diff --git a/apps/admin/app/(all)/(dashboard)/authentication/oidc/form.tsx b/apps/admin/app/(all)/(dashboard)/authentication/oidc/form.tsx
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..3dbe81fa317
--- /dev/null
+++ b/apps/admin/app/(all)/(dashboard)/authentication/oidc/form.tsx
@@ -0,0 +1,248 @@
+/**
+ * Copyright (c) 2023-present Plane Software, Inc. and contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-only
+ * See the LICENSE file for details.
+ */
+
+import { useState } from "react";
+import { isEmpty } from "lodash-es";
+import Link from "next/link";
+import { Controller, useForm } from "react-hook-form";
+// plane internal packages
+import { API_BASE_URL } from "@plane/constants";
+import { Button } from "@makeplane/propel/components/button";
+import { Switch } from "@makeplane/propel/components/switch";
+import { TOAST_TYPE, setToast } from "@/providers/toast";
+import type { IFormattedInstanceConfiguration, TInstanceOIDCAuthenticationConfigurationKeys } from "@plane/types";
+// components
+import { CodeBlock } from "@/components/common/code-block";
+import { ConfirmDiscardModal } from "@/components/common/confirm-discard-modal";
+import type { TControllerInputFormField } from "@/components/common/controller-input";
+import type { TControllerSwitchFormField } from "@/components/common/controller-switch";
+import { ControllerSwitch } from "@/components/common/controller-switch";
+import { ControllerInput } from "@/components/common/controller-input";
+import type { TCopyField } from "@/components/common/copy-field";
+import { CopyField } from "@/components/common/copy-field";
+// hooks
+import { useInstance } from "@/hooks/store";
+
+type Props = {
+  config: IFormattedInstanceConfiguration;
+};
+
+type OIDCConfigFormValues = Record<TInstanceOIDCAuthenticationConfigurationKeys, string>;
+
+const OIDC_FORM_SWITCH_FIELD: TControllerSwitchFormField<OIDCConfigFormValues> = {
+  name: "ENABLE_OIDC_SYNC",
+  label: "your identity provider",
+};
+
+export function InstanceOIDCConfigForm(props: Props) {
+  const { config } = props;
+  // states
+  const [isDiscardChangesModalOpen, setIsDiscardChangesModalOpen] = useState(false);
+  // store hooks
+  const { updateInstanceConfigurations } = useInstance();
+  // form data
+  const {
+    handleSubmit,
+    control,
+    reset,
+    formState: { errors, isDirty, isSubmitting },
+  } = useForm<OIDCConfigFormValues>({
+    defaultValues: {
+      OIDC_PROVIDER_NAME: config["OIDC_PROVIDER_NAME"] || "SSO",
+      OIDC_ISSUER_URL: config["OIDC_ISSUER_URL"],
+      OIDC_CLIENT_ID: config["OIDC_CLIENT_ID"],
+      OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET: config["OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET"],
+      ENABLE_OIDC_SYNC: config["ENABLE_OIDC_SYNC"] || "0",
+      OIDC_ALLOW_UNVERIFIED_EMAIL: config["OIDC_ALLOW_UNVERIFIED_EMAIL"] || "0",
+    },
+  });
+
+  const originURL = !isEmpty(API_BASE_URL) ? API_BASE_URL : typeof window !== "undefined" ? window.location.origin : "";
+
+  const OIDC_FORM_FIELDS: TControllerInputFormField<OIDCConfigFormValues>[] = [
+    {
+      key: "OIDC_PROVIDER_NAME",
+      type: "text",
+      label: "Provider name",
+      description: <>The name shown on the sign-in button, for example Okta, Entra ID, or Keycloak.</>,
+      placeholder: "SSO",
+      error: Boolean(errors.OIDC_PROVIDER_NAME),
+      required: false,
+    },
+    {
+      key: "OIDC_ISSUER_URL",
+      type: "text",
+      label: "Issuer URL",
+      description: (
+        <>
+          Your provider&apos;s issuer identifier. Plane reads every endpoint it needs from{" "}
+          <CodeBlock>{"<issuer>/.well-known/openid-configuration"}</CodeBlock>, so this must be an{" "}
+          <CodeBlock>https</CodeBlock> URL and must match the <CodeBlock>iss</CodeBlock> claim your provider issues.
+        </>
+      ),
+      placeholder: "https://your-org.okta.com",
+      error: Boolean(errors.OIDC_ISSUER_URL),
+      required: true,
+    },
+    {
+      key: "OIDC_CLIENT_ID",
+      type: "text",
+      label: "Client ID",
+      description: <>The client ID of the application you registered with your identity provider.</>,
+      placeholder: "0oa1b2c3d4e5f6g7h8i9",
+      error: Boolean(errors.OIDC_CLIENT_ID),
+      required: true,
+    },
+    {
+      key: "OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET",
+      type: "password",
+      label: "Client secret",
+      description: <>The client secret issued alongside the client ID.</>,
+      placeholder: "*****************************",
+      error: Boolean(errors.OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET),
+      required: true,
+    },
+  ];
+
+  const OIDC_SERVICE_FIELD: TCopyField[] = [
+    {
+      key: "Callback_URL",
+      label: "Callback URL",
+      url: `${originURL}/auth/oidc/callback/`,
+      description: (
+        <>
+          We will auto-generate this. Paste it into the <CodeBlock darkerShade>Redirect URI</CodeBlock> (also called
+          sign-in redirect URI) field of the application you registered with your identity provider.
+        </>
+      ),
+    },
+    {
+      key: "Spaces_Callback_URL",
+      label: "Callback URL for Spaces",
+      url: `${originURL}/auth/spaces/oidc/callback/`,
+      description: (
+        <>
+          Add this as a second <CodeBlock darkerShade>Redirect URI</CodeBlock> on the same application. Signing in to
+          published Spaces comes back here instead, and providers reject any redirect URI they have not been given.
+        </>
+      ),
+    },
+  ];
+
+  const onSubmit = async (formData: OIDCConfigFormValues) => {
+    const payload: Partial<OIDCConfigFormValues> = { ...formData };
+
+    try {
+      const response = await updateInstanceConfigurations(payload);
+      setToast({
+        type: TOAST_TYPE.SUCCESS,
+        title: "Done!",
+        message: "Your OIDC authentication is configured. You should test it now.",
+      });
+      reset({
+        OIDC_PROVIDER_NAME: response.find((item) => item.key === "OIDC_PROVIDER_NAME")?.value,
+        OIDC_ISSUER_URL: response.find((item) => item.key === "OIDC_ISSUER_URL")?.value,
+        OIDC_CLIENT_ID: response.find((item) => item.key === "OIDC_CLIENT_ID")?.value,
+        OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET: response.find((item) => item.key === "OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET")?.value,
+        ENABLE_OIDC_SYNC: response.find((item) => item.key === "ENABLE_OIDC_SYNC")?.value,
+        OIDC_ALLOW_UNVERIFIED_EMAIL: response.find((item) => item.key === "OIDC_ALLOW_UNVERIFIED_EMAIL")?.value,
+      });
+    } catch (err) {
+      console.error(err);
+    }
+  };
+
+  const handleGoBack = (e: React.MouseEvent<HTMLAnchorElement, MouseEvent>) => {
+    if (isDirty) {
+      e.preventDefault();
+      setIsDiscardChangesModalOpen(true);
+    }
+  };
+
+  return (
+    <>
+      <ConfirmDiscardModal
+        isOpen={isDiscardChangesModalOpen}
+        onDiscardHref="/authentication"
+        handleClose={() => setIsDiscardChangesModalOpen(false)}
+      />
+      <div className="flex flex-col gap-8">
+        <div className="grid w-full grid-cols-2 gap-x-12 gap-y-8">
+          <div className="col-span-2 flex flex-col gap-y-4 pt-1 md:col-span-1">
+            <div className="pt-2.5 text-18 font-medium">Provider-provided details for Plane</div>
+            {OIDC_FORM_FIELDS.map((field) => (
+              <ControllerInput
+                key={field.key}
+                control={control}
+                type={field.type}
+                name={field.key}
+                label={field.label}
+                description={field.description}
+                placeholder={field.placeholder}
+                error={field.error}
+                required={field.required}
+              />
+            ))}
+            <ControllerSwitch control={control} field={OIDC_FORM_SWITCH_FIELD} />
+
+            {/* Kept separate from the sync switch: this one relaxes a security check,
+                so it needs to say plainly what turning it on means. */}
+            <div className="border-custom-border-200 flex items-start justify-between gap-4 border-t pt-4">
+              <div className="flex flex-col gap-1">
+                <h4 className="text-sm text-custom-text-300">Accept accounts your provider has not verified</h4>
+                <p className="text-xs text-custom-text-400">
+                  Plane matches accounts by email address. Leave this off unless your provider never sends an{" "}
+                  <CodeBlock>email_verified</CodeBlock> claim (Entra ID commonly omits it). Turning it on means trusting
+                  your provider to only ever assert addresses it controls.
+                </p>
+              </div>
+              <div className="relative shrink-0 pt-1">
+                <Controller
+                  control={control}
+                  name="OIDC_ALLOW_UNVERIFIED_EMAIL"
+                  render={({ field: { value, onChange } }) => {
+                    const isOn = value === "1";
+                    return <Switch checked={isOn} onCheckedChange={() => onChange(isOn ? "0" : "1")} size="sm" />;
+                  }}
+                />
+              </div>
+            </div>
+
+            <div className="flex flex-col gap-1 pt-4">
+              <div className="flex items-center gap-4">
+                <Button
+                  variant="primary"
+                  size="md"
+                  stretch="auto"
+                  onClick={(e) => void handleSubmit(onSubmit)(e)}
+                  loading={isSubmitting}
+                  disabled={!isDirty}
+                  label={isSubmitting ? "Saving" : "Save changes"}
+                />
+                <Button
+                  variant="secondary"
+                  size="md"
+                  stretch="auto"
+                  nativeButton={false}
+                  render={<Link href="/authentication" onClick={handleGoBack} />}
+                  label="Go back"
+                />
+              </div>
+            </div>
+          </div>
+          <div className="col-span-2 md:col-span-1">
+            <div className="flex flex-col gap-y-4 rounded-lg bg-layer-3 px-6 pt-1.5 pb-4">
+              <div className="pt-2 text-18 font-medium">Plane-provided details for your provider</div>
+              {OIDC_SERVICE_FIELD.map((field) => (
+                <CopyField key={field.key} label={field.label} url={field.url} description={field.description} />
+              ))}
+            </div>
+          </div>
+        </div>
+      </div>
+    </>
+  );
+}
diff --git a/apps/admin/app/(all)/(dashboard)/authentication/oidc/page.tsx b/apps/admin/app/(all)/(dashboard)/authentication/oidc/page.tsx
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..9912d8cb881
--- /dev/null
+++ b/apps/admin/app/(all)/(dashboard)/authentication/oidc/page.tsx
@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
+/**
+ * Copyright (c) 2023-present Plane Software, Inc. and contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-only
+ * See the LICENSE file for details.
+ */
+
+import { useState } from "react";
+import { observer } from "mobx-react";
+import useSWR from "swr";
+// icons
+import { ShieldCheck } from "lucide-react";
+// plane internal packages
+import { Switch } from "@makeplane/propel/components/switch";
+// components
+import { AuthenticationMethodCard } from "@/components/authentication/authentication-method-card";
+import { PageWrapper } from "@/components/common/page-wrapper";
+import { Skeleton } from "@/components/common/skeleton";
+import { setPromiseToast } from "@/providers/toast";
+// hooks
+import { useInstance } from "@/hooks/store";
+// types
+import type { Route } from "./+types/page";
+// local
+import { InstanceOIDCConfigForm } from "./form";
+
+const InstanceOIDCAuthenticationPage = observer(function InstanceOIDCAuthenticationPage(_props: Route.ComponentProps) {
+  // store
+  const { fetchInstanceConfigurations, formattedConfig, updateInstanceConfigurations } = useInstance();
+  // state
+  const [isSubmitting, setIsSubmitting] = useState<boolean>(false);
+  // config
+  const enableOIDCConfig = formattedConfig?.IS_OIDC_ENABLED ?? "";
+  const isEnabled = Boolean(parseInt(enableOIDCConfig));
+  // Every endpoint is discovered from the issuer, so without it plus the client
+  // credentials the method cannot work at all.
+  const isOIDCConfigured =
+    !!formattedConfig?.OIDC_ISSUER_URL && !!formattedConfig?.OIDC_CLIENT_ID && !!formattedConfig?.OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET;
+  // Block turning it *on* before it is configured, which would leave the instance
+  // advertising a sign-in button that can only fail. Turning it off stays available
+  // whatever the config says — otherwise clearing a field would strand the method
+  // enabled with no way back.
+  const cannotEnableYet = !isOIDCConfigured && !isEnabled;
+
+  useSWR("INSTANCE_CONFIGURATIONS", () => fetchInstanceConfigurations());
+
+  const updateConfig = async (key: "IS_OIDC_ENABLED", value: string) => {
+    setIsSubmitting(true);
+
+    const payload = {
+      [key]: value,
+    };
+
+    const updateConfigPromise = updateInstanceConfigurations(payload);
+
+    setPromiseToast(updateConfigPromise, {
+      loading: "Saving Configuration",
+      success: {
+        title: "Configuration saved",
+        message: () => `OIDC authentication is now ${value === "1" ? "active" : "disabled"}.`,
+      },
+      error: {
+        title: "Error",
+        message: () => "Failed to save configuration",
+      },
+    });
+
+    // try/finally rather than the .then/.catch pair the sibling provider pages use:
+    // that shape trips oxlint's promise(always-return), which lint-staged runs with
+    // --deny-warnings, and this reads better anyway — one place resets the flag.
+    try {
+      await updateConfigPromise;
+    } catch (err) {
+      console.error(err);
+    } finally {
+      setIsSubmitting(false);
+    }
+  };
+
+  return (
+    <PageWrapper
+      customHeader={
+        <AuthenticationMethodCard
+          name="OIDC"
+          description="Allow members to log in or sign up to Plane through any OpenID Connect identity provider."
+          icon={<ShieldCheck className="h-6 w-6 p-0.5 text-tertiary" />}
+          config={
+            <span title={cannotEnableYet ? "Add the issuer URL, client ID and client secret first." : undefined}>
+              <Switch
+                checked={isEnabled}
+                onCheckedChange={() => {
+                  updateConfig("IS_OIDC_ENABLED", isEnabled ? "0" : "1");
+                }}
+                size="sm"
+                disabled={isSubmitting || !formattedConfig || cannotEnableYet}
+              />
+            </span>
+          }
+          disabled={isSubmitting || !formattedConfig}
+          withBorder={false}
+        />
+      }
+    >
+      {formattedConfig ? (
+        <InstanceOIDCConfigForm config={formattedConfig} />
+      ) : (
+        <Skeleton className="space-y-8">
+          <Skeleton.Item height="50px" width="25%" />
+          <Skeleton.Item height="50px" />
+          <Skeleton.Item height="50px" />
+          <Skeleton.Item height="50px" />
+          <Skeleton.Item height="50px" width="50%" />
+        </Skeleton>
+      )}
+    </PageWrapper>
+  );
+});
+
+export const meta: Route.MetaFunction = () => [{ title: "OIDC Authentication - God Mode" }];
+
+export default InstanceOIDCAuthenticationPage;
diff --git a/apps/admin/app/routes.ts b/apps/admin/app/routes.ts
index 184bed205a7..48bb06f5c5f 100644
--- a/apps/admin/app/routes.ts
+++ b/apps/admin/app/routes.ts
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ export default [
     route("authentication/gitlab", "./(all)/(dashboard)/authentication/gitlab/page.tsx"),
     route("authentication/google", "./(all)/(dashboard)/authentication/google/page.tsx"),
     route("authentication/gitea", "./(all)/(dashboard)/authentication/gitea/page.tsx"),
+    route("authentication/oidc", "./(all)/(dashboard)/authentication/oidc/page.tsx"),
     route("ai", "./(all)/(dashboard)/ai/page.tsx"),
     route("image", "./(all)/(dashboard)/image/page.tsx"),
   ]),
diff --git a/apps/admin/components/authentication/oidc-config.tsx b/apps/admin/components/authentication/oidc-config.tsx
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..d499f806216
--- /dev/null
+++ b/apps/admin/components/authentication/oidc-config.tsx
@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+/**
+ * Copyright (c) 2023-present Plane Software, Inc. and contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-only
+ * See the LICENSE file for details.
+ */
+
+import { observer } from "mobx-react";
+import Link from "next/link";
+// icons
+import { SettingsOutline } from "@makeplane/propel/icons";
+// plane internal packages
+import { AnchorButton } from "@makeplane/propel/components/anchor-button";
+import { Button } from "@makeplane/propel/components/button";
+import { Switch } from "@makeplane/propel/components/switch";
+import type { TInstanceAuthenticationMethodKeys } from "@plane/types";
+// hooks
+import { useInstance } from "@/hooks/store";
+
+type Props = {
+  disabled: boolean;
+  updateConfig: (key: TInstanceAuthenticationMethodKeys, value: string) => void;
+};
+
+export const OIDCConfiguration = observer(function OIDCConfiguration(props: Props) {
+  const { disabled, updateConfig } = props;
+  // store
+  const { formattedConfig } = useInstance();
+  // derived values
+  const enableOIDCConfig = formattedConfig?.IS_OIDC_ENABLED ?? "";
+  // The issuer is what every endpoint is discovered from, so it is required
+  // alongside the client credentials before the method can be switched on.
+  const isOIDCConfigured =
+    !!formattedConfig?.OIDC_ISSUER_URL && !!formattedConfig?.OIDC_CLIENT_ID && !!formattedConfig?.OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET;
+
+  return (
+    <>
+      {isOIDCConfigured ? (
+        <div className="flex items-center gap-4">
+          <AnchorButton
+            variant="primary"
+            size="sm"
+            nativeButton={false}
+            render={<Link href="/authentication/oidc" />}
+            label="Edit"
+          />
+          <Switch
+            checked={Boolean(parseInt(enableOIDCConfig))}
+            onCheckedChange={() => {
+              const newEnableOIDCConfig = Boolean(parseInt(enableOIDCConfig)) === true ? "0" : "1";
+              updateConfig("IS_OIDC_ENABLED", newEnableOIDCConfig);
+            }}
+            size="sm"
+            disabled={disabled}
+          />
+        </div>
+      ) : (
+        <Button
+          variant="secondary"
+          size="sm"
+          stretch="auto"
+          nativeButton={false}
+          render={<Link href="/authentication/oidc" />}
+          icon={<SettingsOutline className="h-4 w-4 p-0.5 text-tertiary" />}
+          label="Configure"
+        />
+      )}
+    </>
+  );
+});
diff --git a/apps/admin/components/common/header/core.ts b/apps/admin/components/common/header/core.ts
index 4cfc8ee7187..b0b24df281a 100644
--- a/apps/admin/components/common/header/core.ts
+++ b/apps/admin/components/common/header/core.ts
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ export const CORE_HEADER_SEGMENT_LABELS: Record<string, string> = {
   github: "GitHub",
   gitlab: "GitLab",
   gitea: "Gitea",
+  oidc: "OIDC",
   workspace: "Workspace",
   create: "Create",
 };
diff --git a/apps/admin/hooks/oauth/core.tsx b/apps/admin/hooks/oauth/core.tsx
index bdafd3e0b7a..f8e5cd07641 100644
--- a/apps/admin/hooks/oauth/core.tsx
+++ b/apps/admin/hooks/oauth/core.tsx
@@ -4,6 +4,8 @@
  * See the LICENSE file for details.
  */
 
+// OIDC is generic, so it has no brand mark; propel ships no shield icon, hence lucide.
+import { ShieldCheck } from "lucide-react";
 import { KeyOutline, MailOutline } from "@makeplane/propel/icons";
 // types
 import type {
@@ -23,6 +25,7 @@ import { GiteaConfiguration } from "@/components/authentication/gitea-config";
 import { GithubConfiguration } from "@/components/authentication/github-config";
 import { GitlabConfiguration } from "@/components/authentication/gitlab-config";
 import { GoogleConfiguration } from "@/components/authentication/google-config";
+import { OIDCConfiguration } from "@/components/authentication/oidc-config";
 import { PasswordLoginConfiguration } from "@/components/authentication/password-config-switch";
 
 // Authentication methods
@@ -89,4 +92,12 @@ export const getCoreAuthenticationModesMap: (
     config: <GiteaConfiguration disabled={disabled} updateConfig={updateConfig} />,
     enabledConfigKey: "IS_GITEA_ENABLED",
   },
+  oidc: {
+    key: "oidc",
+    name: "OIDC",
+    description: "Allow members to log in or sign up to Plane through any OpenID Connect identity provider.",
+    icon: <ShieldCheck className="h-6 w-6 p-0.5 text-tertiary" />,
+    config: <OIDCConfiguration disabled={disabled} updateConfig={updateConfig} />,
+    enabledConfigKey: "IS_OIDC_ENABLED",
+  },
 });
diff --git a/apps/admin/hooks/oauth/index.ts b/apps/admin/hooks/oauth/index.ts
index 74c11e33fcd..7143d3cf433 100644
--- a/apps/admin/hooks/oauth/index.ts
+++ b/apps/admin/hooks/oauth/index.ts
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ export const useAuthenticationModes = (props: TGetAuthenticationModeProps): TIns
     authenticationModes["github"],
     authenticationModes["gitlab"],
     authenticationModes["gitea"],
+    authenticationModes["oidc"],
   ];
 
   return availableAuthenticationModes;
diff --git a/apps/api/plane/authentication/adapter/base.py b/apps/api/plane/authentication/adapter/base.py
index 3a616a21c38..342b2a2b388 100644
--- a/apps/api/plane/authentication/adapter/base.py
+++ b/apps/api/plane/authentication/adapter/base.py
@@ -129,6 +129,7 @@ def check_sync_enabled(self):
             "github": "ENABLE_GITHUB_SYNC",
             "gitlab": "ENABLE_GITLAB_SYNC",
             "gitea": "ENABLE_GITEA_SYNC",
+            "oidc": "ENABLE_OIDC_SYNC",
         }
         config_key = provider_config_map.get(self.provider)
         if config_key:
@@ -144,6 +145,16 @@ def download_and_upload_avatar(self, avatar_url, user):
         if not avatar_url:
             return None
 
+        # Not every provider hands back a fetchable URL. Authentik, for one, generates a
+        # `data:image/svg+xml;base64,...` avatar for users with no uploaded picture, and
+        # OIDC providers in general are free to do the same. There is nothing to download
+        # from those, and passing one to the SSRF-safe fetcher below raises
+        # ValueError("Invalid URL scheme...") which log_exception records as a full stack
+        # trace on *every* sign-in. Returning early leaves the caller to store the value
+        # as-is, so such avatars still render.
+        if not str(avatar_url).lower().startswith(("http://", "https://")):
+            return None
+
         try:
             headers = self.get_avatar_download_headers()
             # Download the avatar image over an SSRF-safe client: the avatar URL
diff --git a/apps/api/plane/authentication/adapter/error.py b/apps/api/plane/authentication/adapter/error.py
index 6d789311020..ca3d2935fef 100644
--- a/apps/api/plane/authentication/adapter/error.py
+++ b/apps/api/plane/authentication/adapter/error.py
@@ -50,6 +50,10 @@
     "GITLAB_OAUTH_PROVIDER_ERROR": 5121,
     "GITEA_OAUTH_PROVIDER_ERROR": 5123,
     "OAUTH_PROVIDER_UNVERIFIED_EMAIL": 5124,
+    # OIDC
+    "OIDC_NOT_CONFIGURED": 5113,
+    "OIDC_OAUTH_PROVIDER_ERROR": 5114,
+    "OIDC_INVALID_ID_TOKEN": 5116,
     # Reset Password
     "INVALID_PASSWORD_TOKEN": 5125,
     "EXPIRED_PASSWORD_TOKEN": 5130,
diff --git a/apps/api/plane/authentication/adapter/oauth.py b/apps/api/plane/authentication/adapter/oauth.py
index afb1a31325d..843284680c2 100644
--- a/apps/api/plane/authentication/adapter/oauth.py
+++ b/apps/api/plane/authentication/adapter/oauth.py
@@ -55,6 +55,8 @@ def authentication_error_code(self):
             return "GITLAB_OAUTH_PROVIDER_ERROR"
         elif self.provider == "gitea":
             return "GITEA_OAUTH_PROVIDER_ERROR"
+        elif self.provider == "oidc":
+            return "OIDC_OAUTH_PROVIDER_ERROR"
         else:
             return "OAUTH_NOT_CONFIGURED"
 
diff --git a/apps/api/plane/authentication/provider/oauth/oidc.py b/apps/api/plane/authentication/provider/oauth/oidc.py
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..fb77be0ab34
--- /dev/null
+++ b/apps/api/plane/authentication/provider/oauth/oidc.py
@@ -0,0 +1,267 @@
+# Copyright (c) 2023-present Plane Software, Inc. and contributors
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-only
+# See the LICENSE file for details.
+
+# Python imports
+import base64
+import os
+from datetime import datetime, timedelta
+from urllib.parse import urlencode
+
+import pytz
+
+# Module imports
+from plane.authentication.adapter.oauth import OauthAdapter
+from plane.authentication.adapter.error import (
+    AUTHENTICATION_ERROR_CODES,
+    AuthenticationException,
+)
+from plane.authentication.utils.oidc import (
+    get_discovery_document,
+    normalize_issuer,
+    validate_id_token,
+)
+from plane.license.utils.instance_value import get_configuration_value
+
+
+class OIDCProvider(OauthAdapter):
+    """Generic OpenID Connect provider.
+
+    Unlike the other providers in this package, every endpoint is discovered from
+    the admin-configured issuer rather than hardcoded, so one implementation serves
+    any compliant IdP (Okta, Entra ID, Keycloak, Auth0, Authentik, Google).
+
+    Identity comes from the ID token, which is verified in set_token_data() before
+    any claim is read. The userinfo endpoint is consulted only to fill in profile
+    fields the ID token omitted, and never to establish who the user is.
+    """
+
+    provider = "oidc"
+    scope = "openid email profile"
+
+    def __init__(self, request, code=None, state=None, nonce=None, callback=None, is_space=False):
+        (
+            OIDC_ISSUER_URL,
+            OIDC_CLIENT_ID,
+            OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET,
+        ) = get_configuration_value(
+            [
+                {"key": "OIDC_ISSUER_URL", "default": os.environ.get("OIDC_ISSUER_URL")},
+                {"key": "OIDC_CLIENT_ID", "default": os.environ.get("OIDC_CLIENT_ID")},
+                {"key": "OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET", "default": os.environ.get("OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET")},
+            ]
+        )
+
+        if not (OIDC_ISSUER_URL and OIDC_CLIENT_ID and OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET):
+            raise AuthenticationException(
+                error_code=AUTHENTICATION_ERROR_CODES["OIDC_NOT_CONFIGURED"],
+                error_message="OIDC_NOT_CONFIGURED",
+            )
+
+        self.issuer = normalize_issuer(OIDC_ISSUER_URL)
+        self.nonce = nonce
+        # Populated by set_token_data() once the ID token has been verified.
+        self.id_token_claims = None
+
+        # Resolve the provider's endpoints. Cached, so this is a network call only
+        # on the first login after the cache expires.
+        self.discovery_document = get_discovery_document(self.issuer)
+
+        authorization_endpoint = self.discovery_document["authorization_endpoint"]
+        token_url = self.discovery_document["token_endpoint"]
+        # userinfo_endpoint is optional in the spec; profile fallback is skipped without it.
+        userinfo_url = self.discovery_document.get("userinfo_endpoint")
+
+        # The /app and /spaces flows have separate callback endpoints and separate
+        # session keys, so the IdP must be sent back to whichever one started this.
+        # OAuth also requires the redirect_uri on the token exchange to match the one
+        # on the authorization request, so the callback leg builds it the same way.
+        callback_path = "/auth/spaces/oidc/callback/" if is_space else "/auth/oidc/callback/"
+        redirect_uri = f"""{"https" if request.is_secure() else "http"}://{request.get_host()}{callback_path}"""
+
+        url_params = {
+            "client_id": OIDC_CLIENT_ID,
+            "redirect_uri": redirect_uri,
+            "response_type": "code",
+            "scope": self.scope,
+            "state": state,
+        }
+        # The nonce is only meaningful on the authorization request; on the callback
+        # leg it is the value we compare the returned token against instead.
+        if nonce and state:
+            url_params["nonce"] = nonce
+
+        auth_url = f"{authorization_endpoint}?{urlencode(url_params)}"
+
+        super().__init__(
+            request,
+            self.provider,
+            OIDC_CLIENT_ID,
+            self.scope,
+            redirect_uri,
+            auth_url,
+            token_url,
+            userinfo_url,
+            OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET,
+            code,
+            callback=callback,
+        )
+
+    def _token_request_auth(self):
+        """Return (extra_form_fields, headers) for authenticating to the token endpoint.
+
+        Providers advertise which client authentication methods they accept. Sending
+        the secret in the form body (client_secret_post) matches what the other
+        providers here do, but some IdPs only accept HTTP Basic (client_secret_basic),
+        so honour whatever the discovery document says.
+        """
+        supported = self.discovery_document.get("token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported") or []
+
+        # OIDC Discovery 1.0 §3 makes this field OPTIONAL and states that when it is
+        # omitted "the default is client_secret_basic". So an absent list means basic,
+        # not a free choice: a compliant provider that only accepts the default and
+        # does not publish the list would reject a form-body secret outright.
+        #
+        # When the list *is* published, prefer client_secret_post where offered, which
+        # is what the other providers in this package send.
+        use_basic = "client_secret_basic" in supported if supported else True
+        if supported and "client_secret_post" in supported:
+            use_basic = False
+
+        if use_basic:
+            credentials = f"{self.client_id}:{self.client_secret}".encode("utf-8")
+            encoded = base64.b64encode(credentials).decode("ascii")
+            return {}, {"Accept": "application/json", "Authorization": f"Basic {encoded}"}
+
+        return (
+            {"client_id": self.client_id, "client_secret": self.client_secret},
+            {"Accept": "application/json"},
+        )
+
+    def set_token_data(self):
+        auth_fields, headers = self._token_request_auth()
+        data = {
+            "grant_type": "authorization_code",
+            "code": self.code,
+            "redirect_uri": self.redirect_uri,
+            **auth_fields,
+        }
+        token_response = self.get_user_token(data=data, headers=headers)
+
+        # Verify the ID token before anything downstream reads a claim from it.
+        # This is the step that makes the whole flow trustworthy, so it happens
+        # here rather than in set_user_data().
+        self.id_token_claims = validate_id_token(
+            id_token=token_response.get("id_token"),
+            discovery_document=self.discovery_document,
+            client_id=self.client_id,
+            nonce=self.nonce,
+        )
+
+        # expires_in is a duration in seconds from now (RFC 6749 §5.1), unlike the
+        # absolute timestamps some of the other providers here return.
+        expires_in = token_response.get("expires_in")
+        access_token_expired_at = datetime.now(tz=pytz.utc) + timedelta(seconds=int(expires_in)) if expires_in else None
+        refresh_expires_in = token_response.get("refresh_expires_in")
+        refresh_token_expired_at = (
+            datetime.now(tz=pytz.utc) + timedelta(seconds=int(refresh_expires_in)) if refresh_expires_in else None
+        )
+
+        super().set_token_data(
+            {
+                "access_token": token_response.get("access_token"),
+                "refresh_token": token_response.get("refresh_token", None),
+                "access_token_expired_at": access_token_expired_at,
+                "refresh_token_expired_at": refresh_token_expired_at,
+                "id_token": token_response.get("id_token", ""),
+            }
+        )
+
+    def _get_profile_claims(self):
+        """Merge ID token claims with userinfo, preferring the signed ID token."""
+        claims = dict(self.id_token_claims)
+
+        # Consult userinfo only when the ID token is genuinely short of something we
+        # need: an email to identify the account by, the verification status we gate
+        # on, or any name to display. Plenty of IdPs put all of it in the ID token,
+        # and fetching userinfo regardless would add a round trip to every login.
+        #
+        # email_verified has to be part of this test, not just email. Providers vary
+        # in which claims reach the ID token versus userinfo -- Authentik, for one,
+        # only puts scope-mapped claims in the ID token when the provider enables it
+        # -- so treating a missing email_verified as "nothing more to fetch" rejects
+        # logins over a claim the userinfo endpoint would have supplied.
+        has_email = claims.get("email") is not None
+        has_verification = claims.get("email_verified") is not None
+        has_name = any(claims.get(field) is not None for field in ("given_name", "family_name", "name"))
+        if not self.userinfo_url or (has_email and has_verification and has_name):
+            return claims
+
+        userinfo = self.get_user_response()
+
+        # The userinfo response is unsigned, so it is merged only once it proves it
+        # describes the same subject as the verified ID token (OIDC Core 1.0 5.3.2).
+        # A response that does not is discarded rather than trusted: otherwise a
+        # provider bug or a swapped response could graft another user's profile, or
+        # another user's email, onto this session. Discarding rather than failing
+        # keeps a quirky userinfo endpoint from locking out logins that the ID token
+        # alone could satisfy; if that leaves no email at all, the adapter's own
+        # email validation rejects the login further down.
+        if userinfo.get("sub") != claims.get("sub"):
+            self.logger.warning("OIDC: discarding userinfo response whose sub does not match the id_token")
+            return claims
+
+        for field in ("email", "email_verified", "given_name", "family_name", "name", "picture"):
+            if claims.get(field) is None and userinfo.get(field) is not None:
+                claims[field] = userinfo[field]
+
+        return claims
+
+    def set_user_data(self):
+        claims = self._get_profile_claims()
+
+        # Reject unverified emails. An IdP that has not verified the address cannot
+        # vouch for it, and Plane matches accounts by email — so accepting one lets
+        # whoever controls that unverified address take over an existing account
+        # (GHSA-7j95-vh8g-f365). Fail closed: an absent claim counts as unverified.
+        #
+        # Not every IdP emits email_verified (Entra ID commonly omits it), so an
+        # admin whose provider verifies addresses out of band can opt out with
+        # OIDC_ALLOW_UNVERIFIED_EMAIL=1. Doing so means trusting that IdP to only
+        # ever assert addresses it controls.
+        (OIDC_ALLOW_UNVERIFIED_EMAIL,) = get_configuration_value(
+            [
+                {
+                    "key": "OIDC_ALLOW_UNVERIFIED_EMAIL",
+                    "default": os.environ.get("OIDC_ALLOW_UNVERIFIED_EMAIL", "0"),
+                }
+            ]
+        )
+        if OIDC_ALLOW_UNVERIFIED_EMAIL != "1" and claims.get("email_verified") is not True:
+            raise AuthenticationException(
+                error_code=AUTHENTICATION_ERROR_CODES["OAUTH_PROVIDER_UNVERIFIED_EMAIL"],
+                error_message="OAUTH_PROVIDER_UNVERIFIED_EMAIL",
+            )
+
+        # Some IdPs send only a full `name`; split it so first/last are populated.
+        first_name = claims.get("given_name")
+        last_name = claims.get("family_name")
+        if not first_name and claims.get("name"):
+            first_name, _, last_name_fallback = str(claims["name"]).partition(" ")
+            last_name = last_name or last_name_fallback
+
+        super().set_user_data(
+            {
+                "email": claims.get("email"),
+                "user": {
+                    # `sub` is the only claim guaranteed stable for the user at this
+                    # issuer; email can be reassigned, so it must not key the account.
+                    "provider_id": claims.get("sub"),
+                    "email": claims.get("email"),
+                    "avatar": claims.get("picture"),
+                    "first_name": first_name,
+                    "last_name": last_name,
+                    "is_password_autoset": True,
+                },
+            }
+        )
diff --git a/apps/api/plane/authentication/urls.py b/apps/api/plane/authentication/urls.py
index 4bec07db00b..047a96e690c 100644
--- a/apps/api/plane/authentication/urls.py
+++ b/apps/api/plane/authentication/urls.py
@@ -18,6 +18,8 @@
     GitHubOauthInitiateEndpoint,
     GoogleCallbackEndpoint,
     GoogleOauthInitiateEndpoint,
+    OIDCCallbackEndpoint,
+    OIDCOauthInitiateEndpoint,
     MagicGenerateEndpoint,
     MagicSignInEndpoint,
     MagicSignUpEndpoint,
@@ -34,6 +36,8 @@
     GitHubOauthInitiateSpaceEndpoint,
     GoogleCallbackSpaceEndpoint,
     GoogleOauthInitiateSpaceEndpoint,
+    OIDCCallbackSpaceEndpoint,
+    OIDCOauthInitiateSpaceEndpoint,
     MagicGenerateSpaceEndpoint,
     MagicSignInSpaceEndpoint,
     MagicSignUpSpaceEndpoint,
@@ -150,4 +154,17 @@
         GiteaCallbackSpaceEndpoint.as_view(),
         name="space-gitea-callback",
     ),
+    ## OIDC
+    path("oidc/", OIDCOauthInitiateEndpoint.as_view(), name="oidc-initiate"),
+    path("oidc/callback/", OIDCCallbackEndpoint.as_view(), name="oidc-callback"),
+    path(
+        "spaces/oidc/",
+        OIDCOauthInitiateSpaceEndpoint.as_view(),
+        name="space-oidc-initiate",
+    ),
+    path(
+        "spaces/oidc/callback/",
+        OIDCCallbackSpaceEndpoint.as_view(),
+        name="space-oidc-callback",
+    ),
 ]
diff --git a/apps/api/plane/authentication/utils/oidc.py b/apps/api/plane/authentication/utils/oidc.py
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..d1f1dcb6774
--- /dev/null
+++ b/apps/api/plane/authentication/utils/oidc.py
@@ -0,0 +1,303 @@
+# Copyright (c) 2023-present Plane Software, Inc. and contributors
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-only
+# See the LICENSE file for details.
+
+"""OpenID Connect discovery and ID token validation.
+
+The existing OAuth providers (google, github, gitlab, gitea) obtain identity by
+calling a provider-specific userinfo endpoint with the access token. OIDC instead
+carries identity in a signed ID token, so the trust anchor is the token signature
+rather than the transport. Everything in this module exists to make that signature
+check correct: getting the right keys, and rejecting every token that does not
+prove it came from the configured issuer for this client.
+"""
+
+# Python imports
+import hmac
+import logging
+from urllib.parse import urlparse
+
+# Third party imports
+import jwt
+import requests
+from jwt import PyJWKClient
+
+# Django imports
+from django.core.cache import cache
+
+# Module imports
+from plane.authentication.adapter.error import (
+    AUTHENTICATION_ERROR_CODES,
+    AuthenticationException,
+)
+
+logger = logging.getLogger("plane.authentication")
+
+# How long a provider's discovery document is reused before being re-fetched.
+DISCOVERY_CACHE_TTL = 60 * 60  # 1 hour
+DISCOVERY_CACHE_PREFIX = "oidc:discovery:"
+
+# Network timeout for discovery and JWKS fetches, in seconds.
+NETWORK_TIMEOUT = 10
+
+# Signing algorithms accepted for an ID token.
+#
+# Asymmetric only, and this is a security control rather than a preference. If a
+# symmetric algorithm (HS256) were permitted, an attacker could forge a token by
+# signing it with the issuer's *public* key as the HMAC secret — the public key
+# is published in the JWKS, so it is not a secret at all. PyJWT would then verify
+# that forgery successfully because the key material matches. "none" is excluded
+# for the same class of reason: it asserts identity with no proof whatsoever.
+ALLOWED_SIGNING_ALGORITHMS = frozenset(
+    {"RS256", "RS384", "RS512", "ES256", "ES384", "ES512", "PS256", "PS384", "PS512"}
+)
+
+# Endpoints a discovery document must advertise for the login flow to work.
+REQUIRED_DISCOVERY_FIELDS = ("issuer", "authorization_endpoint", "token_endpoint", "jwks_uri")
+
+# Every endpoint this module actually calls. userinfo_endpoint is optional in the
+# spec, so it is checked only when present.
+DISCOVERY_ENDPOINT_FIELDS = ("authorization_endpoint", "token_endpoint", "jwks_uri", "userinfo_endpoint")
+
+# Tolerated clock skew between this instance and the identity provider, in seconds.
+LEEWAY = 60
+
+
+def _provider_error(message):
+    """Raise the generic OIDC provider error, logging the specific cause server-side.
+
+    The detail is deliberately not surfaced to the caller: the error travels back to
+    the browser as a query parameter on the sign-in page.
+
+    Callers must pass a constant description and never interpolate configuration
+    values. Issuer, client id and client secret all arrive from the same
+    get_configuration_value() call, so letting any of them reach this log makes the
+    secret one edit away from being written to disk in clear text. An instance has a
+    single configured issuer, so a constant message is still unambiguous.
+    """
+    logger.warning("OIDC: %s", message)
+    raise AuthenticationException(
+        error_code=AUTHENTICATION_ERROR_CODES["OIDC_OAUTH_PROVIDER_ERROR"],
+        error_message="OIDC_OAUTH_PROVIDER_ERROR",
+    )
+
+
+def normalize_issuer(issuer, *, from_configuration=True):
+    """Return the issuer without a trailing slash, validating its form.
+
+    The issuer identifier is compared byte-for-byte against the `iss` claim later,
+    so it has to be normalized once, here, and used consistently everywhere.
+
+    Two kinds of caller reach this, and they differ in whose mistake a bad value is.
+    The configured issuer is the administrator's to fix, so it fails as
+    OIDC_NOT_CONFIGURED and the sign-in page tells the user to contact their
+    administrator. The issuer echoed back inside a discovery document is the
+    provider's, so that path fails as the generic provider error and says to try
+    again. Passing both through one error code sent an admin who typed `http://`
+    chasing a transient fault that would never clear.
+    """
+
+    def reject(reason):
+        if from_configuration:
+            # Reason strings here are constants: the issuer arrives from the same
+            # configuration that holds OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET, so none of it is logged.
+            logger.warning("OIDC: %s", reason)
+            raise AuthenticationException(
+                error_code=AUTHENTICATION_ERROR_CODES["OIDC_NOT_CONFIGURED"],
+                error_message="OIDC_NOT_CONFIGURED",
+            )
+        _provider_error(reason)
+
+    if not issuer:
+        reject("issuer is empty")
+
+    issuer = str(issuer).strip().rstrip("/")
+    parsed = urlparse(issuer)
+
+    # OIDC Discovery requires the issuer to be an https URL with no query or
+    # fragment. Enforcing it here means a misconfigured instance fails at the
+    # admin panel rather than silently downgrading every login to plaintext.
+    if parsed.scheme != "https" or not parsed.netloc or parsed.query or parsed.fragment:
+        reject("issuer is not a valid https URL")
+
+    return issuer
+
+
+def get_discovery_document(issuer):
+    """Fetch and cache the provider's OpenID configuration.
+
+    Returns the parsed document. Raises AuthenticationException if the provider is
+    unreachable, malformed, or asserts an issuer other than the configured one.
+    """
+    issuer = normalize_issuer(issuer)
+    cache_key = f"{DISCOVERY_CACHE_PREFIX}{issuer}"
+
+    document = cache.get(cache_key)
+    if document:
+        return document
+
+    discovery_url = f"{issuer}/.well-known/openid-configuration"
+    try:
+        response = requests.get(discovery_url, timeout=NETWORK_TIMEOUT)
+        response.raise_for_status()
+        document = response.json()
+    except requests.RequestException:
+        _provider_error("could not fetch the provider's discovery document")
+    except ValueError:
+        _provider_error("discovery document is not valid JSON")
+
+    if not isinstance(document, dict):
+        _provider_error("discovery document is not a JSON object")
+
+    missing = [field for field in REQUIRED_DISCOVERY_FIELDS if not document.get(field)]
+    if missing:
+        # The field names are not interpolated: anything derived from the document
+        # carries taint from the configured issuer, and that config also holds the
+        # client secret. REQUIRED_DISCOVERY_FIELDS lists what a document must carry.
+        _provider_error("discovery document is missing one or more required fields")
+
+    # Validating the issuer's scheme is not enough: the endpoints inside the document
+    # are separate URLs and may point anywhere. OIDC Discovery 1.0 requires https for
+    # all of them, and the consequences here are concrete rather than theoretical --
+    # token_endpoint receives the authorization code together with the client secret,
+    # and jwks_uri supplies the keys every ID token signature is checked against. A
+    # document advertising http:// for either would put the secret on the wire in
+    # clear text, or let anyone on the path serve their own signing keys.
+    insecure = [
+        field
+        for field in DISCOVERY_ENDPOINT_FIELDS
+        if document.get(field) and urlparse(str(document[field])).scheme != "https"
+    ]
+    if insecure:
+        _provider_error("discovery document advertises one or more non-https endpoints")
+
+    # The document must claim the issuer we asked about. Without this check a
+    # provider could hand back another issuer's endpoints, and tokens minted by
+    # that third party would then satisfy the `iss` check below (OIDC Discovery
+    # 1.0 §4.3 makes this comparison mandatory for exactly that reason).
+    if normalize_issuer(document.get("issuer"), from_configuration=False) != issuer:
+        _provider_error("discovery document issuer does not match the configured issuer")
+
+    cache.set(cache_key, document, DISCOVERY_CACHE_TTL)
+    return document
+
+
+def get_signing_algorithms(discovery_document):
+    """Return the algorithms to accept: the provider's advertised set, filtered to the allowlist."""
+    advertised = discovery_document.get("id_token_signing_alg_values_supported") or []
+    algorithms = [alg for alg in advertised if alg in ALLOWED_SIGNING_ALGORITHMS]
+
+    if not algorithms:
+        # Either the provider advertises nothing usable, or it only offers
+        # symmetric/none signing. Both are refusals rather than fallbacks: there is
+        # no safe default to substitute here.
+        # The advertised list is deliberately not logged, for the reason above. Check
+        # id_token_signing_alg_values_supported in the provider's own metadata.
+        _provider_error("provider advertises no supported ID token signing algorithm")
+
+    return algorithms
+
+
+# PyJWKClient instances, keyed by jwks_uri. Each one holds its own key-set cache
+# with a TTL, so keeping them alive is what makes that cache effective. The set of
+# issuers on an instance is bounded by configuration, so this cannot grow unbounded.
+_jwk_clients = {}
+
+
+def _get_jwk_client(jwks_uri):
+    """Return a cached PyJWKClient for the given JWKS endpoint."""
+    client = _jwk_clients.get(jwks_uri)
+    if client is None:
+        client = PyJWKClient(jwks_uri, cache_jwk_set=True, lifespan=DISCOVERY_CACHE_TTL)
+        _jwk_clients[jwks_uri] = client
+    return client
+
+
+def validate_id_token(id_token, discovery_document, client_id, nonce=None):
+    """Verify an ID token's signature and claims, returning its payload.
+
+    Every parameter is part of the security boundary:
+      * the signature is checked against the issuer's published JWKS,
+      * `iss` must equal the configured issuer,
+      * `aud` must contain this instance's client_id,
+      * `exp`/`iat` must be current,
+      * `nonce` must match the value this instance put in the session.
+    """
+    if not id_token:
+        logger.warning("OIDC: token response contained no id_token")
+        raise AuthenticationException(
+            error_code=AUTHENTICATION_ERROR_CODES["OIDC_INVALID_ID_TOKEN"],
+            error_message="OIDC_INVALID_ID_TOKEN",
+        )
+
+    issuer = discovery_document["issuer"]
+    algorithms = get_signing_algorithms(discovery_document)
+
+    try:
+        # PyJWKClient reads the token header to select the matching key by `kid`.
+        # Its key-set cache lives on the instance, so the client itself is reused
+        # across logins — a fresh client per request would refetch the JWKS every
+        # single time and make the cache pointless.
+        jwk_client = _get_jwk_client(discovery_document["jwks_uri"])
+        signing_key = jwk_client.get_signing_key_from_jwt(id_token)
+    except (jwt.PyJWTError, requests.RequestException) as e:
+        logger.warning("OIDC: could not resolve signing key for id_token: %s", e)
+        raise AuthenticationException(
+            error_code=AUTHENTICATION_ERROR_CODES["OIDC_INVALID_ID_TOKEN"],
+            error_message="OIDC_INVALID_ID_TOKEN",
+        )
+
+    try:
+        claims = jwt.decode(
+            id_token,
+            signing_key.key,
+            algorithms=algorithms,
+            audience=client_id,
+            issuer=issuer,
+            leeway=LEEWAY,
+            options={
+                "verify_signature": True,
+                "verify_exp": True,
+                "verify_iat": True,
+                "verify_aud": True,
+                "verify_iss": True,
+                "require": ["iss", "sub", "aud", "exp", "iat"],
+            },
+        )
+    except jwt.PyJWTError as e:
+        # Covers expired, wrong audience, wrong issuer, bad signature and missing
+        # required claims. The specific reason is logged but never returned.
+        logger.warning("OIDC: id_token rejected: %s", e)
+        raise AuthenticationException(
+            error_code=AUTHENTICATION_ERROR_CODES["OIDC_INVALID_ID_TOKEN"],
+            error_message="OIDC_INVALID_ID_TOKEN",
+        )
+
+    # When the token is issued to more than one audience, OIDC Core §3.1.3.7 requires
+    # an `azp` claim naming the party the token was actually issued to. PyJWT's
+    # audience check passes as long as our client_id appears anywhere in the list,
+    # so without this a token minted for a different client at the same issuer would
+    # be accepted here.
+    audience = claims.get("aud")
+    if isinstance(audience, (list, tuple)) and len(audience) > 1:
+        if claims.get("azp") != client_id:
+            # Neither value is logged: client_id comes from instance configuration.
+            logger.warning("OIDC: id_token lists multiple audiences and azp does not name this client")
+            raise AuthenticationException(
+                error_code=AUTHENTICATION_ERROR_CODES["OIDC_INVALID_ID_TOKEN"],
+                error_message="OIDC_INVALID_ID_TOKEN",
+            )
+
+    # The nonce binds this token to the browser session that started the flow, which
+    # is what stops a token replayed from another session being accepted here.
+    # Compared in constant time, and a missing claim fails closed.
+    if nonce is not None:
+        token_nonce = claims.get("nonce")
+        if not token_nonce or not hmac.compare_digest(str(token_nonce), str(nonce)):
+            logger.warning("OIDC: id_token nonce mismatch")
+            raise AuthenticationException(
+                error_code=AUTHENTICATION_ERROR_CODES["OIDC_INVALID_ID_TOKEN"],
+                error_message="OIDC_INVALID_ID_TOKEN",
+            )
+
+    return claims
diff --git a/apps/api/plane/authentication/views/__init__.py b/apps/api/plane/authentication/views/__init__.py
index a9c816ae9ea..109d18db96e 100644
--- a/apps/api/plane/authentication/views/__init__.py
+++ b/apps/api/plane/authentication/views/__init__.py
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
 from .app.gitlab import GitLabCallbackEndpoint, GitLabOauthInitiateEndpoint
 from .app.gitea import GiteaCallbackEndpoint, GiteaOauthInitiateEndpoint
 from .app.google import GoogleCallbackEndpoint, GoogleOauthInitiateEndpoint
+from .app.oidc import OIDCCallbackEndpoint, OIDCOauthInitiateEndpoint
 from .app.magic import MagicGenerateEndpoint, MagicSignInEndpoint, MagicSignUpEndpoint
 
 from .app.signout import SignOutAuthEndpoint
@@ -26,6 +27,8 @@
 
 from .space.google import GoogleCallbackSpaceEndpoint, GoogleOauthInitiateSpaceEndpoint
 
+from .space.oidc import OIDCCallbackSpaceEndpoint, OIDCOauthInitiateSpaceEndpoint
+
 from .space.magic import (
     MagicGenerateSpaceEndpoint,
     MagicSignInSpaceEndpoint,
diff --git a/apps/api/plane/authentication/views/app/oidc.py b/apps/api/plane/authentication/views/app/oidc.py
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..1435e1b6b60
--- /dev/null
+++ b/apps/api/plane/authentication/views/app/oidc.py
@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
+# Copyright (c) 2023-present Plane Software, Inc. and contributors
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-only
+# See the LICENSE file for details.
+
+# Python imports
+import uuid
+
+# Django import
+from django.http import HttpResponseRedirect
+from django.views import View
+
+# Module imports
+from plane.authentication.provider.oauth.oidc import OIDCProvider
+from plane.authentication.utils.login import user_login
+from plane.authentication.utils.redirection_path import get_redirection_path
+from plane.authentication.utils.user_auth_workflow import post_user_auth_workflow
+from plane.license.models import Instance
+from plane.authentication.utils.host import base_host
+from plane.authentication.adapter.error import (
+    AuthenticationException,
+    AUTHENTICATION_ERROR_CODES,
+)
+from plane.utils.path_validator import get_safe_redirect_url
+
+# Session keys. Namespaced so a concurrent sign-in through another provider cannot
+# overwrite the values this flow will check on the way back.
+STATE_SESSION_KEY = "oidc_state"
+NONCE_SESSION_KEY = "oidc_nonce"
+
+
+class OIDCOauthInitiateEndpoint(View):
+    def get(self, request):
+        request.session["host"] = base_host(request=request, is_app=True)
+        next_path = request.GET.get("next_path")
+        if next_path:
+            request.session["next_path"] = str(next_path)
+
+        # Check instance configuration
+        instance = Instance.objects.first()
+        if instance is None or not instance.is_setup_done:
+            exc = AuthenticationException(
+                error_code=AUTHENTICATION_ERROR_CODES["INSTANCE_NOT_CONFIGURED"],
+                error_message="INSTANCE_NOT_CONFIGURED",
+            )
+            params = exc.get_error_dict()
+            url = get_safe_redirect_url(
+                base_url=base_host(request=request, is_app=True), next_path=next_path, params=params
+            )
+            return HttpResponseRedirect(url)
+
+        try:
+            state = uuid.uuid4().hex
+            nonce = uuid.uuid4().hex
+            provider = OIDCProvider(request=request, state=state, nonce=nonce)
+            request.session[STATE_SESSION_KEY] = state
+            request.session[NONCE_SESSION_KEY] = nonce
+            auth_url = provider.get_auth_url()
+            return HttpResponseRedirect(auth_url)
+        except AuthenticationException as e:
+            params = e.get_error_dict()
+            url = get_safe_redirect_url(
+                base_url=base_host(request=request, is_app=True), next_path=next_path, params=params
+            )
+            return HttpResponseRedirect(url)
+
+
+class OIDCCallbackEndpoint(View):
+    def get(self, request):
+        code = request.GET.get("code")
+        state = request.GET.get("state")
+        next_path = request.session.get("next_path")
+
+        # Both values are single-use: popping them means a replayed callback finds
+        # nothing to match against, even if the authorization code is still live.
+        expected_state = request.session.pop(STATE_SESSION_KEY, None)
+        nonce = request.session.pop(NONCE_SESSION_KEY, None)
+
+        # A missing nonce means this session did not start the flow: state and nonce
+        # are always stored together. Without it the ID token would be validated with
+        # no session binding at all, so this fails closed exactly like a bad state.
+        if not state or not expected_state or state != expected_state or not nonce:
+            exc = AuthenticationException(
+                error_code=AUTHENTICATION_ERROR_CODES["OIDC_OAUTH_PROVIDER_ERROR"],
+                error_message="OIDC_OAUTH_PROVIDER_ERROR",
+            )
+            params = exc.get_error_dict()
+            url = get_safe_redirect_url(
+                base_url=base_host(request=request, is_app=True), next_path=next_path, params=params
+            )
+            return HttpResponseRedirect(url)
+
+        if not code:
+            exc = AuthenticationException(
+                error_code=AUTHENTICATION_ERROR_CODES["OIDC_OAUTH_PROVIDER_ERROR"],
+                error_message="OIDC_OAUTH_PROVIDER_ERROR",
+            )
+            params = exc.get_error_dict()
+            url = get_safe_redirect_url(
+                base_url=base_host(request=request, is_app=True), next_path=next_path, params=params
+            )
+            return HttpResponseRedirect(url)
+
+        try:
+            provider = OIDCProvider(request=request, code=code, nonce=nonce, callback=post_user_auth_workflow)
+            user = provider.authenticate()
+            # Login the user and record his device info
+            user_login(request=request, user=user, is_app=True)
+            # Get the redirection path
+            if next_path:
+                path = next_path
+            else:
+                path = get_redirection_path(user=user)
+            url = get_safe_redirect_url(base_url=base_host(request=request, is_app=True), next_path=path, params={})
+            return HttpResponseRedirect(url)
+        except AuthenticationException as e:
+            params = e.get_error_dict()
+            url = get_safe_redirect_url(
+                base_url=base_host(request=request, is_app=True), next_path=next_path, params=params
+            )
+            return HttpResponseRedirect(url)
diff --git a/apps/api/plane/authentication/views/space/oidc.py b/apps/api/plane/authentication/views/space/oidc.py
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..8b580097c98
--- /dev/null
+++ b/apps/api/plane/authentication/views/space/oidc.py
@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
+# Copyright (c) 2023-present Plane Software, Inc. and contributors
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-only
+# See the LICENSE file for details.
+
+# Python imports
+import uuid
+
+# Django import
+from django.http import HttpResponseRedirect
+from django.views import View
+from django.utils.http import url_has_allowed_host_and_scheme
+
+# Module imports
+from plane.authentication.provider.oauth.oidc import OIDCProvider
+from plane.authentication.utils.login import user_login
+from plane.license.models import Instance
+from plane.authentication.utils.host import base_host
+from plane.authentication.adapter.error import (
+    AuthenticationException,
+    AUTHENTICATION_ERROR_CODES,
+)
+from plane.utils.path_validator import get_safe_redirect_url, validate_next_path, get_allowed_hosts
+
+# Session keys, namespaced separately from the /app flow so the two cannot clobber
+# each other if a user has both open.
+STATE_SESSION_KEY = "oidc_space_state"
+NONCE_SESSION_KEY = "oidc_space_nonce"
+
+
+class OIDCOauthInitiateSpaceEndpoint(View):
+    def get(self, request):
+        request.session["host"] = base_host(request=request, is_space=True)
+        next_path = request.GET.get("next_path")
+        # Stored in the session because the IdP redirects to a bare redirect_uri that
+        # carries no query string, so the callback has no other way to recover it.
+        if next_path:
+            request.session["next_path"] = str(next_path)
+
+        # Check instance configuration
+        instance = Instance.objects.first()
+        if instance is None or not instance.is_setup_done:
+            exc = AuthenticationException(
+                error_code=AUTHENTICATION_ERROR_CODES["INSTANCE_NOT_CONFIGURED"],
+                error_message="INSTANCE_NOT_CONFIGURED",
+            )
+            params = exc.get_error_dict()
+            url = get_safe_redirect_url(
+                base_url=base_host(request=request, is_space=True), next_path=next_path, params=params
+            )
+            return HttpResponseRedirect(url)
+
+        try:
+            state = uuid.uuid4().hex
+            nonce = uuid.uuid4().hex
+            provider = OIDCProvider(request=request, state=state, nonce=nonce, is_space=True)
+            request.session[STATE_SESSION_KEY] = state
+            request.session[NONCE_SESSION_KEY] = nonce
+            auth_url = provider.get_auth_url()
+            return HttpResponseRedirect(auth_url)
+        except AuthenticationException as e:
+            params = e.get_error_dict()
+            url = get_safe_redirect_url(
+                base_url=base_host(request=request, is_space=True), next_path=next_path, params=params
+            )
+            return HttpResponseRedirect(url)
+
+
+class OIDCCallbackSpaceEndpoint(View):
+    def get(self, request):
+        code = request.GET.get("code")
+        state = request.GET.get("state")
+        next_path = request.session.get("next_path")
+
+        # Single-use: see the /app callback for why these are popped.
+        expected_state = request.session.pop(STATE_SESSION_KEY, None)
+        nonce = request.session.pop(NONCE_SESSION_KEY, None)
+
+        # A missing nonce means this session did not start the flow: state and nonce
+        # are always stored together. Without it the ID token would be validated with
+        # no session binding at all, so this fails closed exactly like a bad state.
+        if not state or not expected_state or state != expected_state or not nonce:
+            exc = AuthenticationException(
+                error_code=AUTHENTICATION_ERROR_CODES["OIDC_OAUTH_PROVIDER_ERROR"],
+                error_message="OIDC_OAUTH_PROVIDER_ERROR",
+            )
+            params = exc.get_error_dict()
+            url = get_safe_redirect_url(
+                base_url=base_host(request=request, is_space=True), next_path=next_path, params=params
+            )
+            return HttpResponseRedirect(url)
+
+        if not code:
+            exc = AuthenticationException(
+                error_code=AUTHENTICATION_ERROR_CODES["OIDC_OAUTH_PROVIDER_ERROR"],
+                error_message="OIDC_OAUTH_PROVIDER_ERROR",
+            )
+            params = exc.get_error_dict()
+            url = get_safe_redirect_url(
+                base_url=base_host(request=request, is_space=True), next_path=next_path, params=params
+            )
+            return HttpResponseRedirect(url)
+
+        try:
+            provider = OIDCProvider(request=request, code=code, nonce=nonce, is_space=True)
+            user = provider.authenticate()
+            # Login the user and record his device info
+            user_login(request=request, user=user, is_space=True)
+            # redirect to referer path
+            next_path = validate_next_path(next_path=next_path)
+
+            # base_host() ends with SPACE_BASE_PATH's trailing slash. Strip it only
+            # when a next_path follows, otherwise the redirect lands on /spaces and the
+            # app rejects it: its configured base URL is /spaces/, so the bare form 404s.
+            space_base_url = base_host(request=request, is_space=True)
+            url = f"{space_base_url.rstrip('/')}{next_path}" if next_path else space_base_url
+            if url_has_allowed_host_and_scheme(url, allowed_hosts=get_allowed_hosts()):
+                return HttpResponseRedirect(url)
+            else:
+                return HttpResponseRedirect(base_host(request=request, is_space=True))
+        except AuthenticationException as e:
+            params = e.get_error_dict()
+            url = get_safe_redirect_url(
+                base_url=base_host(request=request, is_space=True), next_path=next_path, params=params
+            )
+            return HttpResponseRedirect(url)
diff --git a/apps/api/plane/license/api/views/instance.py b/apps/api/plane/license/api/views/instance.py
index a805411eee6..088fd2101a0 100644
--- a/apps/api/plane/license/api/views/instance.py
+++ b/apps/api/plane/license/api/views/instance.py
@@ -55,6 +55,8 @@ def get(self, request):
             GITHUB_APP_NAME,
             IS_GITLAB_ENABLED,
             IS_GITEA_ENABLED,
+            IS_OIDC_ENABLED,
+            OIDC_PROVIDER_NAME,
             EMAIL_HOST,
             ENABLE_MAGIC_LINK_LOGIN,
             ENABLE_EMAIL_PASSWORD,
@@ -91,6 +93,14 @@ def get(self, request):
                     "key": "IS_GITEA_ENABLED",
                     "default": os.environ.get("IS_GITEA_ENABLED", "0"),
                 },
+                {
+                    "key": "IS_OIDC_ENABLED",
+                    "default": os.environ.get("IS_OIDC_ENABLED", "0"),
+                },
+                {
+                    "key": "OIDC_PROVIDER_NAME",
+                    "default": os.environ.get("OIDC_PROVIDER_NAME", "SSO"),
+                },
                 {"key": "EMAIL_HOST", "default": os.environ.get("EMAIL_HOST", "")},
                 {
                     "key": "ENABLE_MAGIC_LINK_LOGIN",
@@ -123,6 +133,9 @@ def get(self, request):
         data["is_github_enabled"] = IS_GITHUB_ENABLED == "1"
         data["is_gitlab_enabled"] = IS_GITLAB_ENABLED == "1"
         data["is_gitea_enabled"] = IS_GITEA_ENABLED == "1"
+        data["is_oidc_enabled"] = IS_OIDC_ENABLED == "1"
+        # Label for the sign-in button; the provider is generic so the admin names it.
+        data["oidc_provider_name"] = OIDC_PROVIDER_NAME or "SSO"
         data["is_magic_login_enabled"] = ENABLE_MAGIC_LINK_LOGIN == "1"
         data["is_email_password_enabled"] = ENABLE_EMAIL_PASSWORD == "1"
 
diff --git a/apps/api/plane/tests/unit/authentication/test_avatar_download.py b/apps/api/plane/tests/unit/authentication/test_avatar_download.py
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..b8be461f1eb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/apps/api/plane/tests/unit/authentication/test_avatar_download.py
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+# Copyright (c) 2023-present Plane Software, Inc. and contributors
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-only
+# See the LICENSE file for details.
+
+"""Avatar download guard on the shared OAuth adapter.
+
+Providers are free to return something other than a fetchable URL. Authentik generates a
+`data:image/svg+xml;base64,...` avatar for users with no uploaded picture, and passing that
+to the SSRF-safe fetcher raises ValueError("Invalid URL scheme..."), which the surrounding
+`except Exception` records via log_exception — a full stack trace on every single sign-in.
+The guard returns early instead, so the caller stores the value as-is and the avatar still
+renders.
+"""
+
+from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch
+
+import pytest
+
+from plane.authentication.adapter.base import Adapter
+
+DATA_URI = ""
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def adapter():
+    return Adapter(request=MagicMock(), provider="oidc")
+
+
+@pytest.mark.unit
+class TestDownloadAndUploadAvatar:
+    @pytest.mark.parametrize(
+        "avatar_url",
+        [DATA_URI, "ftp://example.com/a.png", "file:///etc/passwd", "javascript:alert(1)"],
+        ids=["data-uri", "ftp", "file", "javascript"],
+    )
+    def test_non_http_urls_are_skipped_without_fetching_or_logging(self, adapter, avatar_url):
+        with (
+            patch("plane.authentication.adapter.base.pinned_fetch_following_redirects") as fetch,
+            patch("plane.authentication.adapter.base.log_exception") as log_exception,
+        ):
+            assert adapter.download_and_upload_avatar(avatar_url, user=MagicMock()) is None
+
+        fetch.assert_not_called()
+        # The point of the guard: no stack trace per sign-in.
+        log_exception.assert_not_called()
+
+    @pytest.mark.parametrize("avatar_url", [None, ""], ids=["none", "empty"])
+    def test_absent_avatar_is_skipped(self, adapter, avatar_url):
+        with patch("plane.authentication.adapter.base.pinned_fetch_following_redirects") as fetch:
+            assert adapter.download_and_upload_avatar(avatar_url, user=MagicMock()) is None
+        fetch.assert_not_called()
+
+    @pytest.mark.parametrize(
+        "avatar_url",
+        ["https://example.com/a.png", "http://example.com/a.png", "HTTPS://EXAMPLE.COM/a.png"],
+        ids=["https", "http", "uppercase-scheme"],
+    )
+    def test_http_urls_still_reach_the_fetcher(self, adapter, avatar_url):
+        """The guard must not change behaviour for the providers that return real URLs."""
+        with patch("plane.authentication.adapter.base.pinned_fetch_following_redirects") as fetch:
+            fetch.side_effect = RuntimeError("stop here")
+            with patch("plane.authentication.adapter.base.log_exception"):
+                adapter.download_and_upload_avatar(avatar_url, user=MagicMock())
+        fetch.assert_called_once()
diff --git a/apps/api/plane/tests/unit/authentication/test_oidc.py b/apps/api/plane/tests/unit/authentication/test_oidc.py
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..610bdba586c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/apps/api/plane/tests/unit/authentication/test_oidc.py
@@ -0,0 +1,276 @@
+# Copyright (c) 2023-present Plane Software, Inc. and contributors
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-only
+# See the LICENSE file for details.
+
+"""ID token validation tests for the generic OIDC provider.
+
+The ID token is the only thing proving who the user is, so every rejection path
+here is a security control rather than input validation. The forged-HS256 case in
+particular guards the classic algorithm-confusion attack: the issuer's public key
+is published in its JWKS, so if a symmetric algorithm were ever accepted, anyone
+could mint a valid-looking token by using that public key as the HMAC secret.
+"""
+
+import base64
+import hashlib
+import hmac
+import json
+import time
+from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
+
+import jwt
+import pytest
+from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import serialization
+from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import rsa
+
+from plane.authentication.adapter.error import AuthenticationException
+from plane.authentication.utils import oidc as oidc_utils
+
+ISSUER = "https://idp.example.com"
+CLIENT_ID = "plane-client"
+
+
+def _generate_keypair():
+    key = rsa.generate_private_key(public_exponent=65537, key_size=2048)
+    private_pem = key.private_bytes(
+        serialization.Encoding.PEM,
+        serialization.PrivateFormat.PKCS8,
+        serialization.NoEncryption(),
+    ).decode()
+    public_pem = (
+        key.public_key()
+        .public_bytes(serialization.Encoding.PEM, serialization.PublicFormat.SubjectPublicKeyInfo)
+        .decode()
+    )
+    return private_pem, public_pem
+
+
+PRIVATE_KEY, PUBLIC_KEY = _generate_keypair()
+OTHER_PRIVATE_KEY, _ = _generate_keypair()
+
+DISCOVERY = {
+    "issuer": ISSUER,
+    "authorization_endpoint": f"{ISSUER}/authorize",
+    "token_endpoint": f"{ISSUER}/token",
+    "jwks_uri": f"{ISSUER}/jwks",
+    "id_token_signing_alg_values_supported": ["RS256"],
+}
+
+
+@pytest.fixture(autouse=True)
+def stub_jwks(monkeypatch):
+    """Serve the public key directly instead of fetching the issuer's JWKS."""
+
+    class _Key:
+        key = PUBLIC_KEY
+
+    class _Client:
+        def get_signing_key_from_jwt(self, token):
+            return _Key()
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(oidc_utils, "_get_jwk_client", lambda uri: _Client())
+
+
+def make_token(claims=None, key=PRIVATE_KEY):
+    now = datetime.now(tz=timezone.utc)
+    payload = {
+        "iss": ISSUER,
+        "sub": "user-123",
+        "aud": CLIENT_ID,
+        "iat": now,
+        "exp": now + timedelta(minutes=5),
+    }
+    payload.update(claims or {})
+    return jwt.encode(payload, key, algorithm="RS256")
+
+
+def validate(token, nonce=None):
+    return oidc_utils.validate_id_token(token, DISCOVERY, CLIENT_ID, nonce=nonce)
+
+
+@pytest.mark.unit
+class TestValidateIdToken:
+    def test_valid_token_is_accepted(self):
+        claims = validate(make_token())
+        assert claims["sub"] == "user-123"
+
+    def test_missing_token_is_rejected(self):
+        with pytest.raises(AuthenticationException):
+            validate(None)
+
+    def test_expired_token_is_rejected(self):
+        expired = make_token({"exp": datetime.now(tz=timezone.utc) - timedelta(hours=1)})
+        with pytest.raises(AuthenticationException):
+            validate(expired)
+
+    def test_wrong_audience_is_rejected(self):
+        with pytest.raises(AuthenticationException):
+            validate(make_token({"aud": "a-different-client"}))
+
+    def test_wrong_issuer_is_rejected(self):
+        with pytest.raises(AuthenticationException):
+            validate(make_token({"iss": "https://evil.example.com"}))
+
+    def test_token_signed_by_another_key_is_rejected(self):
+        with pytest.raises(AuthenticationException):
+            validate(make_token(key=OTHER_PRIVATE_KEY))
+
+    def test_missing_sub_is_rejected(self):
+        now = datetime.now(tz=timezone.utc)
+        token = jwt.encode(
+            {"iss": ISSUER, "aud": CLIENT_ID, "iat": now, "exp": now + timedelta(minutes=5)},
+            PRIVATE_KEY,
+            algorithm="RS256",
+        )
+        with pytest.raises(AuthenticationException):
+            validate(token)
+
+    def test_forged_hs256_token_is_rejected(self):
+        """Algorithm confusion: HMAC the token with the issuer's public key.
+
+        Assembled by hand because PyJWT's encode() refuses to build it — which is
+        precisely what an attacker would do.
+        """
+
+        def b64u(raw):
+            return base64.urlsafe_b64encode(raw).rstrip(b"=")
+
+        now = int(time.time())
+        header = b64u(json.dumps({"alg": "HS256", "typ": "JWT", "kid": "k1"}).encode())
+        payload = b64u(
+            json.dumps({"iss": ISSUER, "sub": "attacker", "aud": CLIENT_ID, "iat": now, "exp": now + 300}).encode()
+        )
+        signing_input = header + b"." + payload
+        signature = b64u(hmac.new(PUBLIC_KEY.encode(), signing_input, hashlib.sha256).digest())
+        forged = (signing_input + b"." + signature).decode()
+
+        with pytest.raises(AuthenticationException):
+            validate(forged)
+
+
+@pytest.mark.unit
+class TestNonceBinding:
+    def test_matching_nonce_is_accepted(self):
+        assert validate(make_token({"nonce": "abc"}), nonce="abc")["nonce"] == "abc"
+
+    def test_mismatched_nonce_is_rejected(self):
+        with pytest.raises(AuthenticationException):
+            validate(make_token({"nonce": "abc"}), nonce="xyz")
+
+    def test_absent_nonce_claim_is_rejected_when_one_was_sent(self):
+        with pytest.raises(AuthenticationException):
+            validate(make_token(), nonce="abc")
+
+
+@pytest.mark.unit
+class TestMultipleAudiences:
+    def test_correct_azp_is_accepted(self):
+        token = make_token({"aud": [CLIENT_ID, "other-client"], "azp": CLIENT_ID})
+        assert validate(token)["sub"] == "user-123"
+
+    def test_azp_naming_another_client_is_rejected(self):
+        token = make_token({"aud": [CLIENT_ID, "other-client"], "azp": "other-client"})
+        with pytest.raises(AuthenticationException):
+            validate(token)
+
+    def test_missing_azp_is_rejected(self):
+        token = make_token({"aud": [CLIENT_ID, "other-client"]})
+        with pytest.raises(AuthenticationException):
+            validate(token)
+
+
+@pytest.mark.unit
+class TestDiscoveryEndpointSchemes:
+    """Every endpoint in the document is a separate URL and may point anywhere.
+
+    token_endpoint receives the authorization code together with the client secret,
+    and jwks_uri supplies the keys every signature is checked against, so a document
+    advertising http:// for either is refused rather than followed.
+    """
+
+    @pytest.fixture(autouse=True)
+    def isolated_cache(self, monkeypatch):
+        """Give each test its own discovery cache.
+
+        The module caches documents through Django's cache, which under the test
+        settings is Redis. Reaching for it would make these tests order-dependent on
+        each other and dependent on a running backend, neither of which belongs in a
+        unit test.
+        """
+
+        class _Cache:
+            def __init__(self):
+                self.store = {}
+
+            def get(self, key):
+                return self.store.get(key)
+
+            def set(self, key, value, ttl=None):
+                self.store[key] = value
+
+        monkeypatch.setattr(oidc_utils, "cache", _Cache())
+
+    def _fetch(self, document, monkeypatch):
+        class _Response:
+            @staticmethod
+            def raise_for_status():
+                return None
+
+            @staticmethod
+            def json():
+                return document
+
+        monkeypatch.setattr(oidc_utils.requests, "get", lambda *a, **k: _Response())
+        return oidc_utils.get_discovery_document(ISSUER)
+
+    def test_an_https_document_is_accepted(self, monkeypatch):
+        assert self._fetch(DISCOVERY, monkeypatch)["issuer"] == ISSUER
+
+    @pytest.mark.parametrize(
+        "field",
+        ["authorization_endpoint", "token_endpoint", "jwks_uri", "userinfo_endpoint"],
+    )
+    def test_a_plaintext_endpoint_is_refused(self, field, monkeypatch):
+        document = {**DISCOVERY, "userinfo_endpoint": f"{ISSUER}/userinfo"}
+        document[field] = document[field].replace("https://", "http://")
+        with pytest.raises(AuthenticationException) as exc:
+            self._fetch(document, monkeypatch)
+        assert exc.value.error_message == "OIDC_OAUTH_PROVIDER_ERROR"
+
+
+@pytest.mark.unit
+class TestSigningAlgorithms:
+    def test_symmetric_only_provider_is_refused(self):
+        document = {**DISCOVERY, "id_token_signing_alg_values_supported": ["HS256", "none"]}
+        with pytest.raises(AuthenticationException):
+            oidc_utils.get_signing_algorithms(document)
+
+    def test_asymmetric_algorithms_are_kept(self):
+        document = {**DISCOVERY, "id_token_signing_alg_values_supported": ["RS256", "HS256", "ES256"]}
+        assert oidc_utils.get_signing_algorithms(document) == ["RS256", "ES256"]
+
+
+@pytest.mark.unit
+class TestNormalizeIssuer:
+    def test_trailing_slash_is_stripped(self):
+        assert oidc_utils.normalize_issuer("https://idp.example.com/") == "https://idp.example.com"
+
+    @pytest.mark.parametrize(
+        "issuer",
+        ["", None, "http://idp.example.com", "https://idp.example.com?x=1", "https://idp.example.com#f", "https://"],
+        ids=["empty", "none", "plaintext", "querystring", "fragment", "no-host"],
+    )
+    def test_a_bad_configured_issuer_reads_as_misconfiguration(self, issuer):
+        """The admin typed this, so the sign-in page must say "contact your
+        administrator" rather than "try again" — the latter sends someone chasing a
+        transient fault that will never clear."""
+        with pytest.raises(AuthenticationException) as exc:
+            oidc_utils.normalize_issuer(issuer)
+        assert exc.value.error_message == "OIDC_NOT_CONFIGURED"
+
+    @pytest.mark.parametrize("issuer", ["", "http://idp.example.com"], ids=["empty", "plaintext"])
+    def test_a_bad_issuer_inside_a_discovery_document_blames_the_provider(self, issuer):
+        """Same validation, different fault: this value came back from the provider."""
+        with pytest.raises(AuthenticationException) as exc:
+            oidc_utils.normalize_issuer(issuer, from_configuration=False)
+        assert exc.value.error_message == "OIDC_OAUTH_PROVIDER_ERROR"
diff --git a/apps/api/plane/tests/unit/authentication/test_oidc_provider.py b/apps/api/plane/tests/unit/authentication/test_oidc_provider.py
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..1e7d3b63175
--- /dev/null
+++ b/apps/api/plane/tests/unit/authentication/test_oidc_provider.py
@@ -0,0 +1,409 @@
+# Copyright (c) 2023-present Plane Software, Inc. and contributors
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-only
+# See the LICENSE file for details.
+
+"""Flow-level tests for OIDCProvider against a mock identity provider.
+
+These cover what the provider does with a token response once the signature has
+been checked: which claims become the Plane user, when the userinfo endpoint is
+consulted, and which responses are refused. Token signature and claim validation
+itself lives in test_oidc.py.
+"""
+
+import base64
+from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
+from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch
+
+import jwt
+import pytest
+from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import serialization
+from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import rsa
+
+from plane.authentication.adapter.error import AuthenticationException
+from plane.authentication.provider.oauth import oidc as provider_module
+from plane.authentication.provider.oauth.oidc import OIDCProvider
+from plane.authentication.utils import oidc as oidc_utils
+
+ISSUER = "https://idp.example.com"
+CLIENT_ID = "plane-client"
+CLIENT_SECRET = "client-secret"
+SUBJECT = "sub-abc"
+
+
+def _generate_keypair():
+    key = rsa.generate_private_key(public_exponent=65537, key_size=2048)
+    private_pem = key.private_bytes(
+        serialization.Encoding.PEM,
+        serialization.PrivateFormat.PKCS8,
+        serialization.NoEncryption(),
+    ).decode()
+    public_pem = (
+        key.public_key()
+        .public_bytes(serialization.Encoding.PEM, serialization.PublicFormat.SubjectPublicKeyInfo)
+        .decode()
+    )
+    return private_pem, public_pem
+
+
+PRIVATE_KEY, PUBLIC_KEY = _generate_keypair()
+
+BASE_CONFIG = {
+    "OIDC_ISSUER_URL": ISSUER,
+    "OIDC_CLIENT_ID": CLIENT_ID,
+    "OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET": CLIENT_SECRET,
+    "OIDC_ALLOW_UNVERIFIED_EMAIL": "0",
+}
+
+
+def discovery(**overrides):
+    document = {
+        "issuer": ISSUER,
+        "authorization_endpoint": f"{ISSUER}/authorize",
+        "token_endpoint": f"{ISSUER}/token",
+        "userinfo_endpoint": f"{ISSUER}/userinfo",
+        "jwks_uri": f"{ISSUER}/jwks",
+        "id_token_signing_alg_values_supported": ["RS256"],
+    }
+    document.update(overrides)
+    return document
+
+
+class FakeRequest:
+    """Stands in for the Django request the provider reads the host from."""
+
+    session = {}
+    # save_user_data() copies REMOTE_ADDR and the user agent onto the user row, and both
+    # users.last_login_ip and users.last_login_uagent are NOT NULL, so an empty META fails
+    # the insert on any test that provisions a user.
+    META = {"REMOTE_ADDR": "127.0.0.1", "HTTP_USER_AGENT": "pytest"}
+
+    def is_secure(self):
+        return True
+
+    def get_host(self):
+        return "plane.example.com"
+
+
+@pytest.fixture(autouse=True)
+def stub_jwks(monkeypatch):
+    class _Key:
+        key = PUBLIC_KEY
+
+    class _Client:
+        def get_signing_key_from_jwt(self, token):
+            return _Key()
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(oidc_utils, "_get_jwk_client", lambda uri: _Client())
+
+
+def make_id_token(claims=None, nonce=None):
+    now = datetime.now(tz=timezone.utc)
+    payload = {
+        "iss": ISSUER,
+        "sub": SUBJECT,
+        "aud": CLIENT_ID,
+        "iat": now,
+        "exp": now + timedelta(minutes=5),
+    }
+    if nonce:
+        payload["nonce"] = nonce
+    payload.update(claims or {})
+    return jwt.encode(payload, PRIVATE_KEY, algorithm="RS256")
+
+
+def fake_config(keys, config=None):
+    resolved = config or BASE_CONFIG
+    return [resolved.get(key["key"], key.get("default")) for key in keys]
+
+
+def build_provider(document=None, config=None, nonce=None, code="auth-code", state=None, is_space=False):
+    with (
+        patch.object(provider_module, "get_configuration_value", lambda keys: fake_config(keys, config)),
+        patch.object(provider_module, "get_discovery_document", lambda issuer: document or discovery()),
+    ):
+        return OIDCProvider(request=FakeRequest(), code=code, state=state, nonce=nonce, is_space=is_space)
+
+
+def run_flow(id_token_claims=None, userinfo=None, document=None, config=None, nonce=None):
+    """Drive one full callback leg: token exchange, validation, claim mapping."""
+    provider = build_provider(document, config, nonce)
+
+    token_response = MagicMock()
+    token_response.json.return_value = {
+        "access_token": "access-token",
+        "refresh_token": "refresh-token",
+        "expires_in": 3600,
+        "id_token": make_id_token(id_token_claims, nonce=nonce),
+    }
+    token_response.raise_for_status = lambda: None
+
+    userinfo_response = MagicMock()
+    userinfo_response.json.return_value = userinfo or {}
+    userinfo_response.raise_for_status = lambda: None
+
+    with (
+        patch.object(provider_module, "get_configuration_value", lambda keys: fake_config(keys, config)),
+        patch("plane.authentication.adapter.oauth.requests.post", return_value=token_response),
+        patch("plane.authentication.adapter.oauth.requests.get", return_value=userinfo_response),
+    ):
+        provider.set_token_data()
+        provider.set_user_data()
+
+    return provider
+
+
+@pytest.mark.unit
+class TestClaimMapping:
+    def test_user_data_comes_from_the_id_token(self):
+        provider = run_flow(
+            {
+                "email": "ada@example.com",
+                "email_verified": True,
+                "given_name": "Ada",
+                "family_name": "Lovelace",
+                "picture": "https://example.com/ada.png",
+            }
+        )
+        user = provider.user_data["user"]
+        assert provider.user_data["email"] == "ada@example.com"
+        # `sub`, not email: email can be reassigned, sub cannot.
+        assert user["provider_id"] == SUBJECT
+        assert user["first_name"] == "Ada"
+        assert user["last_name"] == "Lovelace"
+        assert user["avatar"] == "https://example.com/ada.png"
+        assert user["is_password_autoset"] is True
+
+    def test_full_name_is_split_when_given_name_is_absent(self):
+        provider = run_flow(
+            {"email": "alan@example.com", "email_verified": True, "name": "Alan Turing"},
+            userinfo={"sub": SUBJECT},
+        )
+        user = provider.user_data["user"]
+        assert user["first_name"] == "Alan"
+        assert user["last_name"] == "Turing"
+
+    def test_access_token_expiry_is_relative_to_now(self):
+        provider = run_flow({"email": "ada@example.com", "email_verified": True, "name": "Ada"})
+        assert provider.token_data["access_token_expired_at"] > datetime.now(tz=timezone.utc)
+
+
+@pytest.mark.unit
+class TestUnverifiedEmail:
+    def test_unverified_email_is_rejected(self):
+        with pytest.raises(AuthenticationException) as exc:
+            run_flow({"email": "ada@example.com", "email_verified": False, "name": "Ada"})
+        assert exc.value.error_message == "OAUTH_PROVIDER_UNVERIFIED_EMAIL"
+
+    def test_absent_email_verified_claim_fails_closed(self):
+        with pytest.raises(AuthenticationException) as exc:
+            run_flow({"email": "ada@example.com", "name": "Ada"})
+        assert exc.value.error_message == "OAUTH_PROVIDER_UNVERIFIED_EMAIL"
+
+    def test_opt_out_allows_unverified_email(self):
+        config = {**BASE_CONFIG, "OIDC_ALLOW_UNVERIFIED_EMAIL": "1"}
+        provider = run_flow({"email": "ada@example.com", "name": "Ada"}, config=config)
+        assert provider.user_data["email"] == "ada@example.com"
+
+
+@pytest.mark.unit
+class TestUserinfoFallback:
+    def test_userinfo_fills_claims_the_id_token_omitted(self):
+        provider = run_flow(
+            {"email": "grace@example.com", "email_verified": True},
+            userinfo={"sub": SUBJECT, "given_name": "Grace", "family_name": "Hopper"},
+        )
+        assert provider.user_data["user"]["first_name"] == "Grace"
+
+    def test_userinfo_supplies_a_missing_email_verified(self):
+        """An otherwise complete ID token that omits email_verified must still be
+        topped up from userinfo rather than rejected. Providers differ on which claims
+        reach the ID token, so rejecting here would fail a login that the userinfo
+        call can satisfy."""
+        provider = run_flow(
+            {"email": "ada@example.com", "given_name": "Ada", "family_name": "Lovelace"},
+            userinfo={"sub": SUBJECT, "email_verified": True},
+        )
+        assert provider.user_data["email"] == "ada@example.com"
+
+    def test_userinfo_that_denies_verification_still_rejects(self):
+        """Topping up from userinfo must not become a way around the check."""
+        with pytest.raises(AuthenticationException) as exc:
+            run_flow(
+                {"email": "ada@example.com", "given_name": "Ada", "family_name": "Lovelace"},
+                userinfo={"sub": SUBJECT, "email_verified": False},
+            )
+        assert exc.value.error_message == "OAUTH_PROVIDER_UNVERIFIED_EMAIL"
+
+    def test_userinfo_is_not_called_when_the_id_token_suffices(self):
+        """A complete ID token must not cost an extra network round trip."""
+        provider = build_provider()
+        token_response = MagicMock()
+        token_response.json.return_value = {
+            "access_token": "access-token",
+            "expires_in": 3600,
+            "id_token": make_id_token(
+                {"email": "ada@example.com", "email_verified": True, "given_name": "Ada", "family_name": "Lovelace"}
+            ),
+        }
+        token_response.raise_for_status = lambda: None
+
+        with (
+            patch.object(provider_module, "get_configuration_value", lambda keys: fake_config(keys)),
+            patch("plane.authentication.adapter.oauth.requests.post", return_value=token_response),
+            patch("plane.authentication.adapter.oauth.requests.get") as userinfo_get,
+        ):
+            provider.set_token_data()
+            provider.set_user_data()
+
+        userinfo_get.assert_not_called()
+
+    def test_userinfo_for_another_subject_is_discarded(self):
+        """A userinfo response that does not match the ID token must not be trusted."""
+        provider = run_flow(
+            {"email": "ada@example.com", "email_verified": True},
+            userinfo={
+                "sub": "a-different-subject",
+                "given_name": "Mallory",
+                "email": "mallory@evil.example.com",
+            },
+        )
+        assert provider.user_data["email"] == "ada@example.com"
+        assert provider.user_data["user"]["first_name"] != "Mallory"
+        assert provider.user_data["user"]["provider_id"] == SUBJECT
+
+
+@pytest.mark.unit
+class TestClientAuthentication:
+    def test_basic_auth_is_used_when_that_is_all_the_provider_accepts(self):
+        provider = build_provider(discovery(token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported=["client_secret_basic"]))
+        fields, headers = provider._token_request_auth()
+        assert fields == {}
+        credentials = base64.b64decode(headers["Authorization"].split()[1]).decode()
+        assert credentials == f"{CLIENT_ID}:{CLIENT_SECRET}"
+
+    def test_secret_goes_in_the_form_body_when_the_provider_offers_it(self):
+        provider = build_provider(discovery(token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported=["client_secret_post"]))
+        fields, headers = provider._token_request_auth()
+        assert fields["client_secret"] == CLIENT_SECRET
+        assert "Authorization" not in headers
+
+    def test_post_is_preferred_when_the_provider_offers_both(self):
+        provider = build_provider(
+            discovery(token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported=["client_secret_basic", "client_secret_post"])
+        )
+        fields, headers = provider._token_request_auth()
+        assert fields["client_secret"] == CLIENT_SECRET
+        assert "Authorization" not in headers
+
+    @pytest.mark.parametrize("advertised", [None, []], ids=["field-absent", "field-empty"])
+    def test_an_unpublished_list_falls_back_to_basic_per_the_spec(self, advertised):
+        """OIDC Discovery 1.0 §3: when token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported is
+        omitted, "the default is client_secret_basic". A compliant provider that
+        accepts only the default and publishes no list would reject a form-body
+        secret, so an absent list is not a free choice."""
+        document = discovery()
+        if advertised is None:
+            document.pop("token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported", None)
+        else:
+            document["token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported"] = advertised
+
+        provider = build_provider(document)
+        fields, headers = provider._token_request_auth()
+        assert fields == {}
+        credentials = base64.b64decode(headers["Authorization"].split()[1]).decode()
+        assert credentials == f"{CLIENT_ID}:{CLIENT_SECRET}"
+
+
+@pytest.mark.unit
+class TestAuthorizationRequest:
+    def test_authorization_url_carries_state_nonce_and_scope(self):
+        provider = build_provider(state="state-1", nonce="nonce-1", code=None)
+        url = provider.get_auth_url()
+        assert "state=state-1" in url
+        assert "nonce=nonce-1" in url
+        assert "scope=openid+email+profile" in url
+        assert "redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fplane.example.com%2Fauth%2Foidc%2Fcallback%2F" in url
+
+    def test_app_flow_calls_back_to_the_app_endpoint(self):
+        provider = build_provider(state="state-1", nonce="nonce-1", code=None)
+        assert provider.redirect_uri == "https://plane.example.com/auth/oidc/callback/"
+
+    def test_spaces_flow_calls_back_to_the_spaces_endpoint(self):
+        """The two flows keep separate session keys, so the IdP must return to the
+        endpoint that started the login or the state/nonce lookup finds nothing."""
+        provider = build_provider(state="state-1", nonce="nonce-1", code=None, is_space=True)
+        assert provider.redirect_uri == "https://plane.example.com/auth/spaces/oidc/callback/"
+        assert "redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fplane.example.com%2Fauth%2Fspaces%2Foidc%2Fcallback%2F" in (
+            provider.get_auth_url()
+        )
+
+    def test_missing_configuration_is_reported(self):
+        config = {**BASE_CONFIG, "OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET": None}
+        with pytest.raises(AuthenticationException) as exc:
+            build_provider(config=config)
+        assert exc.value.error_message == "OIDC_NOT_CONFIGURED"
+
+
+@pytest.mark.unit
+@pytest.mark.django_db
+class TestSignupGating:
+    """OIDC honours ENABLE_SIGNUP.
+
+    There is no separate sign-up flow for OIDC — the same button serves login and
+    registration — so hiding a sign-up button in the UI proves nothing here. The only
+    thing standing between a disabled instance and a brand-new IdP identity is
+    __check_signup() in the shared adapter, reached through complete_login_or_signup().
+    """
+
+    def _authenticate(self, email, enable_signup):
+        """Drive the post-token half of the flow with a verified ID token for `email`."""
+        provider = build_provider()
+        provider.id_token_claims = {
+            "sub": f"sub-for-{email}",
+            "email": email,
+            "email_verified": True,
+            "given_name": "Ada",
+            "family_name": "Lovelace",
+        }
+        provider.token_data = None  # skip Account creation; irrelevant to the gate
+
+        with (
+            patch.object(provider_module, "get_configuration_value", lambda keys: fake_config(keys)),
+            patch(
+                "plane.authentication.adapter.base.get_configuration_value",
+                lambda keys: (enable_signup,),
+            ),
+        ):
+            provider.set_user_data()
+            return provider.complete_login_or_signup()
+
+    def test_new_identity_is_refused_when_signup_is_disabled(self):
+        from plane.db.models import User
+
+        with pytest.raises(AuthenticationException) as exc:
+            self._authenticate("stranger@example.com", enable_signup="0")
+
+        assert exc.value.error_message == "SIGNUP_DISABLED"
+        assert not User.objects.filter(email="stranger@example.com").exists()
+
+    def test_new_identity_is_admitted_when_signup_is_enabled(self):
+        user = self._authenticate("newcomer@example.com", enable_signup="1")
+        assert user.email == "newcomer@example.com"
+
+    def test_an_invited_address_is_admitted_even_while_signup_is_disabled(self):
+        """The gate checks for a pending workspace invite before refusing."""
+        from plane.db.models import Workspace, WorkspaceMemberInvite
+
+        owner = self._authenticate("owner@example.com", enable_signup="1")
+        workspace = Workspace.objects.create(name="Acme", slug="acme", owner=owner)
+        WorkspaceMemberInvite.objects.create(email="invited@example.com", workspace=workspace, role=15, token="tok")
+
+        user = self._authenticate("invited@example.com", enable_signup="0")
+        assert user.email == "invited@example.com"
+
+    def test_an_existing_user_can_still_sign_in_while_signup_is_disabled(self):
+        """Gating registration must not lock out people who already have accounts."""
+        existing = self._authenticate("regular@example.com", enable_signup="1")
+
+        again = self._authenticate("regular@example.com", enable_signup="0")
+        assert again.id == existing.id
diff --git a/apps/api/plane/tests/unit/authentication/test_oidc_views.py b/apps/api/plane/tests/unit/authentication/test_oidc_views.py
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..536af2e0941
--- /dev/null
+++ b/apps/api/plane/tests/unit/authentication/test_oidc_views.py
@@ -0,0 +1,134 @@
+# Copyright (c) 2023-present Plane Software, Inc. and contributors
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-only
+# See the LICENSE file for details.
+
+"""Guards on the OIDC callback endpoints.
+
+Both callbacks reject the request before any provider or database work happens, so
+these run on a bare RequestFactory. The nonce check matters as much as the state
+check: state proves the redirect belongs to this browser, nonce proves the ID token
+does. Losing either one silently would leave the token unbound to the session.
+"""
+
+from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch
+
+import pytest
+from django.test import RequestFactory
+
+from plane.authentication.views.app.oidc import (
+    NONCE_SESSION_KEY,
+    STATE_SESSION_KEY,
+    OIDCCallbackEndpoint,
+)
+from plane.authentication.views.space.oidc import (
+    NONCE_SESSION_KEY as SPACE_NONCE_SESSION_KEY,
+)
+from plane.authentication.views.space.oidc import (
+    STATE_SESSION_KEY as SPACE_STATE_SESSION_KEY,
+)
+from plane.authentication.views.space.oidc import (
+    OIDCCallbackSpaceEndpoint,
+)
+from plane.authentication.views.space import oidc as space_oidc
+
+# 5114 = OIDC_OAUTH_PROVIDER_ERROR, the code both callbacks refuse with.
+REFUSAL_CODE = "5114"
+
+
+@pytest.fixture(autouse=True)
+def base_urls(settings):
+    """base_host() builds the refusal redirect from these; unset they yield None."""
+    settings.WEB_URL = "https://plane.example.com"
+    settings.APP_BASE_URL = "https://plane.example.com"
+    settings.SPACE_BASE_URL = "https://plane.example.com"
+
+
+def make_request(session, query):
+    request = RequestFactory().get("/auth/oidc/callback/", query)
+    request.session = dict(session)
+    return request
+
+
+def refused(response):
+    """A refusal is a redirect back to the sign-in page carrying the error code."""
+    return response.status_code == 302 and f"error_code={REFUSAL_CODE}" in response.url
+
+
+@pytest.mark.unit
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    ("view", "state_key", "nonce_key"),
+    [
+        (OIDCCallbackEndpoint, STATE_SESSION_KEY, NONCE_SESSION_KEY),
+        (OIDCCallbackSpaceEndpoint, SPACE_STATE_SESSION_KEY, SPACE_NONCE_SESSION_KEY),
+    ],
+    ids=["app", "spaces"],
+)
+class TestCallbackGuards:
+    def test_missing_nonce_is_refused(self, view, state_key, nonce_key):
+        """State alone is not enough: without the nonce the ID token would be
+        validated with no session binding, so the login is refused instead."""
+        request = make_request({state_key: "s1"}, {"code": "c", "state": "s1"})
+        assert refused(view().get(request))
+
+    def test_mismatched_state_is_refused(self, view, state_key, nonce_key):
+        request = make_request({state_key: "s1", nonce_key: "n1"}, {"code": "c", "state": "other"})
+        assert refused(view().get(request))
+
+    def test_absent_state_in_session_is_refused(self, view, state_key, nonce_key):
+        request = make_request({}, {"code": "c", "state": "s1"})
+        assert refused(view().get(request))
+
+    def test_missing_code_is_refused(self, view, state_key, nonce_key):
+        request = make_request({state_key: "s1", nonce_key: "n1"}, {"state": "s1"})
+        assert refused(view().get(request))
+
+    def test_state_and_nonce_are_single_use(self, view, state_key, nonce_key):
+        """Both are popped, so a replayed callback finds nothing left to match.
+
+        The state check passes here and the request is refused for the missing code
+        instead, which keeps the test out of the provider while still proving the pop
+        happens on a request that got past state validation.
+        """
+        session = {state_key: "s1", nonce_key: "n1"}
+        request = RequestFactory().get("/auth/oidc/callback/", {"state": "s1"})
+        request.session = session
+
+        assert refused(view().get(request))
+        assert state_key not in session
+        assert nonce_key not in session
+
+        # Replaying the same callback now fails the state check outright.
+        replay = make_request(session, {"code": "c", "state": "s1"})
+        assert refused(view().get(replay))
+
+
+@pytest.mark.unit
+class TestSpacesLandingUrl:
+    """Where a successful Spaces login comes to rest.
+
+    SPACE_BASE_PATH contributes a trailing slash that the callback used to strip
+    unconditionally, sending the browser to /spaces. The Spaces app declares a base URL of
+    /spaces/ and 404s on the bare form, so the slash has to survive when there is no
+    next_path to append.
+    """
+
+    def _run(self, session_next_path=None):
+        session = {SPACE_STATE_SESSION_KEY: "s1", SPACE_NONCE_SESSION_KEY: "n1"}
+        if session_next_path:
+            session["next_path"] = session_next_path
+        request = RequestFactory().get("/auth/spaces/oidc/callback/", {"code": "c", "state": "s1"})
+        request.session = session
+
+        provider = MagicMock()
+        provider.authenticate.return_value = MagicMock()
+        with (
+            patch.object(space_oidc, "OIDCProvider", return_value=provider),
+            patch.object(space_oidc, "user_login"),
+        ):
+            return OIDCCallbackSpaceEndpoint().get(request)
+
+    def test_lands_on_the_spaces_base_path_with_its_trailing_slash(self):
+        assert self._run().url == "https://plane.example.com/spaces/"
+
+    def test_next_path_is_appended_without_doubling_the_slash(self):
+        assert self._run(session_next_path="/foo").url == "https://plane.example.com/spaces/foo"
diff --git a/apps/api/plane/utils/instance_config_variables/core.py b/apps/api/plane/utils/instance_config_variables/core.py
index 6df27d26170..da1e9d0b89b 100644
--- a/apps/api/plane/utils/instance_config_variables/core.py
+++ b/apps/api/plane/utils/instance_config_variables/core.py
@@ -250,6 +250,56 @@
     },
 ]
 
+oidc_config_variables = [
+    {
+        "key": "IS_OIDC_ENABLED",
+        "value": os.environ.get("IS_OIDC_ENABLED", "0"),
+        "category": "OIDC",
+        "is_encrypted": False,
+    },
+    {
+        "key": "OIDC_ISSUER_URL",
+        "value": os.environ.get("OIDC_ISSUER_URL"),
+        "category": "OIDC",
+        "is_encrypted": False,
+    },
+    {
+        "key": "OIDC_CLIENT_ID",
+        "value": os.environ.get("OIDC_CLIENT_ID"),
+        "category": "OIDC",
+        "is_encrypted": False,
+    },
+    {
+        "key": "OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET",
+        "value": os.environ.get("OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET"),
+        "category": "OIDC",
+        "is_encrypted": True,
+    },
+    # Label shown on the sign-in button. The provider is generic, so the instance
+    # admin names it after their own IdP ("Okta", "Entra ID", "Keycloak").
+    {
+        "key": "OIDC_PROVIDER_NAME",
+        "value": os.environ.get("OIDC_PROVIDER_NAME", "SSO"),
+        "category": "OIDC",
+        "is_encrypted": False,
+    },
+    # Escape hatch for IdPs that do not emit email_verified (Entra ID commonly
+    # omits it). Setting this to "1" trusts the provider to only assert addresses
+    # it has verified — see the comment in provider/oauth/oidc.py.
+    {
+        "key": "OIDC_ALLOW_UNVERIFIED_EMAIL",
+        "value": os.environ.get("OIDC_ALLOW_UNVERIFIED_EMAIL", "0"),
+        "category": "OIDC",
+        "is_encrypted": False,
+    },
+    {
+        "key": "ENABLE_OIDC_SYNC",
+        "value": os.environ.get("ENABLE_OIDC_SYNC", "0"),
+        "category": "OIDC",
+        "is_encrypted": False,
+    },
+]
+
 core_config_variables = [
     *authentication_config_variables,
     *workspace_management_config_variables,
@@ -257,6 +307,7 @@
     *github_config_variables,
     *gitlab_config_variables,
     *gitea_config_variables,
+    *oidc_config_variables,
     *smtp_config_variables,
     *llm_config_variables,
     *unsplash_config_variables,
diff --git a/apps/space/helpers/authentication.helper.tsx b/apps/space/helpers/authentication.helper.tsx
index 6e11d61bd02..54618405975 100644
--- a/apps/space/helpers/authentication.helper.tsx
+++ b/apps/space/helpers/authentication.helper.tsx
@@ -65,6 +65,11 @@ export enum EAuthenticationErrorCodes {
   GOOGLE_OAUTH_PROVIDER_ERROR = "5115",
   GITHUB_OAUTH_PROVIDER_ERROR = "5120",
   GITLAB_OAUTH_PROVIDER_ERROR = "5121",
+  // OIDC
+  OIDC_NOT_CONFIGURED = "5113",
+  OIDC_OAUTH_PROVIDER_ERROR = "5114",
+  OIDC_INVALID_ID_TOKEN = "5116",
+  OAUTH_PROVIDER_UNVERIFIED_EMAIL = "5124",
   // Reset Password
   INVALID_PASSWORD_TOKEN = "5125",
   EXPIRED_PASSWORD_TOKEN = "5130",
@@ -262,6 +267,25 @@ const errorCodeMessages: {
     message: () => `GitLab OAuth provider error. Please try again.`,
   },
 
+  // OIDC
+  [EAuthenticationErrorCodes.OIDC_NOT_CONFIGURED]: {
+    title: `OIDC not configured`,
+    message: () => `OIDC not configured. Please contact your administrator.`,
+  },
+  [EAuthenticationErrorCodes.OIDC_OAUTH_PROVIDER_ERROR]: {
+    title: `OIDC provider error`,
+    message: () => `OIDC provider error. Please try again.`,
+  },
+  [EAuthenticationErrorCodes.OIDC_INVALID_ID_TOKEN]: {
+    title: `Sign in could not be verified`,
+    message: () => `We could not verify the response from your identity provider. Please try again.`,
+  },
+  [EAuthenticationErrorCodes.OAUTH_PROVIDER_UNVERIFIED_EMAIL]: {
+    title: `Email address not verified`,
+    message: () =>
+      `Your identity provider has not verified this email address. Please verify it with your provider, or contact your administrator.`,
+  },
+
   // Reset Password
   [EAuthenticationErrorCodes.INVALID_PASSWORD_TOKEN]: {
     title: `Invalid password token`,
@@ -376,6 +400,10 @@ export const authErrorHandler = (errorCode: EAuthenticationErrorCodes, email?: s
     EAuthenticationErrorCodes.GOOGLE_OAUTH_PROVIDER_ERROR,
     EAuthenticationErrorCodes.GITHUB_OAUTH_PROVIDER_ERROR,
     EAuthenticationErrorCodes.GITLAB_OAUTH_PROVIDER_ERROR,
+    EAuthenticationErrorCodes.OIDC_NOT_CONFIGURED,
+    EAuthenticationErrorCodes.OIDC_OAUTH_PROVIDER_ERROR,
+    EAuthenticationErrorCodes.OIDC_INVALID_ID_TOKEN,
+    EAuthenticationErrorCodes.OAUTH_PROVIDER_UNVERIFIED_EMAIL,
     EAuthenticationErrorCodes.INVALID_PASSWORD_TOKEN,
     EAuthenticationErrorCodes.EXPIRED_PASSWORD_TOKEN,
     EAuthenticationErrorCodes.INCORRECT_OLD_PASSWORD,
diff --git a/apps/space/hooks/oauth/core.tsx b/apps/space/hooks/oauth/core.tsx
index 0a2f915cf24..954490bb547 100644
--- a/apps/space/hooks/oauth/core.tsx
+++ b/apps/space/hooks/oauth/core.tsx
@@ -4,6 +4,8 @@
  * See the LICENSE file for details.
  */
 
+// icons
+import { ShieldCheck } from "lucide-react";
 // plane imports
 import { useSearchParams } from "next/navigation";
 import { useTheme } from "next-themes";
@@ -33,7 +35,8 @@ export const useCoreOAuthConfig = (oauthActionText: string): TOAuthConfigs => {
       (config?.is_google_enabled ||
         config?.is_github_enabled ||
         config?.is_gitlab_enabled ||
-        config?.is_gitea_enabled)) ||
+        config?.is_gitea_enabled ||
+        config?.is_oidc_enabled)) ||
     false;
   const oAuthOptions: TOAuthOption[] = [
     {
@@ -87,6 +90,26 @@ export const useCoreOAuthConfig = (oauthActionText: string): TOAuthConfigs => {
       },
       enabled: config?.is_gitea_enabled,
     },
+    {
+      id: "oidc",
+      // The provider is generic, so the button carries whatever the instance admin
+      // named their IdP rather than a hardcoded vendor.
+      text: `${oauthActionText} with ${config?.oidc_provider_name || "SSO"}`,
+      icon: <ShieldCheck className="h-[18px] w-[18px] text-tertiary" />,
+      onClick: () => {
+        // Encoded, unlike the providers above: useSearchParams() hands back a decoded
+        // value, so a next_path containing ? & or # would otherwise split into extra
+        // query parameters. The server decodes it again before validating.
+        // The Spaces endpoints, unlike the providers above which all point at the
+        // /app ones. Those log the user in with is_app=True and land them on the web
+        // app rather than back on Spaces; /auth/spaces/oidc/ uses the Spaces session
+        // keys, its own callback, and returns to SPACE_BASE_URL.
+        window.location.assign(
+          `${API_BASE_URL}/auth/spaces/oidc/${next_path ? `?next_path=${encodeURIComponent(next_path)}` : ``}`
+        );
+      },
+      enabled: config?.is_oidc_enabled,
+    },
   ];
 
   return {
diff --git a/apps/web/core/hooks/oauth/core.tsx b/apps/web/core/hooks/oauth/core.tsx
index 4f7dfab8932..193136270c9 100644
--- a/apps/web/core/hooks/oauth/core.tsx
+++ b/apps/web/core/hooks/oauth/core.tsx
@@ -4,6 +4,8 @@
  * See the LICENSE file for details.
  */
 
+// icons
+import { ShieldCheck } from "lucide-react";
 // plane imports
 import { useSearchParams } from "next/navigation";
 import { useTheme } from "next-themes";
@@ -33,7 +35,8 @@ export const useCoreOAuthConfig = (oauthActionText: string): TOAuthConfigs => {
       (config?.is_google_enabled ||
         config?.is_github_enabled ||
         config?.is_gitlab_enabled ||
-        config?.is_gitea_enabled)) ||
+        config?.is_gitea_enabled ||
+        config?.is_oidc_enabled)) ||
     false;
   const oAuthOptions: TOAuthOption[] = [
     {
@@ -87,6 +90,22 @@ export const useCoreOAuthConfig = (oauthActionText: string): TOAuthConfigs => {
       },
       enabled: config?.is_gitea_enabled,
     },
+    {
+      id: "oidc",
+      // The provider is generic, so the button carries whatever the instance admin
+      // named their IdP rather than a hardcoded vendor.
+      text: `${oauthActionText} with ${config?.oidc_provider_name || "SSO"}`,
+      icon: <ShieldCheck className="h-[18px] w-[18px] text-tertiary" />,
+      onClick: () => {
+        // Encoded, unlike the providers above: useSearchParams() hands back a decoded
+        // value, so a next_path containing ? & or # would otherwise split into extra
+        // query parameters. The server decodes it again before validating.
+        window.location.assign(
+          `${API_BASE_URL}/auth/oidc/${next_path ? `?next_path=${encodeURIComponent(next_path)}` : ``}`
+        );
+      },
+      enabled: config?.is_oidc_enabled,
+    },
   ];
 
   return {
diff --git a/apps/web/helpers/authentication.helper.tsx b/apps/web/helpers/authentication.helper.tsx
index 977f0940625..b3460b22e59 100644
--- a/apps/web/helpers/authentication.helper.tsx
+++ b/apps/web/helpers/authentication.helper.tsx
@@ -79,6 +79,11 @@ export enum EAuthenticationErrorCodes {
   GOOGLE_OAUTH_PROVIDER_ERROR = "5115",
   GITHUB_OAUTH_PROVIDER_ERROR = "5120",
   GITLAB_OAUTH_PROVIDER_ERROR = "5121",
+  // OIDC
+  OIDC_NOT_CONFIGURED = "5113",
+  OIDC_OAUTH_PROVIDER_ERROR = "5114",
+  OIDC_INVALID_ID_TOKEN = "5116",
+  OAUTH_PROVIDER_UNVERIFIED_EMAIL = "5124",
   // Reset Password
   INVALID_PASSWORD_TOKEN = "5125",
   EXPIRED_PASSWORD_TOKEN = "5130",
@@ -288,6 +293,25 @@ const errorCodeMessages: {
     message: () => `GitLab OAuth provider error. Please try again.`,
   },
 
+  // OIDC
+  [EAuthenticationErrorCodes.OIDC_NOT_CONFIGURED]: {
+    title: `OIDC not configured`,
+    message: () => `OIDC not configured. Please contact your administrator.`,
+  },
+  [EAuthenticationErrorCodes.OIDC_OAUTH_PROVIDER_ERROR]: {
+    title: `OIDC provider error`,
+    message: () => `OIDC provider error. Please try again.`,
+  },
+  [EAuthenticationErrorCodes.OIDC_INVALID_ID_TOKEN]: {
+    title: `Sign in could not be verified`,
+    message: () => `We could not verify the response from your identity provider. Please try again.`,
+  },
+  [EAuthenticationErrorCodes.OAUTH_PROVIDER_UNVERIFIED_EMAIL]: {
+    title: `Email address not verified`,
+    message: () =>
+      `Your identity provider has not verified this email address. Please verify it with your provider, or contact your administrator.`,
+  },
+
   // Reset Password
   [EAuthenticationErrorCodes.INVALID_PASSWORD_TOKEN]: {
     title: `Invalid password token`,
@@ -414,6 +438,10 @@ export const authErrorHandler = (errorCode: EAuthenticationErrorCodes, email?: s
     EAuthenticationErrorCodes.GOOGLE_OAUTH_PROVIDER_ERROR,
     EAuthenticationErrorCodes.GITHUB_OAUTH_PROVIDER_ERROR,
     EAuthenticationErrorCodes.GITLAB_OAUTH_PROVIDER_ERROR,
+    EAuthenticationErrorCodes.OIDC_NOT_CONFIGURED,
+    EAuthenticationErrorCodes.OIDC_OAUTH_PROVIDER_ERROR,
+    EAuthenticationErrorCodes.OIDC_INVALID_ID_TOKEN,
+    EAuthenticationErrorCodes.OAUTH_PROVIDER_UNVERIFIED_EMAIL,
     EAuthenticationErrorCodes.INVALID_PASSWORD_TOKEN,
     EAuthenticationErrorCodes.EXPIRED_PASSWORD_TOKEN,
     EAuthenticationErrorCodes.INCORRECT_OLD_PASSWORD,
diff --git a/packages/constants/src/auth/core.ts b/packages/constants/src/auth/core.ts
index a6a26c69f33..4a428db7dd5 100644
--- a/packages/constants/src/auth/core.ts
+++ b/packages/constants/src/auth/core.ts
@@ -13,4 +13,5 @@ export const CORE_LOGIN_MEDIUM_LABELS: Record<TCoreLoginMediums, string> = {
   gitlab: "GitLab",
   google: "Google",
   gitea: "Gitea",
+  oidc: "OIDC",
 };
diff --git a/packages/constants/src/auth/index.ts b/packages/constants/src/auth/index.ts
index 9d29181f0b6..f35580ed873 100644
--- a/packages/constants/src/auth/index.ts
+++ b/packages/constants/src/auth/index.ts
@@ -146,6 +146,11 @@ export enum EAuthErrorCodes {
   GOOGLE_OAUTH_PROVIDER_ERROR = "5115",
   GITHUB_OAUTH_PROVIDER_ERROR = "5120",
   GITLAB_OAUTH_PROVIDER_ERROR = "5121",
+  // OIDC
+  OIDC_NOT_CONFIGURED = "5113",
+  OIDC_OAUTH_PROVIDER_ERROR = "5114",
+  OIDC_INVALID_ID_TOKEN = "5116",
+  OAUTH_PROVIDER_UNVERIFIED_EMAIL = "5124",
   // Reset Password
   INVALID_PASSWORD_TOKEN = "5125",
   EXPIRED_PASSWORD_TOKEN = "5130",
diff --git a/packages/types/src/instance/auth.ts b/packages/types/src/instance/auth.ts
index f3566b291f7..83d6acd472f 100644
--- a/packages/types/src/instance/auth.ts
+++ b/packages/types/src/instance/auth.ts
@@ -10,7 +10,8 @@ export type TCoreInstanceAuthenticationModeKeys =
   | "google"
   | "github"
   | "gitlab"
-  | "gitea";
+  | "gitea"
+  | "oidc";
 
 export type TInstanceAuthenticationModeKeys = TCoreInstanceAuthenticationModeKeys;
 
@@ -31,7 +32,8 @@ export type TInstanceAuthenticationMethodKeys =
   | "IS_GOOGLE_ENABLED"
   | "IS_GITHUB_ENABLED"
   | "IS_GITLAB_ENABLED"
-  | "IS_GITEA_ENABLED";
+  | "IS_GITEA_ENABLED"
+  | "IS_OIDC_ENABLED";
 
 export type TInstanceGoogleAuthenticationConfigurationKeys =
   | "GOOGLE_CLIENT_ID"
@@ -56,11 +58,20 @@ export type TInstanceGiteaAuthenticationConfigurationKeys =
   | "GITEA_CLIENT_SECRET"
   | "ENABLE_GITEA_SYNC";
 
+export type TInstanceOIDCAuthenticationConfigurationKeys =
+  | "OIDC_ISSUER_URL"
+  | "OIDC_CLIENT_ID"
+  | "OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET"
+  | "OIDC_PROVIDER_NAME"
+  | "OIDC_ALLOW_UNVERIFIED_EMAIL"
+  | "ENABLE_OIDC_SYNC";
+
 export type TInstanceAuthenticationConfigurationKeys =
   | TInstanceGoogleAuthenticationConfigurationKeys
   | TInstanceGithubAuthenticationConfigurationKeys
   | TInstanceGitlabAuthenticationConfigurationKeys
-  | TInstanceGiteaAuthenticationConfigurationKeys;
+  | TInstanceGiteaAuthenticationConfigurationKeys
+  | TInstanceOIDCAuthenticationConfigurationKeys;
 
 export type TInstanceAuthenticationKeys = TInstanceAuthenticationMethodKeys | TInstanceAuthenticationConfigurationKeys;
 
@@ -83,4 +94,4 @@ export type TOAuthConfigs = {
   oAuthOptions: TOAuthOption[];
 };
 
-export type TCoreLoginMediums = "email" | "magic-code" | "github" | "gitlab" | "google" | "gitea";
+export type TCoreLoginMediums = "email" | "magic-code" | "github" | "gitlab" | "google" | "gitea" | "oidc";
diff --git a/packages/types/src/instance/base.ts b/packages/types/src/instance/base.ts
index 493067c9bdf..98217c4de17 100644
--- a/packages/types/src/instance/base.ts
+++ b/packages/types/src/instance/base.ts
@@ -51,6 +51,9 @@ export interface IInstanceConfig {
   is_github_enabled: boolean;
   is_gitlab_enabled: boolean;
   is_gitea_enabled: boolean;
+  is_oidc_enabled: boolean;
+  // Label for the OIDC sign-in button; the provider is generic so the admin names it.
+  oidc_provider_name: string | undefined;
   is_magic_login_enabled: boolean;
   is_email_password_enabled: boolean;
   github_app_name: string | undefined;
diff --git a/packages/utils/src/auth.ts b/packages/utils/src/auth.ts
index cd0646af012..7f18c0b7472 100644
--- a/packages/utils/src/auth.ts
+++ b/packages/utils/src/auth.ts
@@ -228,6 +228,24 @@ const errorCodeMessages: {
     title: `GitLab OAuth provider error`,
     message: () => `GitLab OAuth provider error. Please try again.`,
   },
+  // OIDC
+  [EAuthErrorCodes.OIDC_NOT_CONFIGURED]: {
+    title: `OIDC not configured`,
+    message: () => `OIDC not configured. Please contact your administrator.`,
+  },
+  [EAuthErrorCodes.OIDC_OAUTH_PROVIDER_ERROR]: {
+    title: `OIDC provider error`,
+    message: () => `OIDC provider error. Please try again.`,
+  },
+  [EAuthErrorCodes.OIDC_INVALID_ID_TOKEN]: {
+    title: `Sign in could not be verified`,
+    message: () => `We could not verify the response from your identity provider. Please try again.`,
+  },
+  [EAuthErrorCodes.OAUTH_PROVIDER_UNVERIFIED_EMAIL]: {
+    title: `Email address not verified`,
+    message: () =>
+      `Your identity provider has not verified this email address. Please verify it with your provider, or contact your administrator.`,
+  },
   // Reset Password
   [EAuthErrorCodes.INVALID_PASSWORD_TOKEN]: {
     title: `Invalid password token`,
@@ -340,6 +358,10 @@ export const authErrorHandler = (errorCode: EAuthErrorCodes, email?: string): TA
     EAuthErrorCodes.GOOGLE_OAUTH_PROVIDER_ERROR,
     EAuthErrorCodes.GITHUB_OAUTH_PROVIDER_ERROR,
     EAuthErrorCodes.GITLAB_OAUTH_PROVIDER_ERROR,
+    EAuthErrorCodes.OIDC_NOT_CONFIGURED,
+    EAuthErrorCodes.OIDC_OAUTH_PROVIDER_ERROR,
+    EAuthErrorCodes.OIDC_INVALID_ID_TOKEN,
+    EAuthErrorCodes.OAUTH_PROVIDER_UNVERIFIED_EMAIL,
     EAuthErrorCodes.INVALID_PASSWORD_TOKEN,
     EAuthErrorCodes.EXPIRED_PASSWORD_TOKEN,
     EAuthErrorCodes.INCORRECT_OLD_PASSWORD,