@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+---
+'@objectstack/spec': minor
+'@objectstack/plugin-security': minor
+'@objectstack/lint': minor
+'@objectstack/skills': minor
+---
+
+feat(security)!: `current_user.queues` is resolved by the platform from the ownership-queue service, and `queues` joins the reserved `current_user` keys (#27016)
+
+Clause-②: no (narrowing) — `queues` joins `RESERVED_RLS_MEMBERSHIP_KEYS`, so an object's `membershipKeys` may no longer declare a key named `queues`, and a registered membership resolver's `queues` answer is screened off. Nothing is widened past what the platform itself resolves: where no app supplied the key, a policy reading `current_user.queues` matched no rows before, and now it matches the caller's own queues.
+Metadata-protocol: narrowed
+
+<!-- adr-0087: not-required (no-migration-prescription) No key, export or type is removed or renamed: one name is added to the reserved list, which makes a membership key of that name refused at parse. The replacement name is the author's to choose, so there is no mechanical rewrite to prescribe and no tombstone. -->
+
+**BREAKING** accept-set narrowing in `@objectstack/spec` (`MembershipKeyNameSchema`, read through `ObjectSchema.membershipKeys`) and at the membership resolver screen in `@objectstack/plugin-security`.
+
+- **Now.** A row-level security policy can read `current_user.queues`: the machine names of the ownership queues the caller belongs to in the active organization, directly or through a position, team or unit, as each queue's members define. The security plugin resolves it from the ownership-queue service's `queuesOf`, the same membership answer the claim gate's `isMember` reads, once per request and only when a policy about to compile reads the key. For example `owner_id == null && queue in current_user.queues` lets queue members read the unowned records sitting in their queues.
+- **One source.** No other source can supply the key. A registered `rls-membership-resolver` that answers `queues` has that answer dropped with a WARN, a `rlsMembership` bag entry or a `queues` field on the execution context is never read, and a context copied for another user or organization does not carry the set. With no signed-in user, no ownership-queue service, or a membership read that fails, the key stays unresolved and every policy reading it matches no rows.
+- **Who moves.** An object that declares `membershipKeys: { queues: … }`, or a membership resolver that lists `queues` among its keys. Census on this repository at 7eb613c3: none in `packages`, `examples`, `qa`, `skills` or `content`.
+
+**The remedy.** Rename the membership key. `queues` is resolved by the platform; choose a name that says what your set holds.
@@ -966,7 +966,7 @@ Metadata query with filtering, sorting, and pagination
 | **sharingModel** | `Enum<'private' \| 'public_read' \| 'public_read_write' \| 'controlled_by_parent'>` | optional | Org-Wide Default record visibility (OWD) for INTERNAL users. Canonical four only (legacy aliases removed, ADR-0090 D4): private (owner-only) \| public_read (everyone reads, owner writes) \| public_read_write (everyone reads+writes) \| controlled_by_parent (derived from the master record). A CUSTOM object that omits this resolves to private at runtime (ADR-0090 D1). |
 | **sharing** | `{ controlledByParent?: object }` | optional | Per-object sharing opt-ins that refine the org-wide default sharingModel declares. controlledByParent.ownerMayEdit: on a controlled_by_parent detail, the row's owner may update it with read access to the master (ADR-0055 §3 amendment). |
 | **defaultRowScope** | `{ name: string; label?: string; description?: string; operation: Enum<'select' \| 'insert' \| 'update' \| 'delete' \| 'all'>; … }` | optional | The object's default row scope: one row-level security policy, written like a permission set's `rowLevelSecurity` entry without `object` (the declaring object is implied; writing `object` is refused). The security plugin's row-policy collection, the one step every read, write and explain passes through, applies it when no permission set the caller holds carries a row policy for this object and the operation: a held policy for every object (`'*'`) counts, while one for another operation, switched off, or outside the caller's positions does not. A policy an authored set carries for the object is used as authored, with this default not added to it; a principal whose superuser bypass skips row policies is unaffected; an object that declares none keeps the behaviour it has without the key. The default is judged like a held policy: its `operation`, `positions` and `enabled` decide where it applies, and a `using` the row-filter compiler cannot lower makes every read it governs return no rows, with one warning in the server log. `os validate`, `os build` and `os lint` judge this predicate as they judge a permission set's policy and report one that cannot lower; saving the object through the server does not run that check, so keep it inside the lowerable subset. Explain names an applied default as the object's own, not a permission set's. |
-| **membershipKeys** | `Record<string, { userField: string; valueField: string; filter?: string; label?: string; … }>` | optional | Membership keys this object defines, by name: each makes `current_user.KEY` the set of `valueField` values on this object's rows whose `userField` is the signed-in user and on which the optional `filter` holds, for a row-level security policy to read with `in` (e.g. `supplier in current_user.portal_supplier_ids`, declared on a supplier-contact object as `portal_supplier_ids: { userField: 'user', valueField: 'supplier', filter: 'active == true' }`). Declare a key on the one object whose rows define it; a key name is one request-wide name, so declaring it on two objects is refused, and the kernel's own names (`id`, `organization_id`, `positions`, `org_user_ids`, `accessible_org_ids`, `email`) are refused. The set is read once per request, only when a policy reads the key, as a system read inside the caller's organization and regardless of what the caller may read on this object, so the caller needs no read on it; it holds at most 1,000 values, and a larger set, a failed read, a `filter` that does not compile for this object, or a key a registered membership resolver also owns makes every policy reading it match no rows. Whoever can write this object's rows can grant the key. |
+| **membershipKeys** | `Record<string, { userField: string; valueField: string; filter?: string; label?: string; … }>` | optional | Membership keys this object defines, by name: each makes `current_user.KEY` the set of `valueField` values on this object's rows whose `userField` is the signed-in user and on which the optional `filter` holds, for a row-level security policy to read with `in` (e.g. `supplier in current_user.portal_supplier_ids`, declared on a supplier-contact object as `portal_supplier_ids: { userField: 'user', valueField: 'supplier', filter: 'active == true' }`). Declare a key on the one object whose rows define it; a key name is one request-wide name, so declaring it on two objects is refused, and the kernel's own names (`id`, `organization_id`, `positions`, `org_user_ids`, `accessible_org_ids`, `email`, `queues`) are refused. The set is read once per request, only when a policy reads the key, as a system read inside the caller's organization and regardless of what the caller may read on this object, so the caller needs no read on it; it holds at most 1,000 values, and a larger set, a failed read, a `filter` that does not compile for this object, or a key a registered membership resolver also owns makes every policy reading it match no rows. Whoever can write this object's rows can grant the key. |
 | **externalSharingModel** | `never` | optional | [REMOVED] `object.externalSharingModel` was removed in @objectstack/spec 18 (ADR-0049 enforce-or-remove) — it never had an effect: no request resolves an external principal, and the external rung of the authorization kernel (ADR-0095) admits explicitly shared rows only, never an org-wide default, so the value changed no answer for anyone. Delete the key. `sharingModel` is the one org-wide default; a principal reaches a row it does not own through an explicit share, and an anonymous reader through a share link (`publicSharing`). Run `os migrate meta --from 17` to list the mechanical edits for existing sources; `--write` applies the ones it can prove, and you apply the rest by hand. |
 | **publicSharing** | `{ enabled?: boolean; allowedAudiences?: Enum<'public' \| 'link_only' \| 'signed_in' \| 'email'>[]; allowedPermissions?: Enum<'view' \| 'comment' \| 'edit'>[]; maxExpiryDays?: integer; … }` | optional | Public share-link policy (Notion/Figma-style link sharing) |
 | **actions** | `{ name: string; label: string \| Record<string, string>; description?: string \| Record<string, string>; objectName?: string; … }[]` | optional | Actions associated with this object (auto-populated from top-level actions via objectName) |
 
@@ -173,7 +173,7 @@ const result = ApiMethod.parse(data);
 | **sharingModel** | `Enum<'private' \| 'public_read' \| 'public_read_write' \| 'controlled_by_parent'>` | optional | Org-Wide Default record visibility (OWD) for INTERNAL users. Canonical four only (legacy aliases removed, ADR-0090 D4): private (owner-only) \| public_read (everyone reads, owner writes) \| public_read_write (everyone reads+writes) \| controlled_by_parent (derived from the master record). A CUSTOM object that omits this resolves to private at runtime (ADR-0090 D1). |
 | **sharing** | `{ controlledByParent?: object }` | optional | Per-object sharing opt-ins that refine the org-wide default sharingModel declares. controlledByParent.ownerMayEdit: on a controlled_by_parent detail, the row's owner may update it with read access to the master (ADR-0055 §3 amendment). |
 | **defaultRowScope** | `{ name: string; label?: string; description?: string; operation: Enum<'select' \| 'insert' \| 'update' \| 'delete' \| 'all'>; … }` | optional | The object's default row scope: one row-level security policy, written like a permission set's `rowLevelSecurity` entry without `object` (the declaring object is implied; writing `object` is refused). The security plugin's row-policy collection, the one step every read, write and explain passes through, applies it when no permission set the caller holds carries a row policy for this object and the operation: a held policy for every object (`'*'`) counts, while one for another operation, switched off, or outside the caller's positions does not. A policy an authored set carries for the object is used as authored, with this default not added to it; a principal whose superuser bypass skips row policies is unaffected; an object that declares none keeps the behaviour it has without the key. The default is judged like a held policy: its `operation`, `positions` and `enabled` decide where it applies, and a `using` the row-filter compiler cannot lower makes every read it governs return no rows, with one warning in the server log. `os validate`, `os build` and `os lint` judge this predicate as they judge a permission set's policy and report one that cannot lower; saving the object through the server does not run that check, so keep it inside the lowerable subset. Explain names an applied default as the object's own, not a permission set's. |
-| **membershipKeys** | `Record<string, { userField: string; valueField: string; filter?: string; label?: string; … }>` | optional | Membership keys this object defines, by name: each makes `current_user.KEY` the set of `valueField` values on this object's rows whose `userField` is the signed-in user and on which the optional `filter` holds, for a row-level security policy to read with `in` (e.g. `supplier in current_user.portal_supplier_ids`, declared on a supplier-contact object as `portal_supplier_ids: { userField: 'user', valueField: 'supplier', filter: 'active == true' }`). Declare a key on the one object whose rows define it; a key name is one request-wide name, so declaring it on two objects is refused, and the kernel's own names (`id`, `organization_id`, `positions`, `org_user_ids`, `accessible_org_ids`, `email`) are refused. The set is read once per request, only when a policy reads the key, as a system read inside the caller's organization and regardless of what the caller may read on this object, so the caller needs no read on it; it holds at most 1,000 values, and a larger set, a failed read, a `filter` that does not compile for this object, or a key a registered membership resolver also owns makes every policy reading it match no rows. Whoever can write this object's rows can grant the key. |
+| **membershipKeys** | `Record<string, { userField: string; valueField: string; filter?: string; label?: string; … }>` | optional | Membership keys this object defines, by name: each makes `current_user.KEY` the set of `valueField` values on this object's rows whose `userField` is the signed-in user and on which the optional `filter` holds, for a row-level security policy to read with `in` (e.g. `supplier in current_user.portal_supplier_ids`, declared on a supplier-contact object as `portal_supplier_ids: { userField: 'user', valueField: 'supplier', filter: 'active == true' }`). Declare a key on the one object whose rows define it; a key name is one request-wide name, so declaring it on two objects is refused, and the kernel's own names (`id`, `organization_id`, `positions`, `org_user_ids`, `accessible_org_ids`, `email`, `queues`) are refused. The set is read once per request, only when a policy reads the key, as a system read inside the caller's organization and regardless of what the caller may read on this object, so the caller needs no read on it; it holds at most 1,000 values, and a larger set, a failed read, a `filter` that does not compile for this object, or a key a registered membership resolver also owns makes every policy reading it match no rows. Whoever can write this object's rows can grant the key. |
 | **externalSharingModel** | `never` | optional | [REMOVED] `object.externalSharingModel` was removed in @objectstack/spec 18 (ADR-0049 enforce-or-remove) — it never had an effect: no request resolves an external principal, and the external rung of the authorization kernel (ADR-0095) admits explicitly shared rows only, never an org-wide default, so the value changed no answer for anyone. Delete the key. `sharingModel` is the one org-wide default; a principal reaches a row it does not own through an explicit share, and an anonymous reader through a share link (`publicSharing`). Run `os migrate meta --from 17` to list the mechanical edits for existing sources; `--write` applies the ones it can prove, and you apply the rest by hand. |
 | **publicSharing** | `{ enabled?: boolean; allowedAudiences?: Enum<'public' \| 'link_only' \| 'signed_in' \| 'email'>[]; allowedPermissions?: Enum<'view' \| 'comment' \| 'edit'>[]; maxExpiryDays?: integer; … }` | optional | Public share-link policy (Notion/Figma-style link sharing) |
 | **actions** | `{ name: string; label: string \| Record<string, string>; description?: string \| Record<string, string>; objectName?: string; … }[]` | optional | Actions associated with this object (auto-populated from top-level actions via objectName) |
 
@@ -53,7 +53,8 @@ object-level permissions (CRUD), RLS provides record-level filtering.
 ### Where a membership key comes from
 
 The kernel resolves `current_user.id`, `organization_id`, `positions`,
-`org_user_ids`, `accessible_org_ids` and `email` itself. Any other
+`org_user_ids`, `accessible_org_ids`, `email` and `queues` (the ownership
+queues the caller sits in, ADR-0142 D3) itself. Any other
 `current_user.KEY` read with `in` is a membership set the APP supplies,
 through one of two sources: