@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+---
+'@objectstack/lint': minor
+'@objectstack/spec': patch
+'@objectstack/objectql': patch
+---
+
+feat(lint)!: `searchable-field-unsearchable` reports a `searchableFields` entry that names a `secret` or `password` field, which the engine leaves out of every search without a word
+
+Clause-②: no (narrowing) — `os validate`, `os build`, `os lint` and the metadata publish door refuse a `searchableFields` entry whose field type is `secret` or `password`, on the object's own set, on every list view surface and on a react page's ListView `searchableFields` prop, which they accepted before. The finding takes the severity of the `formula`-entry finding (`error`). No rule id is added or removed.
+Metadata-protocol: narrowed
+
+<!-- adr-0087: not-required (no-migration-prescription) No key of any schema is added, removed, renamed or re-shaped: a searchableFields entry the engine already withheld from every search (ADR-0100) is now refused where it is authored. The one remedy is to delete the entry, which a conversion cannot decide for the author, so there is no key for a migration to rewrite and no tombstone. -->
+
+**BREAKING** accept-set narrowing at every authoring door for `searchableFields`.
+
+- **Before.** The engine's search expansion leaves every credential column (`secret`, `password`) out of the set it scans (ADR-0100), an author-declared one included, and says nothing. A declaration naming one passed every gate and searched a narrower set than written; a declaration naming only credential fields fell through to the auto-default set.
+- **Now.** The rule refuses the entry at `error`, naming the entry, its type and the object. It is judged on every object, a better-auth `password` included: the read mask spares that one, the search withhold does not.
+- **Who sees it.** An object or list view whose `searchableFields` names a `secret` or `password` field. No metadata shipped in this repository does.
+
+**The remedy.** Drop the entry: credential fields are never searched. `os explain searchable-field-unsearchable` states what the engine does with it on each surface.
+
+`@objectstack/spec` exports `isCredentialFieldType(fieldType)` from `@objectstack/spec/data`: whether a field type is masked on read on at least one object (`secret`, `password`), the exemption-free question. `@objectstack/objectql`'s `collectCredentialFields` now reads it instead of its own type literal; its answer is unchanged.
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+---
+'@object-ui/components': patch
+---
+
+fix(components): a grid's select-all draws a dash for a partial selection
+
+Clause-②: no
+Metadata-protocol: none
+
+With some but not all rows of the page selected, the data table's header checkbox was already announced as mixed (`aria-checked="mixed"`) but drew the same check mark as "all selected", so a user could read two selected rows as the whole page. It now draws a dash, filled like the checked state; all selected still draws the check and none selected draws nothing. The upstream Shadcn `Checkbox` is unchanged: the header uses a package-internal tri-state wrapper.
@@ -2465,11 +2465,24 @@ const SEARCHABLE_FIELD_UNSEARCHABLE_EXPLANATION: RuleExplanation = {
     VIRTUAL_FIELD_STORAGE,
     'A formula entry is refused on EVERY surface, the object\'s own set included — the REST ingress ' +
       'answers `400 INVALID_FIELD`, the same answer a stale entry gets: measured, it ' +
-      'matched 0 rows on driver-memory, and 0 rows with no error on driver-sql. Otherwise the ' +
-      'object\'s own `searchableFields` is existence-only: its declared branch scans any stored ' +
-      'column, so a json or lookup column declared there is a narrow choice the engine executes, not ' +
-      'a finding. A system column outside the allowed set is not judged either: its runtime ' +
-      'metadata is registry-owned and invisible here.',
+      'matched 0 rows on driver-memory, and 0 rows with no error on driver-sql. Otherwise, apart ' +
+      'from a credential entry, the object\'s own `searchableFields` is existence-only: its declared ' +
+      'branch scans any stored column, so a json or lookup column declared there is a narrow choice ' +
+      'the engine executes, not a finding. A system column outside the allowed set is not judged ' +
+      'either: its runtime metadata is registry-owned and invisible here.',
+    'A `secret` or `password` entry is refused on EVERY surface as well, the object\'s own set ' +
+      'included. The engine leaves every credential column out of the set a search scans (ADR-0100), ' +
+      'an author-declared one included, and says nothing: a declaration naming one scans a narrower ' +
+      'set than written, and one naming only credential fields falls through to the AUTO-DEFAULT ' +
+      'set. A list view naming one is refused with `400 INVALID_FIELD` when the object\'s set is the ' +
+      'auto-default, which never admits a credential type; when the object declares the entry, the ' +
+      'REST ingress admits it and the engine withholds it, so a view naming only credential fields ' +
+      'searches the object\'s whole set. Credential types are judged by the spec\'s ' +
+      '`isCredentialFieldType`, the predicate the engine\'s credential collector reads, with no ' +
+      'better-auth exemption: the read mask spares a better-auth `password`, the search withhold ' +
+      'does not. An error, as a formula entry is: the entry can never match, and the narrowing is ' +
+      'otherwise silent. The one fix is to drop it — mirroring the value onto a searchable column ' +
+      'would publish what the withhold protects.',
   ],
 };
 
 
@@ -301,6 +301,22 @@ describe('the object write door dispatches at the adjudicated scope (#4716)', ()
     expect(f.message).toContain('gone_field');
   });
 
+  it('REFUSES an object whose searchableFields names a credential field the engine never searches', () => {
+    // The same rule's credential arm, at the publish door: the engine withholds
+    // a `secret` / `password` column from every search (ADR-0100), so the
+    // declaration is refused where a Studio tenant writes it.
+    const result = expectSingleRefusal(
+      cleanObject({
+        fields: { owner: { type: 'text' }, api_key: { type: 'secret' } },
+        searchableFields: ['owner', 'api_key'],
+      }),
+      'searchable-field-unsearchable',
+    );
+    const f = result.errors.find((e) => e.rule === 'searchable-field-unsearchable')!;
+    expect(f.path).toBe('objects.leave_request.searchableFields[1]');
+    expect(f.message).toContain("is a 'secret' field, a credential");
+  });
+
   it('REFUSES an object whose built-in list view names a column it does not have', () => {
     const result = expectSingleRefusal(
       cleanObject({ listViews: { all: { label: 'All', columns: ['owner', 'gone_column'] } } }),
 
@@ -520,6 +520,24 @@ describe('validateReactPageProps — <ListView> searchableFields (#4329)', () =>
     expect(f[0].message).toContain('400 INVALID_FIELD');
   });
 
+  it('flags a secret or password entry under the metadata verdict — the shared core\'s credential check', () => {
+    const vault = {
+      name: 'crm_account',
+      fields: { name: { type: 'text' }, api_key: { type: 'secret' }, portal_password: { type: 'password' } },
+    };
+    const f = pastDeprecation(validateReactPageProps(
+      listPage(
+        list(`data={{ provider: 'object', object: 'crm_account' }} searchableFields={['name', 'api_key', 'portal_password']}`),
+        [vault],
+      ),
+    ));
+    expect(f.map((x) => [x.rule, x.severity, x.path])).toEqual([
+      [SEARCHABLE_FIELD_UNSEARCHABLE, 'error', 'pages[0].source › searchableFields[1]'],
+      [SEARCHABLE_FIELD_UNSEARCHABLE, 'error', 'pages[0].source › searchableFields[2]'],
+    ]);
+    expect(f[0].hint).toBe('Drop "api_key": credential fields are never searched');
+  });
+
   it('[#8404] warns on an unprovisioned anchor, and PINS that this surface threads the index', () => {
     // Load-bearing beyond the warning itself. `validateReactPageProps` builds
     // `unprovisionedAnchors` for its other field-prop checks, so if this
 
@@ -939,6 +939,127 @@ describe('[#6674] validateSearchableFields — a virtual formula entry', () => {
   });
 });
 
+/**
+ * A credential entry. Since the engine's ADR-0100 search withhold, the search
+ * expansion leaves every `secret` / `password` column out of the field map it
+ * resolves over, an author-declared one included, and says nothing — so the
+ * declared set is silently narrower than written. The finding is that
+ * withhold's build-time voice, at the virtual entry's severity.
+ */
+describe('validateSearchableFields — a secret or password entry', () => {
+  const accountFields = {
+    name: { type: 'text' },
+    billing_email: { type: 'email' },
+    api_key: { type: 'secret' },
+    portal_password: { type: 'password' },
+  };
+
+  it.each([
+    ['secret', 'api_key'],
+    ['password', 'portal_password'],
+  ])("flags a '%s' entry on the OBJECT's own searchableFields — previously clean", (ctype, field) => {
+    const findings = validateSearchableFields({
+      objects: [
+        { name: 'crm_account', fields: accountFields, searchableFields: ['name', field, 'billing_email'] },
+      ],
+    });
+
+    // The text and email entries beside it stay clean: the check reads the TYPE.
+    expect(findings).toHaveLength(1);
+    expect(findings[0].rule).toBe(SEARCHABLE_FIELD_UNSEARCHABLE);
+    expect(findings[0].severity).toBe('error');
+    expect(findings[0].path).toBe('objects[0].searchableFields[1]');
+    expect(findings[0].where).toBe('object "crm_account"');
+    expect(findings[0].message).toContain(`"${field}"`);
+    expect(findings[0].message).toContain(`is a '${ctype}' field, a credential`);
+    expect(findings[0].hint).toBe(`Drop "${field}": credential fields are never searched`);
+  });
+
+  it.each([
+    ['secret', 'api_key'],
+    ['password', 'portal_password'],
+  ])("flags a '%s' entry on a list view narrowing, under the same verdict", (ctype, field) => {
+    const findings = validateSearchableFields({
+      objects: [
+        {
+          name: 'crm_account',
+          fields: accountFields,
+          listViews: { all: { type: 'grid', searchableFields: ['name', field] } },
+        },
+      ],
+    });
+
+    // Auto-default object: without the credential check the admissibility pass
+    // would explain this entry by its type alone and offer a text-like field.
+    expect(findings).toHaveLength(1);
+    expect(findings[0].rule).toBe(SEARCHABLE_FIELD_UNSEARCHABLE);
+    expect(findings[0].severity).toBe('error');
+    expect(findings[0].path).toBe('objects[0].listViews.all.searchableFields[1]');
+    expect(findings[0].message).toContain(`is a '${ctype}' field, a credential`);
+    expect(findings[0].hint).toBe(`Drop "${field}": credential fields are never searched`);
+  });
+
+  it('flags a view entry the object ITSELF declares — the declared set does not make it searchable', () => {
+    // The object's declaration admits the entry at the REST ingress, so the
+    // #4830 admissibility pass passes it; the engine still withholds it.
+    const findings = validateSearchableFields({
+      objects: [
+        {
+          name: 'crm_account',
+          fields: accountFields,
+          searchableFields: ['name', 'api_key'],
+          listViews: { all: { type: 'grid', searchableFields: ['api_key'] } },
+        },
+      ],
+    });
+
+    expect(findings.map((f) => [f.rule, f.path])).toEqual([
+      [SEARCHABLE_FIELD_UNSEARCHABLE, 'objects[0].searchableFields[1]'],
+      [SEARCHABLE_FIELD_UNSEARCHABLE, 'objects[0].listViews.all.searchableFields[0]'],
+    ]);
+  });
+
+  it('is exemption-free: a `password` on a better-auth object is reported too', () => {
+    // The read mask spares a better-auth `password`; the search withhold does not.
+    const findings = validateSearchableFields({
+      objects: [
+        {
+          name: 'crm_account',
+          managedBy: 'better-auth',
+          fields: accountFields,
+          searchableFields: ['name', 'portal_password'],
+        },
+      ],
+    });
+
+    expect(findings).toHaveLength(1);
+    expect(findings[0].path).toBe('objects[0].searchableFields[1]');
+    expect(findings[0].message).toContain("is a 'password' field, a credential");
+  });
+
+  it('CONTROL — the same declaration with text and email entries only stays clean', () => {
+    expect(
+      validateSearchableFields({
+        objects: [
+          {
+            name: 'crm_account',
+            fields: accountFields,
+            searchableFields: ['name', 'billing_email'],
+            listViews: { all: { type: 'grid', searchableFields: ['name', 'billing_email'] } },
+          },
+        ],
+      }),
+    ).toEqual([]);
+  });
+
+  it('`os explain` names the silent withhold and the exemption-free predicate', () => {
+    const text = explanationOf(SEARCHABLE_FIELD_UNSEARCHABLE);
+    expect(text).toContain('A `secret` or `password` entry is refused on EVERY surface');
+    expect(text).toContain('`isCredentialFieldType`');
+    expect(text).toContain('no better-auth exemption');
+  });
+});
+
 /**
  * [#8404] The FIFTH blanket-`SYSTEM_FIELDS` read site. Existence and provenance
  * are different questions: on an ADR-0015 `external` object the platform
@@ -1132,13 +1253,14 @@ describe('[#22161] one-line verdicts — the three searchable ids', () => {
 describe('[#22161] one-line fixes — the three searchable ids', () => {
   it('every `fix:` line the cases above fired is one line of at most 200 characters', () => {
     // Coverage control: every arm fired — both unknown arms, the anchor, and
-    // the four unsearchable arms (virtual, outside a declared set, a reference
-    // column and any other type outside the auto-default set).
+    // the five unsearchable arms (virtual, credential, outside a declared set,
+    // a reference column and any other type outside the auto-default set).
     const hints = fired.map((f) => f.hint);
     expect(hints.some((h) => h.startsWith('Fix the name, or add "')), 'unknown name').toBe(true);
     expect(hints.some((h) => h.startsWith("'search' scans this object's own columns only")), 'dotted').toBe(true);
     expect(hints.some((h) => h.startsWith("If the remote table carries '")), 'anchor').toBe(true);
     expect(hints.some((h) => h.startsWith('Mirror the computed value')), 'virtual').toBe(true);
+    expect(hints.some((h) => h.endsWith(': credential fields are never searched')), 'credential').toBe(true);
     expect(hints.some((h) => h.startsWith('Add "') && h.includes('.searchableFields')), 'declared set').toBe(true);
     expect(hints.some((h) => h.includes("to search by the related record's title")), 'reference').toBe(true);
     expect(hints.some((h) => h.endsWith('or target a text-like field instead')), 'other type').toBe(true);
 
@@ -68,6 +68,30 @@
  *    WITH NO ERROR on driver-sql. Since #6674 the spec resolution drops such
  *    an entry and both enforcement faces refuse it by name.
  *
+ * 4. CREDENTIALS, on EVERY surface — the object's own set included
+ *    (`searchable-field-unsearchable`): a `secret` or `password` entry names a
+ *    real, stored field, so checks 1 and 3 pass it — but since the engine's
+ *    ADR-0100 search withhold the expansion leaves every credential column out
+ *    of the field map it resolves over (`expandSearchOnAst`,
+ *    `@objectstack/objectql`, by `collectCredentialFields`), an author-declared
+ *    one included, and says nothing. The declared set is silently narrower
+ *    than written, and a declaration naming ONLY credential fields falls
+ *    through to the auto-default set — #4254's "asked narrower, answered
+ *    wider" again. Judged by the spec's own predicate
+ *    ({@link isCredentialFieldType}, `@objectstack/spec/data`), the one that
+ *    engine collector reads, so linter and engine cannot disagree about which
+ *    types are credentials. The withhold is exemption-free (a better-auth
+ *    `password` is withheld too), and so is this check.
+ *
+ *    `error`, the virtual entry's severity, deliberately and for the virtual
+ *    entry's reason: the entry can never match wherever it is declared, and a
+ *    narrowing the runtime makes in silence gets its word at build time. A
+ *    warning would leave `os validate` passing a declaration the runtime does
+ *    not honour, which is the gap this check exists to close. The remedy has
+ *    one form — drop the entry — since no mirror of a credential onto a
+ *    searchable column is a fix: that would publish the very value the
+ *    withhold protects.
+ *
  * The OBJECT's own `searchableFields` stays existence-only OTHERWISE, and the
  * dividing line is STORAGE, not search quality: the runtime's declared branch
  * filters by existence and scannability, never by type taste, so a json or
@@ -121,6 +145,7 @@
 
 import {
   resolveSearchFieldResolution,
+  isCredentialFieldType,
   isVirtualSearchField,
   SEARCH_AUTO_EXCLUDED_FIELDS,
   type SearchFieldMeta,
@@ -159,8 +184,9 @@ export interface SearchableFieldFinding {
  *
  * - `'canonical'` — the object's own `searchableFields`. The runtime honors
  *   any entry that exists and has a stored column to scan (existence- and
- *   scannability-filtered, never type-filtered), so existence and virtuality
- *   are checked and nothing else (#6674).
+ *   scannability-filtered, never type-filtered), apart from the credential
+ *   columns the engine withholds, so existence, virtuality and credentials
+ *   are checked and nothing else (#6674, module note check 4).
  * - `'narrowing'` — a list view's `searchableFields` (metadata or react
  *   surface). Clients echo it as the `$searchFields` override, which the
  *   #4254 ingress gate intersects with the object's allowed set — entries the
@@ -430,6 +456,32 @@ export function checkSearchableFieldList(
       continue;
     }
 
+    // ── Credential entries — EVERY surface, canonical included ──
+    //
+    // The engine's search expansion withholds every `secret` / `password`
+    // column from the set it scans (ADR-0100), a declared one included, without
+    // a word; this is that withhold's build-time voice (module note, check 4).
+    // Judged by the spec predicate the engine's collector reads. Ahead of the
+    // admissibility pass on purpose: on a view over an auto-default object
+    // that pass would otherwise explain the entry by its type alone, and the
+    // remedy it offers ("target a text-like field") is not this one.
+    const ctype = target.fields[name]?.type;
+    if (isCredentialFieldType(ctype)) {
+      findings.push({
+        severity: 'error',
+        rule: SEARCHABLE_FIELD_UNSEARCHABLE,
+        where,
+        path: `${path}[${i}]`,
+        message:
+          `${subject} entry "${name}" on object "${objectName}" is a '${ctype}' field, a ` +
+          `credential: 'search' never scans it`,
+        // One remedy line; what the engine does with the entry on each surface
+        // is the id's `os explain` entry.
+        hint: `Drop "${name}": credential fields are never searched`,
+      });
+      continue;
+    }
+
     // ── Runtime admissibility (#4830) — view-level narrowings only ──
     if (!resolution || resolution.allowed.has(name)) continue;
     // ③ System column outside the allowed set: its runtime metadata is
 
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@
  * ruling of 2026-08-12 on #7728.
  */
 
-import { isMaskedOnReadFieldType, type ServiceObject } from '@objectstack/spec/data';
+import { isCredentialFieldType, isMaskedOnReadFieldType, type ServiceObject } from '@objectstack/spec/data';
 
 /**
  * Prefix marking a persisted field value as a `sys_secret` handle ref rather
@@ -291,7 +291,7 @@ export function collectCredentialFields(schema: ServiceObject | undefined | null
   if (!fields) return [];
   const out: string[] = [];
   for (const [name, def] of Object.entries(fields)) {
-    if (def && (def.type === 'secret' || def.type === 'password')) out.push(name);
+    if (def && isCredentialFieldType(def.type)) out.push(name);
   }
   return out;
 }