@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+---
+'@objectstack/plugin-security': minor
+'@objectstack/spec': patch
+---
+
+feat(plugin-security)!: the permission-set projection, its seed-name lookup and refusal sink are deleted (ADR-0131 D3, C3 stage 7a)
+
+Clause-②: no (narrowing)
+
+<!-- adr-0087: not-required (runtime-export-retired @objectstack/plugin-security#permissionSetRowFields, @objectstack/plugin-security#permissionSetBodyFromRow, @objectstack/plugin-security#upsertEnvPermissionSet, @objectstack/plugin-security#projectPermissionMutation, @objectstack/plugin-security#registerPermissionSetProjection, @objectstack/plugin-security#createPermissionSetWriteThrough, @objectstack/plugin-security#reconcilePermissionSetProjection, @objectstack/plugin-security#PermissionSeedOutcome, @objectstack/plugin-security#ProjectionDeps, @objectstack/plugin-security#ProjectionReconcileOutcome, @objectstack/plugin-security#WriteThroughDeps) The retired names are runtime functions and types of the projector that mirrored a permission-set definition into a sys_permission_set row. No metadata moves: no spec key, authorable spelling or stored shape changes, and no stored row is rewritten. Stage 8 already stopped registering the projector and the data-door write-through, so nothing in a running deployment called them. -->
+
+**BREAKING** (retired exports of `@objectstack/plugin-security`), graded `minor` on the v18 prerelease line.
+
+Stage 8 stopped registering the `sys_permission_set` row object, the `permission` mutation projector and the data-door write-through. This change deletes the modules behind them: `permission-set-projection`, `seed-name-lookup` and `seed-refusal-sink`. A permission set is written through the metadata door alone (`PUT /api/v1/meta/permission/:name`), and the security catalog serves it by name.
+
+What a consumer sees:
+
+- FROM `createPermissionSetWriteThrough(deps)` TO nothing: no `sys_permission_set` data-door write exists to redirect. Write the set through the metadata door. Delete the call.
+- FROM `registerPermissionSetProjection(protocol, deps)` TO nothing: no row mirrors a definition. Delete the call.
+- FROM `reconcilePermissionSetProjection(...)` TO nothing: there is no projection to reconcile at boot. Delete the call.
+- FROM `projectPermissionMutation(...)` TO nothing. Delete the call.
+- FROM `upsertEnvPermissionSet(...)` TO `PUT /api/v1/meta/permission/:name`, or the metadata protocol's `saveMetaItem({ type: 'permission', name, item })`.
+- FROM `permissionSetBodyFromRow(row)` TO `permissionSetDefinitionFromRow(row)` from `@objectstack/core`: the same mapping, for converting a stored `sys_permission_set` row into its definition.
+- FROM `permissionSetRowFields(definition)` TO nothing: no row is written. Delete the call.
+- FROM the types `PermissionSeedOutcome`, `ProjectionDeps`, `ProjectionReconcileOutcome` and `WriteThroughDeps` TO nothing. Delete the import.
+
+Unchanged: the security catalog's echo of a metadata-door permission set or position on an environment kernel, which lives in its own module since #23308. The packaged-permission-set lock still refuses a metadata-door save of a set a code package ships (`403 NOT_OVERRIDABLE`), and the boot still reports environment overlays that shadow such a set. `OverlayDetectionOptions.logger` now asks only for `warn`, the one channel the reading reports on.
+
+**`@objectstack/spec`** (patch): the `permission.tabPermissions` liveness entry no longer cites the deleted projection, and the liveness README's registered-but-unbound `permission-set-projection` proof row is retired with the invariant it described (no `@proof` tag carries it any more).
@@ -9,5 +9,5 @@ Clause-②: no
 - **What was wrong.** A writable runtime package's permission set marked `isDefault: true`, published through the package door with no `packageId` in its body, recorded no audience-binding suggestion on an environment kernel, so ADR-0090 D5's "packages suggest, admins confirm" never happened for it. On that kernel the protocol hydrates no stored row into the engine registry, so the security catalog finds the set in the metadata service. The only body there is the permission-set projection's in-memory copy, and that copy carried no `_packageId`. The catalog served the set as unowned while `GET /api/v1/meta/permission/NAME` named the package, and the suggestion collector skipped it.
 - **What changed.** The projection's copy of a tenant-authored set now names the package its stored row is bound to. It reads that binding from the protocol's by-name read (the `_packageId` that read serves) and derives none of its own. The catalog, the by-name read and the layered read (`?layers=true`, whose `packageId` comes from the same copy) now name the same owner. `GET /api/v1/security/suggested-bindings` lists one pending suggestion under that package. A `manage_metadata` holder still has to accept it: the publish grants nothing.
 - **When the body's `packageId` disagrees.** A set whose body declares a `packageId` other than the package it is published into is now owned, for the catalog and the suggestions, by the package it is published into, which is what the by-name read already served. On an environment kernel, a suggestion recorded under the body's package is pruned at the next sync while pending, and withheld from `everyone` with its reason logged if it was accepted. A pending suggestion under the publishing package replaces it.
-- **Unchanged.** The `sys_permission_set` row (still `managed_by: 'admin'`, with no `package_id`), the packaged-permission-set lock and every edit door. A code package's set, whose owner the catalog reads from its artifact. A set saved into no package, which stays unowned and records no suggestion. A copy of a code-shipped set's legacy overlay, which carries no owner, as before.
+- **Unchanged.** The packaged-permission-set lock and every edit door. (No `sys_permission_set` row is written for the set: C3 stage 7a retires the last writer.) A code package's set, whose owner the catalog reads from its artifact. A set saved into no package, which stays unowned and records no suggestion. A copy of a code-shipped set's legacy overlay, which carries no owner, as before.
 - **If the binding cannot be read**, the copy is registered without an owner, as before, and one warning says so. It still enforces the new body, and the next save, publish or boot reads the binding again.
@@ -5,12 +5,12 @@
 ## 适用面
 
 - 只约束 `needs-user-decision` 卡与决策箱讨论的四维分析。
-- 内部工具卡(dev 派发用)四维照旧,⛔ 不强加行业类比;只适用新记录,存量 ⛔ 不回改。
 
 ## 常设决裁批流程
 
 - 每批恰好 5 张,末批不足照呈;呈完即停等回批,⛔ 永不一条消息投多批。
-- 批序:在飞被阻塞 > 运营阻塞 > 用户可见 > 结构性;每卡 = 六项写法 + 四棱块。
+- 批序:在飞被阻塞 > 运营阻塞 > 用户可见 > 结构性;卡面分析只一层 = 立卡席六项 + 四棱。
+- 总监批前卡评论是增量:命令复核前提,逐棱同异,推荐/回退/口径;不同意字母才展开四维。
 - 回批一行式逐卡对应字母选项;带的附加条件随执行落地,⛔ 不为它另起请示轮。
 - 呈递详解 = 逐卡散文按正文六项;⛔ 表格行、判词、栅格不构成详解,压缩批次是违规。
 - 受管草稿批例外:一 PR 一行(改了什么/为什么/席位意见/一个动作),⛔ 不套六项;速读住 PR。
 
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@
 ## 基本原则
 
 - 三要素:每批 5 张;每卡从业务角度讲清问题、选项与代价;每卡带四维分析加一个推荐。
-- 呈报的代价列旁恒带工作量列(车道 · 阶段/PR 数 · 实测先例或「无先例」),与卡面同列。
+- 聊天呈批逐卡六项,取材 = 卡面分析 + 本席增量;增量点名复核了什么,⛔ 不复述所同意的。
 - 创业阶段不渐进:废弃别名与能力退役默认立即退休,无窗口、无双拼写宽限。
 - 一次裁清:子问题、分叉与执行参数(字母、车道、级别)同笔裁定,⛔ 不留 dev 另立决策卡。
 
 
@@ -108,7 +108,6 @@ that silently does not happen.
 | 9 | `explain()` may target a principal other than the caller | plugin-security | Get: no `manage_users` / delegated-admin check | `packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/security-plugin.ts#explainAccessForCaller` |
 | 9b | The master-detail write check the `security` service serves (`checkControlledByParentWrite`, ADR-0055) answers `allow` | plugin-security | Get: `allow` for any record, with no master judged — the write path's own first exit, so a gate composing it admits exactly what the record's own system-context update would. Lose: nothing a caller reaches today: its two consumers, the `sys_attachment` and `sys_comment` parent gates, return before they ask for a system session | `packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/security-plugin.ts#checkControlledByParentWrite` |
 | 10 | Anonymous-deny treats the caller as authenticated | core | Get: passes the 401 seam with no `userId` | `packages/core/src/security/anonymous-deny.ts#shouldDenyAnonymous` |
-| 11 | Permission-set projection middleware skipped | plugin-security | Lose: nothing on a stock composition — the security plugin no longer registers this middleware, because the `sys_permission_set` object it projected into is retired (ADR-0131 D3); the module is still exported. Where a host registers it, the skip is of the projection of permission-set-derived columns | `packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/permission-set-projection.ts#createPermissionSetWriteThrough` |
 | 12 | Session-resolution middleware skipped | plugin-auth | Get: no session lookup attempted | `packages/plugins/plugin-auth/src/auth-plugin.ts#start` |
 | 13 | Per-request performance timings disclosed | observability | Get: timing headers a normal caller cannot pull | `packages/observability/src/perf-timing.ts#isPerfDisclosurePrincipal` |
 | 15 | MCP stdio bridge skips the object API-exposure gate | mcp | Get: the bridge reaches objects whose `apiEnabled` / `apiMethods` would refuse an external caller | `packages/mcp/src/stdio-data-bridge.ts#enforceApiExposure` |
 
@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ what moved this page's population from 225 to 227; nothing about the two sites
 changed, only whether this instrument could see them.
 
 **The expensive failure direction is a keyword.** Sites whose receiver the author
-typed `any` have no type to read, and there are 41 of them — just under a fifth
+typed `any` have no type to read, and there are 38 of them — just under a fifth
 of the population, concentrated in exactly the seed and bootstrap paths this
 control exists for. Scoring an unreadable receiver as "not an engine" would have
 dropped every one of them silently, with a clean exit and a smaller number that
@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ are reported as `undecidable` rather than assumed either way.
 
 The same holds twice over for the context. An options argument spelled as a
 literal can be read; one spelled `options`, `{ ...opts }`, or handed through a
-forwarding shim cannot, and **53 of the 228 sites are spelled that way**. A
+forwarding shim cannot, and **53 of the 225 sites are spelled that way**. A
 context resolved from an inline literal or a local `const` can be tested for
 `isSystem`; one arriving from a helper call cannot.
 
@@ -187,10 +187,10 @@ reproduce them. Where it disagrees, it disagrees on the page:
 
 | carried figure | where it survives | this census |
 | :--- | :--- | ---: |
-| 175 write call sites | quoted in the merged changeset | **228** |
+| 175 write call sites | quoted in the merged changeset | **225** |
 | 24 carrying no tenant context | quoted in the merged changeset | **2** provable and tenancy-enabled; **32** more whose options argument is unreadable |
-| 127 of 175 statically decidable, 48 runtime-parameter-name sites | restated on the `isSystem`-scoping card | **155 of 228** decidable, **73** undecidable |
-| 135 (77%) silenced by the `isSystem` guard before the posture gate | the lost issue body — **no surviving corroboration** | **not reproduced**: 121 decidably elevated, 0 decidably not, 99 undecidable |
+| 127 of 175 statically decidable, 48 runtime-parameter-name sites | restated on the `isSystem`-scoping card | **154 of 225** decidable, **71** undecidable |
+| 135 (77%) silenced by the `isSystem` guard before the posture gate | the lost issue body — **no surviving corroboration** | **not reproduced**: 120 decidably elevated, 0 decidably not, 97 undecidable |
 | 141 and 132, two independent re-derivations | the card that filed this work | — |
 
 **The differences are not reconciled, and deliberately so.** The old census's
@@ -200,18 +200,18 @@ be stated is what this instrument counts, which is written above and re-runnable
 at any commit.
 
 Two structural facts do plausibly widen this reading against any hand or regex
-one, and both are counted in the generated tables below: the 41 sites reached
+one, and both are counted in the generated tables below: the 38 sites reached
 through an erased (`any`) receiver, and the 50 that name their object through a
 `const` rather than inline. An instrument that read either the way a person does
 would report a smaller number and would not say so.
 
 The fourth row is the one worth flagging to anyone citing it. **The 135 / 77%
 figure has no surviving corroboration anywhere in the tree.** This census reads
-121 of 228 (53%) as decidably elevated, with 99 more whose elevation is a
+120 of 225 (53%) as decidably elevated, with 97 more whose elevation is a
 run-time fact — so the claim is neither confirmed nor refuted, and the honest
 answer is that a static reading cannot settle it.
 
-⇒ **Cite `2 / 228`, and say what it is**: the sites whose options argument was
+⇒ **Cite `2 / 225`, and say what it is**: the sites whose options argument was
 READ and holds no tenant context, against a decidably tenancy-enabled object.
 That is the control's provable yield surface. ⛔ Do not cite it as "the sites
 without tenant context" — **32 further sites** have an options argument this
@@ -223,30 +223,30 @@ cannot read, and they are neither in nor out.
 
 | what | count |
 | :--- | ---: |
-| write call sites on the application surface | **228** |
-| …whose object name is statically decidable | 155 |
-| …whose object name is chosen at run time | 73 |
+| write call sites on the application surface | **225** |
+| …whose object name is statically decidable | 154 |
+| …whose object name is chosen at run time | 71 |
 | …against an object with tenancy ENABLED | 153 |
 | …against an object that declares tenancy off | 1 |
-| threading a tenant context | 167 |
+| threading a tenant context | 164 |
 | PROVABLY carrying none (options read, no context key) | **8** |
 | …of those, against a decidably tenancy-enabled object | **2** |
 | options argument UNREADABLE — may or may not carry one | 53 |
 | …of those, against a decidably tenancy-enabled object | 32 |
-| threading a decidably ELEVATED (`isSystem`) context | 121 |
+| threading a decidably ELEVATED (`isSystem`) context | 120 |
 | threading a context that is decidably NOT elevated | 0 |
-| threading a context whose elevation is a run-time fact | 99 |
+| threading a context whose elevation is a run-time fact | 97 |
 
 | how the instrument reached the site | count |
 | :--- | ---: |
 | receiver carried a readable engine type | 187 |
 | receiver erased, placed by the object NAME | 28 |
-| receiver erased, placed by an `object: string` PARAMETER | 7 |
-| receiver erased, placed by an `UNTYPED_RECEIVERS` row | 6 |
+| receiver erased, placed by an `object: string` PARAMETER | 5 |
+| receiver erased, placed by an `UNTYPED_RECEIVERS` row | 5 |
 
-| object name spelled inline | 105 |
+| object name spelled inline | 104 |
 | object name spelled through a `const` | 50 |
-| object name is an `object: string` parameter | 9 |
+| object name is an `object: string` parameter | 7 |
 | object name is some other run-time expression | 64 |
 
 ### Subtractions the census could NOT defend — enforced
@@ -297,13 +297,13 @@ holds still. They are required to be HERE and to say WHEN they were true;
 their values are not compared. The reasoning, and the measurement behind it,
 are in `scripts/check-tenant-audit-census.mjs`.
 
-Measured on 2026-10-14 at `5d4205c6b`.
+Measured on 2026-10-14 at `ddcdb46bd`.
 
 | corpus scale (not enforced) | count |
 | :--- | ---: |
-| tracked non-test sources scanned | 652 |
+| tracked non-test sources scanned | 649 |
 | engine-shaped types recognised | 75 |
 | declared objects in the registry | 116 |
-| same-named calls subtracted as non-engine | 163 |
+| same-named calls subtracted as non-engine | 164 |
 
 {/* END GENERATED: tenant-audit-census */}
@@ -33,19 +33,19 @@ silent, and `node scripts/tenant-audit-census.mjs --write` is the resolution.
 
 | Measure | Value |
 |---|---:|
-| Write call sites | 228 |
-| Object name statically decidable | 155 |
-| Object name chosen at run time | 73 |
+| Write call sites | 225 |
+| Object name statically decidable | 154 |
+| Object name chosen at run time | 71 |
 | Against a tenancy-enabled object | 153 |
 | Against an object declaring tenancy off | 1 |
-| Threading a tenant context | 167 |
+| Threading a tenant context | 164 |
 | Provably carrying none | 8 |
 | …and decidably tenancy-enabled | 2 |
 | Options argument unreadable | 53 |
 | …and decidably tenancy-enabled | 32 |
-| Threading a decidably elevated context | 121 |
+| Threading a decidably elevated context | 120 |
 | Threading a decidably non-elevated context | 0 |
-| Threading a context of undecidable elevation | 99 |
+| Threading a context of undecidable elevation | 97 |
 
 ## Subtractions the census could NOT defend — enforced
 
@@ -90,14 +90,14 @@ holds still. They are required to be HERE and to say WHEN they were true;
 their values are not compared. The reasoning, and the measurement behind it,
 are in `scripts/check-tenant-audit-census.mjs`.
 
-Measured on 2026-10-14 at `5d4205c6b`.
+Measured on 2026-10-14 at `ddcdb46bd`.
 
 | corpus scale (not enforced) | count |
 | :--- | ---: |
-| tracked non-test sources scanned | 652 |
+| tracked non-test sources scanned | 649 |
 | engine-shaped types recognised | 75 |
 | declared objects in the registry | 116 |
-| same-named calls subtracted as non-engine | 163 |
+| same-named calls subtracted as non-engine | 164 |
 
 ## Every site
 
@@ -161,9 +161,6 @@ Measured on 2026-10-14 at `5d4205c6b`.
 | `packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/grant-permission-set-name-backfill.ts` | `insert` | `DATA_MIGRATION_FLAG_OBJECT` | undecidable | elevated | 1 |
 | `packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/grant-permission-set-name-backfill.ts` | `update` | `GRANT_OBJECT` | undecidable | context, elevation undecidable | 1 |
 | `packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/invitation-placement.ts` | `insert` | `sys_user_position` | enabled | elevated | 1 |
-| `packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/permission-set-projection.ts` | `insert` | `object` | undecidable | context, elevation undecidable | 1 |
-| `packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/permission-set-projection.ts` | `update` | `object` | undecidable | context, elevation undecidable | 1 |
-| `packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/permission-set-projection.ts` | `delete` | `sys_permission_set` | undeclared-name | elevated | 1 |
 | `packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/suggested-audience-bindings.ts` | `delete` | `sys_audience_binding_suggestion` | enabled | context, elevation undecidable | 1 |
 | `packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/suggested-audience-bindings.ts` | `insert` | `sys_audience_binding_suggestion` | enabled | context, elevation undecidable | 1 |
 | `packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/suggested-audience-bindings.ts` | `update` | `sys_audience_binding_suggestion` | enabled | context, elevation undecidable | 3 |