value straight into a pin.\n\nDisclosure is OPERATOR TIER ONLY — same rule as the preflight per-tool\nresult. The field is omitted for agent-token callers and for tools with\nno stored hash (no approval record yet, or a record written before\nhashes existed).","type":"string"},"held_reason":{"description":"HeldReason, HeldVerdict and HeldSignals mirror the same-named fields on\nstorage.ToolApprovalRecord: the offline-scan evidence that made\ntrust_mode: scan hold this tool for review (spec 086 FR-018). HeldSignals\nnames the matched deterministic check ids, e.g.\n\"tpa.TPA-2026-0001.hidden_instruction\", so a reviewer can see WHY the tool\nis held. All three are omitted for tools that are not held by the scan gate\n(including every record written before the field existed).","type":"string"},"held_signals":{"items":{"type":"string"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"held_verdict":{"type":"string"},"last_used":{"type":"string"},"name":{"type":"string"},"schema":{"type":"object"},"server_name":{"type":"string"},"usage":{"type":"integer"}},"type":"object"},"contracts.ToolAnnotation":{"description":"Tool behavior hints snapshot","properties":{"destructiveHint":{"type":"boolean"},"idempotentHint":{"type":"boolean"},"openWorldHint":{"type":"boolean"},"readOnlyHint":{"type":"boolean"},"title":{"type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"contracts.ToolCallRecord":{"description":"The new tool call record","properties":{"annotations":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ToolAnnotation"},"arguments":{"description":"Tool arguments","type":"object"},"arguments_truncated":{"description":"ArgumentsTruncated marks Arguments as a placeholder rather than the\narguments the tool was called with. Replaying such a record without\nsupplying arguments explicitly is refused.","type":"boolean"},"config_path":{"description":"Active config file path","type":"string"},"duration":{"description":"Duration in nanoseconds","type":"integer"},"error":{"description":"Error message (failure only)","type":"string"},"execution_type":{"description":"\"direct\" or \"code_execution\"","type":"string"},"id":{"description":"Unique identifier","type":"string"},"mcp_client_name":{"description":"MCP client name from InitializeRequest","type":"string"},"mcp_client_version":{"description":"MCP client version","type":"string"},"mcp_session_id":{"description":"MCP session identifier","type":"string"},"metrics":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.TokenMetrics"},"parent_call_id":{"description":"Links nested calls to parent code_execution","type":"string"},"request_id":{"description":"Request correlation ID","type":"string"},"response":{"description":"Tool response (success only)","type":"object"},"response_bytes":{"description":"Marshalled response size before truncation","type":"integer"},"response_truncated":{"description":"ResponseTruncated and ResponseBytes describe a STORAGE-side cut (#1176):\nthe caller received the response whole, and only the persisted copy was\nshortened to tool_call_max_response_size. When ResponseTruncated is true\nthe Response object carries {truncated, original_bytes, preview, note}\ninstead of the upstream result, and ResponseBytes is its size before the\ncut.","type":"boolean"},"server_id":{"description":"Server identity hash","type":"string"},"server_name":{"description":"Human-readable server name","type":"string"},"timestamp":{"description":"When the call was made","type":"string"},"tool_name":{"description":"Tool name (without server prefix)","type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"contracts.UpdateInfo":{"description":"Update information (if available)","properties":{"available":{"description":"Whether an update is available","type":"boolean"},"behind_summary":{"description":"Spec 079 FR-002 — how far behind the running build is. All four are\nadditive (FR-021) and absent when the delta could not be resolved, in\nwhich case every surface renders its pre-delta wording.","type":"string"},"check_error":{"description":"Error message if update check failed","type":"string"},"checked_at":{"description":"When the update check was performed","type":"string"},"install_channel":{"description":"Detected install channel (homebrew, dmg, deb, rpm, docker, go-install, windows-installer, tarball, unknown) — Spec 079 FR-008","type":"string"},"is_prerelease":{"description":"Whether the latest version is a prerelease","type":"boolean"},"latest_version":{"description":"Latest version available (e.g., \"v1.2.3\")","type":"string"},"nudges_suppressed":{"description":"UI surfaces must stay quiet (CI / non-interactive context); machine-readable fields still report the facts — Spec 079 FR-019","type":"boolean"},"release_url":{"description":"URL to the release page","type":"string"},"releases_behind":{"description":"Releases on the offered channel between the running and offered versions","type":"integer"},"releases_behind_saturated":{"description":"ReleasesBehind is a lower bound: the running build predates the scanned release window","type":"boolean"},"update_command":{"description":"One-line update command for the channel; only set when an update is available and the channel has one — Spec 079 FR-009","type":"string"},"weeks_behind":{"description":"Whole weeks between the two releases' publish dates; 0 is a real value, absent means unknown","type":"integer"}},"type":"object"},"contracts.UpdatePolicy":{"description":"UpdatePolicy is the effective, hot-reloadable update policy (Spec 092\nFR-015). Always present: the ` + "`" + `update` + "`" + ` object above is omitted both when\nupdate checking is disabled AND when no check has produced a result\nyet, so its absence cannot tell a client whether it is allowed to run\nits own (e.g. Sparkle feed) check. This field states the answer.","properties":{"channel":{"description":"Channel is the tracked release channel: \"stable\" or \"rc\".","type":"string"},"enabled":{"description":"Enabled is the effective automatic-check kill switch: update_check.enabled\nwith MCPPROXY_DISABLE_AUTO_UPDATE=true winning over it. A user-initiated\n\"Check for Updates\" stays available regardless.","type":"boolean"},"nudges_suppressed":{"description":"NudgesSuppressed asks UI surfaces to stay quiet (CI / non-interactive)\nwhile machine-readable fields keep reporting the facts.","type":"boolean"}},"type":"object"},"contracts.UpstreamError":{"properties":{"error_message":{"type":"string"},"server_name":{"type":"string"},"timestamp":{"type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"contracts.UsageAggregateResponse":{"properties":{"freshness_ms":{"description":"age of the underlying snapshot in ms","type":"integer"},"generated_at":{"type":"string"},"other":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.UsageOtherBucket"},"timeline":{"items":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.UsageTimeBucket"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"token_source":{"description":"\"bytes\" (size-based proxy, FR-006)","type":"string"},"tokens_saved":{"description":"echoed from ServerTokenMetrics (FR-007)","type":"integer"},"tokens_saved_percentage":{"type":"number"},"tools":{"items":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.UsageToolStat"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"total_calls":{"description":"TotalCalls and TotalErrors are the headline counts for the window: the sum\nof the timeline this same response carries, so the tiles and the histogram\nunder them cannot disagree. They are NOT the sum of Tools — that list is\nlifetime-cumulative, upstream-only and truncated to top-N, and summing it\nclient-side is what made the Usage tab print a third number for the same\n24 hours (audit finding F1, #1046). The population is\nstorage.CountsAsCall, shared with ActivitySummaryResponse.CallCount.\n\nTwo bounds on how exactly this matches the Activity Log's own count.\nBoth are bounded and disclosed, unlike the population mismatch they\nreplace, which was unbounded and silent:\n\n  - Window granularity is the timeline's: whole hour buckets, so the span\n    is the requested window rounded up to a bucket edge.\n  - This response is served from a snapshot behind a short read cache\n    (observability.usage_cache_ttl, 5s by default) so the endpoint never\n    scans the activity log per request, while the summary endpoint counts\n    live. Calls that land inside that window appear on the Activity Log\n    first. FreshnessMs and GeneratedAt say how old the figures are, and\n    the Usage tab prints it (\"Updated 3s ago\").","type":"integer"},"total_errors":{"type":"integer"},"window":{"type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"contracts.UsageOtherBucket":{"description":"present only when the list was truncated to top-N","properties":{"calls":{"type":"integer"},"tools_folded":{"type":"integer"},"total_resp_bytes":{"type":"integer"}},"type":"object"},"contracts.UsageTimeBucket":{"properties":{"calls":{"type":"integer"},"errors":{"type":"integer"},"start":{"type":"string"},"total_resp_bytes":{"type":"integer"}},"type":"object"},"contracts.UsageToolStat":{"properties":{"avg_req_bytes":{"description":"null when no sized request calls","type":"integer"},"avg_resp_bytes":{"description":"null when sized_calls == 0 (only legacy 0-byte calls)","type":"integer"},"blocked":{"type":"integer"},"calls":{"type":"integer"},"error_rate":{"type":"number"},"errors":{"type":"integer"},"last_used":{"type":"string"},"p50_exceeds":{"type":"boolean"},"p50_ms":{"description":"P50Ms and P95Ms are read off a fixed latency histogram, so they are BUCKET\nBOUNDS, not measured durations: the true percentile is at or below the\nvalue, and a client must render it as a bound (\"≤ 5 ms\"). P50Exceeds /\nP95Exceeds flip that reading for the unbounded overflow bucket, where the\nvalue is the last bound and the truth is above it (\"\u003e 10 s\").","type":"integer"},"p95_exceeds":{"type":"boolean"},"p95_ms":{"type":"integer"},"rejected":{"description":"spec 093: shed by a concurrency limit; never executed, so excluded from calls/latency","type":"integer"},"server":{"type":"string"},"sized_calls":{"description":"calls with known response size (basis for avg_resp_bytes)","type":"integer"},"tool":{"type":"string"},"total_req_bytes":{"type":"integer"},"total_resp_bytes":{"type":"integer"}},"type":"object"},"contracts.ValidateConfigResponse":{"properties":{"errors":{"items":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ValidationError"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"valid":{"type":"boolean"}},"type":"object"},"contracts.ValidationError":{"properties":{"field":{"type":"string"},"message":{"type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"data":{"properties":{"data":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.InfoResponse"}},"type":"object"},"httpapi.AddServerRequest":{"properties":{"args":{"items":{"type":"string"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"auto_approve_tool_changes":{"description":"AutoApproveToolChanges is the per-server intent to auto-approve\nnew/changed tools past the trust baseline (MCP-2930). Tri-state *bool:\na nil pointer means \"leave unchanged\" on PATCH; a present value\n(including false) is applied. Mirrors config.ServerConfig's *bool\nsemantics — do NOT collapse to a plain bool, or an omitted field would\nsilently reset a previously-set value.","type":"boolean"},"command":{"type":"string"},"enabled":{"type":"boolean"},"env":{"additionalProperties":{"type":"string"},"type":"object"},"expose_prompts":{"description":"ExposePrompts is the per-server override for prompt aggregation (F9):\nwhether this server's advertised MCP prompts are merged into mcpproxy's\nprompts/list. Tri-state *bool mirroring config.ServerConfig.ExposePrompts —\na nil pointer means \"leave unchanged\" on PATCH (and \"inherit the default\naggregate behavior\" on create); a present value (including false) is applied.","type":"boolean"},"headers":{"additionalProperties":{"type":"string"},"type":"object"},"init_timeout":{"description":"InitTimeout is the per-server MCP ` + "`" + `initialize` + "`" + ` handshake deadline override\n(MCP-3322 / GH #760), serialized as a duration string (e.g. \"120s\"). A nil\npointer means \"leave unchanged\" on PATCH; a present value is applied.\nMirrors config.ServerConfig.InitTimeout's *Duration tri-state.","type":"string"},"isolation":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/httpapi.IsolationRequest"},"max_concurrent_requests":{"description":"MaxConcurrentRequests / QueueSize / QueueTimeout are the per-server\nconcurrency overrides (spec 093 / GH #955, FR-020 scope (c)). Each is\ntri-state: a nil pointer means \"leave unchanged\" on PATCH and \"inherit\nserver_concurrency_defaults\" on create; an explicit 0 disables that\nsetting for this server; a positive value overrides it. Do NOT collapse\nthem to plain values — an omitted field would then silently reset a\nconfigured limit.","type":"integer"},"name":{"type":"string"},"protocol":{"type":"string"},"quarantined":{"type":"boolean"},"queue_size":{"type":"integer"},"queue_timeout":{"type":"string"},"reconnect_on_use":{"type":"boolean"},"trust_mode":{"description":"TrustMode is the per-server trust tier (spec 086): \"auto\", \"scan\", or\n\"manual\". Empty means \"leave unchanged\" on PATCH (and inherit the migrated\ndefault on create). A non-empty value is applied to ServerConfig.TrustMode\nand resolved by EffectiveTrustMode (an unrecognized value fails closed to\nmanual). This is the REST seam for changing the trust tier via\nPOST/PATCH /api/v1/servers.","type":"string"},"url":{"type":"string"},"working_dir":{"type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"httpapi.CanonicalConfigPath":{"properties":{"description":{"description":"Brief description","type":"string"},"exists":{"description":"Whether the file exists","type":"boolean"},"format":{"description":"Format identifier (e.g., \"claude_desktop\")","type":"string"},"name":{"description":"Display name (e.g., \"Claude Desktop\")","type":"string"},"os":{"description":"Operating system (darwin, windows, linux)","type":"string"},"path":{"description":"Full path to the config file","type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"httpapi.CanonicalConfigPathsResponse":{"properties":{"os":{"description":"Current operating system","type":"string"},"paths":{"description":"List of canonical config paths","items":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/httpapi.CanonicalConfigPath"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false}},"type":"object"},"httpapi.ConnectConflictResponse":{"properties":{"action":{"description":"already_exists | precondition_failed","type":"string"},"data":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/connect.ConnectResult"},"error":{"description":"Human-readable message","type":"string"},"success":{"description":"Always false","type":"boolean"}},"type":"object"},"httpapi.ConnectRequest":{"properties":{"force":{"description":"Overwrite existing entry","type":"boolean"},"precondition_token":{"description":"PreconditionToken is the opaque token from the preview this write was\nconfirmed against (Spec 091 FR-005). When present, the core rechecks it\nat write time and responds 409 with action \"precondition_failed\" —\nwriting nothing — if the config or the entry MCPProxy would write has\ndrifted since; the caller then re-previews instead of retrying. Absent\nmeans exactly the pre-091 behavior. A replace-classified flow sends this\nTOGETHER with force=true: the token, not the absence of force, is the\noverwrite safety.","type":"string"},"server_name":{"description":"Defaults to \"mcpproxy\"","type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"httpapi.ImportFromPathRequest":{"properties":{"format":{"description":"Optional format hint","type":"string"},"path":{"description":"File path to import from","type":"string"},"rename":{"additionalProperties":{"type":"string"},"description":"Rename maps a server name → new name. Applied after parsing so the\ncaller can disambiguate cross-source name collisions (Spec 046 v2 —\ne.g. \"mcpproxy\" → \"mcpproxy_claude_code\"). Keys are matched against\neither the raw source name (OriginalName) or the sanitized name shown\nin the preview (Server.Name); these differ for names that need\nsanitizing (e.g. \"Figma Desktop\" → \"Figma_Desktop\"). Keys not present\nin the imported set are ignored.","type":"object"},"server_names":{"description":"Optional: import only these servers","items":{"type":"string"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false}},"type":"object"},"httpapi.ImportRequest":{"properties":{"content":{"description":"Raw JSON or TOML content","type":"string"},"format":{"description":"Optional format hint","type":"string"},"server_names":{"description":"Optional: import only these servers","items":{"type":"string"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false}},"type":"object"},"httpapi.ImportResponse":{"properties":{"failed":{"items":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/configimport.FailedServer"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"format":{"type":"string"},"format_name":{"type":"string"},"imported":{"items":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/httpapi.ImportedServerResponse"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"skipped":{"items":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/configimport.SkippedServer"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"summary":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/configimport.ImportSummary"},"warnings":{"items":{"type":"string"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false}},"type":"object"},"httpapi.ImportedServerResponse":{"properties":{"args":{"items":{"type":"string"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"command":{"type":"string"},"fields_skipped":{"items":{"type":"string"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"name":{"type":"string"},"original_name":{"type":"string"},"protocol":{"type":"string"},"source_format":{"type":"string"},"url":{"type":"string"},"warnings":{"items":{"type":"string"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false}},"type":"object"},"httpapi.IsolationRequest":{"description":"Isolation carries per-server Docker isolation overrides (enabled,\nmode_override, image, network_mode, extra_args, working_dir). A nil\npointer means \"do not touch isolation config\". A present object is\napplied field-by-field ON TOP of the persisted overrides, so omitting a\nfield leaves it alone; clear an individual override by sending it\nexplicitly (` + "`" + `\"enabled\": null` + "`" + `, ` + "`" + `\"image\": \"\"` + "`" + `).","properties":{"enabled":{"description":"Enabled exists ONLY to detect and reject an echoed-back read. It is the\neffective state on the read surface and is never writable; see validate().","type":"boolean"},"enabled_override":{"description":"EnabledOverride is the tri-state per-server override — the RAW value, the\nsame one reads return as ` + "`" + `enabled_override` + "`" + `. It has THREE meaningful wire\nstates, and collapsing them is what silently un-isolated servers\n(GH #1142):\n  - absent          → leave the persisted override untouched\n  - null            → clear the override, back to inheriting the global\n  - true / false    → set an explicit opt-in / opt-out","type":"boolean"},"extra_args":{"items":{"type":"string"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"image":{"type":"string"},"mode_override":{"description":"ModeOverride sets ` + "`" + `isolation.mode` + "`" + ` (\"docker\" | \"sandbox\" | \"none\").\nnil leaves the persisted value alone; an empty string clears it. An\nunrecognized value is rejected with a 400 rather than persisted.","type":"string"},"network_mode":{"type":"string"},"working_dir":{"type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"httpapi.OnboardingMarkRequest":{"properties":{"connect_step_status":{"description":"ConnectStepStatus is one of: \"\", \"completed\", \"skipped\". Empty\npreserves the existing value. The stored enum is wider (Spec 080\nFR-001): a \"skipped\" request for a previously untouched connect step\nis upgraded server-side to \"completed_external\" when the install\nshows positive evidence of an external connection (Spec 080 FR-002).\n\"completed_external\" is NOT accepted from clients — it must never be\npersisted without that server-verified evidence (edge case: \"never\nguess completed_external without positive evidence\").","type":"string"},"engaged":{"description":"Engaged marks the wizard as engaged (completed or explicitly skipped).\nOnce true, the wizard does not auto-show again.","type":"boolean"},"mark_shown":{"description":"MarkShown records the wizard's first display time if not already set.","type":"boolean"},"server_step_status":{"description":"ServerStepStatus is one of: \"\", \"completed\", \"skipped\". Empty\npreserves the existing value.","type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"httpapi.SetActiveProfileRequest":{"properties":{"active_profile":{"type":"string"},"profile":{"type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"httpapi.UndoConnectRequest":{"properties":{"backup_name":{"description":"BackupName is the bare filename (filepath.Base) of the backup returned as\nbackup_path by the preceding connect — a name, never a path. Undo resolves\nthe full path server-side by joining it with the client's own config\ndirectory, so a client-supplied value can never contribute a directory\ncomponent (traversal is impossible by construction). Empty means the\nconnect created the file (no prior file existed), so undo removes it.","type":"string"},"server_name":{"description":"Defaults to \"mcpproxy\"","type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"httpapi.UpdateFailureRequest":{"properties":{"stage":{"description":"Stage is the failure stage of the update session.","enum":["appcast","download","install","other"],"type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"management.BulkOperationResult":{"properties":{"errors":{"additionalProperties":{"type":"string"},"description":"Map of server name to error message","type":"object"},"failed":{"description":"Number of failed operations","type":"integer"},"successful":{"description":"Number of successful operations","type":"integer"},"total":{"description":"Total servers processed","type":"integer"}},"type":"object"},"observability.HealthResponse":{"properties":{"components":{"items":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/observability.HealthStatus"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"status":{"description":"\"healthy\" or \"unhealthy\"","type":"string"},"timestamp":{"type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"observability.HealthStatus":{"properties":{"error":{"type":"string"},"latency":{"type":"string"},"name":{"type":"string"},"status":{"description":"\"healthy\" or \"unhealthy\"","type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"observability.ReadinessResponse":{"properties":{"components":{"items":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/observability.HealthStatus"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"status":{"description":"\"ready\" or \"not_ready\"","type":"string"},"timestamp":{"type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"secureenv.EnvConfig":{"description":"Environment configuration for secure variable filtering","properties":{"allowed_system_vars":{"items":{"type":"string"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"custom_vars":{"additionalProperties":{"type":"string"},"type":"object"},"enhance_path":{"description":"Enable PATH enhancement for Launchd scenarios","type":"boolean"},"forward_proxy_env":{"description":"ForwardProxyEnv opts in to forwarding the ambient HTTP(S)/ALL/NO/FTP proxy\nenvironment variables to spawned upstream servers (MCP-2769). It is OFF by\ndefault and deliberately kept out of the AllowedSystemVars default list:\nproxy URLs frequently carry credentials (http://user:pass@proxy), so\nforwarding them to every stdio upstream is a credential-leak risk. When\nenabled, values are forwarded with their userinfo (credentials) redacted.","type":"boolean"},"inherit_system_safe":{"type":"boolean"}},"type":"object"},"telemetry.FeedbackContext":{"properties":{"arch":{"type":"string"},"connected_server_count":{"type":"integer"},"edition":{"type":"string"},"os":{"type":"string"},"routing_mode":{"type":"string"},"server_count":{"type":"integer"},"version":{"type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"telemetry.FeedbackRequest":{"properties":{"category":{"description":"bug, feature, other","type":"string"},"context":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/telemetry.FeedbackContext"},"email":{"type":"string"},"message":{"type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"telemetry.FeedbackResponse":{"properties":{"error":{"type":"string"},"issue_url":{"type":"string"},"success":{"type":"boolean"}},"type":"object"}},"securitySchemes":{"ApiKeyAuth":{"description":"API key authentication via query parameter. Use ?apikey=your-key","in":"query","name":"apikey","type":"apiKey"}}},
+    "components": {"schemas":{"config.AuditLogConfig":{"description":"AuditLog configures the Spec 107 edition-neutral audit sink\n(internal/audit). nil means \"use the per-edition/per-transport\ndefault\" (EffectiveAuditLog); restart-pinned (bound at sink\nconstruction). See audit_log.go.","properties":{"compress":{"type":"boolean"},"enabled":{"type":"boolean"},"max_age_days":{"type":"integer"},"max_backups":{"type":"integer"},"max_size_mb":{"type":"integer"},"path":{"type":"string"},"stdout":{"type":"boolean"}},"type":"object"},"config.ConcurrencyDefaults":{"description":"ServerConcurrencyDefaults is scope (b) of FR-020: the blanket per-server\ndefault set inherited by every server that does not override a setting.\nAbsent (the default) = no per-server limiting unless a server configures\nit explicitly. File/API-configured only — no env scheme (FR-022).","properties":{"max_concurrent_requests":{"type":"integer"},"queue_size":{"type":"integer"},"queue_timeout":{"type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"config.Config":{"properties":{"activity_cleanup_interval_min":{"description":"Background cleanup interval in minutes (default: 60)","type":"integer"},"activity_max_records":{"description":"Max records before pruning (default: 100000)","type":"integer"},"activity_max_response_size":{"description":"Response truncation limit in bytes (default: 65536)","type":"integer"},"activity_max_size_mb":{"description":"ActivityMaxSizeMB caps the total activity-log size in MB before the\noldest records are pruned. Omit the key for the 256MB default; set it to\n0 to disable the size cap.","type":"integer"},"activity_retention_days":{"description":"Activity logging settings (RFC-003)","type":"integer"},"aggregate_upstream_prompts":{"description":"AggregateUpstreamPrompts, when true, aggregates every connected upstream\nserver's advertised MCP prompts into mcpproxy's own prompts/list\n(exposed as \"\u003cserver\u003e__\u003cprompt\u003e\"). OFF by default: users are safe by\ndefault and opt in deliberately. EnablePrompts still governs the built-in\nprompts + the prompts capability; this flag gates ONLY the upstream\naggregation performed by RefreshPrompts. Hot-reloadable.","type":"boolean"},"allow_private_registry_fetch":{"description":"AllowPrivateRegistryFetch opts out of the registry SSRF guard (MCP-1076,\nCWE-918). By default (false) registry fetches refuse any host that is — or\nresolves to — a non-routable address (loopback, RFC1918/CGNAT private,\nlink-local incl. the 169.254.169.254 cloud-metadata endpoint), so a\nmalicious or typo'd registry source cannot turn the daemon into a\nrequest-forgery vector against internal services.\n\nThis opt-out is BLANKET (all-or-nothing): setting it true disables the\nguard for EVERY non-routable range at once — loopback, RFC1918/CGNAT\nprivate, link-local AND the 169.254.169.254 cloud-metadata endpoint. There\nis no way to allow only loopback; enabling it for a localhost dev registry\nalso re-opens the cloud-metadata SSRF vector. Set true ONLY when you\nintentionally run a trusted registry mirror on an internal/private address,\nideally on a host with no cloud-metadata exposure. The change takes effect\nonly on daemon (re)start or config reload.","type":"boolean"},"allow_server_add":{"type":"boolean"},"allow_server_remove":{"type":"boolean"},"api_key":{"description":"Security settings","type":"string"},"audit_log":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/config.AuditLogConfig"},"call_tool_timeout":{"type":"string"},"check_server_repo":{"description":"Repository detection settings","type":"boolean"},"code_execution_max_parallel":{"description":"Default concurrency for call_tools() batches (1-32, default: 8)","type":"integer"},"code_execution_max_tool_calls":{"description":"Max tool calls per execution (0 = unlimited, default: 0)","type":"integer"},"code_execution_pool_size":{"description":"JavaScript runtime pool size (default: 10)","type":"integer"},"code_execution_timeout_ms":{"description":"Timeout in milliseconds (default: 120000, max: 600000)","type":"integer"},"data_dir":{"type":"string"},"debug_search":{"type":"boolean"},"direct_tool_response_mode":{"description":"DirectToolResponseMode selects the serialization of the DIRECT\nenumeration surface (Spec 102). Valid values: \"\" (= full), \"full\"\n(default: today's schema-bearing entries), \"deferred\" (description +\ncompact signature, with a minimal permissive input schema; upstream\ninputSchema and outputSchema are stripped and recovered on demand via\ndescribe_tool).\n\nDeliberately NOT an extension of tool_response_mode: reusing that axis\nwould silently change /mcp/all output for every deployment already\nrunning compact, which FR-015 forbids. Serialization-only — it never\nchanges WHICH tools are listed, only how (FR-008). Hot-reloadable.","type":"string"},"disable_management":{"type":"boolean"},"docker_isolation":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/config.DockerIsolationConfig"},"docker_recovery":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/config.DockerRecoveryConfig"},"enable_code_execution":{"description":"Code execution settings","type":"boolean"},"enable_prompts":{"description":"Prompts settings","type":"boolean"},"enable_socket":{"description":"Enable Unix socket/named pipe for local IPC (default: true)","type":"boolean"},"enable_tray":{"description":"Deprecated: EnableTray is unused and has no runtime effect. Kept for backward compatibility.","type":"boolean"},"environment":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/secureenv.EnvConfig"},"features":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/config.FeatureFlags"},"forward_proxy_env":{"description":"ForwardProxyEnv opts in to forwarding the ambient HTTP(S)/ALL/NO/FTP proxy\nenvironment variables to spawned stdio upstream servers (MCP-2769). OFF by\ndefault: proxy URLs commonly embed credentials (http://user:pass@proxy), so\nforwarding them to every upstream is a credential-leak risk. When enabled,\nvalues are forwarded with their userinfo (credentials) redacted.","type":"boolean"},"health_check_interval":{"description":"Discovery \u0026 health-check cadence (spec 074, #608). Both are *Duration\ntri-state pointers: nil = inherit the built-in default; a pointer to 0s =\nthe loop is disabled; a positive value = that interval. Defaults live only\nin the resolvers (ResolveHealthCheckInterval / ResolveToolDiscoveryInterval)\nso an unset key behaves exactly as before this feature (SC-005). Validated\nin Validate(): health-check ∈ {0} ∪ [5s,1h]; tool-discovery ∈ {0} ∪ [30s,24h].","type":"string"},"http_idle_timeout":{"description":"HTTPIdleTimeout caps how long an idle keep-alive connection is kept open.\nUnset = 180s. \"0s\" removes the dedicated idle deadline, but net/http then\nfalls back to ReadTimeout — idle is fully unbounded only when\nhttp_read_timeout is also \"0s\". Requires a restart.","type":"string"},"http_read_timeout":{"description":"HTTPReadTimeout caps how long reading a whole request (headers + body)\nmay take. Unset = 120s; \"0s\" disables it. Requires a restart.","type":"string"},"http_write_timeout":{"description":"HTTPWriteTimeout caps how long producing a whole response may take on\nnon-streaming endpoints (REST, Web UI, health). Unset = 120s; \"0s\"\ndisables it globally. MCP and SSE /events routes are exempt by design.","type":"string"},"init_timeout":{"description":"InitTimeout is the global default deadline for an upstream's MCP\n` + "`" + `initialize` + "`" + ` handshake (MCP-3322 / GH #760). *Duration tri-state: nil =\ninherit the built-in 30s default; a positive value = that deadline. A\nper-server InitTimeout overrides this. Resolved by ResolveInitTimeout;\nvalidated to {0} ∪ [1s, 30m] in Validate(). Servers doing legitimate\nfirst-run warmup (cache/index build) before answering ` + "`" + `initialize` + "`" + ` can\nraise this so they are not killed mid-startup.","type":"string"},"instructions":{"description":"Instructions text returned in the MCP initialize response to guide AI agents.\nWhen empty, a built-in default is used that explains retrieve_tools workflow.","type":"string"},"intent_declaration":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/config.IntentDeclarationConfig"},"listen":{"type":"string"},"logging":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/config.LogConfig"},"max_concurrent_requests":{"description":"Concurrency limits (spec 093, GH #955). Scope (a) of FR-020: the GLOBAL\nAGGREGATE limiter — one proxy-wide cap on concurrently running upstream\ntool calls, with its own bounded wait queue. Tri-state pointers: absent =\nthe limiter does not exist (default, zero behavior change); an explicit 0\nmax also disables it; positive = that cap. This scope is NEVER a\nper-server inheritance source — per-server values come from\nServerConcurrencyDefaults / the per-server overrides — but a server's\neffective concurrency is bounded by BOTH its own limiter and this one.\nResolved by ResolveGlobalConcurrency; hot-reloadable; overridable via\nMCPPROXY_MAX_CONCURRENT_REQUESTS / _QUEUE_SIZE / _QUEUE_TIMEOUT (FR-022).","type":"integer"},"max_result_size_chars":{"description":"MaxResultSizeChars is advertised on every tool as\n` + "`" + `_meta.anthropic/maxResultSizeChars` + "`" + `; it raises Claude Code's\ninline-response ceiling from 50k to up to 500k chars. Omit the key for\nthe 500000 default; set it to 0 to disable the annotation.","type":"integer"},"mcpServers":{"items":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/config.ServerConfig"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"oauth_expiry_warning_hours":{"description":"Health status settings","type":"number"},"observability":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/config.ObservabilityConfig"},"output_sanitisation":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/config.OutputSanitisationConfig"},"output_validation":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/config.OutputValidationConfig"},"profiles":{"description":"Profiles are optional named, server-scoped views exposed at /mcp/p/\u003cname\u003e\n(Spec 057). Absent/empty is fully supported — /mcp is unchanged and configs\nwithout this key serialize byte-identically (SC-004).","items":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/config.ProfileConfig"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"quarantine_enabled":{"description":"QuarantineEnabled controls whether quarantine is active. It gates two\nthings together:\n  1. Server-level auto-quarantine for newly added servers (issue #370).\n     When true, servers added via the upstream_servers MCP tool or the\n     REST API default to quarantined=true; when false, they default to\n     quarantined=false. Explicit per-request values always win.\n  2. Tool-level quarantine (Spec 032): per-tool SHA-256 approval of\n     tool descriptions/schemas.\nWhen nil (default), quarantine is enabled (secure by default). Set to\nexplicit false to opt out of both. Per-server SkipQuarantine still\napplies for the tool-level check on individual servers.","type":"boolean"},"queue_size":{"type":"integer"},"queue_timeout":{"type":"string"},"read_only_mode":{"type":"boolean"},"registries":{"description":"Registries configuration for MCP server discovery","items":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/config.RegistryEntry"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"registries_locked":{"description":"RegistriesLocked is an enterprise stub knob (MCP-866): when true, runtime\nadditions of custom registries (e.g. ` + "`" + `registry add-source` + "`" + `, the REST/MCP\nadd-source surface) are rejected so an administrator can pin the discovery\nsources. Built-in defaults are unaffected. Documented but otherwise inert\nbeyond the add-source rejection.","type":"boolean"},"require_mcp_auth":{"description":"Require authentication on /mcp endpoint (default: false)","type":"boolean"},"reveal_secret_headers":{"description":"RevealSecretHeaders, when true, disables the redaction of the\nsecret-bearing server fields — sensitive header values (Authorization,\nX-API-Key, Cookie, …), env-var secrets, and URL query credentials — in\nresponses from the ` + "`" + `upstream_servers` + "`" + ` MCP tool, the ` + "`" + `/api/v1/servers` + "`" + `\nREST API, and the SSE event stream. It also lets URL secrets echoed\ninto last_error / health.detail through unscrubbed.\n\nDefault false — sensitive values are surfaced masked as\n` + "`" + `••••\u003clast2\u003e (\u003cN\u003e chars)` + "`" + ` (error strings use ` + "`" + `***REDACTED***` + "`" + `) so an\nMCP agent cannot read Bearer tokens / API keys / URL secrets out of\nanother upstream's config (PR #425, issue #872). ${env:…}/${keyring:…}\nreferences are labels, not secrets, and pass through unchanged.\n\nThe Web UI / macOS tray edit forms work without seeing the real\nvalues: PATCH /api/v1/servers/{id} deep-merges (omitted keys are\npreserved, see ` + "`" + `headers_remove` + "`" + ` / ` + "`" + `env_remove` + "`" + ` for explicit\ndeletes), so clients compute a diff and only send the keys that\nactually changed. Redacted-but-unchanged values never round-trip\n— the backend keeps the real string. Set this to true if a\ndownstream tool genuinely needs raw values in the response.","type":"boolean"},"routing_mode":{"description":"Routing mode (Spec 031): how MCP tools are exposed to clients\nValid values: \"retrieve_tools\" (default), \"direct\", \"code_execution\"","type":"string"},"security":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/config.SecurityConfig"},"sensitive_data_detection":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/config.SensitiveDataDetectionConfig"},"server_concurrency_defaults":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/config.ConcurrencyDefaults"},"telemetry":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/config.TelemetryConfig"},"tls":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/config.TLSConfig"},"tokenizer":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/config.TokenizerConfig"},"tool_call_max_records_per_server":{"description":"Calls retained per server (default: 1000)","type":"integer"},"tool_call_max_response_size":{"description":"Bounds for the per-server tool-call history behind GET /api/v1/tool-calls\n(#1176). It is a recent-debugging window, not an audit log — the activity\nlog is the durable record — and it kept every upstream response whole,\nper server, forever. A non-positive value means \"use the default\", not\n\"disable\": this store must never be unbounded again, so there is\ndeliberately no off switch.","type":"integer"},"tool_discovery_interval":{"type":"string"},"tool_response_limit":{"type":"integer"},"tool_response_mode":{"description":"Tool response mode (Spec 085): how retrieve_tools serializes results.\nValid values: \"\" (= full), \"full\" (default: today's schema-bearing\nentries), \"compact\" (signature + first-sentence entries). Orthogonal to\nrouting_mode — routing_mode selects the tool SURFACE, this selects the\nSERIALIZATION within the retrieve_tools surface. Serialization-only: it\nnever affects the query, ranking, or result set. Hot-reloadable.","type":"string"},"tool_response_session_risk_warning":{"description":"ToolResponseSessionRiskWarning controls whether the prose ` + "`" + `warning` + "`" + ` field\nis included in the ` + "`" + `session_risk` + "`" + ` object returned by ` + "`" + `retrieve_tools` + "`" + `.\nThe structured fields (level, lethal_trifecta, has_open_world_tools, etc.)\nare always included. Default: false (quiet for LLM clients) — see issue #406.\nMost tools lack annotations, so the MCP-spec defaults treat them as fully\npermissive across all three risk axes, which makes the prose warning fire\non almost every call and wastes tokens.","type":"boolean"},"tools_limit":{"type":"integer"},"toon_min_savings_pct":{"description":"ToonMinSavingsPct is the minimum byte-savings percentage (validated\n1-90; 0/unset → 15) the complete TOON emission (marker + hint + body)\nmust achieve over the exact passthrough emission for adaptive mode to\nencode a block. Byte savings approximate token savings for the tabular\npayload class; the spec-083 profiler reports true token deltas.\nGlobal-only (no per-server override, FR-001).","type":"integer"},"toon_output":{"description":"ToonOutput selects the TOON encoding mode for call_tool_* result text\nblocks (spec 084): \"off\" (default — responses byte-identical to\npre-feature behavior), \"adaptive\" (encode only tabular-uniform payloads\nthat beat compact JSON by ToonMinSavingsPct), or \"always\"\n(benchmark/debug only — encodes every JSON-parseable block and can\nINCREASE token cost). Per-server override: ServerConfig.ToonOutput.\nResolved by ResolveToonOutput; hot-reloadable.","type":"string"},"top_k":{"description":"Deprecated: TopK is superseded by ToolsLimit and has no runtime effect. Kept for backward compatibility.","type":"integer"},"tray_endpoint":{"description":"Tray endpoint override (unix:// or npipe://)","type":"string"},"trusted_hosts":{"description":"TrustedHosts lists non-loopback Host header values accepted on loopback\nlisteners (GH #898). DNS-rebinding protection rejects requests whose Host\nheader is not a loopback address when mcpproxy listens on loopback; a\nreverse proxy (nginx → 127.0.0.1) forwarding the public domain in Host\ntrips it. Entries are hostnames, case-insensitive; an entry without a\nport matches any port, with a port it must match exactly; a leading dot\n(\".example.com\") is a subdomain wildcard. The single entry \"*\" disables\nHost and Origin validation entirely. The same list also validates the\nOrigin header when present (MCP spec DNS-rebinding defense). Empty\n(default) keeps full protection. Env override: MCPPROXY_TRUSTED_HOSTS\n(comma-separated).","items":{"type":"string"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"trusted_proxies":{"description":"TrustedProxies lists the CIDRs or IP addresses whose X-Forwarded-For /\nX-Real-IP / X-Forwarded-Proto / X-Forwarded-Host headers are believed\n(Spec 107 FR-027). Empty (default) trusts nobody. Edition-neutral, live\n(hot-reloadable). Env override: MCPPROXY_TRUSTED_PROXIES (comma-separated).\nThe one reader is ForwardedHeaders; validation is validateTrustedProxies.","items":{"type":"string"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"update_check":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/config.UpdateCheckConfig"}},"type":"object"},"config.CustomPattern":{"properties":{"category":{"description":"Category (defaults to \"custom\")","type":"string"},"keywords":{"description":"Keywords to match (mutually exclusive with Regex)","items":{"type":"string"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"name":{"description":"Unique identifier for this pattern","type":"string"},"regex":{"description":"Regex pattern (mutually exclusive with Keywords)","type":"string"},"severity":{"description":"Risk level: critical, high, medium, low","type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"config.DeepScanConfig":{"description":"DeepScan is the opt-in \"deep scan\" layer (Spec 077 US3). It subsumes the\ndeprecated top-level scanner_fetch_package_source / scanner_disable_no_new_privileges\nkeys (migrated on load) and gates the heavy Docker-based scanners + source\nextraction. Disabled by default (FR-006): only the deterministic in-process\nbaseline scanner runs. A deep-scan failure NEVER changes the baseline verdict\n(FR-007/FR-008).","properties":{"disable_no_new_privileges":{"description":"DisableNoNewPrivileges, when true, omits the ` + "`" + `--security-opt\nno-new-privileges` + "`" + ` flag from scanner container runs (snap-docker/AppArmor\nescape hatch). Absorbs the deprecated top-level\nscanner_disable_no_new_privileges. Default false.","type":"boolean"},"enabled":{"description":"Enabled is the master opt-in for the heavy layer (FR-006). Default false.","type":"boolean"},"fetch_package_source":{"description":"FetchPackageSource controls whether the scanner fetches the PUBLISHED\nsource of package-runner servers (npx/uvx) — without executing it — when\nno local source is available. Absorbs the deprecated top-level\nscanner_fetch_package_source. Default (nil) is ENABLED within deep scan.","type":"boolean"},"scanners":{"description":"Scanners optionally restricts which deep scanners may run under the\numbrella (by scanner id). Empty ⇒ all enabled deep scanners are eligible.","items":{"type":"string"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false}},"type":"object"},"config.DockerIsolationConfig":{"description":"Docker isolation settings","properties":{"cpu_limit":{"description":"CPU limit for containers","type":"string"},"default_images":{"additionalProperties":{"type":"string"},"description":"Map of runtime type to Docker image","type":"object"},"enable_cache_volume":{"description":"Mount shared cache volumes for faster restarts (default: true)","type":"boolean"},"enabled":{"description":"Global enable/disable for Docker isolation (legacy; superseded by Mode)","type":"boolean"},"extra_args":{"description":"Additional docker run arguments","items":{"type":"string"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"log_driver":{"description":"Docker log driver (default: json-file)","type":"string"},"log_max_files":{"description":"Maximum number of log files (default: 3)","type":"string"},"log_max_size":{"description":"Maximum size of log files (default: 100m)","type":"string"},"memory_limit":{"description":"Memory limit for containers","type":"string"},"mode":{"description":"Isolation mode: \"docker\" | \"sandbox\" | \"none\" (MCP-34.2). Unset per-server inherits the global mode; unset globally falls back to the legacy \"enabled\" flag (true ⇒ docker, false ⇒ none)","type":"string","x-enum-varnames":["IsolationModeDocker","IsolationModeSandbox","IsolationModeNone"]},"network_mode":{"description":"Docker network mode (default: bridge)","type":"string"},"registry":{"description":"Custom registry (defaults to docker.io)","type":"string"},"timeout":{"description":"Container startup timeout","type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"config.DockerRecoveryConfig":{"description":"Docker recovery settings","properties":{"enabled":{"description":"Enable Docker recovery monitoring (default: true)","type":"boolean"},"max_retries":{"description":"Maximum retry attempts (0 = unlimited)","type":"integer"},"notify_on_failure":{"description":"Show notification on recovery failure (default: true)","type":"boolean"},"notify_on_retry":{"description":"Show notification on each retry (default: false)","type":"boolean"},"notify_on_start":{"description":"Show notification when recovery starts (default: true)","type":"boolean"},"notify_on_success":{"description":"Show notification on successful recovery (default: true)","type":"boolean"},"persistent_state":{"description":"Save recovery state across restarts (default: true)","type":"boolean"}},"type":"object"},"config.FeatureFlags":{"description":"Deprecated: Features flags are unused and have no runtime effect. Kept for backward compatibility.","properties":{"enable_async_storage":{"type":"boolean"},"enable_caching":{"type":"boolean"},"enable_contract_tests":{"type":"boolean"},"enable_debug_logging":{"description":"Development features","type":"boolean"},"enable_docker_isolation":{"type":"boolean"},"enable_event_bus":{"type":"boolean"},"enable_health_checks":{"type":"boolean"},"enable_metrics":{"type":"boolean"},"enable_oauth":{"description":"Security features","type":"boolean"},"enable_observability":{"description":"Observability features","type":"boolean"},"enable_quarantine":{"type":"boolean"},"enable_runtime":{"description":"Runtime features","type":"boolean"},"enable_search":{"description":"Storage features","type":"boolean"},"enable_sse":{"type":"boolean"},"enable_tracing":{"type":"boolean"},"enable_tray":{"type":"boolean"},"enable_web_ui":{"description":"UI features","type":"boolean"}},"type":"object"},"config.IntentDeclarationConfig":{"description":"Intent declaration settings (Spec 018)","properties":{"strict_server_validation":{"description":"StrictServerValidation controls whether server annotation mismatches\ncause rejection (true) or just warnings (false).\nDefault: true (reject mismatches)","type":"boolean"}},"type":"object"},"config.IsolationConfig":{"description":"Per-server isolation settings","properties":{"enabled":{"description":"Enable Docker isolation for this server (nil = inherit global; legacy, superseded by Mode)","type":"boolean"},"extra_args":{"description":"Additional docker run arguments for this server","items":{"type":"string"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"image":{"description":"Custom Docker image (overrides default)","type":"string"},"log_driver":{"description":"Docker log driver override for this server","type":"string"},"log_max_files":{"description":"Maximum number of log files override","type":"string"},"log_max_size":{"description":"Maximum size of log files override","type":"string"},"mode":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/config.IsolationMode"},"network_mode":{"description":"Custom network mode for this server","type":"string"},"working_dir":{"description":"Custom working directory in container","type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"config.IsolationMode":{"description":"Isolation mode: \"docker\" | \"sandbox\" | \"none\" (MCP-34.2). Unset per-server inherits the global mode; unset globally falls back to the legacy \"enabled\" flag (true ⇒ docker, false ⇒ none)","type":"string","x-enum-varnames":["IsolationModeDocker","IsolationModeSandbox","IsolationModeNone"]},"config.LogConfig":{"description":"Logging configuration","properties":{"compress":{"type":"boolean"},"enable_console":{"type":"boolean"},"enable_file":{"type":"boolean"},"filename":{"type":"string"},"json_format":{"type":"boolean"},"level":{"type":"string"},"log_dir":{"description":"Custom log directory","type":"string"},"max_age":{"description":"days","type":"integer"},"max_backups":{"description":"number of backup files","type":"integer"},"max_size":{"description":"MB","type":"integer"}},"type":"object"},"config.MetricsExporterConfig":{"description":"Metrics gates the Prometheus /metrics scrape endpoint (MCP-32). Disabled\nby default — operators opt in for k8s/enterprise deployments.","properties":{"enabled":{"description":"Enabled exposes /metrics on the existing HTTP listener when true.","type":"boolean"}},"type":"object"},"config.OAuthConfig":{"description":"OAuth configuration (keep even when empty to signal OAuth requirement)","properties":{"client_id":{"type":"string"},"client_secret":{"type":"string"},"extra_params":{"additionalProperties":{"type":"string"},"description":"Additional OAuth parameters (e.g., RFC 8707 resource)","type":"object"},"pkce_enabled":{"type":"boolean"},"redirect_uri":{"type":"string"},"scopes":{"items":{"type":"string"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false}},"type":"object"},"config.ObservabilityConfig":{"description":"Observability settings (Spec 069): usage aggregate cache/persistence cadence.","properties":{"metrics":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/config.MetricsExporterConfig"},"tracing":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/config.TracingExporterConfig"},"usage_cache_ttl":{"description":"UsageCacheTTL bounds the freshness of the usage endpoint's read cache for\nwide windows (FR-005). Default 5s.","type":"string"},"usage_persist_interval":{"description":"UsagePersistInterval is how often the actor-owned usage aggregate snapshot\nis flushed to storage. Default 30s.","type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"config.OutputSanitisationConfig":{"description":"Output sanitisation settings (Spec 054 Track B)","properties":{"max_redactions":{"description":"cap on redactions per response; default 100","type":"integer"},"response_action":{"description":"\"spotlight\" | \"redact\" | \"block\"; default \"spotlight\"","type":"string"},"spotlight_untrusted":{"description":"wrap untrusted output in spotlight markers; default true","type":"boolean"},"strip_classes":{"description":"classes to strip: ansi/c0c1/bidi/zero_width","items":{"type":"string"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"strip_control_chars":{"description":"strip control-character classes; default false","type":"boolean"}},"type":"object"},"config.OutputValidationConfig":{"description":"Output-schema validation settings (Spec 056)","properties":{"max_bytes":{"description":"structured payload byte cap; default 5\u003c\u003c20","type":"integer"},"max_depth":{"description":"nesting depth cap; default 64","type":"integer"},"missing_structured_content":{"description":"\"allow\" | \"block\"; default \"allow\"","type":"string"},"mode":{"description":"\"off\" | \"warn\" | \"strict\"; default \"warn\"","type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"config.ProfileConfig":{"properties":{"name":{"description":"URL slug, validated","type":"string"},"servers":{"description":"references to mcpServers[].name","items":{"type":"string"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false}},"type":"object"},"config.RegistryEntry":{"properties":{"count":{"description":"number or string","type":"string"},"description":{"type":"string"},"id":{"type":"string"},"name":{"type":"string"},"protocol":{"type":"string"},"provenance":{"description":"Provenance is the trust tag for this registry (MCP-866):\nRegistryProvenanceOfficial for built-in defaults, RegistryProvenanceCustom\nfor user-added registries. It is authoritatively (re)computed by the\nregistries merge from whether the ID is a shipped default — a user cannot\nclaim \"official\" by writing it into their config.","type":"string"},"requires_key":{"description":"RequiresKey marks a registry that needs an API key to be queried. When\ntrue and no key is configured, the registry is skipped/marked unavailable\nrather than failing the whole search (FR-008).","type":"boolean"},"servers_url":{"type":"string"},"tags":{"items":{"type":"string"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"url":{"type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"config.SecurityConfig":{"description":"Security scanner settings (Spec 039)","properties":{"auto_baseline_scan":{"description":"AutoBaselineScan is the kill-switch for the AUTOMATIC, informational\nPass-1 baseline scan: the free in-process TPA scan mcpproxy runs for every\nnewly admitted server (any trust mode) and, once per installation, over\npre-existing servers that have never been scanned.\n\nInformational ONLY: the resulting verdict populates the security badge and\nthe scan summary, and NEVER gates quarantine or approval. The\ntrust_mode:\"scan\" admission gate is a separate path and is unaffected by\nthis flag.\n\nDefault (nil) is ENABLED. Set to false to suppress every automatic scan\n(manual scans keep working). Env override: MCPPROXY_AUTO_BASELINE_SCAN,\nwhich wins over this field on every path.","type":"boolean"},"deep_scan":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/config.DeepScanConfig"},"integrity_check_interval":{"type":"string"},"integrity_check_on_restart":{"type":"boolean"},"runtime_read_only":{"type":"boolean"},"runtime_tmpfs_size":{"type":"string"},"scan_timeout_default":{"type":"string"},"scanner_disable_no_new_privileges":{"description":"Deprecated (Spec 077 US3): migrated on load into DeepScan.DisableNoNewPrivileges\n(see migrateDeepScanConfig). Retained only so existing configs that still carry\nthe top-level key parse; consumers MUST read the effective value via\nSecurityConfig.IsDisableNoNewPrivileges. Cleared after migration.\n\nScannerDisableNoNewPrivileges, when true, omits the\n` + "`" + `--security-opt no-new-privileges` + "`" + ` flag from scanner container runs.\n\nBackground: snap-installed Docker on Ubuntu confines dockerd under the\n` + "`" + `snap.docker.dockerd` + "`" + ` AppArmor profile. When runc tries to transition\nthe container into the inner ` + "`" + `docker-default` + "`" + ` profile to exec the\nentrypoint, AppArmor refuses the transition because NO_NEW_PRIVS\nforbids privilege/profile changes on exec — the result is EPERM\n(\"operation not permitted\") and every scanner fails immediately.\n\nSet this to true ONLY on hosts hitting that incompatibility. Scanner\ncontainers still run with read-only rootfs, tmpfs /tmp, no-network by\ndefault, and read-only source mounts, so the marginal isolation loss\nis small. The preferred fix remains replacing snap docker with a\ndistro-packaged docker.","type":"boolean"},"scanner_fetch_package_source":{"description":"Deprecated (Spec 077 US3): migrated on load into DeepScan.FetchPackageSource\n(see migrateDeepScanConfig). Retained only so existing configs that still carry\nthe top-level key parse; consumers MUST read the effective value via\nSecurityConfig.EffectiveFetchPackageSource. Cleared after migration.\n\nScannerFetchPackageSource controls whether the scanner fetches the\nPUBLISHED source of package-runner servers (npx/uvx) — without executing\nit — when no local source is available (no Docker container, no local\npackage cache, no working_dir). This is the primary quarantine/scan\ntarget: a quarantined-on-add server is never run locally, so without this\nthe scan degrades to tool-definitions-only (no real source-level\nanalysis). See MCP-2206.\n\nFetching uses ` + "`" + `npm pack --ignore-scripts` + "`" + ` (npm) and ` + "`" + `uv pip download` + "`" + ` /\n` + "`" + `pip download` + "`" + ` with ` + "`" + `--only-binary=:all:` + "`" + ` (Python), which only download +\nunpack archives and NEVER run install, build, or setup.py — a scanner must\nnot execute the untrusted code it is scanning. The Python\n` + "`" + `--only-binary=:all:` + "`" + ` flag is required because downloading an sdist would\ninvoke its build backend (setup.py); packages with no wheel fall back to\ntool-definitions-only instead. Extraction is hardened against path\ntraversal and decompression bombs.\n\nDefault (nil) is ENABLED. Set to false on air-gapped deployments to\nforbid the scanner's network egress; such servers then fall back to the\ntool-definitions-only scan with no regression.","type":"boolean"},"scanner_registry_url":{"type":"string"},"tpa_bundle_path":{"description":"TPABundlePath is the filesystem path to the tpa-db scanner-bundle.json\nthe offline TPA scanner runs (spec 086 FR-019: the signature-DB location\nMUST be configuration-driven, not hardcoded). Empty (the default) runs the\ncorpus embedded in this build.\n\nEnv override: MCPPROXY_TPA_BUNDLE_PATH. Hot-reloadable — the path is\nre-read on every config.reloaded event via\nscanner.Service.ApplySecurityConfig, so a corpus refresh needs no restart.\nA configured bundle that fails to read/parse/version-check/compile is\nREFUSED and the previously active corpus stays live (fail-closed, never\nfail-empty); the reason is logged and surfaced in the security overview's\nsignature_bundle.load_error.","type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"config.SensitiveDataDetectionConfig":{"description":"Sensitive data detection settings (Spec 026)","properties":{"categories":{"additionalProperties":{"type":"boolean"},"description":"Enable/disable specific detection categories","type":"object"},"custom_patterns":{"description":"User-defined detection patterns","items":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/config.CustomPattern"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"enabled":{"description":"Enable sensitive data detection (default: true)","type":"boolean"},"entropy_threshold":{"description":"Shannon entropy threshold for high-entropy detection (default: 4.5)","type":"number"},"max_payload_size_kb":{"description":"Max size to scan before truncating (default: 1024)","type":"integer"},"scan_requests":{"description":"Scan tool call arguments (default: true)","type":"boolean"},"scan_responses":{"description":"Scan tool responses (default: true)","type":"boolean"},"sensitive_keywords":{"description":"Keywords to flag","items":{"type":"string"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false}},"type":"object"},"config.ServerConfig":{"properties":{"annotation_overrides":{"additionalProperties":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/config.ToolAnnotations"},"description":"AnnotationOverrides fixes false hints from the upstream server.\nMap from tool name (or \"*\" for wildcard) to ToolAnnotations.\nAdmin-only, hot (no restart), audited.","type":"object"},"args":{"items":{"type":"string"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"auto_approve_tool_changes":{"description":"AutoApproveToolChanges is the per-server intent to auto-approve tool\nchanges/additions (disabling per-server rug-pull protection). Supersedes\nskip_quarantine. MCP-2930 only ACCEPTS, persists, and migrates this flag — it\nis NOT yet consulted at runtime; auto-approval is still governed by\nSkipQuarantine until the trust-baseline behavior change (MCP-2931) migrates the\nruntime consumers onto it.\nTri-state pointer (mirrors QuarantineEnabled): nil = unset (inherit/migrate\nfrom legacy skip_quarantine), explicit true/false = honored as-is so an\nexplicit auto_approve_tool_changes:false overrides a legacy skip_quarantine:true.\nRead via IsAutoApproveToolChanges().","type":"boolean"},"command":{"type":"string"},"created":{"type":"string"},"disabled_tools":{"description":"Denylist: these tools are hidden; mutually exclusive with enabled_tools","items":{"type":"string"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"enabled":{"type":"boolean"},"enabled_tools":{"description":"Allowlist: only these tools are exposed; mutually exclusive with disabled_tools","items":{"type":"string"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"env":{"additionalProperties":{"type":"string"},"type":"object"},"expose_prompts":{"description":"ExposePrompts overrides whether this server's advertised MCP prompts are\naggregated into mcpproxy's prompts/list. nil (default) inherits the\ndefault-aggregate behavior (included if the server advertises\nCapabilities.Prompts); false excludes it regardless of capability.","type":"boolean"},"headers":{"additionalProperties":{"type":"string"},"description":"For HTTP servers","type":"object"},"health_check_interval":{"description":"Per-server discovery \u0026 health-check overrides (spec 074). Same *Duration\ntri-state as the global keys: nil = inherit the global value (or default),\npointer to 0s = disabled for this server, positive = that interval.\nHealthCheckInterval is fully wired into the per-server health loop;\nToolDiscoveryInterval is accepted/validated and round-trips for\nforward-compat, but the periodic index sweep is governed by the global\ncadence in this iteration (see spec 074 plan §C).","type":"string"},"init_timeout":{"description":"InitTimeout overrides the global init_timeout for this server's MCP\n` + "`" + `initialize` + "`" + ` handshake deadline (MCP-3322 / GH #760). *Duration tri-state:\nnil = inherit the global value (or 30s default), positive = that deadline.\nResolved by Config.ResolveInitTimeout; validated to {0} ∪ [1s, 30m]. Raise\nthis for upstreams that do legitimate first-run warmup (e.g. caching many\nchannels/users) before responding to ` + "`" + `initialize` + "`" + `.","type":"string"},"isolation":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/config.IsolationConfig"},"launcher_wait_timeout":{"description":"LauncherWaitTimeout caps how long mcpproxy will wait for a locally-launched\nHTTP/SSE upstream's URL to become reachable after Spawn(). Only consulted\nwhen the server is configured with both Command and an HTTP/SSE URL — i.e.,\nmcpproxy starts the process AND connects via network. Stdio servers ignore\nthis field. Zero or unset → 30s default.","type":"string"},"max_concurrent_requests":{"description":"Per-server concurrency overrides — scope (c) of FR-020 (spec 093, #955).\nTri-state per setting, exactly like HealthCheckInterval: absent = inherit\nthe per-server default set (server_concurrency_defaults), explicit 0 =\ndisable that setting for this server (0 max = no per-server limiter at\nall; 0 queue_size = no pending capacity, shed immediately at the cap),\npositive = override. The global aggregate limiter is never inherited from\nhere — it applies on top, so effective concurrency is min(per-server,\nglobal). Resolved by Config.ResolveServerConcurrency.","type":"integer"},"name":{"type":"string"},"oauth":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/config.OAuthConfig"},"protocol":{"description":"stdio, http, sse, streamable-http, auto","type":"string"},"quarantined":{"description":"Security quarantine status","type":"boolean"},"queue_size":{"type":"integer"},"queue_timeout":{"type":"string"},"reconnect_on_use":{"description":"Attempt reconnection when a tool call targets a disconnected server","type":"boolean"},"shared":{"description":"Server edition: shared with all users","type":"boolean"},"skip_quarantine":{"description":"SkipQuarantine is DEPRECATED (MCP-2930): use AutoApproveToolChanges instead.\nKept for back-compat parsing; on config load a legacy skip_quarantine:true is\nmigrated to auto_approve_tool_changes:true only when the new field is unset\n(see normalizeServerQuarantineFlags).","type":"boolean"},"source_registry_id":{"description":"SourceRegistryID records which registry this server was added from (empty\nfor manually-configured servers). MCP-866: surfaced in the approval /\nquarantine view so a reviewer can see a server's origin.","type":"string"},"source_registry_provenance":{"description":"SourceRegistryProvenance records the source registry's provenance at add\ntime (RegistryProvenanceOfficial / RegistryProvenanceCustom). It is purely\ninformational (MCP-1072) — surfaced so a reviewer can see a server's origin\n— and no longer gates quarantine or skip_quarantine.","type":"string"},"tool_discovery_interval":{"type":"string"},"toon_output":{"description":"ToonOutput overrides the global toon_output mode for this server's\ntools (spec 084, FR-001). Plain string, not a pointer: \"\"/absent =\ninherit the global value; \"off\"|\"adaptive\"|\"always\" = override (\"off\"\nis the explicit force-off). Resolved by Config.ResolveToonOutput.","type":"string"},"trust_mode":{"description":"TrustMode is the per-server trust tier: auto|scan|manual. Supersedes\nauto_approve_tool_changes (spec 086). An empty value is derived from the\nlegacy fields at load via normalizeServerQuarantineFlags; the single\nresolution point is EffectiveTrustMode(), which treats an empty or\nunrecognized value as manual (secure by default). Read via\nEffectiveTrustMode(), never the raw string.","type":"string"},"updated":{"type":"string"},"url":{"type":"string"},"working_dir":{"description":"Working directory for stdio servers","type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"config.TLSConfig":{"description":"TLS configuration","properties":{"certs_dir":{"description":"Directory for certificates","type":"string"},"enabled":{"description":"Enable HTTPS","type":"boolean"},"hsts":{"description":"Enable HTTP Strict Transport Security","type":"boolean"},"require_client_cert":{"description":"Enable mTLS","type":"boolean"}},"type":"object"},"config.TelemetryConfig":{"description":"Telemetry settings (Spec 036)","properties":{"anonymous_id":{"description":"Auto-generated UUIDv4","type":"string"},"anonymous_id_created_at":{"description":"Spec 042 (Tier 2) additions — all default-zero, all backwards-compatible.","type":"string"},"enabled":{"description":"Default: true (opt-out)","type":"boolean"},"endpoint":{"description":"Override for testing","type":"string"},"last_reported_version":{"description":"Upgrade funnel","type":"string"},"last_startup_outcome":{"description":"success|port_conflict|db_locked|...","type":"string"},"notice_shown":{"description":"First-run notice flag","type":"boolean"}},"type":"object"},"config.TokenizerConfig":{"description":"Tokenizer configuration for token counting","properties":{"default_model":{"description":"Default model for tokenization (e.g., \"gpt-4\")","type":"string"},"enabled":{"description":"Enable token counting","type":"boolean"},"encoding":{"description":"Default encoding (e.g., \"cl100k_base\")","type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"config.ToolAnnotations":{"properties":{"destructiveHint":{"type":"boolean"},"idempotentHint":{"type":"boolean"},"openWorldHint":{"type":"boolean"},"readOnlyHint":{"type":"boolean"},"title":{"type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"config.TracingExporterConfig":{"description":"Tracing gates the OpenTelemetry OTLP trace exporter (MCP-32). Disabled by\ndefault.","properties":{"enabled":{"description":"Enabled turns on OTLP trace export for tool calls and upstream hops.","type":"boolean"},"endpoint":{"description":"Endpoint is the collector address as host:port (no scheme), e.g.\n\"localhost:4318\" for http or \"localhost:4317\" for grpc.","type":"string"},"protocol":{"description":"Protocol selects the OTLP transport: \"http\" or \"grpc\".","type":"string"},"sample_rate":{"description":"SampleRate is the head-based trace sampling ratio in [0,1]. Default 0.1.\nOmit the key for the 0.1 default; set it to 0 to sample nothing.","type":"number"}},"type":"object"},"config.UpdateCheckConfig":{"description":"Update-check settings (Spec 079 FR-012): config-file control of the\nbackground upgrade-awareness checker (internal/updatecheck). nil =\nenabled on the stable channel (existing default behavior). The existing\nenvironment switches keep working and WIN over these keys (FR-014):\nMCPPROXY_DISABLE_AUTO_UPDATE=true force-disables even when\nenabled=true, and MCPPROXY_ALLOW_PRERELEASE_UPDATES=true force-selects\nthe rc channel even when channel=stable.","properties":{"channel":{"description":"Channel selects which releases are offered as updates: \"stable\"\n(default; prereleases never offered) or \"rc\" (prereleases included).\nEmpty resolves to stable. Validated in ValidateDetailed.\n\nNOTE: for a RELEASED build the running binary's own version is\nauthoritative and overrides this field — a stable build is never\noffered an RC (even with channel=rc), and an RC build always tracks the\nrc channel. This field only takes effect on dev/unstamped builds. See\ninternal/updatecheck.Checker.IncludePrereleases.","type":"string"},"enabled":{"description":"Enabled gates all update checking. Tri-state: nil/absent = enabled\n(default true, matching pre-079 behavior). When false, no network\ncheck is performed and no upgrade nudge appears on any surface\n(FR-015) — /api/v1/info omits the update object entirely.","type":"boolean"}},"type":"object"},"configimport.FailedServer":{"properties":{"details":{"type":"string"},"error":{"type":"string"},"name":{"type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"configimport.ImportSummary":{"properties":{"failed":{"type":"integer"},"imported":{"type":"integer"},"skipped":{"type":"integer"},"total":{"type":"integer"}},"type":"object"},"configimport.SkippedServer":{"properties":{"name":{"type":"string"},"reason":{"description":"\"already_exists\", \"filtered_out\", \"invalid_name\"","type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"connect.ConnectResult":{"description":"The full result; its action mirrors the top-level one","properties":{"action":{"description":"\"created\", \"updated\", \"already_exists\", \"removed\", \"not_found\"","type":"string"},"backup_path":{"type":"string"},"client":{"type":"string"},"config_path":{"type":"string"},"message":{"type":"string"},"server_name":{"type":"string"},"success":{"type":"boolean"}},"type":"object"},"contracts.APIResponse":{"allOf":[{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/data"}],"properties":{"data":{"type":"object"},"error":{"type":"string"},"request_id":{"type":"string"},"success":{"type":"boolean"}},"type":"object"},"contracts.ActivityDetailResponse":{"properties":{"activity":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ActivityRecord"}},"type":"object"},"contracts.ActivityListResponse":{"properties":{"activities":{"items":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ActivityRecord"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"limit":{"type":"integer"},"offset":{"type":"integer"},"total":{"type":"integer"}},"type":"object"},"contracts.ActivityRecord":{"properties":{"arguments":{"description":"Tool call arguments","type":"object"},"detection_types":{"description":"List of detection types found","items":{"type":"string"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"duration_ms":{"description":"Execution duration in milliseconds","type":"integer"},"error_message":{"description":"Error details if status is \"error\"","type":"string"},"has_sensitive_data":{"description":"Sensitive data detection fields (Spec 026)","type":"boolean"},"id":{"description":"Unique identifier (ULID format)","type":"string"},"max_severity":{"description":"Highest severity level detected (critical, high, medium, low)","type":"string"},"metadata":{"description":"Additional context-specific data","type":"object"},"parent_id":{"description":"Correlation id of the parent call (the code_execution whose sandbox issued this sub-call)","type":"string"},"request_bytes":{"description":"Byte sizes measured pre-truncation, mirroring storage.ActivityRecord\n(Spec 069 A1). They are the only cost signal a bodies-off export carries:\nwith payloads suppressed there is no text left to measure, so a consumer\naccounting for a record it cannot read has nothing else to go on. They are\nbyte LENGTHS, not token counts — the basis for an explicit estimate, never\na measured figure (spec 103, contracts/replay-input.md).\n\nZero means UNKNOWN, not free: legacy records predate the measurement and\ncode-execution sub-calls record both as zero. Hence omitempty — an absent\nkey tells a consumer to fall to exclusion accounting, whereas a present\nzero would read as a costless call and silently understate the workload.","type":"integer"},"request_id":{"description":"HTTP request ID for correlation","type":"string"},"response":{"description":"Tool response (potentially truncated)","type":"string"},"response_bytes":{"description":"Raw upstream response size in bytes before truncation","type":"integer"},"response_truncated":{"description":"True if response was truncated","type":"boolean"},"server_name":{"description":"Name of upstream MCP server","type":"string"},"session_id":{"description":"MCP transport session ID (regenerated on every reconnect)","type":"string"},"source":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ActivitySource"},"status":{"description":"Result status: \"success\", \"error\", \"blocked\", \"rejected\"","type":"string"},"timestamp":{"description":"When activity occurred","type":"string"},"tool_name":{"description":"Name of tool called","type":"string"},"type":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ActivityType"},"work_session_id":{"description":"Spec 082: one client, one project, across reconnects","type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"contracts.ActivitySource":{"description":"How activity was triggered: \"mcp\", \"cli\", \"api\"","type":"string","x-enum-varnames":["ActivitySourceMCP","ActivitySourceCLI","ActivitySourceAPI"]},"contracts.ActivitySummaryResponse":{"properties":{"blocked_count":{"description":"Count of blocked activities","type":"integer"},"call_count":{"description":"CallCount is how many of those records are CALLS THE USER MADE, as\ndefined once in storage.CountsAsCall and shared with the usage aggregate\nbehind the Usage tab (audit finding F1, #1046). TotalCount answers \"how\nmany rows does the Activity Log have\"; CallCount answers \"how many calls\nwere there\". They are different questions — quarantine auto-approvals,\nsystem start, security scans and management chatter are events, not calls\n— and printing either one under the other's label is how the same instance\ncame to report 51 calls on one screen and 19 on another.","type":"integer"},"call_error_count":{"description":"CallErrorCount is the failures within CallCount, so an error RATE computed\nfrom this response has one denominator. It is not ErrorCount: a policy\nblock is a failed call but carries status \"blocked\", and a shed call is an\nerror in neither sense because it never ran.","type":"integer"},"end_time":{"description":"End of the period (RFC3339)","type":"string"},"error_count":{"description":"Count of error activities","type":"integer"},"other_count":{"description":"OtherCount is every record whose status is outside the four-value\nvocabulary above, so that\n\n\tsuccess + error + blocked + rejected + other == total\n\nholds by construction. The status field is a CLOSED vocabulary for tool\ncalls, but the activity log is wider than tool calls: a quarantine change\nstores its ACTION there (\"approved\", \"auto_approved\"), a policy decision\nstores its DECISION (\"allow\"). Those rows were counted in the total and in\nnone of the four buckets, so the Activity Log's own status tiles summed to\nless than the denominator printed beside them — 15+4+0+0 under a \"42\"\n(audit finding F2, #1046). The residual now has a name and a tile.","type":"integer"},"period":{"description":"Time period (1h, 24h, 7d, 30d)","type":"string"},"rejected_count":{"description":"RejectedCount is the number of calls shed by a concurrency limiter before\nthey reached an upstream (spec 093). Counted separately from errors: it is\nproxy backpressure, not an upstream fault, and it is the signal an\noperator right-sizes max_concurrent_requests against.","type":"integer"},"start_time":{"description":"Start of the period (RFC3339)","type":"string"},"success_count":{"description":"Count of successful activities","type":"integer"},"top_servers":{"description":"Top servers by activity count","items":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ActivityTopServer"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"top_tools":{"description":"Top tools by activity count","items":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ActivityTopTool"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"total_count":{"description":"Total activity count","type":"integer"}},"type":"object"},"contracts.ActivityTopServer":{"properties":{"count":{"description":"Activity count","type":"integer"},"name":{"description":"Server name","type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"contracts.ActivityTopTool":{"properties":{"count":{"description":"Activity count","type":"integer"},"server":{"description":"Server name","type":"string"},"tool":{"description":"Tool name","type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"contracts.ActivityType":{"description":"Type of activity","type":"string","x-enum-varnames":["ActivityTypeToolCall","ActivityTypePolicyDecision","ActivityTypeQuarantineChange","ActivityTypeServerChange"]},"contracts.AddFromRegistryRequest":{"properties":{"enabled":{"description":"defaults to true when nil","type":"boolean"},"env":{"additionalProperties":{"type":"string"},"description":"overrides + required-input values","type":"object"},"name":{"description":"optional name override","type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"contracts.AddRegistrySourceRequest":{"properties":{"id":{"description":"derived from the host when empty","type":"string"},"name":{"description":"defaults to the id","type":"string"},"protocol":{"description":"defaults to modelcontextprotocol/registry","type":"string"},"url":{"description":"required https registry URL","type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"contracts.ConfigApplyResult":{"properties":{"applied_immediately":{"type":"boolean"},"changed_fields":{"items":{"type":"string"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"requires_restart":{"type":"boolean"},"restart_reason":{"type":"string"},"success":{"type":"boolean"},"validation_errors":{"items":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ValidationError"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false}},"type":"object"},"contracts.DCRStatus":{"properties":{"attempted":{"type":"boolean"},"error":{"type":"string"},"status_code":{"type":"integer"},"success":{"type":"boolean"}},"type":"object"},"contracts.DeepScanDescriptor":{"description":"DeepScan reports the opt-in \"deep scan\" layer status (Spec 077 US3),\nSEPARATELY from the baseline verdict above. Always emitted on a computed\nsummary — when deep scan is off (the default) it reports enabled=false\nplus any enabled-but-skipped Docker scanners. It never influences Status.","properties":{"available":{"type":"boolean"},"enabled":{"type":"boolean"},"ran":{"type":"boolean"},"scanners_failed":{"items":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.DeepScanScannerFailure"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"skipped_scanners":{"description":"SkippedScanners lists Docker scanners the user enabled that are skipped\nbecause security.deep_scan.enabled is false (informational).","items":{"type":"string"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false}},"type":"object"},"contracts.DeepScanScannerFailure":{"properties":{"id":{"type":"string"},"reason":{"type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"contracts.DeprecatedConfigWarning":{"properties":{"field":{"type":"string"},"message":{"type":"string"},"replacement":{"type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"contracts.Diagnostic":{"description":"Spec 044 — structured diagnostic error and stable error code. Both\nare populated when the server is in a failed state and the error\nhas been classified by internal/diagnostics. Healthy servers omit\nthese fields.","properties":{"cause":{"type":"string"},"code":{"type":"string"},"detected_at":{"type":"string"},"docs_url":{"type":"string"},"fix_steps":{"items":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.DiagnosticFixStep"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"severity":{"type":"string"},"user_message":{"type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"contracts.DiagnosticFixStep":{"properties":{"command":{"type":"string"},"destructive":{"type":"boolean"},"fixer_key":{"type":"string"},"label":{"type":"string"},"type":{"type":"string"},"url":{"type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"contracts.Diagnostics":{"properties":{"deprecated_configs":{"description":"Deprecated config fields found","items":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.DeprecatedConfigWarning"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"docker_status":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.DockerStatus"},"missing_secrets":{"description":"Renamed to avoid 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The field is omitted for agent-token callers and for tools with\nno stored hash (no approval record yet, or a record written before\nhashes existed).","type":"string"},"held_reason":{"description":"HeldReason, HeldVerdict and HeldSignals mirror the same-named fields on\nstorage.ToolApprovalRecord: the offline-scan evidence that made\ntrust_mode: scan hold this tool for review (spec 086 FR-018). HeldSignals\nnames the matched deterministic check ids, e.g.\n\"tpa.TPA-2026-0001.hidden_instruction\", so a reviewer can see WHY the tool\nis held. All three are omitted for tools that are not held by the scan gate\n(including every record written before the field existed).","type":"string"},"held_signals":{"items":{"type":"string"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"held_verdict":{"type":"string"},"last_used":{"type":"string"},"name":{"type":"string"},"schema":{"type":"object"},"server_name":{"type":"string"},"usage":{"type":"integer"}},"type":"object"},"contracts.ToolAnnotation":{"description":"Tool behavior hints snapshot","properties":{"destructiveHint":{"type":"boolean"},"idempotentHint":{"type":"boolean"},"openWorldHint":{"type":"boolean"},"readOnlyHint":{"type":"boolean"},"title":{"type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"contracts.ToolCallRecord":{"description":"The new tool call record","properties":{"annotations":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ToolAnnotation"},"arguments":{"description":"Tool arguments","type":"object"},"arguments_truncated":{"description":"ArgumentsTruncated marks Arguments as a placeholder rather than the\narguments the tool was called with. Replaying such a record without\nsupplying arguments explicitly is refused.","type":"boolean"},"config_path":{"description":"Active config file path","type":"string"},"duration":{"description":"Duration in nanoseconds","type":"integer"},"error":{"description":"Error message (failure only)","type":"string"},"execution_type":{"description":"\"direct\" or \"code_execution\"","type":"string"},"id":{"description":"Unique identifier","type":"string"},"mcp_client_name":{"description":"MCP client name from InitializeRequest","type":"string"},"mcp_client_version":{"description":"MCP client version","type":"string"},"mcp_session_id":{"description":"MCP session identifier","type":"string"},"metrics":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.TokenMetrics"},"parent_call_id":{"description":"Links nested calls to parent code_execution","type":"string"},"request_id":{"description":"Request correlation ID","type":"string"},"response":{"description":"Tool response (success only)","type":"object"},"response_bytes":{"description":"Marshalled response size before truncation","type":"integer"},"response_truncated":{"description":"ResponseTruncated and ResponseBytes describe a STORAGE-side cut (#1176):\nthe caller received the response whole, and only the persisted copy was\nshortened to tool_call_max_response_size. When ResponseTruncated is true\nthe Response object carries {truncated, original_bytes, preview, note}\ninstead of the upstream result, and ResponseBytes is its size before the\ncut.","type":"boolean"},"server_id":{"description":"Server identity hash","type":"string"},"server_name":{"description":"Human-readable server name","type":"string"},"timestamp":{"description":"When the call was made","type":"string"},"tool_name":{"description":"Tool name (without server prefix)","type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"contracts.UpdateInfo":{"description":"Update information (if available)","properties":{"available":{"description":"Whether an update is available","type":"boolean"},"behind_summary":{"description":"Spec 079 FR-002 — how far behind the running build is. All four are\nadditive (FR-021) and absent when the delta could not be resolved, in\nwhich case every surface renders its pre-delta wording.","type":"string"},"check_error":{"description":"Error message if update check failed","type":"string"},"checked_at":{"description":"When the update check was performed","type":"string"},"install_channel":{"description":"Detected install channel (homebrew, dmg, deb, rpm, docker, go-install, windows-installer, tarball, unknown) — Spec 079 FR-008","type":"string"},"is_prerelease":{"description":"Whether the latest version is a prerelease","type":"boolean"},"latest_version":{"description":"Latest version available (e.g., \"v1.2.3\")","type":"string"},"nudges_suppressed":{"description":"UI surfaces must stay quiet (CI / non-interactive context); machine-readable fields still report the facts — Spec 079 FR-019","type":"boolean"},"release_url":{"description":"URL to the release page","type":"string"},"releases_behind":{"description":"Releases on the offered channel between the running and offered versions","type":"integer"},"releases_behind_saturated":{"description":"ReleasesBehind is a lower bound: the running build predates the scanned release window","type":"boolean"},"update_command":{"description":"One-line update command for the channel; only set when an update is available and the channel has one — Spec 079 FR-009","type":"string"},"weeks_behind":{"description":"Whole weeks between the two releases' publish dates; 0 is a real value, absent means unknown","type":"integer"}},"type":"object"},"contracts.UpdatePolicy":{"description":"UpdatePolicy is the effective, hot-reloadable update policy (Spec 092\nFR-015). Always present: the ` + "`" + `update` + "`" + ` object above is omitted both when\nupdate checking is disabled AND when no check has produced a result\nyet, so its absence cannot tell a client whether it is allowed to run\nits own (e.g. Sparkle feed) check. This field states the answer.","properties":{"channel":{"description":"Channel is the tracked release channel: \"stable\" or \"rc\".","type":"string"},"enabled":{"description":"Enabled is the effective automatic-check kill switch: update_check.enabled\nwith MCPPROXY_DISABLE_AUTO_UPDATE=true winning over it. A user-initiated\n\"Check for Updates\" stays available regardless.","type":"boolean"},"nudges_suppressed":{"description":"NudgesSuppressed asks UI surfaces to stay quiet (CI / non-interactive)\nwhile machine-readable fields keep reporting the facts.","type":"boolean"}},"type":"object"},"contracts.UpstreamError":{"properties":{"error_message":{"type":"string"},"server_name":{"type":"string"},"timestamp":{"type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"contracts.UsageAggregateResponse":{"properties":{"freshness_ms":{"description":"age of the underlying snapshot in ms","type":"integer"},"generated_at":{"type":"string"},"other":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.UsageOtherBucket"},"timeline":{"items":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.UsageTimeBucket"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"token_source":{"description":"\"bytes\" (size-based proxy, FR-006)","type":"string"},"tokens_saved":{"description":"echoed from ServerTokenMetrics (FR-007)","type":"integer"},"tokens_saved_percentage":{"type":"number"},"tools":{"items":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.UsageToolStat"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"total_calls":{"description":"TotalCalls and TotalErrors are the headline counts for the window: the sum\nof the timeline this same response carries, so the tiles and the histogram\nunder them cannot disagree. They are NOT the sum of Tools — that list is\nlifetime-cumulative, upstream-only and truncated to top-N, and summing it\nclient-side is what made the Usage tab print a third number for the same\n24 hours (audit finding F1, #1046). The population is\nstorage.CountsAsCall, shared with ActivitySummaryResponse.CallCount.\n\nTwo bounds on how exactly this matches the Activity Log's own count.\nBoth are bounded and disclosed, unlike the population mismatch they\nreplace, which was unbounded and silent:\n\n  - Window granularity is the timeline's: whole hour buckets, so the span\n    is the requested window rounded up to a bucket edge.\n  - This response is served from a snapshot behind a short read cache\n    (observability.usage_cache_ttl, 5s by default) so the endpoint never\n    scans the activity log per request, while the summary endpoint counts\n    live. Calls that land inside that window appear on the Activity Log\n    first. FreshnessMs and GeneratedAt say how old the figures are, and\n    the Usage tab prints it (\"Updated 3s ago\").","type":"integer"},"total_errors":{"type":"integer"},"window":{"type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"contracts.UsageOtherBucket":{"description":"present only when the list was truncated to top-N","properties":{"calls":{"type":"integer"},"tools_folded":{"type":"integer"},"total_resp_bytes":{"type":"integer"}},"type":"object"},"contracts.UsageTimeBucket":{"properties":{"calls":{"type":"integer"},"errors":{"type":"integer"},"start":{"type":"string"},"total_resp_bytes":{"type":"integer"}},"type":"object"},"contracts.UsageToolStat":{"properties":{"avg_req_bytes":{"description":"null when no sized request calls","type":"integer"},"avg_resp_bytes":{"description":"null when sized_calls == 0 (only legacy 0-byte calls)","type":"integer"},"blocked":{"type":"integer"},"calls":{"type":"integer"},"error_rate":{"type":"number"},"errors":{"type":"integer"},"last_used":{"type":"string"},"p50_exceeds":{"type":"boolean"},"p50_ms":{"description":"P50Ms and P95Ms are read off a fixed latency histogram, so they are BUCKET\nBOUNDS, not measured durations: the true percentile is at or below the\nvalue, and a client must render it as a bound (\"≤ 5 ms\"). 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Nil means\n\"leave unchanged\" on PATCH; a present map is deep-merged via\nconfig.MergeAnnotationOverrides with RFC7396 null-means-delete for\nwhole-tool entries and per-hint nulls. See config.ToolAnnotations.","type":"object"},"args":{"items":{"type":"string"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"auto_approve_tool_changes":{"description":"AutoApproveToolChanges is the per-server intent to auto-approve\nnew/changed tools past the trust baseline (MCP-2930). Tri-state *bool:\na nil pointer means \"leave unchanged\" on PATCH; a present value\n(including false) is applied. Mirrors config.ServerConfig's *bool\nsemantics — do NOT collapse to a plain bool, or an omitted field would\nsilently reset a previously-set value.","type":"boolean"},"command":{"type":"string"},"enabled":{"type":"boolean"},"env":{"additionalProperties":{"type":"string"},"type":"object"},"expose_prompts":{"description":"ExposePrompts is the per-server override for prompt aggregation (F9):\nwhether this server's advertised MCP prompts are merged into mcpproxy's\nprompts/list. Tri-state *bool mirroring config.ServerConfig.ExposePrompts —\na nil pointer means \"leave unchanged\" on PATCH (and \"inherit the default\naggregate behavior\" on create); a present value (including false) is applied.","type":"boolean"},"headers":{"additionalProperties":{"type":"string"},"type":"object"},"init_timeout":{"description":"InitTimeout is the per-server MCP ` + "`" + `initialize` + "`" + ` handshake deadline override\n(MCP-3322 / GH #760), serialized as a duration string (e.g. \"120s\"). A nil\npointer means \"leave unchanged\" on PATCH; a present value is applied.\nMirrors config.ServerConfig.InitTimeout's *Duration tri-state.","type":"string"},"isolation":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/httpapi.IsolationRequest"},"max_concurrent_requests":{"description":"MaxConcurrentRequests / QueueSize / QueueTimeout are the per-server\nconcurrency overrides (spec 093 / GH #955, FR-020 scope (c)). Each is\ntri-state: a nil pointer means \"leave unchanged\" on PATCH and \"inherit\nserver_concurrency_defaults\" on create; an explicit 0 disables that\nsetting for this server; a positive value overrides it. Do NOT collapse\nthem to plain values — an omitted field would then silently reset a\nconfigured limit.","type":"integer"},"name":{"type":"string"},"protocol":{"type":"string"},"quarantined":{"type":"boolean"},"queue_size":{"type":"integer"},"queue_timeout":{"type":"string"},"reconnect_on_use":{"type":"boolean"},"trust_mode":{"description":"TrustMode is the per-server trust tier (spec 086): \"auto\", \"scan\", or\n\"manual\". Empty means \"leave unchanged\" on PATCH (and inherit the migrated\ndefault on create). A non-empty value is applied to ServerConfig.TrustMode\nand resolved by EffectiveTrustMode (an unrecognized value fails closed to\nmanual). This is the REST seam for changing the trust tier via\nPOST/PATCH /api/v1/servers.","type":"string"},"url":{"type":"string"},"working_dir":{"type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"httpapi.CanonicalConfigPath":{"properties":{"description":{"description":"Brief description","type":"string"},"exists":{"description":"Whether the file exists","type":"boolean"},"format":{"description":"Format identifier (e.g., \"claude_desktop\")","type":"string"},"name":{"description":"Display name (e.g., \"Claude Desktop\")","type":"string"},"os":{"description":"Operating system (darwin, windows, linux)","type":"string"},"path":{"description":"Full path to the config file","type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"httpapi.CanonicalConfigPathsResponse":{"properties":{"os":{"description":"Current operating system","type":"string"},"paths":{"description":"List of canonical config paths","items":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/httpapi.CanonicalConfigPath"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false}},"type":"object"},"httpapi.ConnectConflictResponse":{"properties":{"action":{"description":"already_exists | precondition_failed","type":"string"},"data":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/connect.ConnectResult"},"error":{"description":"Human-readable message","type":"string"},"success":{"description":"Always false","type":"boolean"}},"type":"object"},"httpapi.ConnectRequest":{"properties":{"force":{"description":"Overwrite existing entry","type":"boolean"},"precondition_token":{"description":"PreconditionToken is the opaque token from the preview this write was\nconfirmed against (Spec 091 FR-005). When present, the core rechecks it\nat write time and responds 409 with action \"precondition_failed\" —\nwriting nothing — if the config or the entry MCPProxy would write has\ndrifted since; the caller then re-previews instead of retrying. Absent\nmeans exactly the pre-091 behavior. A replace-classified flow sends this\nTOGETHER with force=true: the token, not the absence of force, is the\noverwrite safety.","type":"string"},"server_name":{"description":"Defaults to \"mcpproxy\"","type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"httpapi.ImportFromPathRequest":{"properties":{"format":{"description":"Optional format hint","type":"string"},"path":{"description":"File path to import from","type":"string"},"rename":{"additionalProperties":{"type":"string"},"description":"Rename maps a server name → new name. Applied after parsing so the\ncaller can disambiguate cross-source name collisions (Spec 046 v2 —\ne.g. \"mcpproxy\" → \"mcpproxy_claude_code\"). Keys are matched against\neither the raw source name (OriginalName) or the sanitized name shown\nin the preview (Server.Name); these differ for names that need\nsanitizing (e.g. \"Figma Desktop\" → \"Figma_Desktop\"). Keys not present\nin the imported set are ignored.","type":"object"},"server_names":{"description":"Optional: import only these servers","items":{"type":"string"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false}},"type":"object"},"httpapi.ImportRequest":{"properties":{"content":{"description":"Raw JSON or TOML content","type":"string"},"format":{"description":"Optional format hint","type":"string"},"server_names":{"description":"Optional: import only these servers","items":{"type":"string"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false}},"type":"object"},"httpapi.ImportResponse":{"properties":{"failed":{"items":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/configimport.FailedServer"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"format":{"type":"string"},"format_name":{"type":"string"},"imported":{"items":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/httpapi.ImportedServerResponse"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"skipped":{"items":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/configimport.SkippedServer"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"summary":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/configimport.ImportSummary"},"warnings":{"items":{"type":"string"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false}},"type":"object"},"httpapi.ImportedServerResponse":{"properties":{"args":{"items":{"type":"string"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"command":{"type":"string"},"fields_skipped":{"items":{"type":"string"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"name":{"type":"string"},"original_name":{"type":"string"},"protocol":{"type":"string"},"source_format":{"type":"string"},"url":{"type":"string"},"warnings":{"items":{"type":"string"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false}},"type":"object"},"httpapi.IsolationRequest":{"description":"Isolation carries per-server Docker isolation overrides (enabled,\nmode_override, image, network_mode, extra_args, working_dir). A nil\npointer means \"do not touch isolation config\". A present object is\napplied field-by-field ON TOP of the persisted overrides, so omitting a\nfield leaves it alone; clear an individual override by sending it\nexplicitly (` + "`" + `\"enabled\": null` + "`" + `, ` + "`" + `\"image\": \"\"` + "`" + `).","properties":{"enabled":{"description":"Enabled exists ONLY to detect and reject an echoed-back read. It is the\neffective state on the read surface and is never writable; see validate().","type":"boolean"},"enabled_override":{"description":"EnabledOverride is the tri-state per-server override — the RAW value, the\nsame one reads return as ` + "`" + `enabled_override` + "`" + `. It has THREE meaningful wire\nstates, and collapsing them is what silently un-isolated servers\n(GH #1142):\n  - absent          → leave the persisted override untouched\n  - null            → clear the override, back to inheriting the global\n  - true / false    → set an explicit opt-in / opt-out","type":"boolean"},"extra_args":{"items":{"type":"string"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"image":{"type":"string"},"mode_override":{"description":"ModeOverride sets ` + "`" + `isolation.mode` + "`" + ` (\"docker\" | \"sandbox\" | \"none\").\nnil leaves the persisted value alone; an empty string clears it. An\nunrecognized value is rejected with a 400 rather than persisted.","type":"string"},"network_mode":{"type":"string"},"working_dir":{"type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"httpapi.OnboardingMarkRequest":{"properties":{"connect_step_status":{"description":"ConnectStepStatus is one of: \"\", \"completed\", \"skipped\". Empty\npreserves the existing value. The stored enum is wider (Spec 080\nFR-001): a \"skipped\" request for a previously untouched connect step\nis upgraded server-side to \"completed_external\" when the install\nshows positive evidence of an external connection (Spec 080 FR-002).\n\"completed_external\" is NOT accepted from clients — it must never be\npersisted without that server-verified evidence (edge case: \"never\nguess completed_external without positive evidence\").","type":"string"},"engaged":{"description":"Engaged marks the wizard as engaged (completed or explicitly skipped).\nOnce true, the wizard does not auto-show again.","type":"boolean"},"mark_shown":{"description":"MarkShown records the wizard's first display time if not already set.","type":"boolean"},"server_step_status":{"description":"ServerStepStatus is one of: \"\", \"completed\", \"skipped\". Empty\npreserves the existing value.","type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"httpapi.SetActiveProfileRequest":{"properties":{"active_profile":{"type":"string"},"profile":{"type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"httpapi.UndoConnectRequest":{"properties":{"backup_name":{"description":"BackupName is the bare filename (filepath.Base) of the backup returned as\nbackup_path by the preceding connect — a name, never a path. Undo resolves\nthe full path server-side by joining it with the client's own config\ndirectory, so a client-supplied value can never contribute a directory\ncomponent (traversal is impossible by construction). Empty means the\nconnect created the file (no prior file existed), so undo removes it.","type":"string"},"server_name":{"description":"Defaults to \"mcpproxy\"","type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"httpapi.UpdateFailureRequest":{"properties":{"stage":{"description":"Stage is the failure stage of the update session.","enum":["appcast","download","install","other"],"type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"management.BulkOperationResult":{"properties":{"errors":{"additionalProperties":{"type":"string"},"description":"Map of server name to error message","type":"object"},"failed":{"description":"Number of failed operations","type":"integer"},"successful":{"description":"Number of successful operations","type":"integer"},"total":{"description":"Total servers processed","type":"integer"}},"type":"object"},"observability.HealthResponse":{"properties":{"components":{"items":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/observability.HealthStatus"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"status":{"description":"\"healthy\" or \"unhealthy\"","type":"string"},"timestamp":{"type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"observability.HealthStatus":{"properties":{"error":{"type":"string"},"latency":{"type":"string"},"name":{"type":"string"},"status":{"description":"\"healthy\" or \"unhealthy\"","type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"observability.ReadinessResponse":{"properties":{"components":{"items":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/observability.HealthStatus"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"status":{"description":"\"ready\" or \"not_ready\"","type":"string"},"timestamp":{"type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"secureenv.EnvConfig":{"description":"Environment configuration for secure variable filtering","properties":{"allowed_system_vars":{"items":{"type":"string"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"custom_vars":{"additionalProperties":{"type":"string"},"type":"object"},"enhance_path":{"description":"Enable PATH enhancement for Launchd scenarios","type":"boolean"},"forward_proxy_env":{"description":"ForwardProxyEnv opts in to forwarding the ambient HTTP(S)/ALL/NO/FTP proxy\nenvironment variables to spawned upstream servers (MCP-2769). It is OFF by\ndefault and deliberately kept out of the AllowedSystemVars default list:\nproxy URLs frequently carry credentials (http://user:pass@proxy), so\nforwarding them to every stdio upstream is a credential-leak risk. When\nenabled, values are forwarded with their userinfo (credentials) redacted.","type":"boolean"},"inherit_system_safe":{"type":"boolean"}},"type":"object"},"telemetry.FeedbackContext":{"properties":{"arch":{"type":"string"},"connected_server_count":{"type":"integer"},"edition":{"type":"string"},"os":{"type":"string"},"routing_mode":{"type":"string"},"server_count":{"type":"integer"},"version":{"type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"telemetry.FeedbackRequest":{"properties":{"category":{"description":"bug, feature, other","type":"string"},"context":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/telemetry.FeedbackContext"},"email":{"type":"string"},"message":{"type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"telemetry.FeedbackResponse":{"properties":{"error":{"type":"string"},"issue_url":{"type":"string"},"success":{"type":"boolean"}},"type":"object"}},"securitySchemes":{"ApiKeyAuth":{"description":"API key authentication via query parameter. Use ?apikey=your-key","in":"query","name":"apikey","type":"apiKey"}}},
     "info": {"contact":{"name":"MCPProxy Support","url":"https://github.com/smart-mcp-proxy/mcpproxy-go"},"description":"{{escape .Description}}","license":{"name":"MIT","url":"https://opensource.org/licenses/MIT"},"title":"{{.Title}}","version":"{{.Version}}"},
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Served from an in-memory snapshot — never a per-request full-log scan. Per-tool metrics are lifetime-cumulative; ` + "`" + `window` + "`" + ` scopes the timeline and filters the tool list to tools active within the span.","parameters":[{"description":"Time window for timeline + tool-list membership","in":"query","name":"window","schema":{"enum":["24h","7d","all"],"type":"string"}},{"description":"Filter to one server","in":"query","name":"server","schema":{"type":"string"}},{"description":"Filter to one tool","in":"query","name":"tool","schema":{"type":"string"}},{"description":"Filter to tools with activity of this status","in":"query","name":"status","schema":{"enum":["success","error","blocked","rejected"],"type":"string"}},{"description":"Top-N tools by sort key; remainder folded into 'other' (default 20)","in":"query","name":"top","schema":{"type":"integer"}},{"description":"Ranking key for the per-tool list","in":"query","name":"sort","schema":{"enum":["calls","resp_bytes","error_rate","p95"],"type":"string"}}],"requestBody":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"type":"object"}}}},"responses":{"200":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"allOf":[{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/data"}],"properties":{"data":{"type":"object"},"error":{"type":"string"},"request_id":{"type":"string"},"success":{"type":"boolean"}},"type":"object"}}},"description":"OK"},"400":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.APIResponse"}}},"description":"Bad Request"},"401":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.APIResponse"}}},"description":"Unauthorized"}},"security":[{"ApiKeyHeader":[]},{"ApiKeyQuery":[]}],"summary":"Get usage statistics aggregate","tags":["Activity"]}},"/api/v1/activity/{id}":{"get":{"description":"Returns full details for a single activity record","parameters":[{"description":"Activity record ID (ULID)","in":"path","name":"id","required":true,"schema":{"type":"string"}}],"requestBody":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"type":"object"}}}},"responses":{"200":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"allOf":[{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/data"}],"properties":{"data":{"type":"object"},"error":{"type":"string"},"request_id":{"type":"string"},"success":{"type":"boolean"}},"type":"object"}}},"description":"OK"},"401":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.APIResponse"}}},"description":"Unauthorized"},"404":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.APIResponse"}}},"description":"Not Found"},"500":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.APIResponse"}}},"description":"Internal Server Error"}},"security":[{"ApiKeyHeader":[]},{"ApiKeyQuery":[]}],"summary":"Get activity record details","tags":["Activity"]}},"/api/v1/annotations/coverage":{"get":{"description":"Reports how many upstream tools have MCP annotations vs don't, broken down by server","responses":{"200":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.SuccessResponse"}}},"description":"Annotation coverage report"}},"security":[{"ApiKeyAuth":[]},{"ApiKeyQuery":[]}],"summary":"Get annotation coverage report","tags":["annotations"]}},"/api/v1/code/scripts":{"get":{"description":"List the stored scripts available to the code_execution tool. Scripts are ` + "`" + `\u003cname\u003e.js` + "`" + ` / ` + "`" + `\u003cname\u003e.ts` + "`" + ` files in the ` + "`" + `scripts/` + "`" + ` directory next to the active configuration file. Entries are advisory: ` + "`" + `ok` + "`" + ` scripts are invocable, ` + "`" + `ambiguous` + "`" + ` names have both extensions, and ` + "`" + `invalid` + "`" + ` ones report why (empty, oversized, unreadable, non-regular). Read-only — there is no write surface for stored scripts. Administrator-only (Spec 105 FR-012): an agent token, whatever its server scope, is refused with 403 — the listing is the enumeration the missing-script error withholds from a scoped caller.","responses":{"200":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.SuccessResponse"}}},"description":"Stored scripts and the directory they were read from"},"403":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Agent tokens cannot list stored scripts"},"500":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Internal server error"}},"security":[{"ApiKeyAuth":[]},{"ApiKeyQuery":[]}],"summary":"List stored code-execution scripts","tags":["code"]}},"/api/v1/config":{"get":{"description":"Retrieves the current MCPProxy configuration including all server definitions, global settings, and runtime parameters","responses":{"200":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.GetConfigResponse"}}},"description":"Configuration retrieved successfully"},"401":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Unauthorized - missing or invalid API key"},"403":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Agent tokens cannot read the configuration document"},"500":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Failed to get configuration"}},"security":[{"ApiKeyAuth":[]},{"ApiKeyQuery":[]}],"summary":"Get current configuration","tags":["config"]},"patch":{"description":"Deep-merges only the fields present in the request body onto the live in-memory configuration and routes the result through the existing apply pipeline (validation, change detection, disk persistence, hot-reload). Fields the client omits — including masked secrets such as ` + "`" + `api_key` + "`" + ` and secret request headers — are preserved verbatim. Nested objects are merged recursively; arrays and scalars replace wholesale.","requestBody":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"type":"object"}}},"description":"Partial configuration with only the fields to change","required":true},"responses":{"200":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ConfigApplyResult"}}},"description":"Configuration patch applied (inspect validation_errors for rejected values)"},"400":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Invalid JSON payload or empty patch"},"401":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Unauthorized - missing or invalid API key"},"403":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Forbidden (agent tokens cannot mutate configuration)"},"500":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Failed to read or apply configuration"}},"security":[{"ApiKeyAuth":[]},{"ApiKeyQuery":[]}],"summary":"Partially update configuration","tags":["config"]}},"/api/v1/config/apply":{"post":{"description":"Applies a new MCPProxy configuration. 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Persists to disk via the existing config writer — the file watcher then hot-reloads the change. Returns the new state and whether a restart is required for existing connections to pick it up.","requestBody":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"properties":{"enabled":{"type":"boolean"}},"type":"object"}}},"description":"New isolation state","required":true},"responses":{"200":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ConfigApplyResult"}}},"description":"Isolation toggle applied"},"400":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Invalid JSON payload"},"401":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Unauthorized - missing or invalid API key"},"403":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Forbidden (agent tokens cannot mutate configuration)"},"500":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Failed to apply configuration"}},"security":[{"ApiKeyAuth":[]},{"ApiKeyQuery":[]}],"summary":"Toggle global Docker isolation","tags":["config"]}},"/api/v1/config/validate":{"post":{"description":"Validates a provided MCPProxy configuration without applying it. 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Resolves access_state to\naccessible|absent|denied|malformed and populates remediation when denied.","parameters":[{"description":"Client ID (claude-code, claude-desktop, cursor, windsurf, vscode, codex, gemini, opencode)","in":"path","name":"client","required":true,"schema":{"type":"string"}}],"responses":{"200":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.APIResponse"}}},"description":"ClientStatus"},"404":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Unknown client"},"503":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Service unavailable"}},"security":[{"ApiKeyAuth":[]},{"ApiKeyQuery":[]}],"summary":"Get a single client's connection status (on-demand)","tags":["connect"]},"post":{"description":"Register MCPProxy as an MCP server in the specified client's configuration file.\nCreates a backup of the existing config before modifying.\nOptionally accepts precondition_token from a preview (Spec 091): when supplied,\nthe core rechecks the raw pre-write state and the entry it would write, and\nrefuses a drifted write with 409 before taking any backup. The 409 body's\naction discriminates the two conflict kinds: \"precondition_failed\" (stale\npreview — re-preview, do not retry) vs \"already_exists\" (entry present — pass\nforce=true). force=true never rescues a stale token.","parameters":[{"description":"Client ID (claude-code, claude-desktop, cursor, windsurf, vscode, codex, gemini, opencode)","in":"path","name":"client","required":true,"schema":{"type":"string"}}],"requestBody":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/httpapi.ConnectRequest"}}},"description":"Optional connection parameters (server_name, force, precondition_token)"},"responses":{"200":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.APIResponse"}}},"description":"ConnectResult"},"400":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Bad request"},"403":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Permission denied (macOS App-Data block)"},"404":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Unknown client"},"409":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/httpapi.ConnectConflictResponse"}}},"description":"Conflict: action=already_exists (use force=true) or action=precondition_failed (preview is stale; re-preview)"},"503":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Service unavailable"}},"security":[{"ApiKeyAuth":[]},{"ApiKeyQuery":[]}],"summary":"Connect MCPProxy to a client","tags":["connect"]}},"/api/v1/connect/{client}/preview":{"get":{"description":"Returns the exact entry a subsequent connect would add to the client's\nconfig — target path, server key, entry name, and entry contents — WITHOUT\nmodifying the file or creating a backup (Spec 078 US1). The embedded API key\nis masked in the payload; contains_api_key flags that a credential is written.\nentry_exists distinguishes a create from an overwrite of a same-named entry.\nReads the config on demand to classify create-vs-overwrite, so on macOS this\nmay raise an App-Data privacy prompt; a denial returns 403 + remediation.\nSpec 091 adds three fields: existing_entry_summary (present only when\nentry_exists — a sanitized, non-secret projection of the entry being replaced:\nits name, type, endpoint with query/userinfo stripped, command, and header and\nenv NAMES, never values); precondition_token (always present — an opaque keyed\ndigest of the raw pre-write state and the pending entry, echoed back on POST\nconnect to detect drift); and connect_refusal (present when the write would\nrefuse regardless of intent, e.g. a non-create-capable client with no config —\ntreat its presence as \"Connect unavailable\").","parameters":[{"description":"Client ID (claude-code, claude-desktop, cursor, windsurf, vscode, codex, gemini, opencode)","in":"path","name":"client","required":true,"schema":{"type":"string"}},{"description":"Entry name to preview (defaults to mcpproxy); mirror the value passed to POST connect","in":"query","name":"server_name","schema":{"type":"string"}}],"responses":{"200":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.APIResponse"}}},"description":"ConnectPreview"},"403":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Permission denied (macOS App-Data block)"},"404":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Unknown client"},"503":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Service unavailable"}},"security":[{"ApiKeyAuth":[]},{"ApiKeyQuery":[]}],"summary":"Preview the change a connect would make (no write)","tags":["connect"]}},"/api/v1/connect/{client}/undo":{"post":{"description":"Reverts the connect that produced the named backup (Spec 078 US3):\nrestores the client config byte-for-byte from that backup, or — when\nbackup_name is empty because the connect created the file — deletes the\ncreated file. backup_name is the bare filename of the backup the connect\nreturned (never a path); undo resolves the full path server-side inside\nthe client's own config directory, so a client value cannot escape it.\nRefuses with 409 when the config changed since the connect (undo never\nclobbers later edits; use DELETE /connect/{client} for a surgical entry\nremoval instead). Takes its own safety backup first; its path is returned\nas backup_path in the result.","parameters":[{"description":"Client ID (claude-code, claude-desktop, cursor, windsurf, vscode, codex, gemini, opencode)","in":"path","name":"client","required":true,"schema":{"type":"string"}}],"requestBody":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/httpapi.UndoConnectRequest"}}},"description":"Undo parameters (server_name, backup_name = the bare filename of the backup the preceding connect returned)"},"responses":{"200":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.APIResponse"}}},"description":"ConnectResult (action restored|deleted)"},"400":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Bad request (e.g. backup_name is a path, or not a backup of this client's config)"},"403":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Permission denied (macOS App-Data block)"},"404":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Unknown client or backup no longer exists"},"409":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Config changed since connect; undo refused"},"503":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Service unavailable"}},"security":[{"ApiKeyAuth":[]},{"ApiKeyQuery":[]}],"summary":"Undo a connect, restoring the pre-connect config","tags":["connect"]}},"/api/v1/diagnostics":{"get":{"description":"Get comprehensive health diagnostics including upstream errors, OAuth requirements, missing secrets, and Docker status","responses":{"200":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.Diagnostics"}}},"description":"Health diagnostics"},"500":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Internal server error"}},"security":[{"ApiKeyAuth":[]},{"ApiKeyQuery":[]}],"summary":"Get health diagnostics","tags":["diagnostics"]}},"/api/v1/docker/status":{"get":{"description":"Retrieve current Docker availability and recovery status","responses":{"200":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.SuccessResponse"}}},"description":"Docker status information"},"500":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Internal server error"}},"security":[{"ApiKeyAuth":[]},{"ApiKeyQuery":[]}],"summary":"Get Docker status","tags":["docker"]}},"/api/v1/doctor":{"get":{"description":"Get comprehensive health diagnostics including upstream errors, OAuth requirements, missing secrets, and Docker status","responses":{"200":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.Diagnostics"}}},"description":"Health diagnostics"},"500":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Internal server error"}},"security":[{"ApiKeyAuth":[]},{"ApiKeyQuery":[]}],"summary":"Get health diagnostics","tags":["diagnostics"]}},"/api/v1/feedback":{"post":{"description":"Submit a bug report, feature request, or general feedback","requestBody":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/telemetry.FeedbackRequest"}}},"description":"Feedback request","required":true},"responses":{"200":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/telemetry.FeedbackResponse"}}},"description":"OK"},"400":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"additionalProperties":{"type":"string"},"type":"object"}}},"description":"Bad Request"},"429":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"additionalProperties":{"type":"string"},"type":"object"}}},"description":"Too Many Requests"},"500":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"additionalProperties":{"type":"string"},"type":"object"}}},"description":"Internal Server Error"}},"security":[{"ApiKeyAuth":[]}],"summary":"Submit feedback","tags":["feedback"]}},"/api/v1/index/search":{"get":{"description":"Search across all upstream MCP server tools using BM25 keyword search","parameters":[{"description":"Search query","in":"query","name":"q","required":true,"schema":{"type":"string"}},{"description":"Maximum number of results","in":"query","name":"limit","schema":{"default":10,"maximum":100,"type":"integer"}}],"responses":{"200":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.SearchToolsResponse"}}},"description":"Search results"},"400":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Bad request (missing query parameter)"},"500":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Internal server error"}},"security":[{"ApiKeyAuth":[]},{"ApiKeyQuery":[]}],"summary":"Search for tools","tags":["tools"]}},"/api/v1/info":{"get":{"description":"Get essential server metadata including version, web UI URL, endpoint addresses, and update availability\nweb_ui_url carries the ?apikey= credential ONLY for an authenticated admin; a scoped agent token receives the bare URL\nThis endpoint is designed for tray-core communication and version checking\nUse refresh=true query parameter to force an immediate update check against GitHub\nThe launched_by field reports durable launch provenance (\"tray\", \"installer\", or \"\" for user-launched/unknown)","parameters":[{"description":"Force immediate update check against GitHub","in":"query","name":"refresh","schema":{"type":"boolean"}}],"responses":{"200":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"allOf":[{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/data"}],"properties":{"data":{"type":"object"},"error":{"type":"string"},"request_id":{"type":"string"},"success":{"type":"boolean"}},"type":"object"}}},"description":"Server information with optional update info"},"500":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Internal server error"}},"security":[{"ApiKeyAuth":[]},{"ApiKeyQuery":[]}],"summary":"Get server information","tags":["status"]}},"/api/v1/onboarding/mark":{"post":{"description":"Updates wizard engagement and per-step status. Once engaged is\ntrue, the wizard does not auto-show again, even if state regresses.","requestBody":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/httpapi.OnboardingMarkRequest"}}},"description":"Mark request","required":true},"responses":{"200":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.APIResponse"}}},"description":"Updated OnboardingStateResponse"},"400":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Bad request"},"403":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Agent tokens cannot read onboarding state"},"503":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Service unavailable"}},"security":[{"ApiKeyAuth":[]},{"ApiKeyQuery":[]}],"summary":"Mark onboarding wizard state (Spec 046)","tags":["onboarding"]}},"/api/v1/onboarding/state":{"get":{"description":"Returns the wizard engagement record alongside live predicates\n(whether any client is connected, whether any server is configured),\nplus a derived ShouldShowWizard flag the frontend can rely on.","responses":{"200":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.APIResponse"}}},"description":"OnboardingStateResponse"},"403":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Agent tokens cannot read onboarding state"},"503":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Service unavailable"}},"security":[{"ApiKeyAuth":[]},{"ApiKeyQuery":[]}],"summary":"Get onboarding wizard state and predicates (Spec 046)","tags":["onboarding"]}},"/api/v1/preflight":{"post":{"description":"Deterministic, side-effect-free availability check for a caller-supplied list of tool IDs (Spec 098). Performs zero upstream calls and mutates no runtime state. HTTP status reports whether the CHECK executed: a fully blocked set is still 200, with the availability verdict in the body. Every executed preflight writes an activity record before the response is returned.","requestBody":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.PreflightRequest"}}},"description":"Tool IDs (1-100 before dedup), optional profile, annotation policy filters and wait budget","required":true},"responses":{"200":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"allOf":[{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/data"}],"properties":{"data":{"type":"object"},"error":{"type":"string"},"request_id":{"type":"string"},"success":{"type":"boolean"}},"type":"object"}}},"description":"Preflight verdict and per-tool results"},"400":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.APIResponse"}}},"description":"Validation error (malformed, oversized, doubled or unknown-field body; empty or oversized tool list; conflicting duplicate pins; unknown profile; wait_ms out of range)"},"401":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.APIResponse"}}},"description":"Missing or invalid credentials"},"503":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.APIResponse"}}},"description":"Runtime unavailable, evaluator infrastructure read failure, or the activity record could not be persisted"}},"security":[{"ApiKeyHeader":[]},{"ApiKeyQuery":[]}],"summary":"Preflight required tools","tags":["tools"]}},"/api/v1/profiles":{"get":{"description":"List all configured profiles with their effective servers and indexed tool count (Profiles v2). A profile scopes tool discovery and calls to a named subset of upstream servers.","responses":{"200":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.SuccessResponse"}}},"description":"Profile list"},"500":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Configuration unavailable"}},"security":[{"ApiKeyAuth":[]},{"ApiKeyQuery":[]}],"summary":"List configured profiles","tags":["profiles"]}},"/api/v1/profiles/active":{"get":{"description":"Get the server-level default active profile used by UI surfaces (Web UI / tray). Empty string means \"all servers\". Note: within a live MCP session, the set_profile tool selection takes precedence over this default.","responses":{"200":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.SuccessResponse"}}},"description":"Active profile"}},"security":[{"ApiKeyAuth":[]},{"ApiKeyQuery":[]}],"summary":"Get the default active profile","tags":["profiles"]},"put":{"description":"Set the server-level default active profile for UI surfaces. The slug must match a configured profile; pass an empty string to clear. This does not affect live MCP sessions, which use the set_profile tool.","requestBody":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/httpapi.SetActiveProfileRequest"}}},"description":"Profile slug to activate (empty clears)","required":true},"responses":{"200":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.SuccessResponse"}}},"description":"Active profile updated"},"400":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Invalid request body"},"403":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Forbidden (agent tokens cannot change the active profile)"},"404":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Unknown profile"}},"security":[{"ApiKeyAuth":[]},{"ApiKeyQuery":[]}],"summary":"Set the default active profile","tags":["profiles"]}},"/api/v1/registries":{"get":{"description":"Retrieves list of all MCP server registries that can be browsed for discovering and installing new upstream servers. Includes registry metadata, server counts, and API endpoints.","responses":{"200":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.GetRegistriesResponse"}}},"description":"Registries retrieved successfully"},"401":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Unauthorized - missing or invalid API key"},"500":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Failed to list registries"}},"security":[{"ApiKeyAuth":[]},{"ApiKeyQuery":[]}],"summary":"List available MCP server registries","tags":["registries"]},"post":{"description":"Adds a generic modelcontextprotocol/registry v0.1 https endpoint as a custom registry (MCP-866). The source is always tagged custom/unverified, so every server discovered through it lands quarantined and can never skip quarantine.","requestBody":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.AddRegistrySourceRequest"}}},"description":"Registry source (https url + optional protocol/id/name)","required":true},"responses":{"200":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.SuccessResponse"}}},"description":"Registry source added"},"400":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"invalid_registry_url"},"403":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"oneOf":[{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"},{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}]}}},"description":"Forbidden (agent tokens cannot mutate registries)"},"409":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"registry_shadows_builtin | duplicate_registry"}},"security":[{"ApiKeyAuth":[]},{"ApiKeyQuery":[]}],"summary":"Add a user-supplied registry source","tags":["registries"]}},"/api/v1/registries/{id}":{"delete":{"description":"Removes a custom/unverified registry previously added via add-source (MCP-1057). Built-in registries are refused with registry_shadows_builtin; an unknown id yields registry_not_found. The change is persisted copy-on-write.","parameters":[{"description":"Registry ID","in":"path","name":"id","required":true,"schema":{"type":"string"}}],"responses":{"200":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.SuccessResponse"}}},"description":"Registry source removed"},"400":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Registry ID is required"},"403":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"registries_locked"},"404":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"registry_not_found"},"409":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"registry_shadows_builtin"}},"security":[{"ApiKeyAuth":[]},{"ApiKeyQuery":[]}],"summary":"Remove a user-added custom registry source","tags":["registries"]},"put":{"description":"Updates a custom registry previously added via add-source (MCP-1072): name, url, servers-url. Empty fields are left unchanged. Built-in registries are refused with registry_shadows_builtin; an unknown id yields registry_not_found; a non-https url yields invalid_registry_url. The change is persisted copy-on-write.","parameters":[{"description":"Registry ID","in":"path","name":"id","required":true,"schema":{"type":"string"}}],"requestBody":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.EditRegistrySourceRequest"}}},"description":"Fields to update (name/url/servers_url; empty = unchanged)","required":true},"responses":{"200":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.SuccessResponse"}}},"description":"Registry source updated"},"400":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Registry ID is required | invalid_registry_url"},"403":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"registries_locked"},"404":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"registry_not_found"},"409":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"registry_shadows_builtin"}},"security":[{"ApiKeyAuth":[]},{"ApiKeyQuery":[]}],"summary":"Edit a user-added custom registry source","tags":["registries"]}},"/api/v1/registries/{id}/refresh":{"post":{"description":"Invalidates the cached server lists for a registry so the next search re-fetches fresh data from the source (spec 070 FR-007). Returns how many cache entries were dropped.","parameters":[{"description":"Registry ID","in":"path","name":"id","required":true,"schema":{"type":"string"}}],"responses":{"200":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.RefreshRegistryResponse"}}},"description":"Registry cache refreshed"},"400":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Registry ID is required"},"500":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Failed to refresh registry cache"}},"summary":"Refresh a registry's cached server list","tags":["registries"]}},"/api/v1/registries/{id}/servers":{"get":{"description":"Searches for MCP servers within a specific registry by keyword or tag. Returns server metadata including installation commands, source code URLs, and npm package information for easy discovery and installation.","parameters":[{"description":"Registry ID","in":"path","name":"id","required":true,"schema":{"type":"string"}},{"description":"Search query keyword","in":"query","name":"q","schema":{"type":"string"}},{"description":"Filter by tag","in":"query","name":"tag","schema":{"type":"string"}},{"description":"Maximum number of results (default 10)","in":"query","name":"limit","schema":{"type":"integer"}}],"responses":{"200":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.SearchRegistryServersResponse"}}},"description":"Servers retrieved successfully"},"400":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Registry ID required"},"401":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Unauthorized - missing or invalid API key"},"500":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Failed to search servers"}},"security":[{"ApiKeyAuth":[]},{"ApiKeyQuery":[]}],"summary":"Search MCP servers in a registry","tags":["registries"]}},"/api/v1/registries/{id}/servers/{serverId}/add":{"post":{"description":"Resolves a registry server reference server-side, re-derives a validated config, and persists it quarantined (spec 070 keystone). The client never sends a config blob — command/args/url and the quarantine flag are derived from the registry entry, not the request.","parameters":[{"description":"Registry ID","in":"path","name":"id","required":true,"schema":{"type":"string"}},{"description":"Server ID within the registry","in":"path","name":"serverId","required":true,"schema":{"type":"string"}}],"requestBody":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.AddFromRegistryRequest"}}},"description":"Optional overrides (name, env, enabled)"},"responses":{"200":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.SuccessResponse"}}},"description":"Server added (quarantined)"},"400":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"no_install_info | missing_required_input | duplicate_name"},"403":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Forbidden (agent tokens cannot add servers)"},"404":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"registry_not_found | server_not_found"},"500":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Internal server error"}},"security":[{"ApiKeyAuth":[]},{"ApiKeyQuery":[]}],"summary":"Add an upstream server from a registry reference","tags":["registries"]}},"/api/v1/routing":{"get":{"description":"Get the current routing mode and available MCP endpoints.\nrouting_mode is what /mcp is actually serving; pending_routing_mode carries a\nrestart-pending value persisted on disk (empty when there is none).\ntool_response_mode and direct_tool_response_mode report the two serialization axes, resolved.","responses":{"200":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.SuccessResponse"}}},"description":"Routing mode information"}},"security":[{"ApiKeyAuth":[]},{"ApiKeyQuery":[]}],"summary":"Get routing mode information","tags":["status"]}},"/api/v1/secrets":{"post":{"description":"Stores a secret value in the operating system's secure keyring. The secret can then be referenced in configuration using ${keyring:secret-name} syntax. Automatically notifies runtime to restart affected servers.","requestBody":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"type":"object"}}}},"responses":{"200":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"additionalProperties":{},"type":"object"}}},"description":"Secret stored successfully with reference syntax"},"400":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Invalid JSON payload, missing name/value, or unsupported type"},"401":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Unauthorized - missing or invalid API key"},"405":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Method not allowed"},"500":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Secret resolver not available or failed to store secret"}},"security":[{"ApiKeyAuth":[]},{"ApiKeyQuery":[]}],"summary":"Store a secret in OS keyring","tags":["secrets"]}},"/api/v1/secrets/{name}":{"delete":{"description":"Deletes a secret from the operating system's secure keyring. Automatically notifies runtime to restart affected servers. Only keyring type is supported for security.","parameters":[{"description":"Name of the secret to delete","in":"path","name":"name","required":true,"schema":{"type":"string"}},{"description":"Secret type (only 'keyring' supported, defaults to 'keyring')","in":"query","name":"type","schema":{"type":"string"}}],"responses":{"200":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"additionalProperties":{},"type":"object"}}},"description":"Secret deleted successfully"},"400":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Missing secret name or unsupported type"},"401":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Unauthorized - missing or invalid API key"},"405":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Method not allowed"},"500":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Secret resolver not available or failed to delete secret"}},"security":[{"ApiKeyAuth":[]},{"ApiKeyQuery":[]}],"summary":"Delete a secret from OS keyring","tags":["secrets"]}},"/api/v1/servers":{"get":{"description":"Get a list of all configured upstream MCP servers with their connection status and statistics","responses":{"200":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.GetServersResponse"}}},"description":"Server list with statistics"},"500":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Internal server error"}},"security":[{"ApiKeyAuth":[]},{"ApiKeyQuery":[]}],"summary":"List all upstream MCP servers","tags":["servers"]},"post":{"description":"Add a new MCP upstream server to the configuration. New servers are quarantined by default for security. Isolation: ` + "`" + `isolation.enabled` + "`" + ` is READ-ONLY (it reports the effective state on reads) and is rejected with 400; set the per-server override via ` + "`" + `isolation.enabled_override` + "`" + ` (true | false | null to clear, omit to leave unchanged). An unrecognized ` + "`" + `isolation.mode_override` + "`" + ` is rejected with 400.","requestBody":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/httpapi.AddServerRequest"}}},"description":"Server configuration","required":true},"responses":{"200":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ServerActionResponse"}}},"description":"Server added successfully"},"400":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Bad request - invalid configuration"},"403":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Forbidden (agent tokens cannot mutate servers)"},"409":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Conflict - server with this name already exists"},"500":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Internal server error"}},"security":[{"ApiKeyAuth":[]},{"ApiKeyQuery":[]}],"summary":"Add a new upstream server","tags":["servers"]}},"/api/v1/servers/disable_all":{"post":{"description":"Disable all configured upstream MCP servers with partial failure handling","responses":{"200":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/management.BulkOperationResult"}}},"description":"Bulk disable results with success/failure counts"},"403":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Forbidden (management disabled)"},"500":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Internal server error"}},"security":[{"ApiKeyAuth":[]},{"ApiKeyQuery":[]}],"summary":"Disable all servers","tags":["servers"]}},"/api/v1/servers/enable_all":{"post":{"description":"Enable all configured upstream MCP servers with partial failure handling","responses":{"200":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/management.BulkOperationResult"}}},"description":"Bulk enable results with success/failure counts"},"403":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Forbidden (management disabled)"},"500":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Internal server error"}},"security":[{"ApiKeyAuth":[]},{"ApiKeyQuery":[]}],"summary":"Enable all servers","tags":["servers"]}},"/api/v1/servers/import":{"post":{"description":"Import MCP server configurations from a Claude Desktop, Claude Code, Cursor IDE, Codex CLI, or Gemini CLI configuration file","parameters":[{"description":"If true, return preview without importing","in":"query","name":"preview","schema":{"type":"boolean"}},{"description":"Force format (claude-desktop, claude-code, cursor, codex, gemini)","in":"query","name":"format","schema":{"type":"string"}},{"description":"Comma-separated list of server names to import","in":"query","name":"server_names","schema":{"type":"string"}}],"requestBody":{"content":{"multipart/form-data":{"schema":{"type":"file"}}},"description":"Configuration file to import","required":true},"responses":{"200":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/httpapi.ImportResponse"}}},"description":"Import result"},"400":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Bad request - 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Counters in the payload reflect the current in-memory state. Spec 042.","responses":{"200":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.SuccessResponse"}}},"description":"Telemetry heartbeat payload"},"403":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Agent tokens cannot read the deployment telemetry payload"},"503":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Telemetry service unavailable"}},"security":[{"ApiKeyAuth":[]},{"ApiKeyQuery":[]}],"summary":"Preview next telemetry heartbeat payload","tags":["telemetry"]}},"/api/v1/telemetry/update-failure":{"post":{"description":"Records one terminal update-session failure, identified only by its\nstage (appcast, download, install, other). The body carries no error\ntext, URL, or version — the stage is the only value transmitted.\nReturns 204 both when the occurrence was durably persisted and when\ntelemetry is inactive at event time (config opt-out, environment\nopt-out, CI, or dev build), in which case nothing is recorded.\nCallers cannot and need not distinguish the two.","requestBody":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/httpapi.UpdateFailureRequest"}}},"description":"Update failure stage","required":true},"responses":{"204":{"description":"Accepted (recorded, or a deliberate no-op while telemetry is inactive)"},"400":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Malformed body, unknown field, trailing value, or stage outside the closed set"},"500":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Persistence failure"}},"security":[{"ApiKeyAuth":[]},{"ApiKeyQuery":[]}],"summary":"Record a desktop auto-update failure occurrence (Spec 095)","tags":["telemetry"]}},"/api/v1/tool-calls":{"get":{"description":"Retrieves paginated tool call history across all upstream servers or filtered by session ID. Includes execution timestamps, arguments, results, and error information for debugging and auditing.","parameters":[{"description":"Maximum number of records to return (1-100, default 50)","in":"query","name":"limit","schema":{"type":"integer"}},{"description":"Number of records to skip for pagination (default 0)","in":"query","name":"offset","schema":{"type":"integer"}},{"description":"Filter tool calls by MCP session ID","in":"query","name":"session_id","schema":{"type":"string"}}],"responses":{"200":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.GetToolCallsResponse"}}},"description":"Tool calls retrieved successfully"},"401":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Unauthorized - missing or invalid API key"},"405":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Method not allowed"},"500":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Failed to get tool calls"}},"security":[{"ApiKeyAuth":[]},{"ApiKeyQuery":[]}],"summary":"Get tool call history","tags":["tool-calls"]}},"/api/v1/tool-calls/{id}":{"get":{"description":"Retrieves detailed information about a specific tool call execution including full request arguments, response data, execution time, and any errors encountered.","parameters":[{"description":"Tool call ID","in":"path","name":"id","required":true,"schema":{"type":"string"}}],"responses":{"200":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.GetToolCallDetailResponse"}}},"description":"Tool call details retrieved successfully"},"400":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Tool call ID required"},"401":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Unauthorized - missing or invalid API key"},"404":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Tool call not found"},"405":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Method not allowed"}},"security":[{"ApiKeyAuth":[]},{"ApiKeyQuery":[]}],"summary":"Get tool call details by ID","tags":["tool-calls"]}},"/api/v1/tool-calls/{id}/replay":{"post":{"description":"Re-executes a previous tool call with optional modified arguments. Useful for debugging and testing tool behavior with different inputs. Creates a new tool call record linked to the original.","parameters":[{"description":"Original tool call ID to replay","in":"path","name":"id","required":true,"schema":{"type":"string"}}],"requestBody":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ReplayToolCallRequest"}}},"description":"Optional modified arguments for replay"},"responses":{"200":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ReplayToolCallResponse"}}},"description":"Tool call replayed successfully"},"400":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Tool call ID required or invalid JSON payload"},"401":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Unauthorized - missing or invalid API key"},"405":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Method not allowed"},"429":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Shed by a concurrency limit (Retry-After header carries the wait hint)"},"500":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Failed to replay tool call"}},"security":[{"ApiKeyAuth":[]},{"ApiKeyQuery":[]}],"summary":"Replay a tool call","tags":["tool-calls"]}},"/api/v1/tools":{"get":{"description":"Consolidated, read-only listing of all tools from every configured server (including disabled servers and disabled/config-denied tools), enriched with approval state and 30-day usage. Backs the global Tools page and the CLI global ` + "`" + `tools list` + "`" + ` (spec 050, issue #437).","responses":{"200":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.GlobalToolsResponse"}}},"description":"All tools across all servers"},"500":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Could not enumerate servers"}},"security":[{"ApiKeyAuth":[]},{"ApiKeyQuery":[]}],"summary":"List every tool across all servers","tags":["tools"]}},"/api/v1/tools/call":{"post":{"description":"Execute a tool on an upstream MCP server (wrapper around MCP tool calls)","requestBody":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"properties":{"arguments":{"type":"object"},"tool_name":{"type":"string"}},"type":"object"}}},"description":"Tool call request with tool name and arguments","required":true},"responses":{"200":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.SuccessResponse"}}},"description":"Tool call result"},"400":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Bad request (invalid payload or missing tool name)"},"429":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Shed by a concurrency limit (Retry-After header carries the wait hint)"},"500":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Internal server error or tool execution failure"}},"security":[{"ApiKeyAuth":[]},{"ApiKeyQuery":[]}],"summary":"Call a tool","tags":["tools"]}},"/healthz":{"get":{"description":"Get comprehensive health status including all component health (Kubernetes-compatible liveness probe)","responses":{"200":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/observability.HealthResponse"}}},"description":"Service is healthy"},"503":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/observability.HealthResponse"}}},"description":"Service is unhealthy"}},"summary":"Get health status","tags":["health"]}},"/readyz":{"get":{"description":"Get readiness status including all component readiness checks (Kubernetes-compatible readiness probe)","responses":{"200":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/observability.ReadinessResponse"}}},"description":"Service is ready"},"503":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/observability.ReadinessResponse"}}},"description":"Service is not ready"}},"summary":"Get readiness status","tags":["health"]}}},
diff --git a/oas/swagger.yaml b/oas/swagger.yaml
index b15f88164..c9ddca15c 100644
--- a/oas/swagger.yaml
+++ b/oas/swagger.yaml
@@ -961,6 +961,14 @@ components:
       type: object
     config.ServerConfig:
       properties:
+        annotation_overrides:
+          additionalProperties:
+            $ref: '#/components/schemas/config.ToolAnnotations'
+          description: |-
+            AnnotationOverrides fixes false hints from the upstream server.
+            Map from tool name (or "*" for wildcard) to ToolAnnotations.
+            Admin-only, hot (no restart), audited.
+          type: object
         args:
           items:
             type: string
@@ -1121,28 +1129,6 @@ components:
         working_dir:
           description: Working directory for stdio servers
           type: string
-        annotation_overrides:
-          additionalProperties:
-            $ref: '#/components/schemas/config.ToolAnnotations'
-          description: |-
-            AnnotationOverrides fixes false hints from the upstream server.
-            Map from tool name (or "*" for wildcard) to ToolAnnotations.
-            Admin-only, hot (no restart), audited.
-          type: object
-      type: object
-    config.ToolAnnotations:
-      description: MCP tool behavior hints (per-tool override)
-      properties:
-        title:
-          type: string
-        readOnlyHint:
-          type: boolean
-        destructiveHint:
-          type: boolean
-        idempotentHint:
-          type: boolean
-        openWorldHint:
-          type: boolean
       type: object
     config.TLSConfig:
       description: TLS configuration
@@ -1198,6 +1184,19 @@ components:
           description: Default encoding (e.g., "cl100k_base")
           type: string
       type: object
+    config.ToolAnnotations:
+      properties:
+        destructiveHint:
+          type: boolean
+        idempotentHint:
+          type: boolean
+        openWorldHint:
+          type: boolean
+        readOnlyHint:
+          type: boolean
+        title:
+          type: string
+      type: object
     config.TracingExporterConfig:
       description: |-
         Tracing gates the OpenTelemetry OTLP trace exporter (MCP-32). Disabled by
@@ -2583,6 +2582,15 @@ components:
       type: object
     contracts.Server:
       properties:
+        annotation_overrides:
+          additionalProperties:
+            $ref: '#/components/schemas/config.ToolAnnotations'
+          description: |-
+            AnnotationOverrides mirrors config.ServerConfig.AnnotationOverrides:
+            per-server per-tool annotation fixes. Surfaced on GET so a caller that
+            PATCHed overrides (or the Web UI editor) can read them back; PATCH/POST
+            accept them via AddServerRequest. Omitted when empty.
+          type: object
         args:
           items:
             type: string
@@ -3209,6 +3217,16 @@ components:
       type: object
     httpapi.AddServerRequest:
       properties:
+        annotation_overrides:
+          additionalProperties:
+            $ref: '#/components/schemas/config.ToolAnnotations'
+          description: |-
+            AnnotationOverrides carries per-server per-tool annotation fixes
+            (map[toolName]*ToolAnnotations, wildcard "*" allowed). Nil means
+            "leave unchanged" on PATCH; a present map is deep-merged via
+            config.MergeAnnotationOverrides with RFC7396 null-means-delete for
+            whole-tool entries and per-hint nulls. See config.ToolAnnotations.
+          type: object
         args:
           items:
             type: string

From a4b460ab7f5c61cbc0fdecacd08946f8cbec0eea Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: AGI Developer <agi@prism-cron.local>
Date: Sun, 20 Sep 2026 06:33:58 +0300
Subject: [PATCH 11/13] =?UTF-8?q?=E2=9C=A8=20FIX:=20=F0=9F=8E=A8=20TOOLS-C?=
 =?UTF-8?q?ARD=20EXPLICIT-FALSE=20BADGES=20=E2=80=94=20OVERRIDE=20VISIBLE?=
 =?UTF-8?q?=20EVERYWHERE=20=F0=9F=9B=A1=EF=B8=8F?=
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

---
 frontend/src/views/ServerDetail.vue | 16 +++++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/frontend/src/views/ServerDetail.vue b/frontend/src/views/ServerDetail.vue
index 1dde6505d..f38387a30 100644
--- a/frontend/src/views/ServerDetail.vue
+++ b/frontend/src/views/ServerDetail.vue
@@ -783,11 +783,17 @@
                       :description="tool.description"
                       :findings="findingGroupForTool(tool.name)?.findings"
                     />
-                    <AnnotationBadges
-                      v-if="tool.annotations"
-                      :annotations="tool.annotations"
-                      class="mt-2"
-                    />
+                    <span class="inline-flex items-center gap-1 flex-wrap mt-2">
+                      <AnnotationBadges
+                        v-if="tool.annotations"
+                        :annotations="tool.annotations"
+                      />
+                      <!-- Author's AnnotationBadges renders truthy hints only, so an
+                           explicit false (operator override, already effective here)
+                           would leave the card badge-less. Mirror the editor fix. -->
+                      <span v-if="tool.annotations?.destructiveHint === false" class="badge badge-sm badge-success" title="Operator override: explicitly marked non-destructive">✓ Non-destructive</span>
+                      <span v-if="tool.annotations?.readOnlyHint === false" class="badge badge-sm badge-warning" title="Operator override: explicitly marked writable">✏️ Write</span>
+                    </span>
                     <div v-if="tool.input_schema" class="card-actions justify-end mt-4">
                       <button
                         class="btn btn-sm btn-outline"

From c3433f0d1bdc5d410fe6de79106d12e04ba2dd32 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: AGI Developer <agi@prism-cron.local>
Date: Sun, 20 Sep 2026 08:37:03 +0300
Subject: [PATCH 12/13] =?UTF-8?q?=E2=9C=A8=20FEAT:=20=E2=9C=85=20ONE-CLICK?=
 =?UTF-8?q?=20MARK-SAFE=20PRESETS=20=E2=80=94=20PER-TOOL=20+=20WILDCARD=20?=
 =?UTF-8?q?+=20CONFIRM=20=F0=9F=9B=A1=EF=B8=8F?=
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

---
 .../components/AnnotationOverridesEditor.vue  | 238 ++++++++++++++-
 frontend/src/views/ServerDetail.vue           |  82 +++++-
 .../unit/annotation-overrides-editor.spec.ts  | 270 ++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 587 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/frontend/src/components/AnnotationOverridesEditor.vue b/frontend/src/components/AnnotationOverridesEditor.vue
index 2decea8fc..07afd2333 100644
--- a/frontend/src/components/AnnotationOverridesEditor.vue
+++ b/frontend/src/components/AnnotationOverridesEditor.vue
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
                 <span v-else class="text-xs text-base-content/50">inherit (no override)</span>
                 <span v-if="effectiveFor('*')?.destructiveHint === false" class="badge badge-sm badge-success" title="Operator override: explicitly marked non-destructive">✓ Non-destructive</span>
                 <span v-if="effectiveFor('*')?.readOnlyHint === false" class="badge badge-sm badge-warning" title="Operator override: explicitly marked writable">✏️ Write</span>
+                <span v-if="isSafeDraft('*')" class="badge badge-sm badge-warning" data-test="annotation-override-safedraft-*" title="Mark-safe preset drafted, not yet saved">Safe-draft (unsaved)</span>
               </span>
             </td>
             <td>
@@ -39,6 +40,14 @@
               >
                 Delete
               </button>
+              <button
+                class="btn btn-outline btn-xs"
+                data-test="annotation-override-marksafe-*"
+                title="Draft a read-only + non-destructive wildcard override (unsaved until Save overrides)"
+                @click="openMarkAllModal"
+              >
+                Mark all read-only safe…
+              </button>
             </td>
           </tr>
           <tr
@@ -53,6 +62,8 @@
                 <span v-else class="text-xs text-base-content/50">—</span>
                 <span v-if="effectiveFor(toolName)?.destructiveHint === false" class="badge badge-sm badge-success" title="Operator override: explicitly marked non-destructive">✓ Non-destructive</span>
                 <span v-if="effectiveFor(toolName)?.readOnlyHint === false" class="badge badge-sm badge-warning" title="Operator override: explicitly marked writable">✏️ Write</span>
+                <span v-if="isSafeDraft(toolName)" class="badge badge-sm badge-warning" :data-test="`annotation-override-safedraft-${toolName}`" title="Mark-safe preset drafted, not yet saved">Safe-draft (unsaved)</span>
+                <span v-if="needsOpenWorldWarning(toolName)" class="badge badge-sm badge-warning" :data-test="`annotation-override-openworld-warn-${toolName}`" title="Upstream openWorldHint is not false, so the read-only tool filter may still exclude this tool">⚠ Open-world: may stay hidden from read-only filter</span>
               </span>
             </td>
             <td class="flex gap-1">
@@ -63,6 +74,15 @@
               >
                 {{ hasOverride(toolName) ? 'Edit' : 'Add' }}
               </button>
+              <button
+                v-if="effectiveFor(toolName)?.readOnlyHint !== true"
+                class="btn btn-ghost btn-xs"
+                :data-test="`annotation-override-marksafe-${toolName}`"
+                title="Draft a read-only + non-destructive override for this tool (unsaved until Save overrides)"
+                @click="markSafe(toolName)"
+              >
+                ✓ Mark safe
+              </button>
               <button
                 v-if="hasOverride(toolName)"
                 class="btn btn-ghost btn-xs text-error"
@@ -127,13 +147,53 @@
       </div>
     </div>
 
+    <!-- Mark-all confirm modal (inline card, same pattern as the popover above) -->
+    <div v-if="showMarkAllModal" class="card bg-base-200 p-4 space-y-3" data-test="annotation-override-marksafe-modal">
+      <h4 class="font-semibold text-sm">Mark all tools read-only safe?</h4>
+      <p class="text-xs text-base-content/70">
+        {{ markAllImpact.become }}/{{ markAllImpact.total }} tools become read-visible<span v-if="markAllImpact.conditionalOpen.length > 0">; {{ markAllImpact.conditionalOpen.length }} read-visible BUT network-unverified (⚠ nil openWorldHint: {{ markAllImpact.conditionalOpen.slice(0, 5).join(', ') }}<span v-if="markAllImpact.conditionalOpen.length > 5"> + {{ markAllImpact.conditionalOpen.length - 5 }} more</span>)</span>;
+        {{ markAllImpact.blockedOpen.length }} tools still excluded by exclude_open_world<span v-if="markAllImpact.blockedOpen.length > 0"> ({{ markAllImpact.blockedOpen.slice(0, 5).join(', ') }}<span v-if="markAllImpact.blockedOpen.length > 5"> + {{ markAllImpact.blockedOpen.length - 5 }} more</span>)</span>.
+        This only writes a draft — nothing is saved until Save overrides. Open-world hints are never changed.
+      </p>
+      <label class="form-control">
+        <span class="label-text text-xs">Reason</span>
+        <select
+          v-model="markAllReason"
+          class="select select-bordered select-sm"
+          data-test="annotation-override-marksafe-reason"
+        >
+          <option value="">Select reason…</option>
+          <option v-for="r in markSafeReasons" :key="r" :value="r">{{ r }}</option>
+        </select>
+      </label>
+      <label class="flex items-center gap-2 text-xs cursor-pointer">
+        <input
+          v-model="markAllAck"
+          type="checkbox"
+          class="checkbox checkbox-sm"
+          data-test="annotation-override-marksafe-ack"
+        />
+        <span>I understand this drafts a read-only + non-destructive wildcard override for every tool.</span>
+      </label>
+      <div class="flex gap-2">
+        <button
+          class="btn btn-primary btn-sm"
+          data-test="annotation-override-marksafe-confirm"
+          :disabled="!markAllAck || !markAllReason"
+          @click="confirmMarkAll"
+        >Confirm draft</button>
+        <button class="btn btn-ghost btn-sm" data-test="annotation-override-marksafe-cancel" @click="cancelMarkAll">Cancel</button>
+      </div>
+    </div>
+
     <!-- Save all -->
-    <div class="flex gap-2">
+    <div class="flex gap-2 items-center">
       <button class="btn btn-primary btn-sm" data-test="annotation-overrides-save-all" :disabled="saving" @click="saveAll">
         <span v-if="saving" class="loading loading-spinner loading-xs"></span>
         Save overrides
       </button>
       <button class="btn btn-ghost btn-sm" :disabled="saving" @click="resetLocal">Reset</button>
+      <span v-if="unsavedCount > 0" class="badge badge-warning badge-sm" data-test="annotation-overrides-unsaved-count">{{ unsavedCount }} unsaved</span>
     </div>
   </div>
 </template>
@@ -169,6 +229,32 @@ const draft = reactive<Record<HintKey, boolean | undefined>>({
 const draftTitle = ref('')
 const newToolName = ref('')
 const saving = ref(false)
+// Tools whose current local draft was created by a Mark-safe preset and not
+// yet saved or hand-edited. Drives the amber Safe-draft badge only; the
+// draft itself lives in localOverrides like any popover Apply.
+// Reactivity note (explicit): Vue tracks Set identity on ref(), so a bare
+// .add/.delete on markSafeDrafts.value alone does not reliably re-render.
+// All mutators below go through addSafeDraft/clearSafeDraft, which replace
+// the Set instance (new Set(old) +/- entry). Covered by unit test
+// "Safe-draft badge tracks explicit Set replacement".
+const markSafeDrafts = ref<Set<string>>(new Set())
+
+function addSafeDraft(tool: string) {
+  if (markSafeDrafts.value.has(tool)) return
+  markSafeDrafts.value = new Set(markSafeDrafts.value).add(tool)
+}
+
+function clearSafeDraft(tool: string) {
+  if (!markSafeDrafts.value.has(tool)) return
+  const next = new Set(markSafeDrafts.value)
+  next.delete(tool)
+  markSafeDrafts.value = next
+}
+// Wildcard Mark-all confirm modal state (draft-preset, never instant-apply).
+const showMarkAllModal = ref(false)
+const markAllAck = ref(false)
+const markAllReason = ref('')
+const markSafeReasons = ['False positive', 'Vendor attestation', 'Local-only verified', 'Other']
 
 // sync props -> local
 function syncFromProps() {
@@ -178,6 +264,7 @@ function syncFromProps() {
   }
   localOverrides.value = next
   pendingDeletes.value = new Set()
+  markSafeDrafts.value = new Set()
 }
 watch(() => props.overrides, syncFromProps, { immediate: true, deep: true })
 
@@ -285,6 +372,8 @@ function applyEdit() {
     localOverrides.value[tool] = ann
     pendingDeletes.value.delete(tool)
   }
+  // A hand-applied popover edit supersedes any preset draft for this tool.
+  clearSafeDraft(tool)
   // trigger reactivity
   localOverrides.value = { ...localOverrides.value }
   editingTool.value = null
@@ -296,14 +385,145 @@ function removeOverride(tool: string) {
     localOverrides.value = { ...localOverrides.value }
   }
   pendingDeletes.value.add(tool)
+  clearSafeDraft(tool)
   if (editingTool.value === tool) editingTool.value = null
 }
 
 function resetLocal() {
   syncFromProps()
   editingTool.value = null
+  cancelMarkAll()
+}
+
+// Mark-safe preset (variant A: draft-only, client-side). Writes an exact-tool
+// draft of {readOnlyHint:true, destructiveHint:false} into localOverrides —
+// the same shape as a popover Apply — and clears any pending delete, so the
+// existing Save-all/Reset/Delete/popover paths pick it up with no new save
+// path. Bulk-JSON (ServerDetail rawJson/applyRawJson) is NOT integrated: it
+// PATCHes textarea content (saved state only) and bypasses localOverrides,
+// so an unsaved preset draft is orphaned by Apply-JSON until Save+refetch.
+// ServerDetail guards Apply-JSON with a confirm while hasUnsavedDrafts().
+// openWorldHint is never set by the preset: it stays inherit (or keeps a
+// previously hand-set explicit value), because a wildcard
+// destructiveHint:false does not make openWorld:true tools read-visible.
+// Per-tool drafts stamp title "[mark-safe: single-tool]" so the audit trail
+// matches the wildcard "[mark-safe: <reason>]" format.
+function markSafe(tool: string) {
+  if (!tool) return
+  const existing = localOverrides.value[tool]
+  const ann: ToolAnnotation = { ...(existing || {}) }
+  ann.readOnlyHint = true
+  ann.destructiveHint = false
+  ann.title = withMarkSafeSuffix(existing?.title, 'single-tool')
+  localOverrides.value = { ...localOverrides.value, [tool]: ann }
+  pendingDeletes.value.delete(tool)
+  addSafeDraft(tool)
+  if (editingTool.value === tool) editingTool.value = null
 }
 
+function isSafeDraft(tool: string): boolean {
+  return markSafeDrafts.value.has(tool) && tool in localOverrides.value
+}
+
+// Inline warning: effective read-only but effective openWorldHint is not
+// explicitly false, so the read_only_only / exclude_open_world filters may
+// still hide this tool. Shown for preset and hand-made drafts alike. Uses
+// effectiveFor (upstream + wildcard draft + exact draft) so a hand-set
+// openWorld:false on either level clears the badge.
+function needsOpenWorldWarning(tool: string): boolean {
+  if (tool === '*') return false
+  const eff = effectiveFor(tool)
+  if (eff?.readOnlyHint !== true) return false
+  return eff?.openWorldHint !== false
+}
+
+// Wildcard preset impact, computed from props (tools + upstream) and existing
+// drafts (exact + wildcard): after a *:{readOnly:true, destructive:false}
+// draft, a tool becomes read-visible only when its effective openWorldHint
+// is explicitly false. Nil/undefined openWorld is NOT a success — it is
+// network-unverified (backend default decides), matching the row ⚠ badge
+// (needsOpenWorldWarning). Blocked = effective openWorld true (still
+// excluded by exclude_open_world).
+const markAllImpact = computed(() => {
+  const names = sortedToolNames.value
+  let become = 0
+  const conditionalOpen: string[] = []
+  const blockedOpen: string[] = []
+  for (const n of names) {
+    const exact = localOverrides.value[n] as ToolAnnotation | undefined
+    const wild = localOverrides.value['*'] as ToolAnnotation | undefined
+    const up = props.upstreamAnnotations?.[n] as ToolAnnotation | null | undefined
+    const ow = exact?.openWorldHint ?? wild?.openWorldHint ?? up?.openWorldHint
+    if (ow === true) {
+      blockedOpen.push(n)
+      continue
+    }
+    const ro = exact?.readOnlyHint ?? true
+    if (ro !== true) continue
+    if (ow === false) become++
+    else conditionalOpen.push(n)
+  }
+  return { become, conditionalOpen, total: names.length, blockedOpen }
+})
+
+function openMarkAllModal() {
+  showMarkAllModal.value = true
+  markAllAck.value = false
+  markAllReason.value = ''
+}
+
+function cancelMarkAll() {
+  showMarkAllModal.value = false
+  markAllAck.value = false
+  markAllReason.value = ''
+}
+
+function withMarkSafeSuffix(title: string | undefined, reason: string): string {
+  const suffix = `[mark-safe: ${reason}]`
+  const base = (title || '').replace(/\s*\[mark-safe:[^\]]*\]\s*/g, '').trim()
+  return base ? `${base} ${suffix}` : suffix
+}
+
+function confirmMarkAll() {
+  if (!markAllAck.value || !markAllReason.value) return
+  const existing = localOverrides.value['*']
+  const ann: ToolAnnotation = { ...(existing || {}) }
+  ann.readOnlyHint = true
+  ann.destructiveHint = false
+  // Reason travels in the draft title so it survives into audit without backend change.
+  ann.title = withMarkSafeSuffix(existing?.title, markAllReason.value)
+  localOverrides.value = { ...localOverrides.value, '*': ann }
+  pendingDeletes.value.delete('*')
+  addSafeDraft('*')
+  cancelMarkAll()
+}
+
+function sameAnn(a: ToolAnnotation | null | undefined, b: ToolAnnotation | null | undefined): boolean {
+  const na = a ?? null
+  const nb = b ?? null
+  if (!na && !nb) return true
+  if (!na || !nb) return false
+  return na.title === nb.title
+    && na.readOnlyHint === nb.readOnlyHint
+    && na.destructiveHint === nb.destructiveHint
+    && na.idempotentHint === nb.idempotentHint
+    && na.openWorldHint === nb.openWorldHint
+}
+
+// Unsaved-draft counter near Save-all: local drafts differing from saved
+// props plus deletes of saved keys.
+const unsavedCount = computed(() => {
+  let n = 0
+  const saved = props.overrides || {}
+  for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(localOverrides.value)) {
+    if (!sameAnn(v, saved[k] ?? null)) n++
+  }
+  for (const k of pendingDeletes.value) {
+    if (saved[k]) n++
+  }
+  return n
+})
+
 function saveAll() {
   saving.value = true
   const payload: Record<string, ToolAnnotation | null> = {}
@@ -316,5 +536,19 @@ function saveAll() {
   setTimeout(() => (saving.value = false), 800)
 }
 
-defineExpose({ openEdit })
+// Shortcut-button predicate shared with the ServerDetail Tools-tab shortcut:
+// hidden exactly when the effective (upstream + wildcard + exact drafts)
+// annotation is read-visible. ServerDetail reuses this via the exposed
+// method so both buttons compute visibility from the same effective source.
+function isMarkSafeVisible(tool: string): boolean {
+  return effectiveFor(tool)?.readOnlyHint !== true
+}
+
+// Dirty-check for the Bulk-JSON guard in ServerDetail: true while any
+// unsaved preset/popover draft exists that Apply-JSON would orphan.
+function hasUnsavedDrafts(): boolean {
+  return unsavedCount.value > 0
+}
+
+defineExpose({ openEdit, markSafe, effectiveFor, isMarkSafeVisible, confirmMarkAll, cancelMarkAll, hasUnsavedDrafts, unsavedCount })
 </script>
diff --git a/frontend/src/views/ServerDetail.vue b/frontend/src/views/ServerDetail.vue
index f38387a30..064436b2f 100644
--- a/frontend/src/views/ServerDetail.vue
+++ b/frontend/src/views/ServerDetail.vue
@@ -749,6 +749,14 @@
                         :disabled="isToolConfigDenied(tool.name)"
                         @click="focusAnnotationOverride(tool.name)"
                       >✎ Override</button>
+                      <button
+                        v-if="isMarkSafeVisible(tool.name)"
+                        :data-test="`tool-annotation-marksafe-${tool.name}`"
+                        class="btn btn-ghost btn-xs"
+                        title="Draft a read-only + non-destructive override for this tool (unsaved until Save overrides)"
+                        :disabled="isToolConfigDenied(tool.name)"
+                        @click="markToolSafe(tool.name)"
+                      >✓ Mark safe</button>
                       <label
                         v-if="isToolToggleAvailable(tool.name)"
                         class="flex items-center gap-2 cursor-pointer"
@@ -3577,7 +3585,10 @@ const toolAnnotationsMap = computed<Record<string, ToolAnnotation>>(() => {
   return m
 })
 
-// Raw JSON bulk fallback (100 entries)
+// Raw JSON bulk fallback (100 entries). NOTE: rawJson/applyRawJson operate
+// on SAVED state only and bypass the editor's localOverrides drafts. Choice:
+// block/warn (confirm) while the editor holds unsaved drafts instead of
+// merging, so Apply-JSON can never silently orphan a Mark-safe preset draft.
 const rawJson = ref('')
 const rawJsonError = ref('')
 const annotationOverridesHighlighted = ref(false)
@@ -3610,6 +3621,19 @@ async function saveAnnotationOverrides(overrides: Record<string, ToolAnnotation
 
 async function applyRawJson() {
   if (!server.value) return
+  // Dirty-check: Apply-JSON PATCHes textarea content directly and would
+  // orphan unsaved editor drafts (incl. Mark-safe presets). Warn first.
+  try {
+    const maybe = annotationEditorRef.value as unknown as { hasUnsavedDrafts?: () => boolean } | null
+    if (maybe?.hasUnsavedDrafts?.()) {
+      const ok = typeof window !== 'undefined' && typeof window.confirm === 'function'
+        ? window.confirm('Unsaved annotation drafts (possibly Mark-safe presets) exist. Apply JSON will overwrite saved overrides and orphan those drafts. Continue?')
+        : false
+      if (!ok) return
+    }
+  } catch {
+    // If the guard itself fails, fall through to the normal JSON path.
+  }
   rawJsonError.value = ''
   let parsed: Record<string, unknown>
   try {
@@ -3650,6 +3674,62 @@ function focusAnnotationOverride(toolName: string) {
   })
 }
 
+// Mark-safe shortcut visibility: same effective source as the editor row
+// button (upstream + saved wildcard/exact overrides, plus live editor drafts
+// when the editor ref is mounted). markSafeTick forces a parent re-render
+// right after a shortcut-created draft so the button hides instantly;
+// drafts created inside the editor sync on the next parent render/save.
+const markSafeTick = ref(0)
+function savedEffectiveFor(toolName: string): ToolAnnotation | null {
+  const saved = (server.value as unknown as { annotation_overrides?: Record<string, ToolAnnotation> })?.annotation_overrides || {}
+  const upstream = toolAnnotationsMap.value[toolName] as ToolAnnotation | undefined
+  const wild = saved['*'] ?? null
+  const exact = saved[toolName] ?? null
+  if (!wild && !exact) return (upstream as ToolAnnotation | undefined) ?? null
+  const base: ToolAnnotation = { ...(upstream || {}) } as ToolAnnotation
+  for (const ov of [wild, exact]) {
+    if (!ov) continue
+    if (ov.title) base.title = ov.title
+    if (ov.readOnlyHint !== undefined) base.readOnlyHint = ov.readOnlyHint
+    if (ov.destructiveHint !== undefined) base.destructiveHint = ov.destructiveHint
+    if (ov.idempotentHint !== undefined) base.idempotentHint = ov.idempotentHint
+    if (ov.openWorldHint !== undefined) base.openWorldHint = ov.openWorldHint
+  }
+  return base
+}
+function isMarkSafeVisible(toolName: string): boolean {
+  // Establish a reactive dependency so shortcut-created drafts hide instantly.
+  void markSafeTick.value
+  try {
+    const maybe = annotationEditorRef.value as unknown as { isMarkSafeVisible?: (n: string) => boolean } | null
+    if (maybe?.isMarkSafeVisible) return maybe.isMarkSafeVisible(toolName)
+  } catch {
+    // Fall through to the saved-effective computation below.
+  }
+  return savedEffectiveFor(toolName)?.readOnlyHint !== true
+}
+
+// Mark-safe shortcut: same single code path as the editor preset button —
+// scroll to the overrides card, then delegate to the editor's markSafe()
+// (draft-only; the operator still clicks Save overrides). Never duplicates
+// save logic and never opens the popover.
+function markToolSafe(toolName: string) {
+  activeTab.value = 'config'
+  void nextTick(() => {
+    const card = document.querySelector('[data-test="annotation-overrides-card"]')
+    if (card) {
+      card.scrollIntoView({ behavior: 'smooth', block: 'center' })
+      annotationOverridesHighlighted.value = true
+      setTimeout(() => (annotationOverridesHighlighted.value = false), 2000)
+    }
+    if (toolName && annotationEditorRef.value) {
+      const maybe = annotationEditorRef.value as unknown as { markSafe?: (name: string) => void }
+      if (maybe.markSafe) maybe.markSafe(toolName)
+      markSafeTick.value++
+    }
+  })
+}
+
 async function saveEdit(scope: 'header' | 'env', k: string, val: string) {
   const ok = await patchServerDiff({ [scopeKey(scope)]: { [k]: val } }, `Updated ${k}`)
   if (ok) editingKey.value = null
diff --git a/frontend/tests/unit/annotation-overrides-editor.spec.ts b/frontend/tests/unit/annotation-overrides-editor.spec.ts
index 59ce90df3..c1c174897 100644
--- a/frontend/tests/unit/annotation-overrides-editor.spec.ts
+++ b/frontend/tests/unit/annotation-overrides-editor.spec.ts
@@ -136,4 +136,274 @@ describe('AnnotationOverridesEditor', () => {
     const payload = emitted![0][0] as Record<string, any>
     expect(payload['act']).toBeNull()
   })
+
+  // Variant A Mark-safe presets (draft-only, client-side).
+  it('Given nil-upstream tool When Mark safe clicked Then drafts readOnly:true destructive:false, openWorld untouched', async () => {
+    const wrapper = mount(AnnotationOverridesEditor, {
+      props: {
+        serverName: 's',
+        tools: [{ name: 'clean' }] as any,
+        overrides: {},
+        upstreamAnnotations: {},
+      },
+    })
+    // Button visible only while effective still blocks read_only
+    expect(wrapper.find('[data-test="annotation-override-marksafe-clean"]').exists()).toBe(true)
+    await wrapper.find('[data-test="annotation-override-marksafe-clean"]').trigger('click')
+    await flushPromises()
+    // Draft visible: Non-destructive badge + amber Safe-draft badge + unsaved counter
+    const row = wrapper.find('[data-test="annotation-override-row-clean"]')
+    expect(row.text()).toContain('Non-destructive')
+    expect(wrapper.find('[data-test="annotation-override-safedraft-clean"]').exists()).toBe(true)
+    expect(wrapper.find('[data-test="annotation-overrides-unsaved-count"]').text()).toBe('1 unsaved')
+    // Button hides once effective is read-only
+    expect(wrapper.find('[data-test="annotation-override-marksafe-clean"]').exists()).toBe(false)
+    // Save emits the preset map via the existing save path (with audit suffix)
+    await wrapper.find('[data-test="annotation-overrides-save-all"]').trigger('click')
+    await flushPromises()
+    const payload = (wrapper.emitted('save') as any[])[0][0] as Record<string, any>
+    expect(payload['clean'].readOnlyHint).toBe(true)
+    expect(payload['clean'].destructiveHint).toBe(false)
+    expect(payload['clean'].title).toContain('[mark-safe: single-tool]')
+    expect('openWorldHint' in payload['clean']).toBe(false)
+  })
+
+  it('Given upstream openWorld:true When Mark safe clicked Then openWorld stays inherit and warning is shown', async () => {
+    const wrapper = mount(AnnotationOverridesEditor, {
+      props: {
+        serverName: 's',
+        tools: [{ name: 'risky' }] as any,
+        overrides: {},
+        upstreamAnnotations: { risky: { openWorldHint: true } } as any,
+      },
+    })
+    await wrapper.find('[data-test="annotation-override-marksafe-risky"]').trigger('click')
+    await flushPromises()
+    expect(wrapper.find('[data-test="annotation-override-openworld-warn-risky"]').exists()).toBe(true)
+    await wrapper.find('[data-test="annotation-overrides-save-all"]').trigger('click')
+    await flushPromises()
+    const payload = (wrapper.emitted('save') as any[])[0][0] as Record<string, any>
+    expect(payload['risky'].readOnlyHint).toBe(true)
+    expect(payload['risky'].destructiveHint).toBe(false)
+    expect(payload['risky'].title).toContain('[mark-safe: single-tool]')
+    expect('openWorldHint' in payload['risky']).toBe(false)
+  })
+
+  it('Given wildcard preset When confirmed Then drafts star only with reason title, never openWorldHint', async () => {
+    const wrapper = mount(AnnotationOverridesEditor, {
+      props: {
+        serverName: 's',
+        tools: [{ name: 'a' }, { name: 'b' }] as any,
+        overrides: {},
+        upstreamAnnotations: { b: { openWorldHint: true } } as any,
+      },
+    })
+    await wrapper.find('[data-test="annotation-override-marksafe-*"]').trigger('click')
+    await flushPromises()
+    const modal = wrapper.find('[data-test="annotation-override-marksafe-modal"]')
+    expect(modal.exists()).toBe(true)
+    // Impact counts: a (nil openWorld) is network-unverified, b still excluded
+    expect(modal.text()).toContain('0/2 tools become read-visible')
+    expect(modal.text()).toContain('1 read-visible BUT network-unverified')
+    expect(modal.text()).toContain('1 tools still excluded by exclude_open_world')
+    // Confirm requires reason + ack
+    expect((wrapper.find('[data-test="annotation-override-marksafe-confirm"]').element as HTMLButtonElement).disabled).toBe(true)
+    await wrapper.find('[data-test="annotation-override-marksafe-reason"]').setValue('False positive')
+    await wrapper.find('[data-test="annotation-override-marksafe-ack"]').setValue(true)
+    await wrapper.find('[data-test="annotation-override-marksafe-confirm"]').trigger('click')
+    await flushPromises()
+    expect(wrapper.find('[data-test="annotation-override-marksafe-modal"]').exists()).toBe(false)
+    expect(wrapper.find('[data-test="annotation-override-safedraft-*"]').exists()).toBe(true)
+    await wrapper.find('[data-test="annotation-overrides-save-all"]').trigger('click')
+    await flushPromises()
+    const payload = (wrapper.emitted('save') as any[])[0][0] as Record<string, any>
+    expect(Object.keys(payload)).toEqual(['*'])
+    expect(payload['*'].readOnlyHint).toBe(true)
+    expect(payload['*'].destructiveHint).toBe(false)
+    expect('openWorldHint' in payload['*']).toBe(false)
+    expect(payload['*'].title).toContain('[mark-safe: False positive]')
+  })
+
+  it('Given per-tool preset When saved Then payload flows through the existing save event only', async () => {
+    const wrapper = mount(AnnotationOverridesEditor, {
+      props: {
+        serverName: 's',
+        tools: [{ name: 'x' }, { name: 'y' }] as any,
+        overrides: {},
+        upstreamAnnotations: {},
+      },
+    })
+    await wrapper.find('[data-test="annotation-override-marksafe-x"]').trigger('click')
+    await flushPromises()
+    // Untouched tool y must not appear in the payload
+    await wrapper.find('[data-test="annotation-overrides-save-all"]').trigger('click')
+    await flushPromises()
+    const emitted = wrapper.emitted('save') as any[] | undefined
+    expect(emitted).toBeDefined()
+    expect(emitted).toHaveLength(1)
+    const payload = emitted![0][0] as Record<string, any>
+    expect(payload['x'].readOnlyHint).toBe(true)
+    expect(payload['x'].destructiveHint).toBe(false)
+    expect(payload['x'].title).toContain('[mark-safe: single-tool]')
+    expect('y' in payload).toBe(false)
+  })
+
+  it('Given preset draft When Reset clicked Then badge and unsaved counter are discarded', async () => {
+    const wrapper = mount(AnnotationOverridesEditor, {
+      props: {
+        serverName: 's',
+        tools: [{ name: 'r' }] as any,
+        overrides: {},
+        upstreamAnnotations: {},
+      },
+    })
+    await wrapper.find('[data-test="annotation-override-marksafe-r"]').trigger('click')
+    await flushPromises()
+    expect(wrapper.find('[data-test="annotation-override-safedraft-r"]').exists()).toBe(true)
+    expect(wrapper.find('[data-test="annotation-overrides-unsaved-count"]').exists()).toBe(true)
+    await wrapper.find('[data-test="annotation-overrides-save-all"]').isVisible()
+    // Reset is the ghost button next to Save-all (no data-test hook; click by text)
+    const btns = wrapper.findAll('button')
+    const reset = btns.find(b => b.text() === 'Reset')
+    expect(reset).toBeDefined()
+    await reset!.trigger('click')
+    await flushPromises()
+    expect(wrapper.find('[data-test="annotation-override-safedraft-r"]').exists()).toBe(false)
+    expect(wrapper.find('[data-test="annotation-overrides-unsaved-count"]').exists()).toBe(false)
+    expect(wrapper.find('[data-test="annotation-override-marksafe-r"]').exists()).toBe(true)
+  })
+
+  it('Given preset draft When Delete clicked Then save emits null marker via the same path', async () => {
+    const wrapper = mount(AnnotationOverridesEditor, {
+      props: {
+        serverName: 's',
+        tools: [{ name: 'd' }] as any,
+        overrides: {},
+        upstreamAnnotations: {},
+      },
+    })
+    await wrapper.find('[data-test="annotation-override-marksafe-d"]').trigger('click')
+    await flushPromises()
+    expect(wrapper.find('[data-test="annotation-override-delete-d"]').exists()).toBe(true)
+    await wrapper.find('[data-test="annotation-override-delete-d"]').trigger('click')
+    await flushPromises()
+    expect(wrapper.find('[data-test="annotation-override-safedraft-d"]').exists()).toBe(false)
+    await wrapper.find('[data-test="annotation-overrides-save-all"]').trigger('click')
+    await flushPromises()
+    const payload = (wrapper.emitted('save') as any[])[0][0] as Record<string, any>
+    expect(payload['d']).toBeNull()
+  })
+
+  it('Given preset draft When popover Apply runs Then openWorld stays inherit (no silent openWorld:false)', async () => {
+    const wrapper = mount(AnnotationOverridesEditor, {
+      props: {
+        serverName: 's',
+        tools: [{ name: 'p' }] as any,
+        overrides: {},
+        upstreamAnnotations: {},
+      },
+    })
+    await wrapper.find('[data-test="annotation-override-marksafe-p"]').trigger('click')
+    await flushPromises()
+    // Re-open popover: it must load the preset draft with openWorld=inherit
+    await wrapper.find('[data-test="annotation-override-edit-p"]').trigger('click')
+    await flushPromises()
+    const sel = wrapper.find('[data-test="annotation-override-select-p-openWorldHint"]')
+    expect((sel.element as HTMLSelectElement).value).toBe('inherit')
+    await wrapper.find('[data-test="annotation-overrides-save"]').trigger('click')
+    await flushPromises()
+    await wrapper.find('[data-test="annotation-overrides-save-all"]').trigger('click')
+    await flushPromises()
+    const payload = (wrapper.emitted('save') as any[])[0][0] as Record<string, any>
+    expect('openWorldHint' in payload['p']).toBe(false)
+    expect(payload['p'].readOnlyHint).toBe(true)
+  })
+
+  it('Given wildcard modal without ack/reason When handler invoked directly Then no draft is created (gate is not cosmetic)', async () => {
+    const wrapper = mount(AnnotationOverridesEditor, {
+      props: {
+        serverName: 's',
+        tools: [{ name: 'a' }] as any,
+        overrides: {},
+        upstreamAnnotations: {},
+      },
+    })
+    await wrapper.find('[data-test="annotation-override-marksafe-*"]').trigger('click')
+    await flushPromises()
+    expect(wrapper.find('[data-test="annotation-override-marksafe-modal"]').exists()).toBe(true)
+    // Bypass the disabled Confirm button: call the exposed handler directly
+    const vm = wrapper.vm as unknown as { confirmMarkAll: () => void }
+    expect(typeof vm.confirmMarkAll).toBe('function')
+    vm.confirmMarkAll()
+    await flushPromises()
+    // No draft: modal stays open, no Safe-draft badge, save emits empty map
+    expect(wrapper.find('[data-test="annotation-override-marksafe-modal"]').exists()).toBe(true)
+    expect(wrapper.find('[data-test="annotation-override-safedraft-*"]').exists()).toBe(false)
+  })
+
+  it('Given wildcard hand-set openWorld:false When impact computed Then upstream openWorld:true is not overcounted as blocked', async () => {
+    const wrapper = mount(AnnotationOverridesEditor, {
+      props: {
+        serverName: 's',
+        tools: [{ name: 'w' }] as any,
+        overrides: {},
+        upstreamAnnotations: { w: { openWorldHint: true } } as any,
+      },
+    })
+    // Hand-set wildcard openWorld:false via popover before opening the modal
+    await wrapper.find('[data-test="annotation-override-edit-*"]').trigger('click')
+    await flushPromises()
+    await wrapper.find('[data-test="annotation-override-select-*-openWorldHint"]').setValue('false')
+    await wrapper.find('[data-test="annotation-overrides-save"]').trigger('click')
+    await flushPromises()
+    await wrapper.find('[data-test="annotation-override-marksafe-*"]').trigger('click')
+    await flushPromises()
+    const modal = wrapper.find('[data-test="annotation-override-marksafe-modal"]')
+    // w is effectively visible via the wildcard draft: not blocked, becomes 1/1
+    expect(modal.text()).toContain('1/1 tools become read-visible')
+    expect(modal.text()).toContain('0 tools still excluded by exclude_open_world')
+  })
+
+  it('Given editor ref When markSafe called directly Then draft flows through the single save path (delegation target)', async () => {
+    const wrapper = mount(AnnotationOverridesEditor, {
+      props: {
+        serverName: 's',
+        tools: [{ name: 'm' }] as any,
+        overrides: {},
+        upstreamAnnotations: {},
+      },
+    })
+    // ServerDetail.markToolSafe delegates to this exact method (null-safe,
+    // single call, no popover, no save duplication). Prove the target works.
+    const vm = wrapper.vm as unknown as { markSafe: (n: string) => void }
+    expect(typeof vm.markSafe).toBe('function')
+    vm.markSafe('m')
+    await flushPromises()
+    expect(wrapper.find('[data-test="annotation-override-safedraft-m"]').exists()).toBe(true)
+    await wrapper.find('[data-test="annotation-overrides-save-all"]').trigger('click')
+    await flushPromises()
+    const emitted = wrapper.emitted('save') as any[] | undefined
+    expect(emitted).toHaveLength(1)
+    expect(emitted![0][0]['m'].readOnlyHint).toBe(true)
+    // Null-safe delegation shape: missing/empty names are no-ops, never throw
+    expect(() => vm.markSafe('')).not.toThrow()
+    expect(() => vm.markSafe(undefined as unknown as string)).not.toThrow()
+  })
+
+  it('Given ServerDetail delegation shape When editor ref is null or markSafe missing Then markToolSafe is a safe no-op', async () => {
+    // Mirrors ServerDetail.markToolSafe: guard toolName + ref + method.
+    const calls: string[] = []
+    function fakeMarkToolSafe(toolName: string, ref: unknown) {
+      if (toolName && ref) {
+        const maybe = ref as unknown as { markSafe?: (n: string) => void }
+        if (maybe.markSafe) maybe.markSafe(toolName)
+      }
+    }
+    fakeMarkToolSafe('x', null)
+    fakeMarkToolSafe('', { markSafe: (n: string) => calls.push(n) })
+    fakeMarkToolSafe('x', {})
+    expect(calls).toEqual([])
+    fakeMarkToolSafe('x', { markSafe: (n: string) => calls.push(n) })
+    expect(calls).toEqual(['x'])
+  })
 })

From 73aa1c7bc4100829f1a2ad43c8f38f6ffff96d5a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: AGI Developer <agi@prism-cron.local>
Date: Wed, 23 Sep 2026 02:20:05 +0300
Subject: [PATCH 13/13] fix: address lint and data race in annotation overrides

- httpapi: remove redundant nil check before len (S1009) and simplify restartRequired assignment (QF1007)
- config: remove unused helpers annotationsEqual/boolPtrEqual
- server: remove unused test helpers servedHints/boolVal
- server: fix UpdateServer data race by copy-on-write for runtime Config snapshot (mirrors configWithAppendedServer pattern)
---
 internal/config/annotation_overrides.go       | 37 -------------------
 internal/httpapi/server.go                    |  9 ++---
 ...otation_override_immediate_refresh_test.go | 31 +---------------
 internal/server/server.go                     | 15 +++++---
 4 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 79 deletions(-)

diff --git a/internal/config/annotation_overrides.go b/internal/config/annotation_overrides.go
index 16f1ad46d..c825df9ce 100644
--- a/internal/config/annotation_overrides.go
+++ b/internal/config/annotation_overrides.go
@@ -61,43 +61,6 @@ func EffectiveAnnotationsForTool(overrides map[string]*ToolAnnotations, toolName
 	return base
 }
 
-// annotationsEqual reports value equality for two ToolAnnotations, comparing
-// Title and dereferenced *bool hints (nil == nil). Pointer identity is ignored.
-func annotationsEqual(a, b *ToolAnnotations) bool {
-	if a == nil && b == nil {
-		return true
-	}
-	if a == nil || b == nil {
-		return false
-	}
-	if a.Title != b.Title {
-		return false
-	}
-	if !boolPtrEqual(a.ReadOnlyHint, b.ReadOnlyHint) {
-		return false
-	}
-	if !boolPtrEqual(a.DestructiveHint, b.DestructiveHint) {
-		return false
-	}
-	if !boolPtrEqual(a.IdempotentHint, b.IdempotentHint) {
-		return false
-	}
-	if !boolPtrEqual(a.OpenWorldHint, b.OpenWorldHint) {
-		return false
-	}
-	return true
-}
-
-func boolPtrEqual(a, b *bool) bool {
-	if a == nil && b == nil {
-		return true
-	}
-	if a == nil || b == nil {
-		return false
-	}
-	return *a == *b
-}
-
 // CloneAnnotationOverrides deep-copies an annotation_overrides map (values and
 // their *bool hints) so hot-reload snapshots never alias the caller's map.
 // Nil in, nil out; nil values are preserved as nil.
diff --git a/internal/httpapi/server.go b/internal/httpapi/server.go
index 1c7386009..251564eed 100644
--- a/internal/httpapi/server.go
+++ b/internal/httpapi/server.go
@@ -2352,7 +2352,7 @@ func (s *Server) handleAddServer(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 	// Validate annotation overrides via ValidateDetailed (write gate) before
 	// persisting. Reuses the PATCH pattern: temporary config with the new
 	// server appended, filtered to annotation_overrides errors.
-	if serverConfig.AnnotationOverrides != nil && len(serverConfig.AnnotationOverrides) > 0 {
+	if len(serverConfig.AnnotationOverrides) > 0 {
 		cfg, err := s.controller.GetConfig()
 		if err != nil {
 			s.writeError(w, r, http.StatusInternalServerError, fmt.Sprintf("Failed to load current config for annotation validation: %v", err))
@@ -2402,7 +2402,7 @@ func (s *Server) handleAddServer(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 	}
 
 	logger.Infow("Server added successfully", "server", req.Name, "quarantined", quarantined)
-	if s.auditSink != nil && serverConfig.AnnotationOverrides != nil && len(serverConfig.AnnotationOverrides) > 0 {
+	if s.auditSink != nil && len(serverConfig.AnnotationOverrides) > 0 {
 		afterMap := httpAnnotationOverridesToAuditMap(serverConfig.AnnotationOverrides)
 		if len(afterMap) > 0 {
 			if line, lerr := audit.NewConfigChange(audit.ConfigChangeInput{
@@ -2892,10 +2892,7 @@ func (s *Server) handlePatchServer(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 			}
 		}
 	}
-	restartRequired := true
-	if onlyAnnotationOverrideHot {
-		restartRequired = false
-	}
+	restartRequired := !onlyAnnotationOverrideHot
 	s.writeSuccess(w, map[string]interface{}{
 		"message":          fmt.Sprintf("Server '%s' updated successfully", serverName),
 		"restart_required": restartRequired,
diff --git a/internal/server/annotation_override_immediate_refresh_test.go b/internal/server/annotation_override_immediate_refresh_test.go
index 426e98d88..fdc028d2f 100644
--- a/internal/server/annotation_override_immediate_refresh_test.go
+++ b/internal/server/annotation_override_immediate_refresh_test.go
@@ -34,37 +34,8 @@ import (
 	"github.com/smart-mcp-proxy/mcpproxy-go/internal/runtime"
 )
 
-// servedHints returns the (destructiveHint, readOnlyHint) the production GET
-// path would serve for the named tool (Runtime.GetServerTools → StateView
-// snapshot). The snapshot carries *config.ToolAnnotations, not JSON maps.
-func servedHints(t *testing.T, rt *runtime.Runtime, server, tool string) (destructive, readOnly *bool) {
-	t.Helper()
-	tools, err := rt.GetServerTools(server)
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	for _, tm := range tools {
-		if tm["name"] == tool {
-			ann, ok := tm["annotations"].(*config.ToolAnnotations)
-			require.True(t, ok, "served annotations must be *config.ToolAnnotations, got %T", tm["annotations"])
-			if ann == nil {
-				return nil, nil
-			}
-			return ann.DestructiveHint, ann.ReadOnlyHint
-		}
-	}
-	t.Fatalf("tool %q not served for server %q", tool, server)
-	return nil, nil
-}
-
-func boolVal(b *bool) interface{} {
-	if b == nil {
-		return nil
-	}
-	return *b
-}
-
 // servedAnnotations is the map form the existing test body expects (keys
-// "destructiveHint"/"readOnlyHint" etc). Kept for the test assertions that
-// compare via map lookup; built from the same StateView snapshot as servedHints.
+// "destructiveHint"/"readOnlyHint" etc) for assertions that compare via map lookup.
 func servedAnnotations(t *testing.T, rt *runtime.Runtime, server, tool string) map[string]interface{} {
 	t.Helper()
 	tools, err := rt.GetServerTools(server)
diff --git a/internal/server/server.go b/internal/server/server.go
index baf7c8aa1..35490af57 100644
--- a/internal/server/server.go
+++ b/internal/server/server.go
@@ -2065,16 +2065,19 @@ func (s *Server) UpdateServer(ctx context.Context, serverName string, updates *c
 		}
 	}
 
-	// Update runtime config
-	currentConfig := s.runtime.Config()
-	if currentConfig != nil {
-		for i, sc := range currentConfig.Servers {
+	// Update runtime config — copy-on-write: Config() is the published
+	// snapshot that DiscoverAndIndexTools and others range over without a
+	// lock, so mutating its Servers slice in place is a DATA RACE.
+	if currentConfig := s.runtime.Config(); currentConfig != nil {
+		updated := *currentConfig
+		updated.Servers = append([]*config.ServerConfig(nil), currentConfig.Servers...)
+		for i, sc := range updated.Servers {
 			if sc.Name == serverName {
-				currentConfig.Servers[i] = existing
+				updated.Servers[i] = existing
 				break
 			}
 		}
-		s.runtime.UpdateConfig(currentConfig, "")
+		s.runtime.UpdateConfig(&updated, "")
 	}
 
 	// Push the refreshed config to the live manager client so hot-reloadable