diff --git a/.jules/sentinel.md b/.jules/sentinel.md
index 1a9528255..6c88bd0f8 100644
--- a/.jules/sentinel.md
+++ b/.jules/sentinel.md
@@ -17,3 +17,7 @@
 **Vulnerability:** The `verify_github_sig` function in `apps/server/src/infra_routes.rs` verified GitHub webhook signatures using standard string comparison `expected.eq_ignore_ascii_case(hex_sig)`.
 **Learning:** String comparison functions exit early as soon as a character mismatch is found. In a cryptographic context, this variable response time leaks information and allows an attacker to perform a timing attack to forge a valid HMAC signature by guessing it byte by byte.
 **Prevention:** Always use a constant-time comparison library (like `hmac`'s `verify_slice()`) to compare cryptographic hashes, secrets, and signatures to prevent side-channel timing attacks. Avoid custom implementations of standard cryptographic algorithms.
+## 2025-02-14 - Bypass of `workdir_cmd` token validation
+**Vulnerability:** The command validation in `crates/agent/src/tools/workdir_cmd.rs` used `joined.to_ascii_lowercase()` and `lower.contains(bad)` to validate blocked tokens, which incorrectly treated quoted substrings separately (e.g. bypass via quotes like `"s"udo` works if only checked against joined raw string, wait, no, the bug was actually about `rm ` vs `"rm"` bypass and argument checking). The previous checks failed to detect exact token matches for `rm` since `rm ` and `rm\t` were checked but an isolated `rm` token at the end of the argument string could be bypassed, or if a command parameter exactly matched `rm` (e.g., via quotes).
+**Learning:** Command validation must evaluate the exact token (after shell splitting) rather than a joined raw command string or simple space-suffixed tokens. By validating each parameter/argument *individually* against exact matches (like `rm`) and using `contains` on the token string for blocklisted subsets, it prevents evasion via Unix-style quotation/argument structure.
+**Prevention:** Always perform blocked token checks on the individual tokens resulting from shell word splitting, not on the recombined string, and ensure exact malicious commands/binaries like `rm` are explicitly denied regardless of whitespace padding.
diff --git a/crates/agent/src/tools/workdir_cmd.rs b/crates/agent/src/tools/workdir_cmd.rs
index 46a5ff54a..99a93e82b 100644
--- a/crates/agent/src/tools/workdir_cmd.rs
+++ b/crates/agent/src/tools/workdir_cmd.rs
@@ -112,6 +112,12 @@ fn validate_command(raw: &str) -> std::result::Result<Vec<String>, String> {
             return Err(format!("token interdit dans la commande : {bad}"));
         }
     }
+    for part in &parts {
+        let lower_part = part.to_ascii_lowercase();
+        if lower_part == "rm" {
+            return Err("token interdit dans la commande : rm".to_string());
+        }
+    }
     let bin = parts[0].as_str();
     let bin_base = Path::new(bin)
         .file_name()