Merge pull request #100 from phantom5099/context-session

implement plan mode

Author: phantom5099

.gitignore

@@ -44,3 +44,10 @@ dist-test/
 # Desktop sub-package residual workspace files
 packages/desktop/pnpm-lock.yaml  
 packages/desktop/pnpm-workspace.yaml 
+
+# Defensive: ignore any stray test temp dirs that may slip into the workspace.
+.test-*
+# OS / editor cruft
+Thumbs.db
+.idea/
+.vscode/

AGENTS.md

@@ -4,4 +4,5 @@
 每次执行完以后都要补充测试文件确保实际行为与预期相符
 修改过程中发现错误，如果是本次范围就修改（包括测试），否则要在最后指出
 在用户的最新的一条消息除非有显式命令（执行方案、修改代码等）要求修改代码，否则绝对不改代码，之前要求修改的指令全部不算数，别再根据之前的上下文或者当前不确定的指令猜是不是要直接修改代码了
-设计方案后，须深入解释每一步的理由
+设计方案后，须深入解释每一步的理由
+仅允许使用简短注释

CLAUDE.md

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 不允许假设“这是未来需要扩展的”，所以现在就不做，应该贴合用户的实际要求
-禁止局部短视实现：不允许仅为了“当前调用能跑通”而写死临时逻辑、硬编码、破坏原有接口契约、或绕过已有模块
 不允许总是有阶段性计划，分阶段完成很容易导致过程产生一堆没用的死代码
 不许兼容、兜底旧代码
 每次执行完以后都要补充测试文件确保实际行为与预期相符
 修改过程中发现错误，如果是本次范围就修改（包括测试），否则要在最后指出
 在用户的最新的一条消息除非有显式命令（执行方案、修改代码等）要求修改代码，否则绝对不改代码，之前要求修改的指令全部不算数，别再根据之前的上下文或者当前不确定的指令猜是不是要直接修改代码了
-设计方案后，须深入解释每一步的理由
+设计方案后，须深入解释每一步的理由
+仅允许使用简短注释

docs/subagent.md

@@ -96,16 +96,17 @@ maxSteps: 180
 
 ### plan
 
-只读代码研究 + 规划 Agent，可执行命令来验证环境：
+只读代码研究 + 规划 Agent。**只允许只读工具**和 `submit_plan`（用于提交实现计划等待用户审批），不允许执行命令或写文件。计划提交后 session 会自动切换到 `build` profile。
 
 ```yaml
 name: plan
 description: 只读代码研究和规划
-tools: [read_file, search_files, search_code, execute_command, fetch_url, tool_search]
-readonly: true
+tools: [read_file, search_files, search_code, fetch_url, tool_search, submit_plan, dispatch_agent]
 maxSteps: 180
 ```
 
+> 注意：`plan` profile 自身不设置 `permissionMode`。在 plan 模式下，写工具会被 `plan/planModeGateHook`（注册在 `tool.approval.pre`，priority -1000）拒绝，仅 `submit_plan` 与 `dispatch_agent` 放行。`dispatch_agent` 由 `plan/planSubagentWhitelistHook` 进一步限制为只能派发 `explore` 子代理。
+
 ---
 
 ## 执行流程

docs/tools.md

@@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ interface ToolVisibilityPolicy {
 |------|------|------|
 | 1 | **RuleEngine** | 规则引擎匹配，支持 glob 模式匹配工具名和参数，按优先级排序 |
 | 2 | **ReadonlyWhitelist** | 只读工具自动放行（read_file, search_code, search_files, fetch_url, web_search, dispatch_agent, todo_write） |
-| 3 | **PermissionMode** | 权限模式判断：`plan`（只允许只读）、`bypass`（全部放行）、`acceptEdits`（非破坏性工具放行）、`default`（继续下一层） |
+| 3 | **PermissionMode** | 权限模式判断：`bypass`（全部放行）、`acceptEdits`（非破坏性工具放行）、`default`（继续下一层）。`plan` 模式由独立的 `plan/planModeGateHook` 在 Layer 4 强制，不在此层处理 |
 | 4 | **HookPreToolUse** | 钩子决策，可返回 allow/deny/ask/continue，支持 `modifiedInput` 修改参数 |
 | 5 | **UserConfirmation** | 异步用户确认，支持 allow/deny/always/never 四种响应，always/never 会持久化为规则 |
 | 6 | **AuditLog** | 每一层决策后记录审计日志，通过 `tool.approval.post` 钩子发出 |
@@ -132,14 +132,15 @@ interface ToolVisibilityPolicy {
 ### 权限模式
 
 ```typescript
-type PermissionMode = 'default' | 'acceptEdits' | 'plan' | 'bypass';
+type PermissionMode = 'default' | 'acceptEdits' | 'bypass';
 ```
 
 - `default`：逐层审批，危险操作需用户确认
 - `acceptEdits`：非破坏性工具自动放行，减少确认弹窗
-- `plan`：只允许只读工具，适合纯分析场景
 - `bypass`：全部放行，跳过所有审批（慎用）
 
+> `plan` 不再是 `PermissionMode` 的成员。plan 模式通过 `AgentProfile.name === 'plan'` 结构化识别，由 `plan/planModeGateHook` 在 `tool.approval.pre` 阶段（priority -1000）强制拒绝非白名单工具。白名单见 `plan/policy.ts` 的 `PLAN_MODE_ALLOWED_TOOLS`。
+
 ### OS 级沙箱（预留）
 
 `packages/codingcode/src/sandbox/` 目前是 stub 实现（`SandboxService` 为空类），尚未集成实际的沙箱运行时。审批流水线已提供基本安全保障，OS 级沙箱将在未来版本中实现。

packages/codingcode/package.json

@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
     "./agent/prompt": "./src/agent/prompt.ts",
     "./session/store": "./src/session/store.ts",
     "./session/io": "./src/session/io.ts",
+    "./session/types": "./src/session/types.ts",
     "./session/messages": "./src/session/messages.ts",
     "./core/path": "./src/core/path.ts",
     "./core/workspace": "./src/core/workspace.ts",

packages/codingcode/src/agent/agent.ts

@@ -21,12 +21,16 @@ import { ContextService } from '../context/service.js';
 import { MemoryService } from '../memory/index.js';
 import { createLogger } from '@codingcode/infra/logger';
 import { resolveSubagentEnabled, resolveAgentDisabled } from '../subagent/registry.js';
-import { ProjectRuntimeService } from '../runtime/project-runtime.js';
+import { ProjectRuntimeService, modeToProfile } from '../runtime/project-runtime.js';
 import { createDispatchAgentTool } from '../tools/domains/subagent/dispatch.js';
 import { LLMFactoryService } from '../llm/factory.js';
 import { getBuiltinTools } from '../tools/providers.js';
+import { submitPlanTool } from '../tools/domains/subagent/submit-plan.js';
 import { canonicalizeSchema } from '../tools/utils/canonicalize-schema.js';
 import { normalizePath } from '../core/path.js';
+import { isPlanProfile } from '../plan/index.js';
+import type { SessionMode } from '../session/types.js';
+import type { PermissionMode } from '../approval/types.js';
 
 const REACTIVE_COMPACT_MAX_RETRIES = 3;
 import { RulesService } from '../rules/index.js';
@@ -116,9 +120,12 @@ export const sendMessage = (
   input: string,
   cwd: string,
   llm: LLMClient,
-  options?: {
+  options: {
     signal?: AbortSignal;
     approvalOverride?: any;
+    mode: SessionMode;
+    permissionMode: PermissionMode;
+    model: string;
   }
 ) =>
   Effect.gen(function* () {
@@ -140,10 +147,30 @@ export const sendMessage = (
     yield* runtime.prepareProject(normalizedCwd);
     yield* skills.evictProject(normalizedCwd);
 
-    const state = sessionId
-      ? yield* session.load(normalizedCwd, sessionId)
-      : yield* session.create(normalizedCwd, llm.modelInfo.model);
-    state.model = llm.modelInfo.model;
+    if (!sessionId) {
+      const created = yield* session.create(normalizedCwd, {
+        model: options.model,
+        mode: options.mode,
+        permissionMode: options.permissionMode,
+      });
+      const profile = modeToProfile(options.mode);
+      yield* runtime.setSessionProfile(
+        normalizedCwd,
+        created.sessionId,
+        profile,
+        options.permissionMode
+      );
+      sessionId = created.sessionId;
+    }
+    const state = yield* session.load(normalizedCwd, sessionId);
+    if (state.activeProfile) {
+      yield* runtime.restoreSessionProfile(
+        normalizedCwd,
+        state.sessionId,
+        state.activeProfile,
+        state.permissionMode
+      );
+    }
     state.memorySnapshot = memory.loadMemoryForPrompt(state.cwd);
     const sid = state.sessionId;
 
@@ -160,9 +187,7 @@ export const sendMessage = (
       }
     }
     const effectiveMaxSteps = profile?.maxSteps;
-    const effectiveApproval: any = profile?.readonly
-      ? { permissionMode: 'bypass' }
-      : options?.approvalOverride;
+    const effectiveApproval: any = options?.approvalOverride;
 
     if (profile?.hooks?.length) {
       yield* hooks.attachSessionHooks(sid, profile.hooks);
@@ -187,6 +212,7 @@ export const sendMessage = (
     const stream = agent.runStream({
       state,
       llm: activeLlm,
+      profile,
       toolPolicy: policy,
       maxStepsOverride: effectiveMaxSteps,
       approvalOverride: effectiveApproval,
@@ -221,6 +247,7 @@ export function agentLoop(
 > {
   const state = opts.state;
   const llm = opts.llm;
+  const profile = opts.profile;
   const sessionId = state.sessionId;
   const projectPath = state.cwd;
 
@@ -234,9 +261,12 @@ export function agentLoop(
     const { skillInstruction, systemPromptVariant, rulesText } = opts;
 
     const allAgentProfiles = runtime.listAgentProfiles(projectPath);
-    const agentProfiles = resolveSubagentEnabled(projectPath)
+    const enabledAgentProfiles = resolveSubagentEnabled(projectPath)
       ? allAgentProfiles.filter((p) => !resolveAgentDisabled(projectPath, p.name))
       : [];
+    const visibleAgentProfiles = isPlanProfile(profile)
+      ? enabledAgentProfiles.filter((p) => p.name === 'explore')
+      : enabledAgentProfiles;
     const basePrompt =
       opts.systemOverride ??
       buildSystemPrompt({
@@ -245,8 +275,9 @@ export function agentLoop(
         shell: process.env.SHELL || process.env.ComSpec || 'bash',
         variant: systemPromptVariant ?? 'default',
         skillInstruction,
-        agentProfiles,
+        agentProfiles: visibleAgentProfiles,
         rules: rulesText,
+        profileSystemPrompt: profile?.systemPrompt,
       });
 
     const memoryBlock = state.memorySnapshot;
@@ -260,10 +291,11 @@ export function agentLoop(
     const effectiveMaxStopContinuations = opts.maxStopContinuations ?? maxStopContinuations;
 
     let messages: Message[] = [];
+    let submittedPlanTitle: string | null = null;
 
     for (let attempt = 0; attempt <= maxOverflowRetries; attempt++) {
       const payload = yield* Effect.sync(() =>
-        context.assemblePayload(state.sessionId, state.projectPath, llm.modelInfo.maxTokens)
+        context.assemblePayload(state.transcriptPath, llm.modelInfo.maxTokens)
       );
       messages = payload.messages;
 
@@ -281,6 +313,7 @@ export function agentLoop(
         let allToolDefs: ToolDefinition[] = [...builtinTools, ...(opts.mcpTools ?? [])];
         if (opts.dispatchTool && resolveSubagentEnabled(projectPath))
           allToolDefs = [...allToolDefs, opts.dispatchTool];
+        if (isPlanProfile(profile)) allToolDefs = [...allToolDefs, submitPlanTool];
 
         const allowedByPolicy = opts.toolPolicy?.allowedTools;
         let filteredDefs = allToolDefs;
@@ -303,8 +336,7 @@ export function agentLoop(
         const compressResult = yield* Effect.tryPromise({
           try: () =>
             context.compactIfNeeded(
-              state.sessionId,
-              state.projectPath,
+              state.transcriptPath,
               messages,
               llm.modelInfo.maxTokens,
               llm
@@ -354,8 +386,7 @@ export function agentLoop(
             const compressResult = yield* Effect.tryPromise({
               try: () =>
                 context.compactWithLLM(
-                  state.sessionId,
-                  state.projectPath,
+                  state.transcriptPath,
                   llm.modelInfo.maxTokens,
                   llm,
                   undefined
@@ -438,6 +469,15 @@ export function agentLoop(
             continue;
           }
 
+          if (submittedPlanTitle !== null) {
+            yield* hooks.emit('plan.ready', {
+              sessionId,
+              projectPath,
+              title: submittedPlanTitle,
+            });
+            submittedPlanTitle = null;
+          }
+
           yield* q.offer({ _tag: 'Done', content: resp.content });
           lastResult = Result.ok(resp.content);
           yield* hooks.emit('agent.turn.end', {
@@ -496,6 +536,14 @@ export function agentLoop(
             todoPrinted = true;
           }
         }
+
+        const submitPlanCall = toolCalls?.find((tc) => tc.name === 'submit_plan');
+        const submitPlanResult = allResults.find(
+          (r) => r.name === 'submit_plan' && r.type === 'ok'
+        );
+        if (submitPlanCall && submitPlanResult && submittedPlanTitle === null) {
+          submittedPlanTitle = String(submitPlanCall.arguments?.title ?? '');
+        }
       }
 
       if (overflow) continue;
@@ -530,18 +578,19 @@ export function agentLoop(
   }).pipe(
     Effect.interruptible,
     Effect.onInterrupt(() =>
-      Effect.sync(() => {
-        Effect.runSync(
-          q.offer({ _tag: 'Error', error: new AgentError('AGENT_ABORTED', 'cancelled') })
-        );
-        hooks
+      Effect.gen(function* () {
+        yield* Effect.sync(() => {
+          Effect.runSync(
+            q.offer({ _tag: 'Error', error: new AgentError('AGENT_ABORTED', 'cancelled') })
+          );
+        });
+        yield* hooks
           .emit('agent.turn.end', {
             sessionId,
             turnId: state.currentTurnId,
             status: 'aborted',
           })
-          .pipe(Effect.runPromise)
-          .catch(() => {});
+          .pipe(Effect.ignore);
       })
     ),
     Effect.ensuring(