diff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.md
index b1cb9840..c3eadd01 100644
--- a/CHANGELOG.md
+++ b/CHANGELOG.md
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
 
 **Fixes and enhancements:**
 
+- Enforce optional JWK `alg`, `use`, and `key_ops` metadata during JWKS selection and verification. `KeyFinder#call` now returns the JWK when `alg` is present to bind verification to that algorithm; `key_for` keeps returning raw keys. Direct JWK verification also enforces `use` and `key_ops` [#769](https://github.com/jwt/ruby-jwt/pull/769) - [@sj26](https://github.com/sj26).
 - Test that `JWT::Claims::Required` raises `JWT::MissingRequiredClaim` for a non-Hash payload [#768](https://github.com/jwt/ruby-jwt/pull/768) ([@renanmpimentel](https://github.com/renanmpimentel))
 - Your contribution here
 
diff --git a/README.md b/README.md
index fc8cd18c..7ee6aa7c 100644
--- a/README.md
+++ b/README.md
@@ -667,11 +667,26 @@ To decode a JWT using a trusted entity's JSON Web Key Set (JWKS):
 
 ```ruby
 jwks = JWT::JWK::Set.new(jwks_hash)
-jwks.filter! {|key| key[:use] == 'sig' } # Signing keys only!
 algorithms = jwks.map { |key| key[:alg] }.compact.uniq
 JWT.decode(token, nil, true, algorithms: algorithms, jwks: jwks)
 ```
 
+The `jwks` option and `JWT::JWK::KeyFinder` select a key with compatible optional metadata before verification:
+
+- `alg`, when present, must match the token's `alg` header exactly (case-sensitive).
+- `use`, when present, must be `sig`.
+- `key_ops`, when present, must contain `verify`.
+
+Omitted metadata does not restrict the key. Incompatible candidates are skipped; if no eligible key is found,
+the existing loader invalidation is attempted before raising `JWT::SignatureError`.
+Direct verification with a JWK also enforces `use` and `key_ops`, raising `JWT::VerificationKeyError` if incompatible.
+The caller must still supply the allowed algorithms; JWK metadata does not replace that allowlist.
+`KeyFinder#call` returns the JWK itself when `alg` is present, binding verification to that algorithm even
+when the caller allows several algorithms. Without `alg`, it returns the raw verification key as before.
+`KeyFinder#key_for(kid, key_field = :kid)` still returns a raw key and has no token algorithm context.
+`call` resolves JWKs directly; subclasses that customize token lookup should override `call`, not `key_for`.
+Applications extracting a raw key with `key_for` or `jwk.verify_key` must enforce algorithm restrictions themselves.
+
 The `jwks` option can also be given as a lambda that evaluates every time a key identifier is resolved.
 This can be used to implement caching of remotely fetched JWK Sets.
 
@@ -695,9 +710,7 @@ jwks_loader = ->(options) do
   @cached_keys ||= begin
     @cache_last_update = Time.now.to_i
     # Replace with your own JWKS fetching routine
-    jwks = JWT::JWK::Set.new(jwks_hash)
-    jwks.select! { |key| key[:use] == 'sig' } # Signing Keys only
-    jwks
+    JWT::JWK::Set.new(jwks_hash)
   end
 end
 
diff --git a/lib/jwt/jwa.rb b/lib/jwt/jwa.rb
index 5b3654eb..b5938df9 100644
--- a/lib/jwt/jwa.rb
+++ b/lib/jwt/jwa.rb
@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ def validate_jwk_algorithms!(jwks, algorithms, error_class)
 
         return if Array(jwks).all? do |jwk|
           algorithms.any? do |alg|
-            jwk.jwa.valid_alg?(alg)
+            jwk.jwa.valid_alg?(resolve(alg).alg)
           end
         end
 
diff --git a/lib/jwt/jwk/key_base.rb b/lib/jwt/jwk/key_base.rb
index ac9d9b91..a22258b9 100644
--- a/lib/jwt/jwk/key_base.rb
+++ b/lib/jwt/jwk/key_base.rb
@@ -42,7 +42,17 @@ def ==(other)
         other.is_a?(::JWT::JWK::KeyBase) && self[:kid] == other[:kid]
       end
 
+      def usable_for_verification?(algorithm = nil)
+        return false if algorithm && parameters.fetch(:alg, algorithm) != algorithm
+        return false if parameters.fetch(:use, 'sig') != 'sig'
+
+        key_ops = parameters.fetch(:key_ops, ['verify'])
+        key_ops.is_a?(Array) && key_ops.include?('verify')
+      end
+
       def verify(**kwargs)
+        raise JWT::VerificationKeyError, 'JWK metadata does not permit signature verification' unless usable_for_verification?
+
         jwa.verify(**kwargs, verification_key: verify_key)
       end
 
diff --git a/lib/jwt/jwk/key_finder.rb b/lib/jwt/jwk/key_finder.rb
index 6fd18bb8..d1b489b3 100644
--- a/lib/jwt/jwk/key_finder.rb
+++ b/lib/jwt/jwk/key_finder.rb
@@ -27,46 +27,53 @@ def initialize(options)
 
       # Returns the verification key for the given kid
       # @param [String] kid the key id
+      # @param [Symbol] key_field the JWK field to match
       def key_for(kid, key_field = :kid)
-        raise ::JWT::MalformedTokenError, "Invalid type for #{key_field} header parameter" unless kid.nil? || kid.is_a?(String)
-
-        jwk = resolve_key(kid, key_field)
-
-        raise ::JWT::SignatureError, 'No keys found in jwks' unless @jwks.any?
-        raise ::JWT::SignatureError, "Could not find public key for kid #{kid}" unless jwk
-
-        jwk.verify_key
+        find_jwk(kid, key_field).verify_key
       end
 
       # Returns the key for the given token
       # @param [JWT::EncodedToken] token the token
+      # @return [JWT::JWK::KeyBase, Object] the JWK when alg is present, otherwise its raw verification key
       def call(token)
-        @key_fields.each do |key_field|
-          field_value = token.header[key_field.to_s]
-
-          return key_for(field_value, key_field) if field_value
-        end
+        key_field = @key_fields.find { |field| token.header[field.to_s] }
 
-        raise ::JWT::SignatureError, 'No key id (kid) or x5t found from token headers' unless @allow_nil_kid
+        raise ::JWT::SignatureError, 'No key id (kid) or x5t found from token headers' unless key_field || @allow_nil_kid
 
-        kid = token.header['kid']
-        key_for(kid)
+        key_field ||= :kid
+        jwk = find_jwk(token.header[key_field.to_s], key_field, token.header['alg'])
+        jwk.parameters.key?(:alg) ? jwk : jwk.verify_key
       end
 
       private
 
-      def resolve_key(kid, key_field)
-        key_matcher = ->(key) { (kid.nil? && @allow_nil_kid) || key[key_field] == kid }
+      def find_jwk(kid, key_field, algorithm = nil)
+        raise ::JWT::MalformedTokenError, "Invalid type for #{key_field} header parameter" unless kid.nil? || kid.is_a?(String)
+
+        jwk = resolve_key(kid, key_field, algorithm)
 
+        raise ::JWT::SignatureError, 'No keys found in jwks' unless @jwks.any?
+        raise ::JWT::SignatureError, "Could not find public key for kid #{kid}" unless jwk
+
+        jwk
+      end
+
+      def resolve_key(kid, key_field, algorithm)
         # First try without invalidation to facilitate application caching
         @jwks ||= JWT::JWK::Set.new(@jwks_loader.call(key_field => kid))
-        jwk = @jwks.find { |key| key_matcher.call(key) }
+        jwk = matching_key(kid, key_field, algorithm)
 
         return jwk if jwk
 
         # Second try, invalidate for backwards compatibility
         @jwks = JWT::JWK::Set.new(@jwks_loader.call(invalidate: true, kid_not_found: true, key_field => kid))
-        @jwks.find { |key| key_matcher.call(key) }
+        matching_key(kid, key_field, algorithm)
+      end
+
+      def matching_key(kid, key_field, algorithm)
+        @jwks.find do |key|
+          ((kid.nil? && @allow_nil_kid) || key[key_field] == kid) && key.usable_for_verification?(algorithm)
+        end
       end
     end
   end
diff --git a/spec/jwt/jwk/key_finder_spec.rb b/spec/jwt/jwk/key_finder_spec.rb
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..efb208e1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/spec/jwt/jwk/key_finder_spec.rb
@@ -0,0 +1,168 @@
+# frozen_string_literal: true
+
+RSpec.describe JWT::JWK::KeyFinder do
+  let(:jwk) { JWT::JWK.new('a-secret-for-HMAC') }
+  let(:metadata) { {} }
+  let(:parameters) { jwk.export(include_private: true).merge(metadata) }
+  let(:finder) { described_class.new(jwks: { keys: [parameters] }) }
+
+  describe '#key_for' do
+    it 'preserves lookup without an algorithm' do
+      expect(finder.key_for(jwk.kid)).to eq(jwk.verify_key)
+    end
+
+    it 'preserves lookup by an explicit key field' do
+      parameters[:x5t] = 'thumbprint'
+      expect(finder.key_for('thumbprint', :x5t)).to eq(jwk.verify_key)
+    end
+
+    it 'preserves raw-key lookup with algorithm metadata' do
+      parameters[:alg] = 'HS256'
+      expect(finder.key_for(jwk.kid)).to eq(jwk.verify_key)
+    end
+
+    it 'checks key usage even without an algorithm' do
+      parameters[:use] = 'enc'
+      expect { finder.key_for(jwk.kid) }.to raise_error(JWT::SignatureError)
+    end
+  end
+
+  [
+    ['HS256', 'HS512', nil],
+    ['RS512', 'RS256', 'rsa-2048-private.pem'],
+    ['PS256', 'PS512', 'rsa-2048-private.pem'],
+    ['ES256', 'ES384', 'ec256-private.pem']
+  ].each do |algorithm, other_algorithm, key_file|
+    context "when verifying #{algorithm}" do
+      before do
+        skip 'OpenSSL gem missing RSA-PSS support' if algorithm.start_with?('PS') && !OpenSSL::PKey::RSA.method_defined?(:sign_pss)
+      end
+
+      let(:jwk) { JWT::JWK.new(key_file ? test_pkey(key_file) : 'a-secret-for-HMAC') }
+      let(:parameters) { jwk.export(include_private: key_file.nil?).merge(metadata) }
+      let(:payload) { { 'data' => 'signed payload' } }
+      let(:headers) { { kid: jwk.kid } }
+      let(:jwt) { JWT.encode(payload, jwk.signing_key, algorithm, headers) }
+      let(:token) { JWT::EncodedToken.new(jwt) }
+      let(:algorithms) { [algorithm, other_algorithm] }
+
+      [{}, { alg: algorithm }, { use: 'sig' }, { key_ops: ['verify'] },
+       { alg: algorithm, use: 'sig', key_ops: %w[sign verify] }].each do |metadata|
+        context "with compatible metadata #{metadata.inspect}" do
+          let(:metadata) { metadata }
+
+          it 'decodes through the jwks option' do
+            expect(JWT.decode(jwt, nil, true, algorithms: algorithms, jwks: { keys: [parameters] }).first).to eq(payload)
+          end
+
+          it 'verifies through the token key finder' do
+            expect(token.verify_signature!(algorithm: algorithms, key_finder: finder)).to be_nil
+          end
+        end
+      end
+
+      [{ alg: other_algorithm }, { alg: algorithm.downcase }, { use: 'enc' }, { key_ops: ['encrypt'] },
+       { key_ops: ['sign'] }, { key_ops: [] },
+       { use: 'enc', key_ops: ['verify'] }, { use: 'sig', key_ops: ['encrypt'] }].each do |metadata|
+        context "with incompatible metadata #{metadata.inspect}" do
+          let(:metadata) { metadata }
+
+          it 'rejects decoding through the jwks option' do
+            expect { JWT.decode(jwt, nil, true, algorithms: algorithms, jwks: { keys: [parameters] }) }.to raise_error(JWT::SignatureError)
+          end
+
+          it 'rejects verification through the token key finder' do
+            expect { token.verify_signature!(algorithm: algorithms, key_finder: finder) }.to raise_error(JWT::SignatureError)
+          end
+        end
+      end
+    end
+  end
+
+  context 'when looking up a token without a kid' do
+    let(:metadata) { { alg: 'HS512' } }
+    let(:finder) { described_class.new(jwks: { keys: [parameters] }, allow_nil_kid: true) }
+    let(:token) { JWT::EncodedToken.new(JWT.encode({}, jwk.signing_key, 'HS256')) }
+
+    it 'still enforces the JWK algorithm' do
+      expect { finder.call(token) }.to raise_error(JWT::SignatureError)
+    end
+  end
+
+  context 'when looking up JSON keys by x5t' do
+    let(:metadata) { { alg: 'HS512', x5t: 'thumbprint' } }
+    let(:finder) { described_class.new(jwks: JSON.parse(JSON.generate(keys: [parameters])), key_fields: [:x5t]) }
+    let(:token) { JWT::EncodedToken.new(JWT.encode({}, jwk.signing_key, 'HS256', x5t: 'thumbprint')) }
+
+    it 'still enforces the JWK algorithm' do
+      expect { finder.call(token) }.to raise_error(JWT::SignatureError)
+    end
+  end
+
+  context 'when the signature uses a different allowed algorithm from the metadata' do
+    let(:metadata) { { alg: 'HS512' } }
+    let(:jwt) do
+      header = JWT::Base64.url_encode(JSON.generate(alg: 'HS512', kid: jwk.kid))
+      payload = JWT::Base64.url_encode(JSON.generate(data: 'example'))
+      input = [header, payload].join('.')
+      signature = OpenSSL::HMAC.digest('SHA256', jwk.signing_key, input)
+      [input, JWT::Base64.url_encode(signature)].join('.')
+    end
+
+    it 'rejects the signature despite matching JWK and token alg headers' do
+      token = JWT::EncodedToken.new(jwt)
+      expect { token.verify_signature!(algorithm: %w[HS256 HS512], key_finder: finder) }.to raise_error(JWT::VerificationError)
+    end
+
+    it 'also rejects decoding through the jwks option' do
+      expect { JWT.decode(jwt, nil, true, algorithms: %w[HS256 HS512], jwks: { keys: [parameters] }) }.to raise_error(JWT::VerificationError)
+    end
+  end
+
+  context 'when several keys match the identifier' do
+    let(:metadata) { { alg: 'HS256', use: 'sig', key_ops: ['verify'] } }
+    let(:jwt) { JWT.encode({ 'data' => 'example' }, jwk.signing_key, 'HS256', kid: jwk.kid) }
+    let(:finder) { described_class.new(jwks: { keys: [incompatible_key, parameters] }) }
+
+    [{ use: 'enc' }, { key_ops: ['sign'] }, { alg: 'HS512' }].each do |restrictions|
+      context "with an incompatible first key #{restrictions.inspect}" do
+        let(:incompatible_key) { JWT::JWK.new('a-different-secret', kid: jwk.kid).export(include_private: true).merge(restrictions) }
+
+        it 'verifies with the compatible candidate' do
+          expect(JWT::EncodedToken.new(jwt).verify_signature!(algorithm: %w[HS256 HS512], key_finder: finder)).to be_nil
+          expect(JWT.decode(jwt, nil, true, algorithms: %w[HS256 HS512], jwks: { keys: [incompatible_key, parameters] }).first).to eq('data' => 'example')
+        end
+      end
+    end
+
+    context 'without a kid' do
+      let(:incompatible_key) { JWT::JWK.new('a-different-secret', use: 'enc').export(include_private: true) }
+      let(:jwt) { JWT.encode({ 'data' => 'example' }, jwk.signing_key, 'HS256') }
+
+      it 'skips incompatible candidates with allow_nil_kid' do
+        payload, = JWT.decode(jwt, nil, true, algorithms: ['HS256'], jwks: { keys: [incompatible_key, parameters] }, allow_nil_kid: true)
+        expect(payload).to eq('data' => 'example')
+      end
+    end
+  end
+
+  context 'when cached metadata does not permit verification' do
+    let(:metadata) { { use: 'sig' } }
+
+    it 'uses the existing loader invalidation path to find an eligible key' do
+      loader = ->(options) { { keys: [options[:invalidate] ? parameters : parameters.merge(use: 'enc')] } }
+      jwt = JWT.encode({ 'data' => 'example' }, jwk.signing_key, 'HS256', kid: jwk.kid)
+      expect(JWT.decode(jwt, nil, true, algorithms: ['HS256'], jwks: loader).first).to eq('data' => 'example')
+    end
+  end
+
+  context 'when a restricted JWK is used directly' do
+    [{ use: 'enc' }, { key_ops: ['sign'] }].each do |restrictions|
+      it "rejects #{restrictions.inspect} without a key finder" do
+        key = JWT::JWK.new(jwk.signing_key, restrictions.merge(alg: 'HS256'))
+        token = JWT::EncodedToken.new(JWT.encode({}, jwk.signing_key, 'HS256'))
+        expect { token.verify_signature!(algorithm: ['HS256'], key: key) }.to raise_error(JWT::VerificationKeyError)
+      end
+    end
+  end
+end